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Abstract 
This thesis examines the cost and alternative profit efficiency of a sample of Algerian, Moroccan 
and Tunisian banks over the financial liberalisation period 1994-2001. The translog functional 
form and intermediation approach are employed in this study to derive inefficiency estimates as 
well as scale economies levels and scale inefficiencies estimates. The results show that 
inefficiencies are substantial in the three banking systems under study, with an average of 29% of 
cost inefficiency and 32% of alternative profit inefficiency. Scale economies and scale 
inefficiencies are also found to be not negligible at an average level of 46% and 9%, respectively, 
with a negative relationship between assets size class and scale economies and scale 
inefficiencies estimates. The analysis also principally reveals that; first, Moroccan and Tunisian 
banks are more cost efficient than their counterparts in Algeria, secondly, banks that are involved 
in traditional income-generating activities are more profit efficient that other banks, and thirdly, 
banking firms with mixed structures of ownership (a combination of private, public and foreign), 
or listed, are more cost and profit efficient than their counterparts with a single type of 
ownership. We suggest that the three types of ownership may combine so as to reduce various 
inefficiencies associated with single ownership types. For example, foreign ownership might 
bring new technology and updated systems of risk management, the private sector emphasises the 
profitability motive and lending to more profitable sectors, whereas government ownership 
brings experience and knowledge in the domestic market. These factors combined seem to result 
in a more efficient bank operating units than those that have sole ownership features. As our 
results seem to be very sensitive to the data used in this study, we can conclude that the cost and 
profit inefficiencies, and the substantial level of potential gains from scale economies that appear 
to prevail in North African banking, we argue, are likely to reflect the still limited presence of 
competitive pressures in the banking systems under study. We conclude that inefficient banks in 
North African countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) continue to exist because they have been 
(or still) protected, especially as we know that the largest banks are typically State-owned or have 
major state shareholders. 
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Chapter 1 Background, Objectives, 
Methodology and Structure of the Study 
1-1 Introduction 
The three North African countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have witnessed 
substantial programmes of economic and financial reforms over the last two decades. 
These reforms have affected the main characteristics of the banking sector. For example, 
financial reforms have ended the prolonged period of heavy regulations and constraints 
on banking sector activities. 
During the period of financial regulation and repression from the 1960s to the early 
1990s, the central planning systems of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia were exploited by 
planning officials to channel government-owned funds to government-owned enterprises, 
labelled as the "Secteur Public". Within this system, the government imposed 
administrative fixing procedures on lending and deposit interest rates, which for most of 
this period, were either negative or below real market rates. In addition, the banking 
sector suffered from the absence of necessary instruments for credit risk management, 
which are well used in market-based banking systems. Lending and borrowing decisions 
were made by officials outside the banking sector, usually by political supervisors and/or 
party officials, which increased the likelihood of corruption and misconduct. The Secteur 
Public utilised banking funds to finance its planned projects, which in most cases, 
prioritised social objectives over promoting economic efficiency. This behaviour has 
resulted in a large numbers of insolvent government-owned enterprises as well as the 
emergence of substantial nonperforming loans in the banking sectors under study over 
the last two decades. 
Since the early 1990s, the banking sectors of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have 
experienced, to varying degrees, financial liberalisation programmes. This involves the 
transference of the banking systems from a government-controlled to a more market- 
based system characterised by greater rates of competition. This is achieved by 
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increasing the presence of private and foreign-owned banks, reducing the size of 
government-owned banks, and eventually fully privatising these banks. Nowadays in the 
three financial systems under study, interest rates are liberalised and the administrative 
allocations of credit according to the French style I'encadrement du Credit have been 
discontinued. Under the centrally planned-based banking system, banks were performing 
inefficiently, due to the non-market allocation of credits and the heavy social functions 
they performed. Social objectives were placed ahead of economic objectives. As such, 
one would expect that after experiencing various liberalisation programmes, the banking 
systems of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia should have benefited from improved 
efficiency of operations. 
1-2 Objectives of the Study 
The primary objective of this thesis therefore, is to assess the cost and profit efficiency of 
banking firms in the three North African countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
using a dataset covering the period from 1994 to 2001. The thesis aims to determine the 
main factors that influence bank cost and profit efficiency in the three countries, and to 
see whether the liberalisation programmes in the countries have actually resulted in 
improved banking sector efficiency. Finally, the investigation of cost and profit 
efficiency addresses the question as to whether bank management have been able to 
control expenses and generate revenues at the best practice level. If banks are found to be 
inefficient, this suggests that bank management have failed to organise their institution to 
the level occupied by the best practice banks. Bank management might have used too 
many input to produce the same amount of outputs, compared to the best practice firms, 
and/or bank management might have not utilised the optimal or best practice level of 
input/output combination in the light of input prices. Also, bank managers might have 
failed to develop efficient credit risk management skills, due either to the absence of a 
recognised risk management approach, or they might have been denied making optimal 
decisions due to interferences from their owners or political pressures. 
The second main objective of this study is to examine whether financial liberalisation 
measures have affected cost and profit efficiency of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia's 
banking sectors. Financial deregulation, in the form of allowing foreign and private 
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banks to invest domestically, and discontinuing the utilisation of administrative interest 
rates and allocation of credits, was expected to result in the banking sectors in the three 
countries to operate under increasing levels of competition. When competition was 
denied under the central planning system, banking firms were compulsorily lending 
money to underperforming government-owned sectors. One might expect that this 
situation would lead banks to have low levels of cost and profit efficiency. Also, 
economic conditions are believed to have important impact on bank efficiency. Lozano- 
Vivas (2000) compares bank cost efficiency between Spain and France, and finds that 
country macroeconomic conditions represent an important factor in the process of 
determination of bank cost and profit efficiency. The relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions and banking sector performance and efficiency are also 
addressed on this thesis. 
Overall, this study undertakes a detailed comparison of bank cost and profit efficiency 
levels in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. These three countries are key members of the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which intends to form a political and economic union 
similar to that of the EU. This thesis will investigate the evolution of cost and profit 
efficiency, particularly in terms of bank assets size and for different types of banks to see 
if size or ownership types have substantially different efficiency levels. 
1-3 The structure of the Study 
The structure of this thesis is organised as follows; 
Chapter 1 introduces the main objective of the thesis, and outlines the structure of the 
study. 
Second, Chapter 2 reviews the main characteristics of the Algerian, Moroccan and 
Tunisian economies. While the Algerian economy relied strongly on the hydrocarbon 
sector, the Moroccan and Tunisian economies are more diversified with the agricultural, 
services and light industrial sectors. Also, Chapter 2 overviews the political economy of 
the three countries in the Central Planning era, and economic reforms are also indicated. 
Third, Chapter 3 reviews the main characteristics of the banking sectors in the three 
countries. Particular focus will be oriented towards size, ownership, and banking 
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penetration. Financial liberalisation measures are also reviewed including the 
deregulation of interest rates, the elimination of constraints on allocating credits, and the 
permission of private and foreign-owned banks to function in the domestic banking 
systems. 
Fourth, Chapter 4 introduces the theoretical framework of the concept of bank efficiency. 
The chapter provides a conceptional framework of cost and profit efficiency and its type. 
Also, the chapter presents the main methodological approaches that are extensively used 
to model cost and profit efficiency, which are the parametric approaches and the non- 
parametric approaches. In addition, the main approaches employed to define output and 
input variables used in the modelling process, the intermediary and production 
approaches, will be provided in Chapter 4. 
Fifth, Chapter 5 reviews a number of previous studies that investigated cost and profit 
efficiency in US banking, European banking and transition banking systems. 
Sixth, Chapter 6 presents the methodology, data, inputs and outputs' variables definition 
and the results of this study. The methodology used in this study is the stochastic frontier 
approach with the translog function specification. The dataset includes 287 observations 
for a sample of 50 banking and financial firms that functioned in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia during the period 1994-2001. Using the intermediation approach, three output 
variables are used, loans, other performing assets and off-balance sheet items, and three 
inputs variables, deposits, labour and physical assets. The results are presented according 
to size, country location, ownership and bank type. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the main findings of the study along side with the implication 
of the results. Also, the chapter includes the main limitations and difficulties encountered 
while carrying out the current research. 
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Chapter 2 Structural Characteristics of the 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia Economies 
2-1 Introduction 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have experienced features of political, social and 
economic distortions in the post independence State-interventionist era, reflected in 
imbalances in macro-economic, financial and other indictors, including low and 
sometimes negative economic growth rates. The three countries' governments recognised 
the inevitable need to correct these distortions by embarking upon a major transformation 
of their economies through the implementation of a wide range of fundamental reforms 
compatible with the principles of creating freer market-based economies. These reforms, 
in the form of economic liberalisation and financial deregulation, have obtained 
significant technical support and financial assistance from major international financial 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The relative disparity in the speed, 
timing and breadth of the reforms in the three countries, has resulted in different effects 
of these policy actions on the respective local markets. 
One main objective of economic and financial liberalisation is to create an appropriate 
regulatory framework together with encouraging macro-economic conditions, so as to 
diminish the instability of the economy, and to improve the role of the local financial 
system in the economy. Pesola (2001) states that a stable financial system is significantly 
associated with a strong macro-economic environment, including a sound course of 
economic growth. Economic liberalisation and financial deregulation also aim to create 
an environment conducive to the reduction in cost and profit inefficiencies in the banking 
and financial sectors. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), for instance, recognise that 
macro-economic conditions seem to partly explain the efficiency of banks. The more 
favourable the country-specific economic conditions are the greater the improvements in 
the efficiency of the banking sector. 
The present chapter examines the main structural economic characteristics of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia and the changes that have taken place over recent decades. Over 
the last twenty years, the three countries have implemented a series of economic and 
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financial reforms that have led to a reshaping of their economies. First, the chapter will 
present the geographical, demographic and social characteristics of the three countries. 
Second, the chapter will explore the main economic trends that occurred over the period 
prior to the economic and financial liberalisation reforms. The chapter will focus on 
assessing the consequences of the main economic liberalisation measures that were 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. The investigation of the financial systems and the 
financial liberalisation measures in the three countries are discussed afterwards in 
Chapter 3. 
2-2 Overall Description 
2-2-1 Geographic Location 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are located in the North Western corner of Africa and the 
South West of the Mediterranean basin. The three countries constitute the main key 
members of the Arab Maghreb' Union organisation (AMU) created in 1989, which also 
includes Libya and Mauritania. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia occupy a total surface area 
of more than three million square kilometres, in which Algeria takes up about 70%, and 
nearly a quarter of the total surface area of North Africa and the Middle East countries 
(MENA, IMP, 2000)2. The three countries are bordered by Libya from the east, Western 
Sahara3, Mauritania, Niger and Mali from the south, the Atlantic Ocean from the west, 
and the Mediterranean Sea from the north. 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the geographic location of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and the 
region of the Maghreb as a whole. As it can be seen, the three Maghreb countries are 
located in a historically vital geo-strategic location as they intersect between Europe from 
the north, the Middle East from the east and the Sub-Sahara Africa from the south. Over 
history, the Maghreb region always attracted foreign invaders. For instance, while the 
Colonial France used the region as a departure point to penetrate the African continent; 
' Maghreb is the Arabic word for West. 2 "Middle East and North Africa countries (MENA)" is a new appellation for Arab-speaking countries that 
are members of the Arab League Organisation based at Cairo. The acronym MENA was introduced in 
early 1990s at the Peace Conference in Egypt. MENA is also applied to Maghreb (West) and Mashriq 
(East) countries. 
3 The territory of Western Sahara is not a member of the UMA. This territory is still under dispute between 
Morocco and the Algeria-backed Sahraoui dissident group "Polisario". Morocco claims that the Western 
Sahara territory is historically part of its national sovereignty. 
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Muslim Arabs used the region as a base to invade West Africa and Europe through 
Spain. 
In terms of natural resources and strategic economic capacities, the geography occupied 
by the three Maghreb countries is rich in hydrocarbons and minerals, especially gas and 
oil reserves in Algeria and Phosphate in Morocco and Tunisia, a long coast facing the 
Mediterranean Basin and the Atlantic Ocean, the two ranges of the Atlas Mountains, and 
spectacular tourism locations in both the southern desert and the northern and western 
coast. Also, the three countries embrace nearly a third of the total MENA countries 
forests. Despite the natural wealth of the Maghreb region, especially in Algeria, the 
World Bank has always classified the three countries as `developing' countries that 
belong to the lower-middle income economies (World Bank Report, 2001)4. Table 2-1 
summarises a number of geographic and environmental characteristics of the three 
countries over the years 1997 and 2000, while Figure 2-1 shows the geographical 
location of the Maghreb region. 
Table 2-1: The Geographic and environmental characteristics of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia and MENA Countries 
Year 1997 2000 
Countries MENA Algeria Morocco Tunisia MENA Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Surface area (million Sq. 
Km) 11.1 2.1 0.447 0.164 11.1 2.1 0.447 0.164 
Forests (million Sq. Km) - - - - 1.676 0.214 0.302 0.051 Deforestation (average 
annual % 1990-2000) -0.1 -1.3 0.00 -0.2 
CO2 emissions (metric 3 7 4 3 1 1 1 8 - - - ton per Capita) . . . . - 
Access to improved water 
resource (% of total - - - - 88.2 89.0 80.0 80.0 
population) 
Access to improved 
sanitation (% of urban - - - - 93.9 99.0 86.0 96.0 
population) 
Energy use per Capita 
(Kg of oil equivalent) 
1,264.90 895.7 333.6 751.6 1,368.30 956.4 358.6 824.8 
Electricity use per Capita 
(K. watt) 
1,21800 523.2 422.7 783 1,345.80 611.9 447.2 938.9 
Source: World Development Indicators Database, Apn12003. 
MINA: M ddle East and North African countries. 
` See White (2001) for more details about lower-middle income economies characteristics. 
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Figure 2-1: The Geography of Maghreb 
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White (2001) asserts that in the broader context of comparison to other countries and to 
other regions, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia exhibit similar identical, historical, social 
and political characteristics. As the vast majority of the people follow Islam and speak 
Arabic, Arabs and Berbers5, the original population of North Africa, are the main ethnic 
components of the population in the three countries6. These similarities have created a 
sense of unity and community', widely and remarkably seen during the independence 
The Berber communities include mainly Kahyle, Chaouia, Mizab and Touarag in Algeria and Tarifit 
Tamazight and Tachalhit in Morocco (Vermeren, 2002). 
6 Due to historical events related to decolonisation process in the fifties and sixties and the creation of 
Israel. Maghribi Jewish and Christians are tenuous minorities in Morocco and Tunisia, but they could 
hardly be present in Algeria. 
The Solidarity of Maghrebi countries was well seen during the independence war in Algeria. Algerian 
fighters used Tunisia and (intensively) Morocco to transport logistic aid. 
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war in Algeria. In addition, historically imposed unification has further linked the three 
countries particularly under the rule of the Romans and Islamic dynasties. Over history, 
the three countries were relatively colonised and ruled by the same power including the 
Romans, Arab Muslims, Turks8, and finally the French. 
One major event in the post-independence? era of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia is the 
formation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) organisation. For the first time in modem 
history, the heads of state of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia met in 
June 1988 in Ziralda, Algeria, to discuss potential economic and political cooperation. In 
February 1989, the same five heads of state re-met in Marrakech, Morocco, and signed 
the "Traite de Marrakech" announcing the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
(El-Moujahid, February 1989). Darrat and Pennathur (2002) state that the AMU aimed at 
achieving objectives similar to those of the European Union (EU) and North American 
Free-Trade agreement (NAFTA), including coordinating economic policy between the 
state members and strengthening economic and financial linkage across all economic 
sectors. 
According to the "Traite de Marrakech', the AMU has three main objectives; first, 
strengthening the fraternity relations between the members states and people and 
defending their rights; second, the progressive adoption of free movements of people, 
goods and capital between the members; and finally, the implementation of common and 
coherent policies in economic and political affairs in order to drive the countries 
members to a fully integrated single market. The AMU intended to follow the example of 
the European Union (EU) to bring the five countries together, therefore, with full 
economic and institutional political integration. One practical measure implemented by 
the Union was the free movement of people and goods by removing the imposition of 
visa requirements, which has resulted in more than three million people having moved 
between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia over the period from 1989 to 1994. 
8 The Ottoman Turks did not formally occupy Morocco. 9 Post independence era starts from the day of independence from the France until present Algeria 
obtained its independence from France in 1962, while Morocco and Tunisia obtained their independence in 
1956. 
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However, since 1994, the integration process has been slow and often static and the 
situation at present (2004) is still a long way from an integrated Single Maghrebi market. 
Political disputes between the countries, in particular Algeria and Morocco, can explain 
this lack of movement towards further integration. In August 1994, Morocco imposed a 
unilateral temporary cessation of the Union as a result of the "Meurtres de Marrakech" 
incident. A number of armed Franco-Algerian extremists attacked "Hotel Atlas Asm" in 
Marrakech killing a number of tourists (le Monde, 25th August 2003). The Moroccan 
Government subsequently accused Algerian Intelligence Services of being implicated 
and took restricting measures including the re-imposition of visa entry requirements on 
Algerian citizens wishing to travel to Morocco. The Algerian Government replied by 
imposing similar restrictions on Moroccan citizens wishing to travel to Algeria, and 
further, the Algerian Government retaliated by closing the frontiers between Algeria and 
Morocco1° (Le Monde, 314 August 1994). The consequence of this unpredictable 
incident was a massive decline in Algerian visitors to Morocco". Overall, although a 
number of agreements have since been signed, Vermeren (2002) contends that security 
and political instability in Algeria and the dispute over Western Sahara between Algeria 
and Morocco remain the main obstacles to developing further integration in the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU). 
2-2-3 The Demographic Characteristics of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia 
As of the end of 2001, the total population of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia was 
estimated at seventy million people. Algeria has the largest population with about thirty- 
one million people, followed by Morocco (29.2 million) and Tunisia (9.7 million). The 
population of the three countries is approximately the same size as Egypt and less than 
one tenth of Africa's population (World Bank Statistics, April 2003). One important 
demographic feature of the countries under study is the over-representation of the 
10 The frontiers between Algeria and Morocco and Visa requirements were valid until the 30/072004. King 
of Morocco Mohamed VI decided unilaterally to lift visa requirements on Algerian nationals. The Algerian 
Government welcomed this initiative but refused to do the same for Moroccan nationals. The Algerian 
Government thinks that imposing or lifting visa requirements is unilatellay taken by the Moroccan 
Government, and this is considered as a manoeuvre to influence the Algerian official position towards the 
Cause of Western Sahara (Liberate, 31/072004). 
11 In 1992, around 1.66 million Algerian visited Morocco; the number fell to 13 thousand in 1995. 
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younger age groups as more than 60% of the total population are under the age of 30 
years. Table 2-2 accommodates selected data on the demographic characteristics of 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in comparison to MENA region countries. Table Al-1, 
Table Al 2, Table Al-3 and Table A1-4 in Appendix Al display various other statistics 
about the populations of the three countries under study including education, health and 
population indicators. 
Table 2-2: A number of demographic characteristics of Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Countries 
Year 1997 2001 
Countries MENA Algeria Morocco Tunisia MENA Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Total Population (million) 278.4 29.0 27.3 9.2 300.6 30.8 29.2 9.6 
Population growth (%) 20 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.2 
Life expectancy (years) 66.8 70.1 66.6 71.9 68.2 70.6 68.0 72.4 
Fertility rate (birth per 3.7 3.5 3.1 2.4 3 3 9 2 2.8 21 
woman) . . 
Infant mortality rate (per 49.1 40.0 47 27.6 43 6 39 0 39 0 21.0 1,000 live births) . . . 
Child immunisation, 
measles (% of under 12 88.3 92.0 92.0 92.00 92.3 96.0 83.0 92.00 
months) 
Total illiteracy (% of 15 
years old and above) 
39.6 37.1 54.0 32.8 35.5 32.2 50.2 27.9 
Female illiteracy (% of 15 
years old and above 
51.4 47.5 67.2 43.8 46.3 41.7 62.8 38.1 
Primary enrolment (% 
relevant age ¢rounl - - 
75.5 100.0 82.2" 61.8° 78.0' 99.2" 
Sauce: World Development lydicatoas Database, Apnl 2003, vanous pages 
* Statistics of2000. 
Table 2-2 shows that Tunisia has a relatively higher living standard than Algeria and 
Morocco, and the MENA countries overall as measured by life expectancy. The latter, 
can be considered reasonable, even though it is lower than in developed countries (which 
is higher than 74 years). 12 Also, Table 2-2 displays that adult illiteracy rates are higher in 
Morocco (50%)13 than in Algeria (30%) and Tunisia (28%), due to higher rates of female 
illiteracy. As of the end of 2001,62% of Moroccan woman aged fifteen and above were 
illiterate, while, for the same age group, 40% and 32% of Algerian and Tunisia women 
were illiterate, respectively. Most of the illiterate population in the three countries either 
12 Life expectancy in France was 79 in 2001. 
13 According to Vermeren (2002), the demographic course of the three countries is related to the 
demographic policies and woman status. For more details, read the presentation and analysis of Vermeren 
(2002. p83). 
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belong to older age groups or live in distant rural areas. Besides, Table 2-1 shows that, 
demographic growth in Tunisia is lower than in Algeria and Morocco. The low rate of 
population growth in Tunisia is viewed by White (2001) as a conspicuous outcome of the 
1957 Personnel Status Code. This code abolishes polygamy, established a minimum age 
of woman to marry, giving women the right to sign their own marriage certificate and 
gave them the right to demand divorce, to vote and to hold office. The code also might 
have helped to increase the education and literacy of women, and in turn, their inclination 
towards family planning due to their entrance into the labour force. 
2-3 Overview of the Economic Policies of 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
This section reviews the main economic policies that were implemented in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia over the period starting from the sixties. The implementation of a 
broad range of econon}ic and financial reforms in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in recent 
decades, implied that the authorities implicitly and explicitly recognised that the 
strategies of economic development and growth undertaken by then (during the 1960s, 
1970s and part of the 1980s), had not been as successful as deserved in achieving the 
quantitative objectives of economic welfare set out in various development plans. 
Overall, these earlier development strategies were based on constructing large-scale 
government-owned enterprises using the centrally planned model. The latter was adopted 
to create a modem economy that was believed to replace the economic structures 
inherited from the French colonial era. In the three countries under study, the centrally 
planned model required the governments to establish, own and manage their central 
banks and nationalise the remaining industries and companies as a symbol of economic 
self-assertion and sovereignty (Khouri, 1998). 
2-3-1 Algeria 
When Algeria declared independence from France, the country had a predominant 
agrarian economy, which was primarily serving the needs of metropolitan industries 
(Goumiri, 1993). The new Government realised this characteristic, and intended to 
execute a major change from an agrarian economy with a limited industrial base, to a 
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non-traditional economy with a heavy industrial base, by adopting the central planning 
model. On the political side, the Government in power, headed by Ben Bella and from 
1965 by the President Boumediene14, opposed multi-party democracy and imposed one 
party rule by the party of Front de Liberalisation Nationale (FLN)ls. President 
Boumediene confirmed the adoption of nationalisation, central planning and the 
industrialisation model (Aissaoui, 2001), and appointed Belaid Abdessalam as minister 
of economy and planning. They both embraced the dirigist development theory of 
"Industries Industrialisantes" or "Industrialising Industries" proposed by De Bemis16 
According to BenBitour'7 (1998) and Dolman (2000), the "Industries Industrialisantes" 
theory, was based on the total intervention of State in the economy by using external 
borrowings and oil exports revenues to construct a solid economic and industrial base. 
Aissaoui (2001) and Dillman (2000) mention that the central planning system used 
hydrocarbon revenues to finance a capital-intensive industrialisation programme within 
the State sector. Over the 1960s and 1970s, the government invested heavily in the 
industrial sector and created large state-owned enterprises using oil revenues, placing 
Algeria as one of the most Dirigist and Developmentist State in the Third World 
(Dillman, 2000). Thus, the new Algerian government intended to reduce the political, 
economic and cultural links with France (as an ex-colonial power). One practical 
measure was the substantial campaign of nationalisation of all economic sectors, 
including the hydrocarbon and financial sectors (Vermeren, 2002)18. 
la BenBella was the first president of Algeria and was in power from 1962 to 1965. On 5th June 1965, 
Boumediene, who was by then the Minister of Defence, headed a non-violent military coup against the 
president BenBella, and then declared the presidency of "the revolutionary Council" (composed of the 
main Army commanders), which was the government of Algeria from 1965 to 1976. In 1976, a new 
constitution was drawn and accepted by the People and Boumediene was elected as President in a 
referendum. He governed Algeria until he died on 28th December 1978. 
15 The Front de Liberalisation Nationale (FLN) is the organisation that led the war of independence of the 
Algerian people against the French colonial from 1954 until 1962. After the independence, the FLN was 
converted into a political party and the government used it as a heavy beaurocratic machine for populist 
fpurposes. 
The party is still operating in the current political scene in Algeria (2004). 
6 The French economist Gerard de Stanne De Bemis was lecturing at the University of Algiers. 
" Ahmed BenBitour is an economist that served as a minister of Finance (1993-1995) and as a Prime 
Minister (2000-2001). He headed (with Mourad BenAchcnhou) the official Algerian delegation to 
negotiate the external debt reschedule of with the IMF in 1993-1995, and other agreements with the IMF. 
18For more details, see Dillman (2000) who uses the Development Theory and the Rentier-State Theory to 
explain the failure of development in Algeria 
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The implementation of De Bennis' theory generated a situation where the State was 
entirely the main economic agent and social operator in the country, being both 
interventionist and monopolistic. BenBitour (1998) analyses the period from 1970 to 
1978 and observes that the Algerian central planners benefited from an encouraging 
international environment. That is, increasing amounts of hydrocarbon export revenues 
and external borrowings with lower prices supported a favourable investment rate of 45% 
in the recently established state-owned industrial sector (the public sector). BenBitour 
(1998) recognises that, by 1979, the central economy was physically in place and 
covering, at least, the main economic sectors and dominated by many large-sized 
enterprises owned by the government. One consequence of De Bemis' strategy was that 
the privately-owned sector was neglected, and even dis-encouraged by the government. 
The Government monopolised the ownership and the management of almost all 
economic sectors, and imposed a total absence of market-based instruments and 
practices, as competition, especially in the financial sector, which was entirely owned by 
the Government and was subject to heavy administrative practices (Benlssad, 1991). 
Chemingui (2000) notes that Algeria experienced high rates of economic growth 
averaging around 7% per year over the period from 1962 to 1985. The industrial sector, 
led by the upstream hydrocarbon sector, was the source of this growth, driven also by 
large amounts of government investments. In the three development plans from 1966 to 
197919, more than half of total investments were allocated towards the industrial sector 
whereas only one tenth of the total investments was allocated to the agricultural sector. 
Consequently, an important government-owned sector was gradually constructed, 
particularly, in heavy industries, external and internal trade, banking and insurance, and 
also resulting in the marginalisation of private capital. The private sector was evolving 
outside a strongly concentrated and centralised public sector, but in limited activities in 
non-strategic industries. 
Naas (2003) examines the situation of the private sector in Algeria during the first 
economic plans. He finds that the private sector was marginalised by the planning 
19 Bali (1993) mentions that Algeria experienced five major development plans: the First triennial plan 
(1968 to 1970), the first quadrennial plan (1971-1974), the second quadrennial plan (1975-1979), the first 
pentrennial plan (1980-1984), and finally the second pentrennial plan (1985-1989). 
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authorities. The Investment law of 1967, which was maintained until 1994, organised 
private investments as well as the relationship between these and Government-owned 
banking structures. As the law did not impose principles of banking domiciliation and 
specialisation, it outlawed any forms of long term credits for the non-public sector, and it 
set the allowable amount of loans to the limit of 25-30% of total investment expenses. 
The marginalisation of the private sector is clearly indicated by the share of the private 
sector in total bank loans, which was between 3-10%, whereas the share of the private 
sector in total bank deposits was between 43-50% in the 1970s. 
The death of President Boumediene in December 1978 allowed the Algerian government 
to reconsider and revise its "developmentalist"20 role in economic development and 
growth strategies. The new government headed by the President Chadli 
Benjdid21recognised that the economy needed reforming to correct the distortions 
inherited from the Boumediene's era. Tlamacani (1999) states that the President Chadli 
manufactured his range of reform measures under the term "Infitah"22 in the form of two 
five-year development plans financed by hydrocarbon revenues and external debts. 
In the first plan (1980-1984), the government focused on injecting public investments 
into non-heavy industrial sectors. For instance, the agricultural sector and infrastructures 
received an unprecedented third of total government investments, whereas the industrial 
sector received less than 40% (Bali, 1993). Furthermore, the first three-year plan stated 
the approach that the government would follow was to restructure large enterprises 
created in the sixties and seventies, which were mostly headquartered in Algiers. The 
approach consisted of scaling down every large enterprise into a number of smaller and 
medium-sized independent units with separate headquarters distributed around the 
country. The aim of this "downsizing" was to help improve the efficiency and 
performance of larger companies, and also to foster development and employment to 
other regions in Algeria. 
20 This term has been used by Vermeren (2002) to refer to the Central Planning Model. 21 President Chadli BenJdid governed Algeria from 1979 to January 1992. The Army forced him to resign 
as he allegedly showed indications of weaknesses in dealing with the Islamist party, FIS. 22 Infitah is the Arabic work for Openness. 
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In the second three-year development plan (1985-1989p, the projects and financial 
allocations did not significantly differ from those in the first. Investments in the 
agricultural sector, infrastructure and non-productive sectors were prioritised. However, 
the plan did not achieve its objectives due to a severe lack of funds. In 1986, Algeria 
sensed the shock of the twin assault of a Saudi Arabia-inspired lowering of world oil 
prices and a dramatic decline in the value of the US Dollar, the currency in which energy 
trade was transacted (ICG, 2001). Mouhoubi (1998) states that the terms of trade and 
hydrocarbon budgetary revenues declined by half, and subsequently, the government 
suffered from a budgetary deficit of a third of GDP. Aissaoui (2001) reports that exports 
earnings from hydrocarbons fell to $7.3 billion in 1986 from a peak of $14.2 billion in 
1981. The 1986 collapse affected investments and production as the level of activity in 
domestic industries substantially decreased. In parallel, the scarcity of consumption 
products emerged, consumption per capita declined, unemployment and inflation rates 
soared, which, according to Chemingui (2000), precipitated an acute and enduring social, 
economic and political crisis, culminating in civil unrest and the 1986 and 1988 riots24. 
The 1986 shock was considered as clear evidence of the sensitivity of the Algerian 
economy to international energy markets. President Chadli realised the urgent need to 
address deep-seated structural and macroeconomic stabilisation reform programmes so as 
to establish the conditions for sustainable long-term growth, contain price distortions and 
correct macro-economic imbalances (Chemingui, 2000). In parallel, president Chadli 
initiated a programme of political and constitutional reforms in favour of a multi-party 
political regime. He released political prisoners, and permitted expelled political 
opponents to return home and form opposition parties (Volpi, 2003). President Chadli 
appointed the reformist Mouloud Hamrouche as a new Prime Minister, who was in 
favour of a freer-market approach. His priority objectives were to 1) promote private 
sector development, 2) restructure public enterprises, 3) encourage agricultural reform, 4) 
develop a competitive financial sector, and 5) establish an organised labour market. 
'' This plan was not carried to its planned terms due to the 1986 shock and 1988 youth riots. 24 For more details about these riots and related events are masterfully analysed by Volpi (2003). 
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However, this programme did not come to fruition due to the dramatic political events25, 
which reduced Algeria to terrorism, particularly from 1992 to 1999. 
Over the period from 1991 to 1994, macro-economic unbalances became severe. The 
government budget and balance of payments continued to record deficits; both external 
indebtness and debt servicing requirements increased to the level where the Algerian 
government could not honour its obligations (Naas, 2003). In response, the new 
government appointed by President Zaroual in 1994 recognised this inability, and 
subsequently entered into extensive negotiations to reschedule external debts with the 
main borrowers in Paris and London Clubs26. In parallel, Naas (2003) details that the 
government formulated a comprehensive structural adjustment programme that has 
changed the regulatory framework of the Algerian economy in terms of allowing for 
more competition and gradual disengagement of the State from the economy. The 
programme received the assistance of the IMF and World Bank on two occasions: in 
May 1994 through an intentional one-year Stand-By Arrangement, and in May 1995 
through the three-year Extended Fund Facility Arrangement. The structural adjustment 
programme consisted of fiscal, economic (including financial sector), and social reforms. 
25 The new constitution of 24`h February 1989 allowed the establishment of political parties with different 
ideologies. The Islamist party, Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), won the multi-party local elections of 1989 
and later the multi-party legislative elections of December 1991. In June 1991, the FIS declared a civilian 
rebellion to push President Chadli to resign and call for an early multi-candidate presidential election. The 
rebellion witnessed violent incidents between security services and FIS activists, and resulted in the arrest 
of the leaders of the Islamist party and the fall of the Hamrouche government, which was succeeded by the 
Ghouzali government. Ghouzali's mission was primarily the organisation of the legislative elections in 
December 1991, in which the majority of the electorate favoured the Islamist party, FIS. On January 1992, 
Army officers forced President Chadli to resign, annulled the elections results, suspended the electoral 
process, and outlawed the Islamist party FIS. The militants of this party were frustrated and changed their 
focus from an intimidating opposition to an armed insurgency. Since then, Algeria fell into violence, crime, 
massacres, terrorism and confrontations between the Army forces and the FIS armed wings, in which more 
than 150 thousand civilians died. The Army appointed the five-member "High Council of State (HCS)" 
headed by the historical prestigious figure of the Algerian revolution Boudiaf to fulfil the role of the 
President until 1993. Boudiaf had lived in Morocco since the early 1960s, and, however, was assassinated 
by a security officer, in June 1992. The HCS organised a National Concord Conference (Platform for 
National Consensus over the Period of Transition), in which a number of non-elect political, associative, 
and other movements and organisations representing the society gathered and "elected" the general 
Zaroual, then Minister of Defence, as a President of State of Algeria. Zaroual organised presidential 
elections in November 1995 in which three other candidates participated. Zaroual won the elections and became the President of the Republic of Algeria, which encouraged him to establish his legitimacy and 
encouraged him to press on with constitutional and political reforms. (for more details, read the excellent 
work of Aissaoui (2001)). 
26 While Club de Londres musters private lenders, Club de Paris consists of Public lenders. Naas (2003) 
elaborates the contents and terms of rescheduling agreements. 
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First, the fiscal reforms aimed to diminish the interventionist role of the government as a 
major provider of goods and services. The government intended to gradually cease 
subsidising basic goods and services, especially milk, bread, construction materials, and 
transport. Second, the main economic reforms allowed the private sector to invest in 
industries that were considered strategic, such as banking. The government reaffirmed its 
commitment to establish a market-based system of bank intermediation and to further the 
utilisation of indirect market-based monetary instruments. Third, the social reform 
consisted of discontinuing a variety of subsidies and transfers that protected employment 
in the public sectors; instead, the government proposed an unemployment insurance 
scheme. Also, the structural adjustment programme of reforms covered exchange rate 
liberalisation, price and internal and external trade liberalisation, public enterprise reform 
(liquidation of large number of local enterprises), and financial and monetary reforms. 
Consequently, the implementation of the structural reforms in Algeria has been seen as a 
gradual abandonment of the central planning state developmentalist model in favour of 
the role of the market (Naas, 2003). 
The first Government of the Prime Minister Ouyahya (1995-1998) substantially extended 
the programme of reforms especially on the fiscal and social sides. Hundreds of 
companies were liquidated; thousands of employees were dismissed, unemployment 
increased and widespread lifting of subsidies on basic consumption goods plus freezes on 
public sector pay. On the macro-economic side, Ouyahya's reforms succeeded in 
increasing the stock of reserves, reducing balance of payments' deficits and the 
government budget. 
Aissaoui (2001) notes that when President Zaroual decided to cut short his presidential 
mandate, his successor, Boutaflika7 (1999-2004) has had "a sense of purpose" in favour 
of restoring political tolerance and ending the country's isolation from the rest of the 
world. On the economic side, Boutaflika has aimed at restoring investor confidence, and 
focused on attracting foreign investment into the country. He established his inner core, 
27 Boutaflika served as Foreign Minister most of the sixties and seventies, but had been in the political 
wilderness since the end of the Boumediene era. Bouteflika came to power when General Zaroual decided 
to step down in September 1998. Bouteflika won elections held in April 1999 and a second mandate with 
landslide results (85%) in April 2004. Boutaflika is considered as liberal and pragmatic in favour of free 
market. 
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including Chakib Khelil and Abdelatif BenAchenhou as Ministers of Energy and 
Finance, respectively, in order to hasten the process of the economic and financial 
reforms. Khelil is strongly in favour of the full liberalisation of the upstream hydrocarbon 
sector, and confronted substantial political and social opposition when he drafted 
legislation to open up the possibility of SONATRACH (the oil state company) raising 
new finance by opening its capital or that of its affiliates to private and foreign investors. 
During his ongoing tenure, Boutaflika benefited from the recovery of oil prices since 
March 199928, which has strengthened the internal and external economic balances. The 
country reserves in foreign exchange reached more than $30 billion in 2003. 
2-3-2 Morocco 
After obtaining independence from France in 1956, the King of Morocco Mohamed V, 
focused more on constructing his monarchy than on economic development and growth. 
His successor, Hassan II29, invested as King of Morocco in 1961, continued the approach 
of his father to set the foundation to the Alaoui monarchy and extend the purview of his 
dominion by appointing his devoted followers in conspicuous institutional positions. 
Hassan II faced the reality that Morocco was a primarily rural society and did not have, 
as its Algerian neighbour, substantial natural resources such as hydrocarbons (Vermeren, 
2002). Also, the King Hassan II realised the absence of a basic economic infrastructure 
and the weakness of private capital. As a consequence, he initially used the State-led 
system to outline economic development plans30 in which the government was the major 
investor without severely restricting private capital. The development plans outlined in 
the 1960s and 1970s were set out primarily to boost the agricultural sector and 
agriculture-related industries and activities. The implementation of the plans resulted in 
28 Oil prices remained above $30 per barrel for most of the year 2000, and jumped to more than $35 during 
the course of 2004. 
29 King Hassan II was appointed commander of the Royal Armed Forces (1955) and deputy premier (1960) 
and succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Muhammad V (1961). He introduced a new 
constitution (1962) that provided for a popularly elected legislature while maintaining a strong executive 
branch headed by the King. From 1965 to 1970 he exercised severe authoritarian rule in order to contain 
opposition to his regime, but he restored limited parliamentary government under a new constitution in 
1970 and instituted some socio-economic reforms following attempted coups in 1971,1972, and 1973. The 
king Hassan II died on July 23'd, 1999, and was succeeded by his oldest son, King Muhammad VI. 
30 One famous economic plan is the Five year development Plan (1973-1977). According to White (2001), 
this plan called for an annual economic growth rate of 7.5%. The plan also outlines the efforts to make the 
economy more Moroccan by featuring requirements that all major businesses be 51% Moroccan-owned. 
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the construction of numerous agricultural structures such as water dams, and developing 
various agricultural-based industries, such as food processing and vegetable and fruit 
exports. Besides, White (2001) and Vermeren (2002) mention that, since the seventies31, 
mineral industries, especially, phosphate; have occupied an important part in the 
economy of Morocco. Over the period 1973-75, phosphate prices increased on 
international markets witnessing a threefold rise by January 1974. This tripling prompted 
the government to extend its substantial planned investments, already financed partly by 
external debt and phosphate revenues. The government raised substantial funds in the 
international debt market to finance their investment and consumption. 
Similar to Algeria, in 1973, Hassan II utilised the process of "Morroconisation" to enjoy 
sovereignty over economic resources in Morocco in favour of national public and private 
ownership (White, 2001). The process consisted of nationalising a number of enterprises 
in the secondary and tertiary sectors and linking them to the Moroccan national-owned 
sector. However, foreign ownership access to Moroccan enterprises was not entirely 
denied as it was permitted to a maximum of 49% of capital. The Morroconisation law32 
stipulated that national Moroccans had to be in a majority on shareholding and 
management councils and for appointed managers in joint stock companies. The 
chairmen of joint-stock companies had also to be Moroccans. According to Vermeren 
(2002), this law reduced the important dominance of the French banks, already present 
for approximately a century, in favour of local capitalists. 
Belghazi (2000) believes that the process of the Morocconisation, associated with the 
aforementioned investments allowed the government to create a substantial network of 
public enterprises in all sectors of the economy. Hamdouche (1997) believes that the 
"Morocconisation" of foreign enterprises marked an important turning point in the 
development of Morocco's private capital, particularly for large companies in the form of 
agro-industrial and financial groups. Moroccan private capital was permitted to enter new 
branches of economic activity that required new expertise, especially in the agro-industry 
business, tourism, textiles and construction. During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
31 Morocco has 75% of world's reserves of phosphate, and is the second largest phosphate exporter after 
the US, with less than US$2 billion a year (nearly 30% of total world exports) (Vermeren, 2002). 32 Dahir #210 of 2°d March 1973. 
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Morocconisation and development plans adopted a relatively liberal approach toward 
private ownership. While the State was engaged in strategic sectors and investments that 
needed large amounts of capital (as in banking, manufacturing, phosphate extraction and 
infrastructure projects), private capital appears to dominate in activities requiring fewer 
funds, including tourism and in a broad range of agricultural activities. However, 
Vermeren (2002) believes that the Morocconisation process launched in 1973 was 
politically and domestically important for the Throne. King Hasssn II used the 
nationalisation process to assign his most loyal supporters as heads of the Morocconised 
companies33 
As mentioned earlier, Morrisson (1991), White (2001) and Vermeren (2002) review the 
main economic characteristics of Morocco over the sixties and seventies. Similar to 
Algeria, Morrisson (1991) states that the Moroccan government utilised substantial 
amounts of borrowed loans to fund consumption, investment programmes and budgetary 
deficits. As a consequence, external debt increased from US$2.3bn in 1976 to US$11.9bn 
in 1983, by which time the budgetary deficit reached more than one tenth of GDP, and 
debt servicing costs jumped to half of exports. This situation forced the Moroccan 
government to approach its main lenders to negotiate debt rescheduling and the IMF for 
assistance resulting in the launching of a stabilisation and structural adjustment reform 
programme in 1983-1984. The reform programmes aimed at encouraging private 
ownership of production tools and management, and further market-based practices. The 
reform plan also included progressive liberalisation of prices and external trade, gradual 
elimination of subsidies, and gradual abolition of constraints on foreign capital, and also 
restructuring and privatising various public enterprises, including the banking sector. 
2-3-3 Tunisia 
Tunisia obtained its official independence from France in 1956. By then, "the supreme- 
combatant" President Bourguiba34, who headed the new New-Doustour Party 35 
33 For more details, read the excellent analysis of Vermeren (2002), who examines Morocco under the 
reign of Hassan II from different angles, including the political and social aspects of the Maghreb. 34 Habib Bourguiba was "elected" president of Tunisia in 1957. Two years later, he imposed a constitution 
that, while retaining Islam as the religion of state, abolished polygamy, controlled divorce, and attempted 
to make certain that the Friday Pray and month-long fast of Ramadan did not curtail workers' productivity. 
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government, was aware of the major economic problems of Tunisia, including the lack of 
vast hydrocarbon resources, however, his efforts were oriented towards enforcing the 
foundations of his recently established regime as a new constitution was drafted out and 
measures were taken to avoid military coups (White, 2001). He kept the Tunisian army at 
a low profile by allocating it no more than one tenth of total government spending, 
whereas health and agricultural sectors received together more than half of the budget 
funds. Besides this, Bourguiba embraced publicly secular pro-Western principles, which 
were conspicuously manifested in the 1957 Personnel Status Code. This code stated that 
women are equal to men in every thing, including heritage, voting and divorce rights; and 
also polygamy became severely restricted (Verderen, 2002). 
During the 1960s, and similar to the other two Maghreb countries under study, Bourguiba 
drove Tunisia to engage in a series of development plans that created the infrastructure 
and structure of the economy. Implemented by his pro-nationalisation Prime Minister 
Ben Salah, Bourguiba's economic strategy was to enhance the role of the State in all 
economic and productions sectors. Ben Salah's policy was based on "national 
sovereignty and development" that consisted of nationalising most enterprises owned by 
foreign nationals and, in 1964, nationalising all the land still owned by French settlers. In 
the mid-1960s, Ben Salah imposed a strict form of agricultural co-operatives and state 
control of much trade and industry. Bechri and Naccache (2002) mention that, during the 
sixties, the Tunisian government adopted the central planning mode136 and, intensively 
invested in agriculture, manufacturing and in the tertiary sector, resulting in establishing 
large-sized government-owned enterprises in the main economic sectors. About 185 
In 1975, the Tunisian National Assembly made him president for life. On April 6th, 2000, Bourguiba died 
at the age of 96 in his hometown of Al-Munastir. 
35 Discontented young members of the more conservative Destour Party formed the Neo-Destour party in 
1934. After a bitter struggle with the parent organisation, it became the predominant party under the 
leadership of Habib Bourguiba in 1937. It was harassed by French authorities throughout the 1940s and 
began an armed rebellion in 1953 that led to Tunisian independence in 1956. A Neo-Destour government 
was then formed In 1958, Bourguiba was appointed the fast premier of Tunisia, and in 1959 he was 
overwhelmingly voted president. The party consolidated its hold on all levels of Tunisian society and 
constituted itself (1963) as Tunisia's sole political party, renaming itself "Democratic Constitutional 
Assembly" in 1964. Not until 1981 were opposition parties permitted. In 1987, Zinc el-Abidine Ben Ali 
succeeded Bourguiba as leader of the party and president of Tunisia. Under Ben Ali the party pursued free 
market economic policies and a perceived open political atmosphere. To reflect these changes, the party's 
name was again changed in 1988 to the "Democratic Constitutional Assembly". 
36 The major plans in the Ben Salah era are Plan I from 1962 to 1964 and Plan II from 1965 to 1968. These 
two plans set the strategies for agricultural reforms (cooperativisation) and state-led growth. 
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State-owned enterprises were created in the 1960s. By 1969, the government had 
complete monopoly over all sectors of the economy including the financial sector and 
external trade with tight foreign exchange control. 
However, due to his penchant to enforce Tunisia's ties with the European Union, 
Bourguiba removed Ben Salah and appointed former Central Bank Governor pro-free 
market Hedi Nouira37 as Prime Minister throughout the 1970s. Nouira was advocate of 
"economic security and growth" and his appointment indicated that the policy of strict 
central planning followed by Ben Salah (who planned to extend the co-operativisation 
system) generated disputes with local groups, including landowners. In addition, the 
economy suffered from deep-seated budgetary deficits, which would have led, according 
to the World Bank Report (1969), to a severe economic crisis. White (2001) indicates 
that during the sixties, direct foreign investment in Tunisia's industry represented only 
1.2% of total investment in the sector. In 1970, in opposite to neighbouring Algeria, 
President Bourguiba decided to implement a reform programme that shifted the economy 
from a strict central planning to a relaxed market-based economy in favour of export- 
based industrialisation without excluding private and foreign investments. Textiles 
industries (low labour costs), agricultural and ago-agricultural, and tourism industries 
benefited from this strategy based on devoting exports toward the European Market 
(White, 2001). Nevertheless, the new strategy of Bourguiba practically favoured the 
dominance of the public sector, especially in sectors deemed as strategic as in the 
banking sector. 
Tunisia experienced high rates of economic growth due conspicuously to the 
aforementioned association accords with Europe signed in 1969. White (2001) mentions 
that GNP to capita average annual growth recorded an annual increase rate of 4.7% over 
1965-80, compared to 1.3% over 1980-1992. By the late 1970s, due to the vulnerability 
of the Tunisian economy and its growing dependence on external factors, economic 
difficulties and social pressure came to ahead and led to violent riots in 1978 (and later in 
37 The major plans in the Nouira era are Plan III from 1970 to 1972 and Plan IV from 1973 to 1976. These 
two plans set the strategies for gradual decentralisation and export-oriented industrialisation but still with 
prominent presence of the State in the economy. 
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1984). Over the 1970s, the current account balance and the external trade deficits 
worsened, surpassing US$1.4 billion by 1982. 
White (2001) reveals that one other striking difference between Ban Salah's "national 
sovereignty and development" strategy and Nouira's "Economic Security and growth" 
strategy was the regional distribution of public investments. During the 1960s, Ben Salah 
allocated State investments to peripheral areas in Tunisia to balance the share of 
development all around Tunisia. During the 1970s, Nouira relatively liberal policy 
generated regional unbalances as investments were conspicuously concentrated in urban 
and coastal region (Bizert, Sousse, Gabes, and Sfax) and the capital. Only 14% of total 
investment was allocated to the interior of the country creating only 10.9% of total 
employment created. This concentration of investment created rural exodus to cities, and 
therefore higher unemployment rates, at around 16% by 1985. The regional unbalance 
had dramatic effects on the social front as riots erupted in "unfortunate regions" and 
resulted in many fatalities38. 
Therefore, under social pressure in 1982, the government decreed a wage increase, which 
was particularly unwarranted since productivity was declining at that time resulting in an 
increase in inflation to 14%, the highest since 1964. The economic situation witnessed 
deterioration in both fiscal and current account deficits and these rose to unprecedented 
levels, 6.6% and 7.1% of GDP, respectively, by 1985. The economy deteriorated further 
in early 1986 reflected in the dramatic depletion of foreign exchange reserves and the 
government was in a situation of not being able to repay its external debts39. This was 
associated with a severe drought, oil export dropped and tourism receipts decreased. In 
August 1986, Prime minister Mohammed Mzali, who was appointed in 1983, led his 
government to reschedule its external debt payments with its main lenders and signed a 
one-year Stand-By Agreement with the IMF implying an explicit commitment to pursue 
liberalisation measures in the form of a structural adjustment programme starting from 
1987 
38 See White (2001) for more details. 
39 The drop of oil prices in mid-1980s caused receipts from oil exports to drop from 778million dinar from 
1984 to 322 million dinar in 1986. In addition, drought caused a catastrophic harvest in 1986 and income 
from tourism dell from 489 million dinar in 1985 to 437 million dinar in 1986. 
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The structural reform programme that had to be implemented as a part of the IMF 
agreement, aimed at liberalising prices, investments and trade regimes, and relaxing the 
role of State in ownership of the economy. For instance, investment licensing by 
centralised government agencies was eliminated and import licensing and duties were 
gradually reduced40. The reforms continued thought the nineties under the reign of 
President Ben Ali and allowed Tunisia to record relatively higher growth rates. 
2-4 Overview of the Main Economic Reform 
Measures 
This section of the chapter overviews the main economic reforms implemented in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia during the nineties (and financial reforms are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3). Economic reforms consist mainly of those liberalisation, 
stabilisation and structural adjustment measures that have aimed to transfer the 
economies of the three countries into market-oriented systems. Overall, the reform 
programmes in the three countries are similar in terms of their objectives and in all cases, 
have been designed under the technical supervision of the IMP. One major objective is 
the disengagement of the State from the direct ownership and management of the 
economy in almost all spheres of activity. One important observation about economic 
reform in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia is their speed. While major economic reforms 
were undertaken between 1989 and 1995 in Tunisia and Morocco41, these were 
implemented between 1989 and 2001 in Algeria. 
Morrisson (1991) outlines the main features of the stabilisation and structural 
adjustments measures. First, the stabilisation measures include a reduction of 
consumption subsidies, slower growth in domestic credit, currency devaluation, a larger 
reduction in investment expenditure, and slower growth in public sector employment. 
Second, the structural adjustment measures contain fiscal reforms related to the 
introduction of value-added tax (VAT), the lowering towards eradicating of various 
40 Import licensing was lifted on 15% of imports in teens if tariff lines to reach 60% of tariff lines and 70% 
of imports in 19991. Import duties were reduced from an average if 41 % in 1986 to 33% in 1987 and to 
29% in 1990. 
41 Venneren (2002) mentions that the first reform agreement signed between Morocco and international 
financial institutions was in 1983 in the form if "structural adjustment programme". 
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consumption subsidies, the dissolution of the state monopoly on external trade including 
the elimination of export duties and the dismantling of the system of quantitative 
restrictions on imports, and the abolition of price controls over consumer goods and 
services. Also, the reform programmes included the gradual liberalisation of foreign 
exchange rates, the deregulation of interest rates and financial markets, and the 
encouragement of private and foreign capital investments. 
Table 2-3 summarises the most important measures taken in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia in recent years. The next section will present and evaluate the success of these 
reforms. 
Table 2-3: The main economic reform measures undertaken in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia from 1989 to 2001 
Measure Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
1986- Allow foreign participation in oil 
exploration under concession 
Petroleum Code agreements. Allow joint ventures in oil -- 
production and gas fields development, 
But the government maintains majority 
Money and Credit Law 1990, See Chapter 3 1993, See chapter 3 1987, See chapter 3 
1991- Terminate SONATRACI I 
Amendments to 1986 monopoly over oil transportation oil. 
petroleum Code 
Foreign companies are grated fiscal -- 
status, and are allowed to enter Algerian 
market 
Full Foreign trade 
Liberalisation 1995 1992-1993 1994 
Trade Liberalisation 1991 Trade is fully liberalised 
Currency Devaluation - September 1991,221/o 1990 9.3% , - April 1994,40% Foreign exchange 
market creation 
1994 1996 1995 
1994- Full price liberalisation of 
Price liberalisation housing, and agricultural inputs and 1990 1987 
output. 
Privatisation Laws 1995 1989 1989 
Exchange rate 1997- Full convertibility of Algerian 
Liberalisation 1993 1994- Dinar and current account 
1996- Foreign companies are no longer 
required to form a commercial firm 
Amendments to subject to the Algerian Law with head 
Petroleum 1986 Law office in Algiers, if it sets up a joint -- 
venture with SONATRACH (the state 
oil company) 
Sauce: Various 
To summarise, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have experienced two major changes in the 
post-colonialism era. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the three countries adopted the State 
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developmentalist model with different degrees of discipline. The central planning model 
resulted in the establishment of dominant government-owned sectors and forced the 
monopolistic and interventionist role of the State, at least in strategic economic sectors. 
By the 1980s, the limitations of this policy became apparent culminating in the non- 
ability of the respective governments to pay their external debts. Consequently, the three 
countries signed agreements with the IMF and were committed to pursue structural 
reform programmes aimed at liberalising their economies. 
2-5 The Main Economic Trends since the Early 
1990s 
This section of the chapter analyses the main economic and social trends in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia since early 1990s. The aim of this analysis is to provide a broad 
overview of the main economic features of the three countries under study so that later 
the analyses of the banking systems can be placed in context. This section focuses on the 
growth of the respective economies (as measured by GDP growth) plus various other 
features of the structure of their systems (GDP components). In addition, we briefly 
examine a variety of other trends relating to privatisation, inflation, unemployment, 
indebtness and external trade. 
2-5-1 Economic Growth 
As of the end of 2000, the total GDP of the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisia economies 
was estimated at US$105bn. This was approximately equal to the Egyptian economy, and 
slightly less than 15% of the total GDP of Middle East and North African economies 
(MENA). Considering the three countries under study, the Algerian and Tunisian 
economies are the largest and smallest economies, respectively. In terms of GDP, the 
Algerian economy is larger than the Moroccan and Tunisia economies by approximately 
50% and 150%, respectively. However, GDP per capita estimates indicate that Tunisia 
had the highest income per capita. 
Table 2-4 shows details of GDP evolution over the period from 1990 to 2000. nominal 
GDP, Nominal GDP growth, real GDP growth, GDP per capita and GDP per capita 
growth also included in Table 2-4. 
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Table 2-4: Selected Macro-economic Indicators for Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia from 1990 to 2000 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Algeria 
GDP at 
market rates 
(USS 62.05 45.71 47.87 49.77 4197 4126 46.84 4735 48.19 48.85 54.52 54.85 55.90 
billion) 
Nominal 
GDP 11.7 -263 4.7 4.0 -15.7 -1.7 13.5 22 10.4 14.8 26.2 3.5 5.0 
growth ("/o) 
Real GDP 3.8 3.0 
growth (%) - -2.12 -0.92 
3.82 3.80 1.12 5.12 3.9 5.0 
Nominal 
GDP per 1,775 2,449 1,771 1,821 1,858 1,538 1,484 1,667 1,680 1,638 1,633 1,740 
capita 
(USS) 
GDP per 
capita 8.6 -27.7 2.8 2.1 -172 -3.5 123 0.8 -2.5 -3.1 6.5 
_growth 
(%) 
Morocco 
GDP at 
market rates 25.82 27.83 28.45 26.80 3035 3298 36.69 33.41 35.54 35.13 3332 33.49 
billion) 
Nominal 
GDP 13.0 7.8 2.2 -5.8 13.2 8.7 11.1 -8.8 6.4 -1.2 -5.1 1.8 
growth (%) 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 6.92 -4.01 -1.02 10.42 . 6.62 12.22 -2.22 6.82 -0.72 0.82 
Nominal 
er 146 1 
ap 
p 1,055 1,113 1,114 1,028 1,141 1,216 1,324 1,184 1,235 1,197 1,592 , 
(US$) 
GDP per 
capita 103 5.5 0.1 -7.7 11.1 6.5 8.9 -10.6 4.3 -3.1 -2.3 
_growth 
("/e) 
Tunisia 
GDP at 
market rates 1331 13.01 15.50 14.61 15.63 18.03 1959 18.90 20.01 20.78 21.00 20.55 
(US$mn) 
Nominal 
GDP 22.7 5.7 19.1 -5.7 7.0 153 8.7 -33 5.9 3.8 2.8 3.2 
growth (%) 
Real GDP 
growth (%) - - 334 233 7.13 5.43 4.83 6.13 4.73 
Nominal 
cD to 
1,520 1,574 1,838 1,698 1,781 2,013 2,155 2,051 2,144 2,201 2,260 2,140 
(US$) 
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GDP per 
capita 20.1 3.5 16.7 -7.6 4.9 13.0 7.1 -0.8 4.6 2.6 2.7 
growth (%) 
Source: various, but mainly IMF Statistics Yearbooks 2001/2002. 
Table 2-4 shows that, over the nineties, Tunisia's real GDP and GDP per capita 
increased at average growth rates faster than in Algeria and Morocco, which had low 
GDP per capita. The average of the three countries' GDP per capita was lower than that 
of the MENA countries, but higher than the Egyptian average ($1,500), except for 
Morocco. 
In the first half of the 1990s, the Algerian economy experienced a substantial decline in 
GDP, from US$62bn in 1990 to a low of US$41bn in1995, resulting in GDP per capita 
falling to as low as $1,500 by 1995, the lowest in the decade. This period witnessed a 
decline in the price of energy in international markets and in the production of the local 
industrial and agricultural sectors. In the second half of the nineties, the Algerian 
economy stabilised and the GDP increased to more than US$50bn in 2000, due to the 
relative increase in hydrocarbon prices (Aissaoui, 2001). 
Over the 1990s, the Moroccan economy grew at an average yearly rate of two percent. 
However, the GDP trend exhibits some volatility, due to instability in the main sectors of 
the Moroccan economy such as agriculture, where performance is strongly related to 
climate conditions. Throughout the decade, the income per capita in Morocco has been 
systematically lower than in Algeria and Tunisia. 
For Tunisia, the economy experienced a positive growth of around 4.8%, over the period, 
while GDP per capita increased at an average annual rate of 5.7%. The growth in the 
agricultural, manufacturing industries and tourism sectors can be seen as the main source 
of growth. Liberalisation reforms implemented in these sectors can be considered the 
main reason put forward for this growth. 
Overall, the table exhibits that the Tunisian economy and GDP per capita grew faster 
than in Algeria and Morocco. This also may imply that Tunisia, to a certain extent, 
succeeded in bringing the imbalances between demographic growth and economic 
growth under control. 
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2-5-2 Structure of the Economies and GDP 
Components: Hydrocarbons (Algeria) and non- 
hydrocarbon sectors in Morocco and Tunisia) 
One can investigate the main components of GDP in order to explore the major economic 
sectors that drive growth within the respective economies. Overall, the structures of the 
economies in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia show some indications of diversity, but in 
general they are strongly dependent on external forces and climatic conditions. Due to 
development strategies followed in the sixties and seventies, the industrial sector 
(hydrocarbons and construction included) constitute approximately three quarters of the 
Algerian economy, whereas the primary sector (agriculture and fishing), and 
manufacturing and tertiary sector (tourism) account for the same proportion of the 
economy in Morocco42 and Tunisia. As such, the principal driver of growth in Algeria 
relates to the hydrocarbon industries, whereas, light manufacturing, services and 
agriculture predominate in Morocco and Tunisia43. This section will concentrate on the 
upstream hydrocarbon sector in Algeria, and agriculture and tertiary sectors in Morocco 
and Tunisia. Detailed statistics about the whole economic activities and GDP 
development in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are reported in Table Al-5, Table Al-6, 
Table Al-7, Table Al-8, Table A1-9, Table Al-10 and Table Al-11 in Appendix Al. 
2-5-2-1 The Hydrocarbon Sector in Algeria44 
In Algeria, the hydrocarbon industries play a significant role in the economy. In 2000, the 
share of the hydrocarbon sector accounted for two fifths of GDP. Other sectors such as 
manufacturing and construction represented around one fifth of GDP, the distributive and 
tertiary sector accounted for around a quarter of the economy, whereas the agrarian 
sector represented, on average, less than one tenth of the economy. White (2001) 
recognises that the position of the hydrocarbon sector within the Algerian economy has 
strengthened its ties with external economies. He mentions that the hydrocarbon sector is 
42 Morocco has substantial phosphate reserves equal to 75% of the world total reserves. Morocco is third 
largest producer and biggest export of phosphate in the world. 
43 The IMF economy tables reported in the Appendix support this fact. 44 See Aissaoui (2002) for detailed and comprehensive analysis on the hydrocarbon sector and the political 
economy of oil and gas in Algeria, See Aissaoui (2002). 
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the main provider of foreign currency, generally more than 95% of foreign exchange 
revenues. 
Algeria has substantial hydrocarbon reserves and is a large producer and exporter of gas 
in international markets45. Western Europe is the first client of Algeria, in particular, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. These countries are directly linked to the oil and gas fields in 
the south of Algeria through two pipelines, namely; Trans-Med and Maghreb-Europe. 
Algeria is the third biggest gas supplier to Europe, with approximately one tenth of total 
European consumption in 2000, and this rate is expected to increase to half of total 
consumption by 2010 (Arabies, 2002). In the last decade or so, the Algerian government 
has undertaken a number of reform measures in the upstream hydrocarbon sector. The 
Gouzali's government47 implemented a major reform that consisted of the passing of the 
new Hydrocarbon Law in 1991 (which was amended many times thereafter). This new 
piece of legislation primarily permits foreign capital to invest in the upstream 
hydrocarbon sector. Arabies (2002) reported that many international companies are 
currently and intensively operating in Algeria close to Algeria's oil company 
SONATRACH, including BP-ANADARCO, TOTAL-ELF, and SHELL. 
The intensive foreign investment in the hydrocarbons sector have permitted Algeria to 
develop its existing oil and gas fields, discover new fields and promote greater 
production and export capacities. For instance, the number of new oil and gas fields' 
discoveries increased from twenty between 1986 and 1989, to thirty-four between 1990 
and 1994 and to forty-six from 1996 to 199948. These new discoveries allowed the sector 
to grow at an annual average real growth rate of five percent, higher than the real growth 
rate of the economy as a whole. 
45 Algeria is a member of the OPEC Organisation 
46 Trans-Med crosses Tunisia and the Mediterranean to Italy. It was built in the 1986. The Maghreb Europe 
pipeline crosses Morocco and the Mediterranean to Spain and Portugal. Another pipeline is being built to 
link the south of Algeria directly to Spain without crossing Morocco. 47 In the summer of 1991, Prime Minister Ghouzali revealed his plan to sell up to a quarter of the famous 
Hassi-Messaoud oil field reserves to service the heavy burden of external debts. His plan received 
condemnations from nationalistic, Islamist and communist parties as well as trade unions and other 
organisations. 
'$ In 1995, Algeria produced 56.5mn tons of oil and 138bn cubic meters of gas. In 2000, the production of 
oil and gas increased to 66.8mn tons and 170bn cubic meters, respectively. Similarly, gas exports increased 
from 31bn cubic meters in 1994 to 63bn cubic meters in 2000, whereas the oil exports rose from 47.6mn 
tons in 1994 1 58.3mn tons in 2000. 
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BenBitour (1998) and BenAchenhou (2000) 49recognise the "pivotality" of the upstream 
hydrocarbon sector in the growth of the Algerian economy. The sector accounts for about 
95% of total exports and more than half of the government budget revenues. As such, the 
hydrocarbon sector is the main provider of foreign currency as well as being the major 
determinant of government spending. BenAchenhou (2000) notes that revenues 
generated from hydrocarbons exports are used not only for the purchase of consumptive 
imports but also for productive imports including industry equipment and technologies, 
necessary for employment creation. This strong dependence on the upstream 
hydrocarbon sector has positioned Algeria in a delicate situation as the performance of 
the economy is strongly related to fluctuations in international energy prices. Table 2-5 
presents macroeconomic indicators relating to the hydrocarbon sector in Algeria. 
Table 2-5: Selected Macro-economic Indicators and the average oil price 
for Algeria from 1995 to 2000 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Ave $ e Oil Price per barrel 17 6 21 7 19.5 12.6 17.9 28.5 24.8 25.5 ( ) . . 
Total Exports (US$ billion) 10.26 13.47 13.71 10.05 1233 21.68 20.17 18.71 
Oil and gas Exports Revenues 9 73 65 12 13.18 9.77 11.90 21.06 19.09 18.11 (US$ billion) . . 
Current GDP (US$ million) 412 46.9 47.9 47.4 47.6 533 54.68 55.90 
Government Revenues (US$ 
6 12 08 15 16 06 1320 14.29 20.96 19.84 20.11 billion) . . . 
End of period Exchange Rate 
(One Dollar to Algeria Dinar) 47.7 56.18 58.14 6035 6931 75.34 77.82 79.72 
Source: IMF Couttry Reports. 1998,2004. 
*W, (2004), "International Financial Statistics", February PP. 90-93. 
Table 2-5 suggests a strong positive relationship between the price of hydrocarbons and 
Algerian macro-economic indicators. For instance, the price of oil per barrel fell to an 
average of US$12.9 in 1998; driving oil exports revenues to as low as US$9.7bn, and 
GDP and total government revenues to US$47.4bn and US$13.2bn, respectively. While 
the price of oil per barrel increased to an average of US$28.5 in 2000, exports revenues, 
49 Ahmed BenBitour and Mourad BenAchenhou both served as Ministers of Finance and economy, 
respectively, in the governments of Gouzali (1993-1994), Sifi (1994-1995) and Ouyahya (1995-1998). 
BenBitour was appointed as a prime Minister (2000-2001) but resigned after differences with President 
Boutaflika (1999-2004). 
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GDP and government spending increased to unprecedented levels of US$21bn, US$53.3 
and US$20.9bn, respectively. Overall, the significant dependence of the Algeria 
economy on the upstream hydrocarbon sector is mainly the result of the industrialisation 
policy implemented throughout the sixties and seventies associated with a lack of 
diversification in its periodic development plans. 
2-5-2-2 Non-Hydrocarbon Sectors in Morocco and Tunisia 
2-5-2-2-1 Primary sectors including Agriculture 
The primary sectors including agriculture represent one major sector in the economies of 
Morocco and Tunisia. For both countries, during the nineties, the agricultural sector 
accounted for approximately 15% of GDP, 20% of total exports, and 40% of total 
employment. In contrast, in Algeria, agriculture represents less than eight percent of 
GDP. In real terms, the average annual growth rate of the sector has been around ten 
percent in Morocco and six percent in Tunisia during the last decade. Table 2-6 also 
shows that the growth in the agricultural sector in Morocco and Tunisia has been 
relatively volatile. 
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Table 2-6: The Importance of the agricultural Sector in Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia from 1992 to 2002 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Algeria 
The share of 
Agriculture in GDP 10.95 10.88 955 9.66 10.83 9.44 10.84 10.52 7.99 9.17 
(%) 
Morocco 
The share of 
Agriculture in GDP 15.4 14.7 18.5 14.8 20.4 - 16.4 13.7 113 12.29 
(%) 
Real agriculture 
-36 9 7 4 61.4 -43.9 78.7 - 27.9 -16.7 -14.7 growth (%) . . 
Real GDP growth 
-4 0 -1 0 10 4 -7.0 12.0 - 7.7 -0.1 1.0 (%) . . . 
Real GDP growth 
outside agriculture 4.4 32 3.4 
(%) 
www. 
Tunisia 
The share of 
Agriculture in GDP 16.12 14.71 1256 11.4 13.7 133 123 12.8 12.1 11.85 
(%) 
Real agriculture 
-9.9 293 3.0 -1.0 11.1 -1.0 growth (%) 
Real GDP Growth 23 7 1 5.4 4.8 6.5 5.0 (%) . 
Source: IMF, Selected Statistics from Country Reports 1998 and 2003. Ministry of Privatisation and Finance in Morocco, 2003. 
As noted already, Table 2-6 shows that, overall, agriculture represents about 15% of 
GDP in Morocco and Tunisia compared to less than an average of 8% in Algeria. The 
table also suggests the relative important dependency of economic growth on the 
agricultural sector. In addition, the table shows that performance of the three countries' 
agricultural sectors is significantly dependent on climatic conditions. For instance, in 
1996, farm outputs rose by 20%, 80% and 30% in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, 
consecutively, owing to favourable weather conditions as reflected by increased average 
rain fall. In 1997, agricultural outputs declined due to the decrease in the rain fall and 
drought. 
In contrast to Algeria, the importance of agriculture in Morocco and Tunisia has resulted 
in these countries achieving high rates of effective self-sufficiency in agricultural and 
related products. BenBitour (1998) notes that Algeria imports an annual value of US$3- 
4bn of basic commodities such as oil, sugar, dairy products, cereals and legumes. 
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BenBitour (1998) states that dependence on food imports is the consequence of the 
imbalance between the growth of consumption driven by demographic growth, and the 
weakness of the agricultural sector. Confined to only three percent of Algerian territory, 
agriculture satisfies less than a quarter of Algeria's food needs. 
2-5-2-2-2The Tertiary sectors and Services 
Similar to agriculture, the tertiary and services sector is also important for the Moroccan 
and Tunisian economies. Services can be defined to include commerce, banking, 
transport and tourism. Throughout the 1990s, services represented approximately less 
than 20% of Algeria's GDP, 38% of Morocco's GDP, and 45% of Tunisia's GDP. Since 
1994, services, particularly in the hospitality industry, grew rapidly as a result of large 
national and foreign investments and construction of hotels and other structures in the 
tourism sector. For Morocco and Tunisia, tourism is primarily dependent on European 
visitors, particularly, from France and Germany, which represent half of total visitors. 
White (2001) reports that EU tourists accounted for 44% and 50% of total tourists in 
1996 in Morocco and Tunisia respectively, compared to 37% and 43.8% for Egypt and 
Turkey respectively. Consequently, growth in the services sector is evidently dependent 
on European visitors. Tourism is the main foreign currency generator for both Morocco 
and Tunisia, while the currency transfers of Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants comes 
second. 
Porier (1995) relates the growing importance of tourism in North Africa, particularly in 
Tunisia, to the policy of permitting foreign and private capital to invest in the tourism 
industry. Porier (1995) believes that the gradual capital account liberalisation, started in 
the early nineties, was most responsible for encouraging foreign investment and capital 
growth in the sector. The liberalisation programme included allowing for the 
convertibility of local currencies and lifting all restrictions on capital and profit 
repatriation by foreign investors. The liberalisation and investments in the tourism 
industry resulted in increasing foreign visitors, from approximately one and half million 
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in 1990 to three million in 2000 for Morocco50, and from three million in 1995 to five 
million in 2000 for Tunisia. 
Overall, the structure of the economies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia suggest a lack of 
diversification, concentration and unpredictability. In Algeria, which has the largest 
economy in the region, growth is dependent on the hydrocarbon sector, which is, in turn, 
dependent on the international financial market. In Morocco and Tunisia, the economy is 
concentrated around agriculture and the tertiary sector (especially tourism). The growth 
in these two sectors depends on climatic conditions and the number of European visitors. 
2-5-3 External Trade: Imports and Exports Structure 
This section of the chapter examines the exports and imports structure of the three 
countries. Table Al-12 (structure of imports and exports) and Table Al-13 (balance of 
payments) in Appendix Al contain the main indicators of external trade and balance of 
payments items in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in the 1990s. Overall, Algeria, on 
average, benefited from a trade surplus, especially in the second half of the 1990s due to 
improvements in oil prices, whereas Morocco and Tunisia suffered from a trade deficit. 
Also, the tables suggest three main factors relating to the external trade of these countries 
and this relates to their: volatility, concentration and dependency. 
Algeria has maintained a positive balance of trade as exports outweighed imports mainly 
due to growing export revenues, although there were large fluctuations in some years due 
to falling oil prices. The hydrocarbon export revenues account for more than 95% of 
Algeria's total export revenues, which are used to finance imports including food 
commodities (25%), industrial equipment and technology (50%) and also to service 
external debts. In 1999, Algeria's non-hydrocarbon exports amounted to US$41 per 
capita as compared to US$200-650 in Morocco and Tunisia. As it has been noted earlier, 
the dependency on hydrocarbon exports implies that the Algerian external trade is closely 
related to the behaviour of energy prices on international markets, and therefore, the 
50 Morocco attracted 2.98 million visitors in 1990, compared to 1.68 million in 1995. As discussed earlier, 
the reduction was subsequent result of the measures undertaken by the Algerian and Moroccan government 
in the wake of the Marrakech incidents in 1993. Algerian visitors represented approximate 45% of total 
foreign visitors to Morocco in 1993. 
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external terms of trade is dependent on international market forces, which makes 
revenues fluctuate on an annual basis. 
For Morocco and Tunisia, while external trade has increased by three quarters in the 
nineties, imports have grown faster than exports. Agricultural products (fruits and 
vegetables) and raw materials (phosphate51) represent three quarters of Morocco's 
exports, while the structure of imports include hydrocarbon products (20%), food 
including cereals and sugar (20%), capital and semi-finished goods (45%). For Tunisia, 
textiles and leather products export are the main exported products (50%), then 
agricultural products (20%). Tunisia imports' structure contains energy and raw material 
(35%), machine equipment, technology, food and other consumer goods (60%). 
Vermeron (2002) mentions that agricultural products, textiles products and phosphate are 
the main exports of Morocco. He indicates that the development of the textile industry is 
due to the strategy of imports-substitution in this industry launched in the eighties. This 
strategy encouraged foreign capital to invest in this sector benefiting from its low 
production expenses. 
The European Union (EU) is the main trading partner of all these countries, accounting 
for more than, on average, two thirds of foreign trade over the period 1994-2000. France, 
Italy, Spain and Germany are the prime clients and suppliers. The geographical 
approximation and historical and cultural relationships help explain these trade features 
(De Anca, 1997). France accounts for an average of one third of total trade with Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia. In contrast to trade with the EU, trade between the three countries 
under study has been insignificant (less than one percent) and often decreasing during the 
second half of the nineties, as for instance, Tunisia exported to Algeria less than one 
percent of its total exports. The structure of exports and imports helps explain this low 
level of inter-Maghreb trade; for all countries, about half of imports are advanced 
industrial equipment and capital goods that typically come from developed markets such 
as Western Europe. 
s' Vermeren (2002) indicates that, during the seventies, the phosphate boom on international markets 
helped Morocco to finance its industrialisation programmes. Huge amounts of money in the form of 
technology and modern equipments sourced mainly from foreign debts were invested towards this industry. 
But from 1975, as phosphate prices declined, the country experienced increasing deficits in balance of 
payment associated with increases of external debts. In 1980-82, the current deficit reached 12.7% of GDP. 
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2-5-4 External Debt 
External debts are one of the most conspicuous determinants of development and growth, 
particularly in Algeria and Morocco, as it represented, on average, more than half of 
GDP during the nineties. According to Sekkak (1990), the problem of external debts in 
Maghrebi countries is an immediate result of (inadequately managed) previous policies 
of using large foreign credits to finance consumption, infrastructure and investments, 
which generated non-sufficient returns. As of the end of 2000, external debts of the three 
countries under study reached more than US$55bn, approximately twice the external debt 
of Egypt. 
Sekkak (1990) analyses the evolution and causes of Maghreb external indebtness. The 
strategy of accelerated growth adopted by these countries, particularly in Algeria, 
encouraged the importation of funds that could not be provided by internal financing. 
The increased borrowing was motivated by factors such as the over-liquidity of 
international financial markets pushed by the recycling of Petro-Dollars. Sekkak (1990) 
notes that the non-economic absorption of external debts is the main reason that 
aggravated the situation, as external loans financed massive public investments and 
social programmes in businesses in protected markets with non-market disciplined 
management. These investments were not entirely economically profitable, as they did 
not produce satisfactory cash flows and surpluses within the expected time. If they had, 
they would have facilitated debt repayments. Also, Sekkak (1990) notes the unnecessary 
use of external debts to finance consumption rather than cash flow-generating 
investments. Over the period from 1974 to 1984, an average of two fifths of total debts of 
the three countries was used to finance consumption. 
From 1990 onwards, the external debts of Algeria experienced two different trends. First, 
from 1990 to 1995, external debt increased from US$25bn to US$33bn, reflecting an 
increase in the ratio of debt to GDP from forty-four percent to seventy percent52. In 1994, 
Algeria was in a situation of not being able to repay its external debts, and as a 
consequence, had to negotiate payments rescheduling with the main borrowersS3 and had 
to implement a structural reform programme assisted by the M. Second, from 1996 to 
52 Similarly, the cost of debt servicing increased up to 86% in 1993 and 93% in 1994. 53 In 1994 and 1995, Club of Paris agreed to reschedule US$15bn of Algeria's debts. 
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2000, Algeria's external debts fell from US$33.7bn to US$25bn. The price increase in 
energy prices resulted in a proportional increase in exports revenues, which helped 
Algeria to service its debts and achieve a historically high level of reserves to debt 
service ratio in 200054 
In Morocco, external debts have fallen during the nineties from approximately US$24bn 
in 1990 to US$16bn in 2000. Similarly, the external debt to GDP ratio declined from 
ninety-percent in 1990 to fifty-five percent in 2000. However, the external debt to GDP 
ratio is still high in Morocco compared to Algeria (45%) and Tunisia (50%). Morocco 
signed external debts payments rescheduling agreements with the main borrowers (Club 
de Paris) twice: in the early eighties and early nineties. Vermeron (2002) mentions that 
Club de Paris owns nearly half of Morocco's external debts, whom France is the main 
lender. 
In dollar terms, Tunisia has the lowest level of external indebtness among the three 
countries under study, and these amounted to US$10bn in 2000, after being US$5bn in 
1991. However, the level of debt to GDP remained stable, on average, at approximately 
sixty percent Table 2-7 summaries selected indicators of external indebtness of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia. 
54 Reserve to debt service ratio stood at 284% in 2000. 
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Table 2-7: Selected External debt indictors in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
from 1990 to 2000 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Algeria 
Total 
External 27.88 2820 27.08 26.02 29.97 3238 33.42 30.89 33.68 28.00 25.00 
debt' 
Total 44 9 61.7 56 6 523 41.4 76.7 719 652 643 59.4 46.6 debt/GDP . . 
Debt service 31 6 5 32 34 4 34.8 17.0 12.8 12.8 143 16.7 183 16.7 
ratio . . . 
Med&long- 
term debt] 95.4 94.4 95.6 96.2 94.0 94.7 929 92.7 92.8 923 922 
total debts 
Reserves/ 
2 7 5 7 5 7 5.9 93 63 13.6 28.0 24.0 173 248.9 debt service . . . 
Bilateral 
debts/de debts/debts 57.5 58.5 59.1 63.9 24.4 35.0 
41.4 46.5 49.0 50.8 52.2 
Morocco 
Total 
External 24.11 2222 22.03 20.78 21.71 22.44 21.17 20.68 1930 17.50 16.1 
debt' 
Total 
debUGDP 93A 79.9 77.4 77.5 715 68.1 
57.8 61.9 54.2 50.1 48.3 
Debt service 8 4 8 9 10 0 11.9 11.9 123 133 14.1 14.03 16.97 15.56 
ratio . . . 
Med&long- 
term debt] 97.0 98.0 99.0 993 993 
total debts 
Reserves/ 
debt service 
89 14.9 17.0 17.7 20.2 163 179 21.0 232 329 
Bilateral 
debts/debts 55.0 54.0 54.0 53.5 50.1 
Club de Paris 50.0 49.0 49.0 48.6 45.9 
Tunisia 
Total 
External 7.52 538 8.50 8.85 997 11.15 11.41 11.10 1131 12.0 10.0 
debts 
Total 
debt/GDP 61.1 41.4 54.7 60.6 625 622 59.8 
60.9 55.4 59.7 45.6 
Debt service 20 2 26 8 14 4 8 13 143 14.9 153 143 143 143 19.8 ratio . . . . 
Med&long- 
term debt/ 85.6 54.9 51.8 52.8 48.7 
total debts 
Reservest 
d debt t service 
11.9 11.1 11.8 11.5 182 18.0 20.9 21.2 19.5 23.8 
Bilateral 
debts/debts 
Source: IMF, Selected Statistics from Country Reports 2001 and 2003. Ministry of Privatisation and Finance in Morocco, 2003. 
" In billion US Dollars, all other indicators in Percent. 
Table 2-7 shows that in terms of duration, medium and long-term debts represented more 
than ninety percent of Algeria and Morocco's external debts, whereas, in Tunisia, 
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medium and long-term debt were approximately less than half of total external debt. 
Bilateral debts constitute around half of the total debts of the three countries, in which 
Club de Paris account for more than a quarter. The French government and banks are the 
main owners of these countries' external debts, totalling around a quarter. Overall, the 
stabilisation programmes implemented in the 1990s to correct the macro-economic 
distortion seem to have succeeded in improving external debt indicators for the three 
countries under study. 
2-5-5 Exchange Rate Policy 
This section of the chapter reviews the exchange rate policy and its implications for the 
economies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, over the nineties. The exchange rate policy 
in Morocco and Tunisia were designed to maintain a stable exchange rate, whereas in 
Algeria, the exchange rate policy was used to devalue the Algeria Dinar to shorten the 
gap between the administrative nominal exchange and the market exchange rate 
55 
. 
As a part of the global economic reform programmes, the three countries substantially 
reformed their foreign exchange systems in the late eighties and early nineties, by 
gradually liberalising foreign exchange markets and establishing current account 
convertibility. However, there are still significant restrictions imposed, in general, on 
outflows rather than on inflows. Reforms have permitted non-residents to hold accounts 
in foreign and domestic currencies, but residents' accounts are subject to more regulation 
than non-residents' accounts and are not fully convertible into foreign exchange. 
In the three countries, the exchange rate used to be weighted against a basket of 
currencies according to the countries' main trade partners, namely, the Euro-zone. 
Domac and Shabsign (1999) mention that the weights of the basket were reviewed 
regularly in order to consider the change in foreign trade partners and the structure of 
currencies in external settlements. The governments in the three countries discontinued 
the determination of exchange rates administratively, since the creation of the domestic 
inter-bank market in the mid-1990s. The exchange rates are liberalised and freely 
55 Bet, 1990 and 1994, the Dinar declined by 200% against the US dollar in nominal terms. There were 
major devaluation of 22% in Sep. 1992, and 40% in Apr. 1994, due to the agreements with the IMF. The 
government was committed to pay DA168bn (11% of GDP) as a compensation for foreign exchange losses 
occurred on past external borrowing contracted mostly on behalf of the State. More devaluation measures 
in three countries are reported in the sector of financial liberalisation in chapter 3. 
41 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
convertible in the foreign exchange market, but the central banks still can intervene by 
setting ceilings on the buy and sell rate differential. 
Karam (2001), however, mentions that the authorities have adopted a pegged-exchange 
rate policy in Morocco and a managed floating exchange rate policy-based regime in 
Algeria and Tunisia. The pegged exchange rate regime states that the Moroccan Dirham 
is determined daily in the foreign exchange market based on variations in the value of the 
currencies of the country's principal trading partners. In Algeria and Tunisia, although 
the pegged exchange rate regime is used, they also use the managed floating regime; with 
which the central bank quotes regularly the exchange rate applied in foreign exchange 
interventions, according to demand and supply conditions in the inter-bank markets. 
2-5-6 The Public and Private Sectors 
2-5-6-1 The Public Sector 
As noted earlier, the strategy of development adopted in the immediate period of the 
post-colonial era had the objective of constructing substantial government-owned 
economic sectors. 
Algeria has a more deep-seated government-owned sector than Morocco and Tunisia due 
to the disciplined adoption of the centrally planned strategy of development in the sixties 
and seventies. In 1989, the public sector was responsible for creating approximately 54% 
and 40% of added value in the productive sectors including and excluding hydrocarbons, 
respectively, as well as paying more than three quarters of the country's wages (IMF, 
2001). The economic and financial liberalisation programmes launched in the mid- 
nineties, which are still underway, aimed at the gradual disengagement of the 
government from owning and managing productive activities. The privatisation 
programme has converted more than one thousand government-owned firms to the 
private sector (and there were more public firms liquidated). This measure has resulted in 
the reduction of public sector personnel by 360,000. During the major developments, by 
2000, the public sector in Algeria still paid half of the country's wages. The government- 
owned sector, also, still remains dominant in the hydrocarbon (100%) and financial 
sectors (more than 95% ownership). 
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In Morocco, the public sector is less prevalent than in Algeria. During the 1970s, the 
government development and Morroconisation strategy did not exclude private and 
foreign capital from operating in "non-strategic "sectors. In addition, the privatisation 
process started in the eighties has reduced the presence of the state in the capital of firms. 
For instance, in 1988, the public sector employed approximately one-fifth of country's 
total labour and contributed to one-fifth of the country's GDP. According to Jiyad 
(1995), the presence of the State was reduced, but is still more dominant in the industrial 
and energy sector (60%) than in services (55%) and agriculture (less than 5%). In 
contrast to Algeria and Tunisia, Hamdouche (1997) states that the government-owned 
sector in Morocco has been substantially smaller than the private sector since the early 
eighties. Hamdouche (1997) reports that the government-owned sector accounted for less 
than half of the country's GDP and paid about one tenth of total salaries and wages. 
In Tunisia, the size of the public sector was reviewed in late 1980s as new laws were 
introduced and aimed at reducing state involvement. Jiyad (1995) notes that, in 1989, the 
government passed a law that deemed any company as public or government-owned if 
the State held at least half of its capital'6. Similar to Algeria and Morocco, the 
liberalisation reforms and privatisation process have reduced the size of the public sector 
in the economy. For instance, in 1988, the Tunisian public sector enterprises absorbed 
12.5% of the labour force, contributed 13.4% to GNP, owned 28% of total domestic 
investments, and participated in 26% of foreign trade. By the end of 2000, these public 
sector enterprises paid less than 10% of the country's wages and salaries, accounted for 
less than 10% of GNP, and less than 20% of foreign trade. 
2-5-6-1 The Private Sector 
The privatisation of the government-owned sector in the three countries under study has 
been a significant component in the programmes of financial and economic liberalisation 
launched since the early eighties. As the process of privatisation has been well-developed 
in Morocco and Tunisia, less progress has been made in Algeria. 
56 According to Law No. 9 of 1989, a form is considered public if the government owned at least 50% of its 
capital. This replaced Law No. 27 of 1985, which consider every company where the government owned at 
least 34% public. Between 1964 and 1985), a form was considered public if the government owned more at 
least 10% of its capital. 
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Jiyad (1995) discusses the arguments in favour of privatisation in North Africa and 
Middle East countries (MENA). His findings include that state-owned enterprises are 
more likely to be inefficient, mis-managed, loss-making, multi-objective, and politicised. 
In contrast, private enterprises are more likely to be efficient, well-managed, profit- 
motivated and market-driven. Most studies in favour of privatisation, such as Nvong 
(1994), discern three main arguments. First, "the efficiency argument" suggests that 
private-owned enterprises are efficient and more likely to produce better results and 
higher profits than state-owned enterprises. Second, "the management and ownership 
argument" asserts that managers need to have a share in the capital of the enterprises they 
manage in order to be more motivated to avoid inefficiencies. Finally, "the fiscal 
distortion argument" claims that the interventionist role of the government in enterprises 
ownership and management would allocate resources inefficiently, reflected in 
substantial budgetary deficits. 
The privatisation of the public sector in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia reflects a failure of 
the measures undertaken in the era of nationalisation in the sixties and seventies. 
Currently, the governments in the three countries recognise that private ownership is 
preferred and all are committed to the process of State disengagement from the economy. 
The laws and constitutions allow private and foreign capital to own and manage 
properties in almost all economic sectors. The creation of new stock exchanges" has 
significantly helped to float capital and boost the ownership of non-government capital in 
quoted companies, particularly in Morocco and Tunisia. 
Privatisation programmes in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia tend to have a gradual 
character and do not typically distinguish between national private and foreign capital. SB 
At the beginning of the process, privatisation laws were designed to privatise and 
liquidise small and non-performing enterprises, such as public local enterprises in 
Algeria. Enterprises in non-strategic sectors such as tourism and breweries were most 
concerned with the transfer of property to private investors at this stage of the process. 
57 Stock exchanges are more active and developed in Morocco and Tunisia than in Algeria. Stock 
exchanges existed in Morocco and Tunisia since early sixties but had been dormant before the nineties. The 
Algiers Stock exchange was created in late nineties. See next chapter. 58 According to Belghazi (2000), over the 1993-1996 privatisation programme in Morocco, half of the 
companies were transferred to foreign investors 
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Then, privatisation laws were amended to allow "profitable" enterprises in "priority or 
strategic" sectors to be privatised such as in the banking and telecommunications 
sectors" 
In Algeria, the process of privatisation started in 1994 as first conditioned by the one- 
year Stand-By Agreement with the IMF. The government started by passing the law of 
privatisation in 1995, which allows full private ownership in most public enterprises. The 
government liquidated approximately one thousand enterprises of a small and local 
character, in sectors such as in housing, construction and retail, and later managed to 
fully privatise hotels, breweries and brick enterprises60. By 2001, the government put 88 
firms for privatisation, and only one company attracted full foreign capital, - the country's 
largest steel firm, SIDER61. Naas (2003) notes that amendments made to the Investments 
Law in 1994 abolished the former article stipulating the outlawing of any long-term 
credits allocated to the private sector, and limiting long and medium loans to be up to 2- 
3-% of total investment expenses. This change aimed at promoting greater private sector 
funding of industry. However, despite these attempts to improve the role of private 
capital, the results have been modest. The Algiers Stock Exchange created in 1999, has 
failed to attract substantial investment as only three shares were floated by 200462. The 
share of the government is still significant in sectors such as the financial sector, 
hydrocarbon-related activities, and also in the state airline Air Algerie, although private 
ownership significantly dominates retail trade, road transport and agricultural industries. 
In Morocco, Hamdouche (1997) mentions that the privatisation programme targeted 
sectors where private capital (foreign or Moroccan) held a minority position, particularly 
in sectors such as manufacturing, transport, communications and banking. As of the late 
nineties, the government has sold an equivalent of US$1.5bn of its holdings to private 
s9 The Egyptian-Base Mobile Company ORASCOM won the contract of setting up first generation of 
mobile Phones in Algeria in 2001. The second contract took place in late 2003 and was won by the 
Kuwait-base Al-Watania. 
60 During 1997-1998, the government offered 88 companies for privatisation and 350 subsidies (20 hotels, 
20 brick factories, and 4 breweries). In 1998, the government privatised 1200 public pharmacies. 61 The Indian company ISPAT bought SIDER. Also, in 1999, the German giant HENKEL form a joint 
venture with ENAD to manufacture soap and detergent. 62 These share are: ERIAD-Setif (Food processing), SAIDAL (pharmaceutical), and El-Aurassi Hotel. Only 
20% of their capitals are floated on Algiers Stock Exchange. 
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and foreign capital `3. The programme of privatisation in Morocco has attracted foreign 
ownership. For instance, in 1997, foreign capital purchased an equivalent of US$lbn of 
firms listed on privatisation programmes33. Also, according to the IMF (2003), as a result 
of the liberalisation the telecommunication sector in 1996, the government privatised its 
mobile phone industry for US$1. lbn in 1999, and also a third of Maroc Telecom for 
US$2.1 bn to Vivendi (equivalent to 5% of GDP). 
In Tunisia, the government privatised 165 public enterprises over the period from 1987 to 
April 2003 (tounisinfo. com). The government participation in public sector production 
businesses was reduced from 48% at the end of the 1980's to about 42% by 2003 as a 
result of the privatisation process". By 1989, the government has privatised forty-five 
enterprises mainly in tourism, small manufacturing and construction for total receipts of 
US$90m. Most of the enterprises privatised in early phases of the privatisation 
programmes in Tunisia were unprofitable and/or relatively small, and they were directly 
sold to private parties rather to the public via the "Bourse de Tunis". Some were simply 
liquidised and their assets sold to private purchasers. The privatisation programme was 
advanced during the period 1997-2001, in which half of the total value of privatised 
companies was collected. Services, including tourism and banking, and manufacturing 
industries, were mostly concerned with the privatisation programme. Foreign capital 
accounted for approximately three quarters of the receipts of privatisation, of which more 
than nine-tenths were in the construction and financial industries (Tunis iainfo. com). 
2-5-7 Employment and Unemployment 
Another common indicator of economic performance relates to the employment 
prospects within a country. Overall, unemployment rates in the three countries under 
study have been higher than in MENA and in other Mediterranean countries. 
Unemployment rates in Morocco and Algeria are similar, but higher than in Tunisia. In 
2000, the level of unemployment reached 15% in Tunisia, and as high as 28% in Algeria 
63 As of mid-1998, the government sold some or all of its shares in 52 entities out of 114 programmed, in 
which 18 were hotels (www. north-africa. com, 1999). 
64 Tunisia is trying to reach the level of industrialized countries where government ownership share of 
institutions does not exceed 7%, while in Tunisia it is more than 20% 
(http: //www. arabicnews. com/ansub/Daily/Day/971205/1997120502. html) 
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and Morocco, higher than the rate average of MENA countries, 25% (IMF, 2001). The 
IMF (2001) reports that more than a quarter of Algeria and Morocco's population are 
unemployed, which are mostly in urban areas. Akesbi (1999) and Vermeren (2002) found 
that, in Morocco, the unemployment rate is higher for educated individuals compared to 
those with no education. In addition, in all three countries, populations tend to be young 
with around sixty percent of the total populations being less than thirty-years old. This 
category of the population tends to be most affected by high unemployment, specifically 
in Morocco and Algeria. Akesbi (1999) reports that, in Morocco, unemployment among 
the 20-30 year-olds is about 25%, whereas it is about 10% for those more than fifty years 
of age. Akesbi (1999) discerns that quarter of a million job seekers come onto the labour 
market every year, which are mostly less than twenty years of age. 
Akesbi (1999) states a number of factors that help explain the significance of the ongoing 
imbalances between the supply and demand of labour in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
These imbalances primarily relate to various demographic characteristics, the rural 
exodus, and the relatively low rates of investment and economic growth. Jiyad (1995) 
adds other factors including programmes of privatisation, liquidation, and the 
restructuring of public enterprises. These programmes involved dismissing unnecessary 
employees, and consequently, increased the number of unemployed65. Furthermore, 
Akesbi (1999) observes that unemployment mostly affects populations in urban areas 
more than in rural area. Nowadays, around half of the three countries' populations are 
living in urban areas compared to less than forty percent in the eighties. In Algeria, the 
exodus driven by the threat of terrorism and crime in rural areas has led to the increase in 
the proportion of population living in urban areas. According to Akesbi (1999), this rural 
exodus has created a mismatch between the urban population and employment supply. 
An analysis of employment structure shows that an approximate average of thirty percent 
of the active population in the three countries are employed in the distributive sector 
(which includes hospitality, retail and transport industries). The agricultural sector 
employs around forty percent of total employed in Morocco and Tunisia, whereas it 
65 For instance, over the period 1994-2000, the Algerian government has made mire than 450,000 public 
sector employees redundant. However, the state is still the biggest employer in Algeria (as privatisation is 
still underway), whereas the private sector is the biggest employer in Morocco and Tunisia. 
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employs less than fifteen percent of the employed population in Algeria. The industrial 
and construction sector, including the hydrocarbons, is the biggest employer in Algeria 
with nearly half of the employed population. In Morocco and Tunisia, this sector 
employs around thirty percent of total employed (I F statistics, 2001). 
2-6 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the main economic characteristics of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
over the post-colonialism era. In the 1960s and 1970s, the three countries followed 
economic policies based on the principle of "State interventionism". These policies 
generated a situation where the State monopolised the management and ownership of all 
or the main economic sectors. The chapter shows that the three countries followed the 
same pattern in the postcolonial period: local economies dependent on the metropolitan 
economy, central planning model and then economic liberalisation. While Algeria 
strongly adopted the "State Developmentalist" model, Morocco and Tunisia encouraged 
the interventionist role of the State in strategic sectors, but did not exclude the 
participation of the private sector from non-strategic sectors. Tunisia and Morocco 
motivated the private and foreign sector to invest in export-substitute industries. 
While the three countries enjoyed higher levels of economic growth due to the higher 
prices of hydrocarbon and phosphate in the seventies, by the 1980s, this approach to 
economic management of the respective economies by the State had illustrated its 
disadvantages, as reflected in declines in economic growth, falls in export revenues, and 
increased external indebtness. Choski and Parageorgiou (1986) discern that oil crises and 
interest rate shocks altogether with debt problems in Latin America and Africa in the 
eighties, exerted increasing pressures on policy-makers in developing and centrally- 
planned countries to re-evaluate past growth and development strategies, and encouraged 
them to move their economies towards more market-based systems. 
In the late 1980s and by the mid-1990s, having the assistance of the IMF, Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia launched structural reform programmes aimed at the liberalisation 
of economic activities. This included the reduction of State involvement in the economy 
and increasing the role of the private sector encouraging domestic and foreign capital. In 
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addition, the three countries suffered from the heavy burden of external debts owing to 
extravagant developments in the early decades of independence. The three countries were 
forced to reschedule their debts under International Monetary Fund arrangements. 
The chapter has also outlined the main structural characteristics of the Algerian, 
Moroccan and Tunisian economies. In terms of their economic structures, while heavy 
industry and hydrocarbons are more important in Algeria, light manufacturing, services 
and agricultural sectors are more prevalent in Morocco and Tunisia. In terms of their 
external trade, the three countries suffer from structural concentrations and imbalances in 
exports. For instance, nearly 95% of Algeria's export revenues are from the hydrocarbon 
industry, whereas more than 60% of Morocco and Tunisia's exports are from agriculture 
(agriculture-related) and light manufacturing products, such as textiles and shoes. 
Imports of the countries under study are mainly consumer goods and technology 
products. 
The following chapter attempts to highlight the main features of Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia's financial sectors. Particular attention will be paid to discussing various 
financial and monetary reforms. 
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Chapter 3 Structural Characteristics of the 
Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Banking 
Systems 
3-1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter examined the structural characteristics of Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia's economies, and noted that economic growth in Algeria is strongly related to 
world energy prices, whereas growth in Morocco and Tunisia is more dependent on 
climatic conditions (e. g. the performance of the agricultural sector), services (e. g. 
hospitality sector) and export-oriented light manufacturing. The three countries are also 
affected by the performance of the EU economy, as this is their main external trade 
partner. In addition, the previous chapter examined the economic performance of the 
three countries over the post-colonial era. The three countries adopted the centrally 
planning model and built significant government-owned sectors throughout the sixties 
and seventies. In the 1980s and 1990s, driven by the imbalances in their macro- 
economies, the three countries implemented a programme of economic and financial 
reforms in order to correct economic distortions and towards more market-based 
economies. 
The present chapter focuses on the monetary, financial and banking features of the three 
countries under study. The chapter reviews the main developments in the banking system 
since independence, including the role of the monetary policy and financial institutions in 
the Statist economies before financial liberalisation. Over this era, interest rates were 
administratively determined, and the supply of credit and money was controlled directly 
by the State through the old French style encadrement system. Having no autonomy, 
every bank was forced to lend to a (public-owned) specific economic sector compatible 
with its own pre-defined specialisation. The chapter will also assess the main financial 
liberalisation measures that have been undertaken in the three countries. Financial 
liberalisation measures include the abandonment of the aforementioned interventionist 
practices by relaxing the interventions of the state in the financial system and the transfer 
of the management of some of these to the central bank. Interest rates and credit 
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allocation are currently freely set in the market and private and foreign capital is 
permitted in the local banking markets. In addition, the chapter outlines the main features 
and structures of banking and financial systems in the three countries under study. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section reviews the main monetary 
and banking developments over the period pre-liberalisation. Table A2-1, Table A2-2, 
Table A2-3, and Table A2-5 in Appendix A2 contain selected financial and monetary 
indicators in the three countries under study. The second section reviews financial 
liberalisation and reform measures that have being implemented in the three countries. 
The third section examines the main substantial characteristics of the banking systems 
including market concentration, ownership and size. The final section evaluates the major 
features of the banking sectors performance and condition using various balance sheet 
and profitability indicators. Table A2-5 (Algeria), Table A2-6 (Morocco) and Table A2- 
7 (Tunisia) in Appendix A2 contain information on balance sheet structures on the three 
banking systems. 
3-2 Monetary and Financial Policy in the Pre- 
Reform Period 
This section of the chapter reviews the monetary and financial policies that were 
undertaken during the period prior to financial liberalisation. 
3-2-1 Algeria 
Goumiri (1993) and Naas (2003) analyse the main characteristics of the monetary policy 
of the economic and financial authorities and the emergence of the banking sector in 
Algeria over the period from the post-colonial to the liberalisation period. Over the 
period 1962-1985, they categorise the evolution of the Algerian banking sector into three 
major phases: the sovereignty phase (1962-1963), the nationalisation and socialisation 
phase (1966-1980), and the organic restructuring phase (1982-1985). These phases were 
compatible with the dominance of the centrally planned system characterised by 
substantial public, priority and strategic sectors, administratively designed investment 
and development plans, and full State intervention in the process of development and 
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industrialisation. In the late 1980s, the banking sector was gradually oriented towards 
more market-based system. 
First, the phase of sovereignty started just after independence in 1962. This phase 
witnessed the creation of four major financial institutions: the Treasury (August 1962), 
the Central Bank (December 1962), the Caisse Algerienne de Developpement66 (CAD, 
Mai 1963), and the Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de Prevoyance (CNEP, August 1963). 
First, the Treasury was in charge of allocating financial resources to investments, 
particularly those in favour of the agricultural sector. Second, the creation of the Banque 
Centrale d'Algerie established the Algerian Dinar as the country moved out of the Franc 
Zone. The central bank was granted traditional functions including money issue, credit 
control and reserves and State external debt management. In addition to these functions, 
in 1964, the central bank was in charge of granting loans and advances in favour of the 
State-managed agricultural sector. Finally, the CAD and CNEP were created to collect 
savings and finance planned investments, as well as to play the role of a payment 
instruments provider. 
Second, the phase of "Algerianisation and socialisation" started in 1966, and this 
consisted of the construction of the core of the Algerian commercial banking system. 
Naas (2003) indicates that the government needed the creation of its commercial banking 
fabric, mainly in order to channel more financing into its socialist plans. The 
government, headed by President Boumediene, nationalised foreign banks that had 
operated in the country since the colonial era. Benhalima (1987) looks at the 
nationalisation process that created the major three Algerian commercial banks, which 
were Banque Nationale d'Algerie (BNA67, June 1966), Credit Populaire d'Algerie (CPA, 
December, 1966), and Banque Exterieure d'Algerie (BEA, October 1967). BNA was 
principally (and exclusively since 1968) in charge of lending money to the agricultural 
sector, whereas CPA and BEA were primarily in charge of lending money to other 
sectors, including hotels, trade and construction, and to export and import-oriented 
industries. 
66 The CAD was transferred into a real development bank under the name of Banque Algerienne de 
Developpment (BAD) according to Ordonnance No 72-66 of 7t' of June 1972. 67 Naas (2003, pp45-50) mentions that deposits at BNA, CPA and BEA represented approximately 70%, 
10% and 20% of total commercial bank deposits, respectively, by the end of the sixties. 
52 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
The financial policy applied along with the nationalisation and socialisation process was 
passive, as reflected by the central planning and administrative regulation in place. The 
government kept prices constant for prolonged periods and heavily subsidised basic 
commodities, which resulted in generating repressed inflation, and excess in the 
consumer goods market. Also, the financial policy encouraged the government to allocate 
financing and investment centrally using administrative schemes or periodic development 
plans. The Treasury used the Algerian Bank for Development to allocate investment and 
finance provided externally through hydrocarbon exports revenues and substantial 
external borrowings. 
Furthermore, Goumiri (1993) and Naas (2003) state that, in the phase of nationalisation 
and socialisation, the Algerian government imposed four major principles on its financial 
and banking institutions. These principles were adopted to ensure the administratively 
planned exploitation of the banking sector to channel financial resources towards State 
planned investments rather than autonomously shaping investing and financing decisions. 
These principles are unique banking domiciliation, bank specialisation, self-financing 
outlawing, and the illegality of inter-enterprise lending principle. 
First, the principle of unique banking domiciliation, which was introduced in the Budget 
Law of 1970, reflects the mono-bank principle. According to this principle, enterprises 
were obliged to concentrate their banking accounts and their banking operations at one 
bank only68. Naas (2003) finds that, besides the absence of competition, this principle 
resulted in creating liquidity and use-resources unbalances between banks. For example, 
the BEA, which domiciliated SONATRACH (the state oil company), benefited from 
extra liquidity, whereas the BNA, which financed the agricultural sector, was 
continuously in need of extra funding. 
Second, the bank specialisation principle, as a result of mono-banking principle, stated 
that banks were allowed to open banking accounts69 to enterprises that were operating in 
an economic sector that matched their sectoral specialisation. For instance, BNA, then 
6' The principle was legalised by the budget law of 1970 published in the Algerian Official Journal. 69 Every government-owned enterprise disposed two accounts: exploitation account and development 
awOt:. ^t" The exploitation account contains the revenues, payment and short-term loans in order to finance 
working capital needs. The development account records medium and long-term loans. 
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BADR, specialised in the agricultural sector, and BEA primarily specialised in lending 
money to substantial industrial firms such as in hydrocarbons and steel, CPA was in 
charge of lending to industries in the service and construction sectors. 
Third, the principle of outlawing self-financing prohibited enterprises from engaging in 
profit accumulation and self-financing of their investments, unless the planning 
authorities (Ministry of Planning) approved them. Banks did not have autonomy to 
decide upon their investment and financing decisions. Every investment required the 
approval of the Ministry of Planning, then the approval of Comite directeur de la Banque 
Algerienne de Developpment (BAD) to allocate financial resources, the final approval 
came from the Ministry of Finance. 
Finally, the illegality of inter-enterprise lending principle outlawed profit and net cash 
accumulation and their use for inter-enterprise financial operations. Instead, following 
the principle of financial resource centralisation at the Treasury, enterprises were 
required to centralise their unexploited credits, loans and profits at their mono-bank, 
which, in turn, reported to the Treasury and Ministry of Finance to decide upon their 
future exploitation according to the objectives of the various state plans. 
Even though the Central bank was heavily involved in the economy; Goumiri (1993) and 
Benbitour (1998) recognise that the Treasury was the most important institution in the 
financial system of Algeria over the period of central planning. The Treasury managed 
the government revenues and payments, and allocated all the financial resources of the 
government to the financial and banking institutions. The Treasury was responsible for 
lending more than two-thirds of total investments between 1970 and 1980. The banking 
and financial system had a limited intermediary role and was regarded as a tool to be 
used to finance planned investments. 
The third phase of the Algerian banking system's evolution was the organic restructuring 
phase that started in 1984. This phase was a part of the major government-owned 
enterprises organic restructuring operation launched in 1982 in almost all sectors of the 
economy. The banking sector witnessed the creation of two new banks: Banque de 
l'Agriculture et du Developpment Rural (BADR, 1984) and Banque du Developpment 
Local (BDL, 1985). These two banks were established by occupying a number of 
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structures and branches belonging to the BNA and CPA, respectively. Following the 
principle of banking specialisation, BADR was required to lend money to the agricultural 
sector and agro-industrial industries, whereas the BDL was forced to lend money to local 
government-owned enterprises, which were operating under the authority of local 
government departments. 
Thus, from the 1960s throughout the 1980s, the Algerian financial system was 
compulsorily exploited by the government to bridge government finance and government 
investment, with the objective of building a large government-owned sector. In the 
1990s, the Algerian government opted for financial reforms resulted in liveralising the 
financial sector. 
3-2-2 Morocco 
When Morocco obtained its independence from France in 1956, the Moroccan banking 
system consisted of structures that were primarily branches of French banks 
headquartered either in Paris or Algiers. 
The new government of Morocco focused on establishing a banking system that would 
serve its economic and political objectives, within the framework of reclaiming 
sovereignty over the economic and financial sectors. Over the period 1956-1959, the 
Central Bank of Morocco70 was created along with the new national currency, the 
Moroccan Dirham. The sovereignty-reclaiming programme also required existing 
banking structures to apply for new licensing agreements from the newly independent 
government. This measure resulted mainly in a restructuring of the financial sector 
through the reduction in the number of approved banks from sixty-nine in 1954 to 
twenty-six by 196171. 
The phase of bank creation started in 1959, when the government created its first owned 
bank, Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur (BMCE). This bank was required to 
70 Banque du Maroc was established by the Dahir n° 1-59-233 of 30 June 1959 to replace the Banque 
d'Etat du Maroc, and to ensure the functions of a Central Bank. It was created as a state-owned institution 
with legal personality and financial autonomy, entrusted with the privilege of issuing banknotes and coins, 
and the mission of safeguarding the stability of the currency as well as preserving the soundness of the 
banking system. On March 1987, the Banque du Maroc was replaced by Bank Al-Maghrib. 
71 Other reason of reduction in the number of banks was mergers. 
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provide, as a monopolist, foreign trade financing to Moroccan companies. Other 
development banks were created including Caisse de Depot et de Gestion (CDG), Fonds 
d'Equipement Communal (FEC), Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Economique 
(BNDE), and Caisse d'Epargne Nationale (CEN). The setting up of the Moroccan 
banking system continued between 1961 and 1967, as new banks were created. This 
included Credit Agricole (CA), Credit Populaire (CP) and Credit Immobilier and Hotelier 
(CIH)72. Achy (2000) notes that, in the sixties, the primary role of the banking system 
was to collect savings, finance government budgets, pubic enterprises and priority and 
strategic sectors through the mandatory holding of government securities, and bonds 
issued by development banks on behalf of the government. 
The second significant phase of the evolution of the Moroccan banking system was 
launched with the Royal order no 1-67-66 of 21 S` April 1967 enacting law relating to the 
banking industry and credit sector. The main contributions of this law consisted of a 
more precise definition of a bank's activity, the demarcation of duties of Central 
Authorities as well as the establishment of a new regulatory structure. The articles of the 
order were applied to money deposit banking, and were extended to the Credit 
Populaire in 1970. In 1986, the regulations of title III of the enacting law relating to bank 
and credit control were extended to the Banque Nationale pour le Developpement 
Economique and to the Credit Immobilier et Hotelier, which were, in other aspects, 
allowed to collect deposits. In 1987, La Caisse Nationale du Credit Agricole was 
permitted to finance other activities in rural areas. 
In addition, and in order to promote investment projects initiated by Moroccans residing 
abroad, two institutions were created in 1989. These were the Bank Al-Amal, which was 
charged, in particular, with granting participative loans or subordinated loans, and Dar 
Ad-Damane, which aimed to offer guarantee services on the loans authorised by the 
Bank Al-Amal. 
In 1973, the process ofMorocconisation was launched and it did not exclude the banking 
sector. Hamdouche (1997) notes that the nationalisation process that had taken place, 
unlike in Algeria, permitted the Moroccan private sector to invest in banking. 
72 Source: Bank AI-Maghrib (Moroccan central bank) Internet site, 2003. 
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Hamdouche (197) also conforms that the economic strategy adopted in the 1960s did not 
deny the importance of private capital in the Moroccan economy. 
Zamiti (1998) discusses the credit policy in Morocco over the period 1976-1990. The 
policy included dividing financial institutions into deposit money banks and specialised 
financial institutions. Deposits money banks were allowed to open branches and collect 
deposits, however, specialised financial institutions were not permitted to deal with the 
public and open branches. Specialised banks were required to provide finance to projects 
of a development character and with governmental clients. As in Algeria, the French 
style systems '1'encadrement du credit' was adopted with the aim of controlling the 
supply of funds, and ensure these were allocated according to government expectations 
outlined in the periodic plans. The government coerced its commercial banking structure 
to invest in government bonds, which were either issued by the Treasury or by 
government-owned specialised development banks on behalf of the government In the 
early 1980s, banks were required to retain thirty percent of their deposits as treasury 
bonds. In addition, commercial banks were also required to hold fifteen percent of their 
deposits as bonds issued by specialised banks. 
As part of the structural adjustment reform programme, which was designed with the 
assistance of the IMF in the mid-1980s, the Moroccan government implemented 
measures with the objective of liberalising the financial and banking industry. One 
particular measure was the adoption of universal banking. Specialised financial 
institutions became able to collect deposits and savings from the public and open 
branches across the kingdom. 
The financial sector in Morocco underwent a process of profound financial liberalisation 
in the early nineties, as part of the structural adjustment reform programme. The 
liberalisation measures included the elimination of credit ceilings, the deregulation of 
interest rates, the gradual removing of mandatory holdings of government securities, and 
the strengthening of prudential regulation of banks in accordance with international 
"Banks were required to hold 6% of deposits as bonds issued by the Credit Immobilier et Hotelier (CHI), 
5.5% of deposits as bonds issued by Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Economique (BNDE), 
AND 3.5% of deposits as bonds issued by Caisse Nationale de Cr6dit Agricole (CNCA). 
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standards. Financial liberalisation was reflected in the new Banking law of 199374 
relating to credit institutions' activity and their supervision, which represented a 
significant change in the Moroccan banking system. The new law allowed for the 
unification of the legal framework applicable to credit institutions including multipurpose 
deposits banks", specialised financing institutions, and financing companies76, as well as 
the strengthening of the central bank authority, Bank al-Maghrib, over supervision 
functions. For instance, Bank Al-Maghrib required financial and banking institutions that 
received funds from the public to undertake a compulsory annual audit and publishing of 
their financial statements. The Law also imposed measures to protect customers and 
depositors such as the establishment of a Depositors Guarantee Fund as well as a support 
mechanism for credit institutions in difficulty. 
3-2-3 Tunisia 
As in Morocco, Pfeifer (1996) notes that prior to independence, banking structures 
operating in Tunisia were branches and affiliates of banks based in France or Algiers. 
These banking structures primarily served the financial needs of the French settlers and 
French-friendly community in Tunisia. Shortly after independence in 1956, the new 
government headed by President Bourguiba, decided to nationalise all banking structures 
and to link these to the public sector. In 1958, Banque Centrale de Tunisie77 was 
established, and a month later, the currency unit the Tunisian Dinar78was created. The 
central bank was primarily attributed the duties of money issue and money supply to the 
public-owned enterprises. At the same time, the government terminated the foreign 
exchange system under which the Tunisian Dinar was pegged to the French Franc. 
Hall (2001) notes that since independence, the State realised the non-existence of a 
strong private sector, and has pursued an economic development strategy based on the 
interventionist role of the government and its indisputable control and ownership over 
"strategic" sectors including foreign exchange and the financial sector. However, the 
"Dahir enacting Law No. 1-93-147 of July 6m, 1993. 's The Law calls this banks "registered banks" . 76 including consumer credit companies, leasing companies, real estate credit companies, factoring 
companies, suretyship companies, and management of payment companies 
" Law No. 58-90 of 19th September 1958. 78 Law No. 58-109 oft 8`h October 1958. 
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nationalisation process was not accomplished until 1966. By this year, the process of 
"Tunisification" targeted seven banks out of the thirteen operating by then. The 
remaining six remained under French jurisdiction until 196679, when the government 
headed by Ben Salah nationalised all these banks. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Tunisian government restructured the financial and banking 
sector by establishing new banking and financial government-owned firms. The primary 
role of the newly established nationalised banking sector was to collect savings and 
channel these to the treasury and government-owned enterprises. That is, the government 
exploited the structure of the banking industry within the framework of State intervention 
and regulation. Financial regulation in Tunisia consisted of the administrative allocation 
of credit, and the central determination of interest rates, in addition to the prohibition of 
foreign banks from operating in local markets. The financial regulation also included the 
centralisation of bank credit decision-making8'. Banks were compelled to hold up to one 
fifth of their assets in government bonds and to allocate a fixed percentage of their 
deposits for lending at preferential interest rates to priority sectors. 
3-3 Financial Liberalisation in Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia 
This section of the chapter discusses the main financial liberalisation measures 
implemented in the reform period, in the 1980s and 1990s. Financial liberalisation in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia involved the creation of monetary and financial markets, 
the adoption of indirect monetary instruments, the deregulation of interest rates, the 
granting of autonomy to banks upon their credit allocation decision, and the dismantling 
of entry barriers by allowing private and foreign capital to operate in the respective 
banking sectors. 
According to Enders et al. (1998), financial sector reforms in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia were part of a structural adjustment plan launched in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
79 For instance, the property Savings Bank of Algeria and Tunisia, based in Algiers, now Amen Bank. 
remained subject to French jurisdiction until 1966. By this year, most of banks working in Algeria were 
nationalised. 
80 Banks were required to obtain the approval of the central bank for credits exceeding TD 100,000. 
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primary objective of the financial reforms was to move towards the use of indirect 
instruments of monetary control, the adoption of internationally accepted methods of 
supervision and prudential regulation, and the modernisation of the legal and institutional 
structures of the respective banking systems. Another objective of the financial 
liberalisation implemented in the three countries under study was to break down financial 
repression practices, as reflected by both the administratively determined interest rates 
and the quantitative controls on credit allocation based on the Encadrement du Credit 
system. In addition, the financial liberalisation programme envisioned reducing the 
dependence of the economy on local banking capital and aimed to encourage foreign 
capital through the chartering and licensing of new foreign-owned banks. Ben Naceur 
(2003) observes that that financial reforms were articulated around five areas; 
liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation, introduction of new indirect monetary 
policy, strengthening prudential regulation, opening the financial sector to foreign 
financial institutions and promotion of the equity market. 
3-3-1 Interest Rates Liberalisation 
Enders et al. (1997 and 2000) reviews the steps of interest rates liberalisation in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia, and notes that the process of deregulation in the three countries 
was gradual. Overall, as Table 3-1 indicates, interest rates in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia maintained a decreasing trend from the mid-1990s. Table 3-1 reports deposit, 
lending and money market rates in the three countries under study, from 1990 to 2002. 
In Algeria, the passing of the Money and Credit Law (April 1990) terminated the 
determination of interest rates by the Treasury. According to this law, the central bank is 
now responsible for the monetary policy of the country, and therefore, interest rates 
determination. In 1990, the measures relating to discriminatory and preferential interest 
rates for certain sectors, considered as priority, were abolished. Interest rates for the 
private and public sector became unified and commercial paper from both sectors 
became subject to the same eligibility criteria of refinancing. Also, in 1990, controls on 
deposits interest rates were discontinued and became fully deregulated. In 1994, the 
central bank replaced ceilings on lending rates by limits on banking spreads. However, in 
1995, limits on banking spreads were annulled. Eltony (2002) reports, in Algeria, real 
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deposit rates were negative before 1999, and reached the highest level in 1992, at -15%. 
In 1999 and 2000, these rates became positive, at 5.5% and 4%, respectively. Interest 
rates increased over 1990-1995, but declined thereafter. 
In Morocco, Inders et al. (1997) reports that the first attempt to deregulate interest rates 
was in the mid-eighties, when interest rate subsidies for priority sectors were eliminated. 
Between 1989 and 1991, interest rates on lending and for time deposits were further 
liberalised, and ceilings on lending rates for all types of credits, except for export and 
small and medium-sized companies, were replaced by limits on banking spreads. In 
1996, the process of interest rate liberalisation was continued by terminating the use of 
limits on banking spreads, and all the remaining aspects of control on lending and 
deposits rates. For instance, lending interest rates became freely negotiated between 
banks and their clients81. Also, credits of less than one year must have fixed interest 
whereas credit of more than one year can have either fixed or variable interest rates 
indexed to the money market rate. In Morocco, Achy (2002) notes that, before 
implementing the financial liberalisation in the mid-eighties, interest rates were 
administratively set and were negative in real terms, due to high inflation rates. For 
instance, real interest rates were -7% in 1980, but increased to 4.9% by 1987. In the 
1990s, although inflation picked up, nominal interest rates were sufficiently high, 
between 14% and 16%, and real interest rates maintained their positive sign, but a steady 
decline of nominal interest rates, has been accruing since 1995. 
In Tunisia, Inders et al. (1997,2000) state that the creation of the money market in 1987 
was the first step to the gradual process of interest rate liberalisation. Interest rates on 
special savings accounts became pegged to the money market rate (MMR) in the 
proceeding month. The liberalisation processed was furthered by deregulating interest 
rates on term deposits of at least three months. In the late eighties and early nineties, 
lending rates, except for those to priority sectors, were allowed to be freely moving with 
a spread of three percent above the money market rate. Over 1994-1996, the gradual 
liberalisation of interest rates was completed by lifting all controls on lending rates for 
both priority and non-priority sectors. However, Boughrara (2002) mentions that, even 
81 Bank A1-Maghrib Circular of February 15th, 1996 related to interest rates. 
61 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
though interest rates have been liberalised in Tunisia, a number of deposit rates remained 
regulated. For instance, interest rates on sight deposits (up to three months) must not 
exceed a ceiling of 2%, interest rates on special savings deposits82 are set at 2% below 
the money market rate, and savings accounts dedicated to housing financing had a fixed 
rate of 5.25%. Table 3-1 shows the evolution of interest rates in the three countries over 
the period 1990 to 2002. 
Table 3-1: Selected Interest Rates in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, in 
Percent from 1990 to 2002 
Rates Deposits Rates Lending Rates** Money Market Rates* 
Countries Algeria Morocco 
Tunisia 
Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Algeria 
Morocco Tunisia 
1990 00 8 850 63 9 13.75- 9.00 - - 831 11.8125 . . 20.00 
1991 00 8 8 50 9.63 15.00- 9.00 - - 10.00 11.8125 . . 20.00 
1992 8 00 - 9 63 
15.00- 11.04- 
- - 8.80 113125 . . 20.00 1559 
1993 8 00 - 738 
15.00- 10.0- 
- - 7.04 8.8125 . 20.00 14.0 
1994 12 00 7 17 88 6 17.63- 10.00 - 19.80 12.29 8.8125 . . . 22.63 
1995 - - 88 6 83 22 
0- 19 p 10.06 8.8125 
. . 12. 
1996 14.50 7.00 6.13 19.00 8.0- - 18.47 8.42 7.8125 
1997 9.75 - 5.00 1250 
i- 11.80 7.89 6.875 
1998 8.50 7.30 5.00 11.00 1350 - 10.40 630 6.875 
1999 7.50 6.40 3.88 10.00 1350 - 10.43 5.64 5.875 
2000 7.50 5.20 3.88 10.00 1330 - 6.77 5A1 5.8750 
2001 625 5.00 4.00 930 1330 - 335 4.44 6.04 
2002 5.25 4.5 4.00 830 13.10 - 4.20 2.99 5.93 
Source: Various including IMF statistics Book (2000 and 2004) 
*End of Period rates/ "Lending rate in Tunisia were act within a spread of 3% of the money market rate 
"; Naas (2003), Pp. 237. 
** " This rate is called savings remuneration rate, source: Central Bank of Tunisia (2004) 
Table 3-1 indicates that in Algeria, interest rates were stable over the period 1990-93, but 
increased from 1994 to 1996 to the stabilisation programme interest rates reached all time 
82Special saving deposits accounted before 40% of total deposits of the public in the banking sector at the 
end of 1998. 
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low level of 4.20% in terms of the money market rate. In Morocco, money market rates 
increased over the period 1996 to 2002, but were developing irregularly over the period 
1990 to 1995. In Tunisia, money market rates decreased from a high level of 11.81% in 
1990-92 to 5.93% by 2002. Therefore, interest rate liberalisation has resulted in a general 
decline in nominal interest rates in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
3-3-2 Credit Allocation Liberalisation 
As discussed earlier, in the pre-liberalisation period, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
controlled the money supply and influenced banking sector liquidity and credit allocation 
by the adoption of the French style "1'encadrement du Credit". During the mid-nineties, 
the three countries under study had deregulated credit allocation and gave greater 
autonomy to government-owned banks in the credit allocation process. Besson (1993) 
asserts that the "encadrement du Credit" was effectively a form of credit ceilings and 
directed credits, which consisted of fixing, for every bank, a monthly progression of 
norms and ceilings on credits. Any supply that exceeded the set norms generated certain 
sanctions. For the case of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, "encadrement du Credit" 
involved the requirement of banks to use the money channelled from the Treasury to 
provide state-owned banks and priority sectors with credits. The process of financial 
sector liberalisation required the abandonment of the "encadrement du Credit" principle. 
In Algeria, the gradual reduction in directed credits was initiated in 1987, when the 
Treasury decided to withdraw from directed investment in State-owned enterprises. The 
emergence of the Law of Money and Credit in 1990 resulted in the dissociation of the 
Treasury from monetary policy responsibilities, which were transferred to the central 
bank. Also, this law terminated the adoption of the unique banking domiciliation and 
specialisation principles, under which banking transactions of a government-owned 
enterprise were forced to be lodged with specific banks, which were uniquely involved in 
financing projects in the sector in which the enterprise operated. Consequently, all 
economic sectors were opened to all banks, including specialised banks. In addition, 
Iradian et al. (2000) indicates that in 1994-1995, the central bank of Algeria introduced 
remunerated reserve requirements for commercial banks. Iradian et al. (1997) also 
indicates that Algerian banks have been granted greater autonomy, particularly 
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concerning the forced allocation of credit to high-risk state-owned firms and the holding 
of treasury bills. The mandatory holding of treasury bills was phased out in 1994, 
however, commercial banks still hold significant amounts of treasury paper from past re- 
capitalisation exercises83. Abed and Fisher (2003) report that, by the period 2000-2002, 
the Treasury identified the remaining non-performing loans of banks, and re-capitalised 
three government-owned banks through infusions of cash and the issuance of treasury 
securities. 
In Morocco, Enders et at. (1997,2000) reviews the abandonment of credit rationing. In 
1991-1993, the obligatory holdings of bonds and paper issued by specialised 
governmental banks84 were gradually reduced from a peak of 15%. In 1994, while the 
requirement of holding bonds issued by BNDE and CIA was discontinued, the 
requirement to hold bonds issued by CNCAQ was still in place, and was equivalent to 
2% of deposits. In addition, the requirement for compulsory holdings by commercial 
banks of government paper was reduced from 35% of short-term deposits in 1986 to 10% 
of short-term liabilities by 1994. Further, all the preferential access to refinancing and 
credit provided to smaller and for-export related companies was terminated by 1996. 
In Tunisia, Enders et al. (1997,2000) discerns that the deregulation of credits started in 
1988, when the central bank terminated the procedure by which banks had to obtain 
central bank authorisation for credits and loans decisions. In 1990, the central bank 
discontinued the requirement on banks to supply loans and credit to certain government- 
owned enterprises and economic sectors at preferential interest rates. In 1994, the 
deregulation of credits continued as banks were no longer obliged to hold treasury bills, 
and in 1996, obligatory sectoral lending ratios were voided. 
3-3-3 Dismantling of Entry Barriers and Privatisation 
One predominant measure initiated by the financial liberalisation programme in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia, was the dismantling of entry barriers and the disengagement of the 
State from the financial sector, in terms of ownership and management. This measure has 
83 Commercial banks held US$14bn and US$18bn of re-capitalisation equivalent paper in 1995 and 1997, 
respectively. 
84 These banks are Banque Nationale pour le Devcloppement Economique (BNDE), Credit Immobilier et 
Agricole (CIA), and Caisse Nationale du Cr6dit Agricole (CNCA). 
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been implemented through the process of privatisation and the lifting of constraints on 
private and foreign capital to invest in local markets, aimed at increasing competition in 
the financial sector and improving the performance of banks. In the three countries under 
study, privatisation has been processed by permitting national and foreign investors to set 
up financial and banking firms, and also, in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, through 
transferring government-owned banks to the private sector using the capital market or by 
negotiating sales to private institutions. 
Clarke and Cull (1998) discuss the relationship between bank government-ownership and 
banks' incentive. Primarily, as banks collect private saving and convert these into 
investments, banks will have stronger incentives to gather information about the credit- 
worthiness of potential borrowers. The gathered information will then be examined to 
determine how and at what terms credit is allocated, in order to ensure that money is 
directed towards the most productive purposes. In the case of state owned banks political 
and non-market pressures distort banks' incentives, which can be reflected by allocating 
credit on non-commercial lending criteria and to non-productive purposes. Clarke and 
Cull (1998) conclude that privatisation and maintaining the position of the state from the 
ownership of banking structures might generate large effects on financial sector 
performance. 
In Algeria, the new law of Money and Credit of 1990 permitted private and foreign banks 
to set up. Since 1994, the privatisation of the financial sector has developed by allowing 
private and foreign banks to operate in the local market. No major transfer of 
management and ownership concerning public banks has been made to date". As a result 
of the indicated Law, in 2003, there are more than fifteen non-government commercial 
banks (three private-owned and eight foreign-owned) and six government-owned 
commercial banks (Naas, 2003). The recently established private and foreign banks tend 
to be small and have limited networks86. The entry of new foreign and private banks has 
intensified since 1997, as the Bank of Algeria authorised more than twenty new banks 
8S The Algerian government has not started privatising its owned banks (now 2003). The government plans 
to open the 50% capital of CPA for foreign and private investors in 2005. 86 The first joint-venture bank, which was licensed in 1994, is Al-Baraka Bank. This bank is owned equally 
between the Saudi-based private bank, Al-Baraka Group, and the Algerian government-owned bank 
BADR The investment bank, Union Bank, was the first bank fully owned by Algerian private investors 
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with different forms of ownership; fully foreign, fully national private, and national 
private-foreign. 
One major obstacle that has significantly hindered the rapid privatisation of large 
government-owned banking firms is their under-capitalisation, which was caused by the 
large amounts of non-performing loans granted to government-owned enterprises. The 
government has implemented re-capitalisation processes in the nineties either in the form 
of cash or bond-loan swaps. Iradian et al (2000) reports that the first major re- 
capitalisation operation occurred in 1992-1993, when the Treasury substituted 
government bonds for non-performing assets given by public banks to public enterprises. 
As a first step, this operation was substantial as the government bonds accounted for 
approximately a quarter of GDP (these bonds were paid off by 1996). The second major 
re-capitalisation operation in the form of bond-loan swaps occurred in 1997, in favour of 
three main public banks (BADR, BNA, and CNEP"). The cost of this operation was 
about 8.5% of GDP. Overall, the process of State-owned banks recapitalisation has cost 
the government over US$18 billion (Marks and Mussadeq, 2003). 
In Morocco, in 1989, the government voided the procedures of the Morocconisation 
decree of 1973, which imposed a 49% limit on foreign ownership in strategic sectors, 
including the financial sector. The new Banking Law of 1993 allowed private and foreign 
capital to invest and create banking and financial institutions. Morocco has used main 
stock exchange- the Bourse de Casablanca- to process the privatisation of its banking 
sector. Currently, there are seven commercial banks listed in the market representing a 
third of total market capitalisation. The privatisation of banks started over 1995-199788, 
and as of the end of 2000, there were only three major government-owned banks89. A 
new law approved in 2000 allowed Morocco's largest bank (Banque Centrale Populaire) 
to float about a fifth of its shares on the Bourse de Casablanca. 
87 BADR and BNA increased their lending and loan concentration in the food and pharmaceutical 
importing agencies. These agencies suffered large losses originated from the 1994 devaluation of Dinar. 
Iradian et al. (2000) reports that between 1991-1997, public banks receive an equivalent of 11% of GDP to 
compensate them for foreign exchange losses incurred on past external borrowing contracted on the behalf 
of the government. CNEP bank accumulated large amounts of non-performing to he housing and 
construction sector. 
88 The first bank to be privatised was 1995 (Casablanca Bourse Fact Book, 2002). 89 These are: Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP), Credit Immobilier et Hotelier (CII), and Banque 
Nationale pour le Devdloppement Economique (ENDE). 
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In Tunisia, financial liberalisation abolished entry restrictions on non-government owned 
banks allowing them to enter the market. This has been done by opening banks' capital to 
foreign and private participation, by permitting foreign and private capital to open 
branches and operate onshore, and by allowing offshore banks to collect deposits in 
Tunisia Dinar from residents, but with some restrictions. The Central Bank of Tunisian 
(2003b) states that the programme to restructure the banking system and enhance the 
presence of foreign capital continued in 2002 with the privatisation of the International 
Banking Union (UIB) and transformation of joint-venture development banks into full 
service banks. The transaction for privatising the UIB was finalised in November 2002 
with the sale of 3,640,000 public shares, representing 52% of its capital to the French 
bank "7a Societe Generale" for 102.7 MTD. This transaction, in the context of the 
State's privatisation programme, is a major event in that it is the first sale of a controlling 
stake in a Tunisian bank to foreign interests. 
3-3-4 The Creation of Financial Markets 
The establishment and development of stock exchanges in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
can be regarded as a major step in the course of moving towards market-based financing 
of the economy and reducing the dependence of enterprises on banking lending. The 
Bourse de Casablanca is the oldest in the region, established in 1929, followed by 
Bourse de Tunis, 1969, and then more recently Bourse d'Alger in 1999. While only three 
shares are listed on the Algiers exchange, the market capitalisation and number of listed 
companies in Casablanca and Tunis increased considerably due to privatisation 
programmes executed in the 1990s. However, all three stock exchanges are still small 
and have not developed in line with the respective banking systems. Demirugüc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (1998) discern that larger stock market capitalisation to GDP ratios appear 
to be related to increased bank margins, reflecting possible complementarily between 
debt and equity. The same study also finds that a larger market capitalisation to bank 
assets ratio, however, is related negatively to margins, suggesting that relatively well- 
developed stock markets can substitute for bank finance. 
Eltony (2000) states that the development of capital markets requires a sound regulatory 
framework and a number of structural reforms. These, in particular, relate to the 
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establishment of an effective privatisation programme, a sound macro-economic 
environment in favour of increasing the share of private ownership in the economy, the 
strengthening of market forces through improved information flows, accounting 
standards, property rights, pricing efficiency, and tax reforms. 
In Algeria, the Algiers Stock Exchange (ASC) is the smallest in the region with only 
three still-dominantly government-owned listed shares90. Currently, there is no financial 
and banking firm quoted on the market. The capitalisation of the market represents less 
than 1% of total GDP. 
In Morocco, the Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE) is the largest in the region with a 
market capitalisation of DH115bn (US$14bn) and fifty-eight listed companies, in 2000, 
accounting for about two-fifths of Morocco's GDP. The CSC witnessed considerable 
development in the nineties, as market capitalisation increased from DH7.8bn in 1993 to 
DH145bn by 2000, and market capitalisation to GDP ratio from 5% in 1990 to 40% in 
2000. Since 1993, the programme of privatisation contributed conspicuously to the 
development of the Casablanca exchange. The number of listed firms increased from 44 
in 1995 to 58 in 2000. In terms of market concentration, the share of the first ten 
securities quoted as a proportion of total market capitalisation declined from 88% in 1994 
to 65% percent in 2000. Financial sector firms account for about half of total market 
capitalisation. The capitalisation of the seven quoted commercial banks' represent a third 
of total market capitalisation. 
In Tunisia, the Tunis Stock Exchange (TSE) capitalisation stood at DT3.9bn (US$2.6bn) 
in 2000 with forty-four quoted companies, representing around fourteen percent of the 
country's GDP. Similarly, the number of quoted firms increased from thirteen in 1990 to 
forty-six in 2002. Over the period 1990-2000, the capitalisation of the Tunis market 
increased nearly eight times. However, over 2000-2002, the capitalisation of the market 
decreased from 3.8 to 2.8 billion Tunisian Dinar. Interestingly, foreign capital is strongly 
present in Tunis in an estimated at 60%t of quoted forms, holding around a fifth of total 
market capitalisation. Currently, there are a number of leasing firms, three insurance 
90 Only 20% of these shares ate floated on the Algiers Stock Exchange. These companies are Eriad-Setif 
(agro-industrial), Saidal (pharmaceutical), and Al-Aurassi Hotel. 
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companies and fourteen commercial and development banks listed on the Tunis exchange 
that account for around half of total market capitalisation. 
Despite these developments, Eltony (2000) notes that the exchanges in Morocco and 
Tunisia are relatively underdeveloped compared to other MENA exchanges, such as in 
Egypt and Jordan. First, the number of listed shares in Cairo and Amman is greater than 
that in Morocco and Tunisia. Second, as of the end of 2000, the capitalisation of the 
Casablanca and Tunis stock exchanges reached US$14bn and US$2.6bn, respectively, 
compared to US$21 and US$5bn in Cairo and Amman, respectively. Also, in 2000, the 
ratio of market capitalisation to GDP was higher in Morocco (40%) than in Egypt (23%) 
and Tunisia (13%), but lower than that of Jordan (70%). Nevertheless, share dealings on 
the Casablanca and Tunis exchanges were greater than in Cairo and Amman exchanges. 
For instance, in 2000, the value of shares traded in Casablanca and Tunis amounted to 
US$1.8bn, compared to US$0.7bn for Egypt and US$0.9bn for Jordan. 
3-4 Banking Regulation in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia 
The banking system in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia consists of the central banks, 
commercial banks, and other financial institutions. As noted earlier, the regulatory 
framework for the financial and banking system is more market-oriented than in the 
period prior to liberalisation. In the three countries, banking sector reforms have 
deregulated barriers to entry and reduced the differences between commercial banks and 
development, investment and other specialised banks. The current legislation that 
regulates the financial systems is, the Law No. 14 of April 1990 relating to Money and 
Credit in Algeria, the Dahir of 6"' of July 1993 relating to Banking Law in Morocco, and 
Banking Law of 1994 and 2001, modifying the banking law of 1967 in Tunisia. These 
laws have contributed to the development process by liberalising sector practices and 
regulation. Also, they have unified the legal basis of universal banking by reducing the 
compartmentalisation of activities between commercial banks and other financial 
institutions. Also, in the three countries, credit institutions are required to provide 
information about their activities to the central bank on a regular basis. 
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According to the current legislations, the central banks of the three countries9' are the 
monetary authorities responsible for monetary, debt and exchange rate policies. The 
central banks were created just after independence, and currently they operate with 
various degrees of autonomy and independence from their respective executive political 
authorities, including the Ministry of Finance. For instance, in the three countries, the 
central banks are still working under the supervision of the political authorities, as heads 
of state nominate the governors and executive boards. Also, in the three countries central 
bank policies have to be coordinated with the macroeconomic and financial plans of the 
government and Ministry of Finance. The lack of political and economic independence of 
these central banks could result in monetary policy being conducted under political 
pressure pressures, resulting in higher levels of inflation. Alesina and Summers (1993) 
suggest that monetary discipline associated with full central bank independence is likely 
to reduce the level and variability of inflation. 
In the three countries, the central banks have the privilege of regulating and supervising 
the financial and banking sector, play the role of financial and economic advisers to the 
government, manage internal and external debts, use a variety of indirect instruments to 
regulate credit and interest rates, and supervise the foreign exchange market. However, 
one difference between the central banks in the three countries is the banking licensing 
privilege. While the Banque d'Algerie sets the conditions for financial institutions' 
establishment and supervises their activities, Bank Al-Maghrib and Banque Centrale de 
Tunisie are denied this privilege as the Ministry Finance in the respective countries is 
responsible for chartering new banks. 
The new banking laws in the three countries allow credit institutions to expand their 
activities into previously prohibited activities such as lending in foreign exchange. Also 
the banking laws facilitate money market interventions by the central bank via the buying 
and selling of government bonds between the central bank and credit institutions. 
Besides, the new banking laws introduce important measures such as the ending of bank 
specialisation and the greater protection for banks' clients and depositors. There is a 
91 Banque d'Algerie in Algeria, Bank A1-Maghrib and Banque Centrale de Tunisie 
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unified legal basis for universal banking, reflecting that there is no longer a major 
separation between commercial banks and other financial institutions. 
3-5 Banking Regulations in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia 2 
This part of the section briefly reviews banking sector regulation in Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia. Banking regulations are significant as, for instance, the minimum capital 
and supervisory norms provide banking users with confidence about the safety of the 
systems. Banking conditions in the three countries are being progressively updated to 
reflect the shift towards internationally-accepted norms. 
3-5-1 Minimum required Capital 
The central banks in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia determine the amounts of the 
subscribed and paid-up capital of banks. They also decide upon the amounts of capital 
required to enable banking and financial firms to meet capital adequacy requirements. 
The minimum levels of bank capital are imposed on both already established and newly 
established banks, on government-owned and private owned banks, and on domestic- 
owned and foreign-owned banks. Currently, the minimum capital applied to create a 
bank in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia is DA500mn, DHlOOmn, and DT10mn for 
commercial banks, respectively, and DAlOOmn, DM100mn, and DT3mn for other non- 
commercial banks respectively93. 
3-5-2 Capital Adequacy Ratio (Solvency Ratio) 
Minimum capital adequacy indicators have gradually been updated to be compliant with 
the principles of the Basle Accord. Currently, all agreed banks are compliant with the 
minimum eight percent level. In the three countries, the large amounts of non-performing 
loans were a major obstacle to meet the eight percent international minimum level. 
92 For more details on banking regulation in Tunisia, See Smida (2003). 93 The minimum required capital for banks operating in the three countries is set in the respective banking 
laws. In Algeria, the authorities are planning an increase in minimum required capital due to the 
repercussions of El-Khalifa Bank collapse. 
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In Algeria, it was planned to set minimum capital adequacy ratio at four percent in 1992, 
five percent in 1993 and then eight percent in 199594. However, banks suffered from 
major under-capitalisation, which forced the Bank of Algeria to postpone the compliance 
with the eight percent ratio until 1999. In Morocco, the minimum solvency ratio has been 
set at eight percent since 199795. In Tunisia, the central bank set the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio at five percent over 1992-20002', but increased this to the international 
minimum level of eight percent in 200124. 
In Algeria, Iradian et al (2000) states that the government has re-capitalised its banks in 
order to bring their capital adequacy ratios in line with international standards. The 
capitalisation operations cost is estimated at 45% of GDP, over 1990-1999. Public-owned 
banks received a large influx of funds in the form of cash or debt-takeover procedure. 
3-5-3 Liquidity Ratios 
The central banks in the three countries impose various liquidity requirements on 
commercial banks and other financial institutions. The main purpose of this procedure is 
to ensure that banks could meet the liquidity requests of their customers, and could 
achieve balances between assets and liabilities in terms of liquidity and maturity. For 
instance, the liquidity ratio (calculated as current assets to current liabilities ratio), is 
currently 100% in the three countries. 
3-5-4 Provision for Bad Loans 
The central banks in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have the privilege of setting the level 
of provisions for each category of assets in terms of risk. Provisioning is strongly related 
to the soundness of the banks, so any increase in assets provisioning would improve the 
banks' soundness but reduces their profitability. The banking laws in the three countries 
define four categories of assets. First, standard assets, which represent good loans, have 
provisions required at one percent of the value of these assets. Second, substandard loans 
have provisions of a fifth of the value of these assets. Third, doubtful Assets have 
94 Banking Instruction No. 34-91 of 14the November 1991. 95 Artete No. 175-97 of 22nd January 1997 pursuant to Law 1-93-147. " Circulaire No. 91024 of 17th December 1991. 24 Circulaire No. 2001-04 of 16'x' Febniary 2001, and Circulaire NO. 2001-12 of 4`h May 2001. 
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allocated provisions of half of the value of these assets. Finally, non-performing assets 
have provisions of a hundred percent. 
3-5-5 Restrictions on Large Exposures (Assets 
Concentration) 
The central banks in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia impose some measures to reduce the 
extent of bank exposures to a specific category of bank customers. These measures 
include credit and loan ceilings. 
In Algeria, the ratio used to define credit concentration is loans to the client or 
borrower's equity. Since 1995, the banking legislationu sets this ratio at a maximum 
level of twenty-five percent, compared to thirty percent in 1993 and forty percent in 
1992. In Morocco, a bank exposure to credit concentration is calculated as loans to the 
client's net capital26. This ratio is currently set at a minimum of ten percent since 1997, 
after being seven percent Banks are also required to list all risks and information about 
loans that exceed five percent of the client's net capital. In Tunisia, the legislation27 states 
that any amount of credit or loans granted to only one borrower must not exceed a 
quarter of the borrower's equity. Shareholders, mangers and executives are allowed to 
borrow up to three times of their capital. 
3-5-6 Deposits' Guarantee System 
Financial legislation in the three countries under study envisioned enforcing banking 
safety by creating a deposits' guarantee mechanism that protects and insures banking 
customers' deposits. This mechanism offers bank depositors aspects of guarantees that 
make their deposits safe. This should encourage depositors to have greater confidence in 
the banking system and therefore encourage savings. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) state that when bank deposits are not insured, a deterioration in the quality of 
bank's assets may result in pushing depositors to rashly and suddenly withdraw their 
funds before the bank declares bankruptcy, which also may lead to a liquidity crisis. 
u Instruction No. 34-91 of 14th November 1992 and Instruction No. 74-94 of 29th November 1994. 26 Anet6 No. 34-91 of 22d January pursuant to Law 1-93-147. 2' Circulaire No 91024 of 17th December 1991 modified by Circulaire No. 2001-04 of 16th February and Circulaire No. 2001-13 of 4t` May 2001. 
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However, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) assert that when depositors are insured 
against the risk of bank insolvency, the likelihood of a depositors withdraw run is 
reduced. 
In the three countries, the depositors' guarantee systems are separate legal entities with 
an independent budget and subject to the central bank's supervision. Also, in the three 
countries the maximum total amount of deposits insured by the system is not related to 
economic indicators. In Algeria, the system offers insurance to deposit amounts up to 
DA600th28. In Morocco, the system of deposits guarantee insures deposits up to DM50th, 
and requires banks to contribute to the financing of the system with 0.25% of the deposits 
they hold. In Tunisia, the system of deposits guarantee is introduced in the form of a joint 
mechanism in which all banks must participate. The system intervenes as a response to 
any demand from the central bank to reimburse depositors relating to banks encountering 
difficulties29. 
3-6 Banking Structures in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia 
This section analyses the banking structures in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in terms of 
their size, branch banking network, penetration, and banking sector ownership. These 
characteristics reflect the indicators of the market structure in the three countries under 
study. Table A2-8 (Algeria), 
Table A2-9 (Morocco) and (Tunisia) in Appendix A2 contain information on a number 
of banking and financial forms operating in the three banking systems under study. 
In Algeria, the banking sector is categorised into commercial banks, financial 
establishments with general vocation, financial establishments with specific vocation, 
and bureaux de liaison. In Morocco, the credit institutions are divided into banks 
approved as money deposit multi-purpose banks or registered banks, specialised banks, 
and financing companies including consumer credits companies, real estate loan 
companies, mean of payment management companies, leasing companies and factoring 
companies. These categories of banks are overseen by the central bank. In Tunisia, the 
2" Reglement No. 97-04 of 3 l" December 1997. 29 Law No. 2001-65 of 10th July 2001. 
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central bank oversees two sectors which are the banking sector and the non-banking 
specialised financial establishments. The banking system includes deposit banks, 
development banks, merchant banks, and offshore banks. The other sector includes 
leasing agencies, factoring companies and representation agencies. As in other financial 
systems, the banking sector including commercial banks and specialised banks are the 
most important types of bans, accounting for the majority of total banking assets in the 
three countries. 
3-6-1 Banking Sector Size 
In the three countries under study, commercial banks represent the core of the financial 
system. Table 3-2 shows the size characteristics of commercial banks in absolute terms 
and as a proportion of GDP over the period 1990-2001. 
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Table 3-2: Comparative size characterises commercial banking in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia 
Assets Size of Commercial Banking Size of Commercial Banking Sector to Indicators 
Sector (in billion of Dollar) GDP (/. ) 
Countries Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
2001 29.472 30372 13939 5134 90.69 6935 
2000 28.887 30.683 13A80 47.89 93.25 6926 
1999 27.772 29.085 12.156 5757 83.10 58.44 
1998 26.720 29.608 13.053 55.85 83.01 65.82 
1997 25.490 25.843 11.098 5325 77.34 58.73 
1996 24.831 20.103 11.010 53.00 54.87 56.20 
1995 23376 19.451 10.853 56.66 58.97 6020 
1994 24.510 17.236 9967 58A0 56.79 63.76 
1993 35.641 14.046 8.786 71.62 52A1 60.14 
1992 33.118 13.691 9.062 69.18 48.12 58.48 
1991 33.703 14.026 9.151 73.72 5039 7034 
1990 52.711 11.530 8.860 8492 44.64 63.19 
Size of Financial Sector (in billion of Size of Fin ancial Sector to GDP (%) Indicators 
Dollar) 
Countries Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
2001 32A31 37.533 14.118 5931 112.07 70.44 
2000 27326 35.853 13.661 50.44 108.97 70.19 
1999 25.440 34.923 12A31 52.73 99.78 59.77 
1998 26.907 35.531 13316 56.24 99.62 67.15 
1997 25.169 31.296 11.092 5238 93.66 58.70 
1996 21204 24.181 10913 4526 66.00 55.71 
1995 19.042 23.643 11.140 46.15 71.67 61.79 
1994 19A62 20.699 10.048 4637 68.20 64.28 
1993 31.824 17387 8.702 63.95 64.88 5957 
1992 29.073 16.599 9.099 60.73 58.34 58.71 
1991 23.842 16.169 9.085 52.15 58.09 69.83 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2001) 
Table 3-2 shows that, in 2001, the banking sector of Morocco is larger than in Algeria 
and Tunisia. Commercial banks' assets represent more than ninety-five percent, ninety- 
three percent, and sixty-five percent of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia's total banking 
assets, respectively (Various sources). Commercial banks' assets represent between 
seventy percent, seventy percent, and sixty percent of the three countries' GDP, 
respectively. The size of the banking sectors in the three countries has significantly 
increased due to the entry of new banks into the system, the growth of activities of banks, 
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and the conversion of non-commercial banks into commercial banks30. According to the 
respective banking laws, the main activities of commercial banks consist of collecting 
deposits of any term and form, from different economic agents, providing various firms 
of loans and credit of any maturity and ensuring the normal work of payment and 
exchange. 
It is important to note that banks operating within the rules of "Islamic Sharia" are 
operating in Algeria and Tunisia, but there is none in Morocco. Only two "Islamic" 
banking firms are operating, one in Algeria, and one in Tunisia. The investment Islamic 
bank "Geit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi was created in the early 1980s, while the Algerian 
money deposit bank Al-Baraka bank was established in 1991. Both of these banks hold 
less than one percent of total bank deposits and assets in the respective countries. In 
Morocco, plans are underway to create an equally-owned Moroccan-Qatari Islamic 
bank". 
3-6-2 Branch Banking Network and Penetration 
Overall, the number of banks and banking branches has considerably increased in the 
three countries over the period 1990-2002. This is primarily due to the expansion of the 
existing banks, and the entry of new banks. 
Table 3-3 exhibits the main banking characteristics of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
according to bank number, network and penetration, over the period 1990-2002. 
30 For instance, the saving bank CNEP in Algeria was a saving bank, but was converted into a commercial 
bank in 1997. Similarly, the Credit Immobilier and Hotelier (CIII) was specialised bank before 1993, but 
converted to a commercial bank. Also, in Tunisia, two commercial banks absorbed a number of non- 
commercial banks in 1999. First, the Union International de Banques (UIB) absorbed Tuniso-Emirates 
Investment Bank. Second, Societe Tunisidnne de Banques (STB) took over Banque Economique pour le 
Ddvd1oppment en Tunisie (BEDT) and the Banque Nationale pour le Ddveloppment Touristiques (BNDT). 
96 Source: www. bladi. net/article-2181. html 
77 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Table 3-3: Comparative commercial banking characterises in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia 
Number of Commercial 
Penetration measures as 
Indicators 
banks 
Number of branches Branches Number to 
Population 
Countries Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
2002 26 18 14 1197« 1878 868 25,898 15,484 11,150 
2001 26* 19 14 1129 1814 868 27,150 16,143 11,145 
2000 21 21 14 1077 1703 857 27,316 16,801 11,155 
1999 17 21 14 1064 1618 828 28,000 17,460 11,401 
1998 12 21 14 1061 1523 817 27,787 18,240 11,420 
1997 8 20 13 1043 1450 792 27,289 18,834 11,641 
1996 7 16 13 1008 1414 786 27,877 18,989 11,565 
1995 7 15 13 963 1386 770 28,858 19,040 11,636 
1994 6 14 13 954 - 753 28,595 - 11,660 
1993 6 14 13 - - 738 - - 11,653 
1992 5 14 12 - - 701 - - 12,026 
1991 5 14 12 - - 674 - - 12,255 
1990 5 14 12 - - 626 - 27000 12939 
" * Naas (2003), p280. 
" ** Lazare et al., (2004), p67. 
" Various. 
" Central banks. 
" Tunisia: Banking Profession Association. 
Table 3-3 shows that the number of banks and bank branches has increased significantly 
in the last few years and that the number the commercial banks (the most significant bank 
type in the three countries), is higher in Algeria, than in Morocco and Tunisia. However, 
the number of bank branches appears to be higher in Morocco than in Algeria and 
Tunisia. Besides, the Tunisian commercial banking sector seems to have more branches 
per capita than in Morocco and Algeria. Overall, even though the number of banks and 
branches has increased in the three countries under study, the Algeria and Moroccan 
banking systems still display a relatively low penetration rate compared to Tunisia. 
In Algeria, Table 3-3 shows that the number of bank branches has doubled over the 
period 1995-2002, from less than 650 to more than 1120 branches by 2000-2002. The 
table also shows that the density of banking branches is far lower in Algeria, compared to 
Morocco and Tunisia. Banking density is more than 27 thousand inhabitants per branch. 
The increase in the number of banking firms reflects the entry of private and foreign- 
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owned banks, but also the expansion of government-owned banks. In Algeria, as of early 
2004, there are 21 commercial banks, of which 14 are non- fully government-owned 
banks. 
In Morocco, Table 3-3 indicates that the number of branches rose from less than 1000 in 
1990 to about 1800 in 2000-2002. Similarly, the average value of assets per branch 
increased from DH174mn in 1990 to about DH230mn in 2000-2002. Table 3.3 shows 
that banking density in Morocco has fallen over 1990-2002, with less than 20 thousand 
inhabitants per branch. Achy (2002) notes that the banking system in Morocco is rather 
limited. Only an estimated fifth of the Moroccan population has access to banking 
services, and less than two-fifths of the labour force has a bank account. Similarly, 
Vermeren (2002) and Ingves and Abed (2003) mention that, as in 2000-2002, only 17- 
15% of Moroccans has banking accounts. Branch concentration shows that the industry is 
dominated by six banks, three of them local and three of them subsidiaries of the major 
French banks. 
In Tunisia, the aforementioned table shows that the commercial banks' network has 
significantly increased in recent years, from less than 600 in 1990, to more than 8000 by 
2000-2002. This expansion has increased the availability of banking services to the 
population as the ratio of inhabitants per branch has fallen from more than 14 thousand in 
1990 to less than 12 thousand by 2000-2002. Ingves and Abed (2003) point out that the 
number of bank accounts to population in Tunisia is 40%, compared to 15% in Morocco. 
3-6-3 Banking Concentration 
Another indicator of market structure relates to the level of concentration in the banking 
sector. Concentration is usually calculated as the fraction of assets, deposits, credits and 
branches, held by the three, four or five largest banks. For instance, Altunbas, Molyneux 
and Gardener (1996) use three and five-firm deposits and assets concentration ratios to 
examine the structure of European banking systems Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson 
(2002) note that there have been many studies that examine the relationship between 
bank structure characteristics and performance of banking systems to test two 
hypotheses. First, the traditional structure-conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis 
suggests that if a small number of banks dominate a banking sector, then it is easier and 
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(less costly) for them to collude. Collusion may result in higher rates charged on loans, 
less interest being paid on deposits, and higher fees being charged. Berger and Hannan 
(1989) state that the SCP theory suggests that higher concentration leads to higher prices, 
and consequently to higher financial returns. Second, the efficiency hypothesis suggests 
that larger market concentration may be the result of better efficiency and lower costs. 
Berger (1995) notes that the efficiency hypothesis investigates the relationship between 
banking concentration from the firm-level efficiency, and that concentrated markets 
evolve because some banks get bigger because they have inherent efficiency advantages. 
It is a matter of empirical investigation to examine whether the SCP paradigm or the 
efficiency hypothesis holds in any particular banking system. Demirugüc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1998) found that banks in countries with a more competitive banking sector 
have smaller net interest margins and lower financial returns. They also found that bank 
concentration positively affects bank profitability, and larger banks tend to have higher 
margins. 
In Algeria, by 2000-2002, in terms of branch concentration, more than sixty percent of 
total branches were owned by four banks, BADR, CNEP, and BDL and BNA. In 
addition, the country's five largest banks own an estimated three quarters of banking 
sector's assets. The three-firm concentration ratio (BADR, CNEP, BDL) is around half of 
total banking sector assets. 
In Morocco, the banking system is characterised by the predominance of the three 
leading banking groups (BCM, BMCE, Banque Populaire), which have approximately 
two-thirds share of total banking sector assets. The CPM, BCM and BMCE31 have the 
largest banking networks in Morocco. By 2000-2002, these three banks have more than 
312,181, and 169 branches, respectively. In addition, most branches are located in urban 
area: the six largest cities account for approximately half of the banking network. Chaput 
et at. (2000) mentions that a third and a tenth of total banking branches are located in 
Casablanca and Rabat, respectively. In Morocco, the four leading banks control about 
three quarters of the country's deposits, and two-thirds of all loans. In addition, the three 
31 By October 2000, the BMCE opened 13 branches abroad. The largest bank in Morocco, BCM, owns 
about 16% of total bank branches 
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largest banks in terms of stock market capitalisation are BCM32, BMCE, and 
Wafabank33. These banks account for about three quarters of total banking market 
capitalisation and a fifth of total market capitalisation. 
In Tunisia, the three-firm and five-firm asset concentration ratios were about 55% and 
75% by 2000-2002. The largest five banks own more than half of the country's bank 
branches. The eleven commercial banks quoted on the Tunis stock exchange represent 
about a quarter of total market capitalisation. The Societe Tunisienne de Banques (STB) 
is the largest bank in terms of market capitalisation and accounts for about a quarter of 
total banking market capitalisation and six percent of total stock market capitalisation. 
The three largest Tunisian banks in terms of market capitalisation represent about 60% 
and 15% of total banking capitalisation and total stock market capitalisation, 
4 respectively' 
3-6-4 Bank Ownership 
In the three countries under study, and similar to a number of MENA countries, three 
main agents own banking institutions, these are; the government, domestic private capital 
and foreign capital. Lee (2002) discusses bank ownership in MENA countries, and finds 
that domestically owned capital (private and public) accounts for about eighty-four 
percent of total bank equity capital, whereas foreign investors own the remaining. The 
private sector is the main owner with approximately three-fifths of total equity capital, 
then the government with about a quarter of equity capital. Lee (2002) elaborates that in 
countries such as Iran (100%), Syria (100%), Libya (100%) and Algeria (95%), state 
bank ownership is dominant. In countries such as Lebanon (25%) and Morocco (23%), 
foreign capital appears to be more significant and is above the average of foreign equity 
capital of MENA countries (16%). Saudi Arabia has the lowest level of foreign capital 
ownership in the banking sector at about 1.1%, then Algeria at 2%. Similarly, Henry and 
Boone (2001) examine the ownership concentration issue in banking industries in MENA 
32 The BCM has a market share of 17% in deposits and loans, and 25% of international transactions. 
33 The BMCE and Wafabank are the second and third largest quoted banks with 22% and 15% of total 
banking market capitalisation, and 6.4% and 4.4% of total market capitalisation, respectively. 34 The Banque du Sud (BS) and Amen Bank (ABO are the second and third largest banks in terms of market 
capitalisation. Each of them account for about 16% of total banking capitalisation and about 3.6% of total 
market capitalisation. 
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countries. They find a significant relationship between high bank concentration (HHO) 
and high government ownership, particularly in the case of Algeria, as well as other 
countries such as Libya and Syria. The aforementioned authors find that Tunisia and 
Morocco has relatively lower government ownership-concentration relations than in 
Algeria. 
In Algeria, as of the end of 2002, the banking sector comprised six major state-owned 
banks35, a number of small private commercial and investment banks, a few foreign 
branches36, and other types of financial institutions such as leasing companies. Lee 
(2002) and Iradian et at. (2000) report that the public banks dominate the banking sector 
in Algeria with approximately 95% of total assets and 90% of bank branches. Marks and 
Drummond (2003) mention that foreign-owned banks operating in Algeria "siphon off 
13% of national savings, but only provide 5% of the credits flowing into the economy". 
The government has not yet operationally opened the capital of government-owned banks 
for privatisation, as it is still in the process of re-capitalising them. Even though the 
presence of private and foreign banks is increasing, it is still considered insignificant 
compared to Morocco and Tunisia. Private and foreign-owned banks own approximately 
5% of total assets, deposits and capital of total banking sector. 
Drummond (2002) and Marks and Mossadeq (2003) mention that the French bank, 
Societe Generale, started negotiations to purchase up to a third of the third-largest public- 
owned bank, Credit Populaire d'Algerie, CPA, -- described as the least bad state-owned 
bank-, but nothing had been achieved by mid 2004. In the meanwhile, Societe Generale 
is in the process of upgrading its existing small branch network to four in the country's 
four major cities. BNP Paribas has upgraded to a full branch while Credit Agricole 
Indosuez has a representative office. The HSBC has a representative office through its 
British Arab Commercial Bank subsidiary, and Citibank has a full branch in Algiers. 
In Morocco, the presence of government ownership in the banking sector has fallen over 
the 1990-2002 period, to a third of total banking assets, and a quarter of total banking 
" These banks are Banque de Devdloppement Local (BDL), Banque Exterieure d'Algerie (BEA), Banque 
Nationale d'Algerie (BNA), Credit Populaire d'Algerie (CPA), Banque Algerienne du Developpment rural 
(BADR), and Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de Prevoyance (CNEP). CNEP bank was converted into a 
commercial bank in 1997, after previously acting as the main public saving and housing loan institution. 36 Including Citibank, Societe Generale, and Barclays. 
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equity capital. Currently, the government still has majority shares in only four banks, 
which used to be specialised banks37. Ingrives and Abed (2003) report that government- 
owned institutions still held approximately 43% of total banking assets by the end of 
2001. The presence of foreign and private capital in the Moroccan banking system 
has 
increased and reached about a quarter of total banking assets and equity capital 
by the 
late 1990s. Unlike in Algeria, foreign banks benefited from the Moroccan bank 
privatisation programmes launched in the early nineties onwards. Chaput et al. 
(2000) 
notes that in Morocco, there is an oligopoly run by a number of Moroccan capitalists 
(families) in collaboration with foreign partners, who hold about a quarter of 
bank's 
capital. A number of international banks, such as Societe Generale, bought and gradually 
increased their stakes in the capital in a number of major Moroccan banks. French banks 
are the main shareholders and management position holders in BMCE, and CM and 
SGMB38. 
Societe Generale has its own-branded subsidiary in Morocco with about 150 
branches. 
BNP Paribas and Credit Lyonnais also operate subsidiaries under different 
brands in 
alliance with powerful local families: Banque Marocaine du Commerce et de l'Industrie 
(BMCI) in the case of BNP-Paribas and Credit du Maroc in the case of Credit Lyonnais. 
The German-based bank Commerzbank has also stakes in Banque Marocaine du 
Commerce Exterieur, while the Spanish banks (Santander Central Hispano) has a stake 
in Banque Commerciale du Maroc", Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria also has a 
minority position in Wafabank, alongside Credit Agricole Indosuez. The American bank 
Citibank also has a branch in Morocco9'. Thus, it can be noted that French banks that are 
3' These banks are Banque Nationale pour le Ddveloppment Economique (BNDE), Credit Immobilier et 
Hotelier (CIH), Caisse Nationale de Cooperation Agricole (CNCA), and Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP). 
Vermeren (2002) mentions that in 1999, there was the "CIH gate", the biggest fmancial scandal Morocco 
ever had since independence involving nearly II billions of dirham (1,5 times the country' bill of 
hydrocarbon imports). 
3s For instance, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) owned 56% of capital of Banque Morocaine du 
Commerce et de l'Industrie (BMCI), Credit Lyonnais owns 51% of capital of Credit du Maroc (CM), 
Societe Generale owns 51% o capital of Societe Gdnerale Marocaine des Banqucs (SGMB). Foreign 
shareholders own 25.2%, 14.5% and 16.6% of capital of Banque Commerciale du Maroc (BCM), Banque 
Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur (BMCE), and Wafabank, respectively. 
97 The latter is known in Morocco as the bank of the royal family. 
98 This information is by James Drummond (2002), " Northern lights: with a French-speaking population of 
70 million, it is little wonder that Algeria Morocco and Tunisia are attractive to French banks. (Middle East 
& Africa: Maghreb)", published in the Banker magazine on Sep 2002. 
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in a position of building up controlling interests in Moroccan banks, similar to their non- 
financial French companies counterparts in other sectors of the Moroccan economy, 
whereas other international banks mainly in minority positions. 
Besides, it has been reported`' that Banque Commerciale du Maroc (BCM) and 
Wafabank have agreed to merge into one entity effectively from the first half of 2004. 
This deal is a takeover bid for 100% of Wafabank's capital, following BCM purchasing 
36.4% of capital share in Wafabank for about two billion Moroccan Dirhanis, US$218mn 
in late November 2003. This merger will create a new entity VCM-Wafabank and this 
will become the largest bank in Morocco in terms of assets, deposits and branches. 
In Tunisia, Chabrier and Ingves (2002) note that although the share of government 
ownership in the banking sector has fallen over 1990-2002, it still has a considerable 
presence. The Tunisian government still has majority stakes in three of the largest 
commercial banks and owns approximately half of development banks' capital39. This 
represents approximately a third of total banking sector assets. The aforementioned 
authors note that government-owned banks in Tunisia tend to be characterised by greater 
exposure to credit risk due to their previous policies of directed lending to strategic 
sectors. In addition, the economic and financial liberalisation programme provides the 
primary explanation for the increasing presence of private and foreign capital in the 
Tunisian banking sector. Chabrier and Ingves (2002) report that domestic private capital 
owns about half of total commercial banking sector assets. Amen Bank is the first 
Tunisian bank entirely created and owned by domestic private capital. They also report 
that foreign capital own approximately half of total assets and capital of development 
banks, and about a third of total commercial banks assets and capital. Middle-east based 
banks are present through Arab Bank and Bahrain-based Arab Banking Corporation, 
which is offshore. French banks include BNP Paribas, which has an affiliate in Union 
Bancaire pour le Commerce et 1'Industrie (UBCI), while Societe Generale owned 52% in 
the Union Internationale de Banque (UIB). Societe Generale also has a representative 
office in Tunis. 
9' www. menareport. com (2d December 2003). 
39 Private shareholders own nearly 6% of total capital of development banks. What remains is equally 
shared between the Tunisian government and a number of oil-exporting Gulf and Libyan governments. 
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One observation about foreign and private capital in the three countries under study is the 
manner it enters the banking 10°industry. In Algeria, private and foreign capital chose to 
establish their own operations rather than waiting for the launching of the bank 
privatisation process. In Morocco and Tunisia, foreign capital mostly preferred to 
purchase stakes in existing banks rather then establish new operations. Iradian et al. 
(1997) presents two main explanations that may support this inclination in Morocco and 
Tunisia. First, the number of banks might seem sufficient to satisfy the demand for 
banking services in the short-term. Second, there is potential for raising efficiency in 
domestic banks through the use of modem technology and improved management 
Thus, while the government ownership sector is still significantly predominant in the 
Algerian banking system, private and foreign ownership of the banking sector outsize 
government ownership in Morocco and Tunisia. Drummond (2002) and Marks and 
Mossadeq (2003) notice the remarkable presence of French-owned capital in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia. Drummond (2002) states that "Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia offer 
the attraction of a large under-banked French-speaking population". We expect Tunisian 
and Moroccan banks to have more independence in terms of making loan decisions than 
Algerian banks. Also, based on studies that find a positive relationship between and 
private and foreign bank ownership, we might expect that banks in Morocco and Tunisia 
tend to be more efficient than in Algeria. 
3-7 Balance Sheet structure 
This part of the chapter examines the assets and liabilities characteristics of the Algerian, 
Moroccan and Tunisian banking systems 40 
Lee (2002) studies the average balance sheet structure of the banking systems of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia with other MENA countries over the period 1989-2001. He reports 
significant increases in the size of assets, deposits, capital, and credits for all the 
countries under study. In three countries under study, the balance sheet structure appears 
to accommodate mainly credits to the economy, credits to the government, security 
40 The balance sheet structure analysis is based on balance sheet statements provided by the Arab Monetary 
Fund (2002). 
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portfolios, and credits to the central bank, on the assets side, and short, time and saving 
deposits, and other funds on the liabilities side. 
On the assets structure, Lee (2002) finds that Algerian banks have fewer credits to the 
economy in their assets than in Morocco and Tunisia, with an average of 46%, 53%, and 
85% of total assets, respectively. Credits to the economy by the banking system were 
around a third of GDP compared to a half in Morocco and Tunisia. Chaput et al. (2000) 
reports that the level of bank credits to the economy to GDP ratio remains low in the 
three countries under study, compared to other more developed markets such as 
Singapore, where credits were 110% of GDP in 1999. Lee (2002) also finds that Tunisian 
banks allocate fewer credits to the government than in Algeria and Morocco, with 
approximately, on average, 6%, 15%, and 30%, respectively. This reflects that the 
government budget in Tunisia and Algeria experienced relatively more favourable 
balance than in Morocco41. In addition, the portfolio of securities investments account for 
approximately 30%, 25% and 12% of total banking assets in the three countries, 
respectively. Although Algerian banks have invested in the three shares listed on Algiers 
Stock Exchange; the majority of their securities portfolio represents the stakes of 
Algerian banks in other government-owned enterprises. The portfolio of securities of 
Moroccan and Tunisia banks is securities investments made via the stock exchange. 
Lee (2002) asserts that, overall; bank credits to the economy tend to be of low maturity. 
There are three main factors that can explain this. First, banks may seem unable to 
transform efficiently and profitably their short-term liquid deposits into medium and 
long-term illiquid assets. Second, bank may seem to suffer from the lack of accurate and 
reliable information on enterprises and projects that stimulate them to extend credits for 
longer terms. Third, banks might have realised the existence of legal and regulatory 
weaknesses that prevent them from playing fully their role in financing projects, such as 
long legal process to re-collect overdue loans, and long delays in judicial procedures. 
41 Over the period 1990-2001, the budget balance to GDP ratio was, on average, 1.1% in Algeria, - 
3.8% in Morocco, and -2.5% in Tunisia In Algeria, the importance of the credits to government to assets 
ratio is due to the purchase of stock of non-performing loans of government liquidised or restructured bank 
enterprises. 
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On the liabilities side, Lee (2002) reports that, on average over 1990-2002, Moroccan 
banks have received more short-term demand deposits than savings deposits, with 50% 
and 25% of total liabilities and equity, respectively. On contrast, he reports that Tunisian 
banks are less dependent on demand deposits (20%) than time deposits (40%)42 in their 
sources of funding. Algerian banks have approximately the same level of short-term 
deposits and time deposits, with each at quarter of liabilities and equity. Finally, capital 
accounts show, that, over 1990-1999, Algerian banks had equity to assets ratios of less 
than four percent, but this improved from 1999 onwards to about six percent, due to the 
various operations of re-capitalisation, compared to twelve percent in Morocco and 
fourteen percent in Tunisia. 
3-7-1 Algeria 
Table 3-4 shows the balance sheet structure of the Algerian banking system from 1990 to 
2001. (See Table A2-5 in Appendix A2 which shows the total balance sheet of Algerian 
bank as a proportion of total assets). 
42 Short-term demand deposits and Time and savings deposits are those deposits made in local currency by 
residents. 
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Table 3-4: Algeria: Structure of Bank Balance sheet in Algeria from 1990 to 
2002 in Billion Algerian Dinar. 
Ratios Assets 
Year Cash 
Deposits at 
Central 
External 
Credits to Credits to Portfolio & Total Assets 
Assets ts the Economy Others Banks Government 
1990 0.999 1.981 9.032 44.831 246.978 168337 472.158 
1991 0.541 2.540 23218 32.143 325.847 336337 720.965 
1992 0.555 5.293 20.821 28334 412.269 287.183 754.455 
1993 0.715 36.973 16A70 300514 220.207 284.880 859.759 
1994 1367 5322 44.877 204.633 305.808 489.411 1,051.318 
1995 2.549 2.865 33.295 155.644 564.618 460.686 1,219.657 
1996 2.626 10.135 32383 141.428 776.814 431.743 1,395.129 
1997 4.061 14.698 23.108 273.147 741.204 432.774 1,488.992 
1998 5.647 10.154 27501 410385 730.826 428.090 1,612.603 
1999 4.616 8.676 27.892 259.486 934.505 489.847 1,925.022 
2000 6552 36.020 28315 600377 775373 508.097 1,954.934 
2001 7363 174267 32.919 589.791 818221 561.973 Z184.534 
Ratios Liabilities 
Y Demand 
Time & External Credits 
from Credits from 
i O h Total ear deposits Savings Liabilities the 
Central the Equ ty t ers Assets 
deposits Bank Government 
1990 105346 72.923 3.714 66325 0.871 18.640 204.139 472.158 
1991 133.112 90.277 9.400 95.455 2.462 25.974 364.285 720.965 
1992 140.841 146.183 13386 78.657 5.876 26.131 343381 754.455 
1993 188.930 180320 12.940 29390 90.195 35393 322.191 859.759 
1994 196.452 247.680 35.138 50.686 38.816 37.584 445.262 1,051.318 
1995 210.775 280.55 22376 189290 44529 53.012 419.020 1,219.657 
1996 234.029 325.958 20.793 259.125 97.531 53.758 403.935 1,395.129 
1997 254.833 409.948 14532 219.063 84359 55.871 450386 1,488.992 
1998 334520 474.194 25.480 226252 55.740 66319 430.098 1,612.603 
1999 352.707 578.574 30.870 310.802 56.660 70.960 524.449 1,925.022 
2000 460.267 617.873 26.661 170538 33507 86388 559.700 1,954.934 
2001 528.649 840.015 36.489 0 26.896 122374 630.111 2,184.534 
Source: AMF Report, 2002. 
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Table 3-4 shows that, in Algeria, the assets of the commercial banking sector increased 
about five times in nominal terms, from around DA470bn in 1990 to more than 
DA2100bn in 2001, possibly due to the increase of bank activities and establishment of 
new banks. Similarly, credits to the economy grew by nearly five times over the same 
period, including credits to government-owned enterprises. The share of credits to the 
economy to GDP considerably decreased from around 60% in (1990-1995) to 40% in 
(1995-2001). However, this decrease is potentially due to the abolition of directed and 
forced lending by banks to the government-owned enterprises, of which large numbers 
were liquidated, and the relative "borrowing weakness" of the private sector. 
Over 1990-1999, public enterprises benefited from around four fifths of total credits, 
while the private sector borrowed around one fifth of total credits, the latter of which 
increased from 18-19% in 1998-99 to around one third in 2000-2002 (Naas, 2003). The 
low levels of credits to the private sector indicate the relatively weak role of the private 
sector in economy. The relatively low levels of credits to the private sector may also 
reflect the dominance of the public sector in Algeria, and the limitations of the 
privatisation programme. In terms of maturity, credits allocated by Algerian banks to 
enterprises were mainly short-term. This implies that Algerian banks provide working 
capital funds for enterprises rather than long-term investment finance. It also suggests 
that perhaps Algerian enterprises are facing difficulties in accessing to investments and 
long-term loans. Naas (2003) examines the structure of bank credits to the economy 
during the period 1998-2001. Over this period, he finds that short-term credits (56-61%) 
outsized long and medium-term credits (44-39%). 
In addition, Table 3-4 shows that the share of credits to the government in total banking 
assets has decreased from 9.5% in 1990 to 3.8% in 1992, then from 35% in 1993 to 10% 
in 1996, and to less than 15% in 2001. Due to the fact that, on average, the government 
budget balance showed surplus, the fluctuations in the share of credits to the government 
in the assets structure of banks reflect the situation of non-performing loans and foreign 
exchange losses. As discussed earlier, the government purchased, in the form of bond- 
debt swaps accumulated stocks of non-performing loans of public enterprises, which 
were either liquidated or restructured. Also, in the same form of debt takeover, the 
government refunded banks the foreign exchange losses they occurred due to the major 
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Dinar devaluations in 1991 and 1994. One consequence of this debt takeover was 
bringing the capital ratios in line with international standards starting from 1999, and 
cleaning up the portfolio of credits to prepare, perhaps, banks for privatisation. 
On the liabilities side, in Algeria, total banking sector deposits increased more than five 
times over the 1990-2001 period. The deposits to total assets ratio rose from less than 
40% in 1990-1993 to around 40% over 1993 to 1998, then to greater than 50% over the 
1999-2001 period. One explanation for this increase may be the deregulation of interest 
rates since 1992 and inflation management, which decreased nominal interest rates and 
brought real interest rates to positive levels. 
The other item figuring on the liabilities side of Algerian banks is credits from the central 
bank. The importance of this item indicates the degree to which commercial banks rely 
on the control of the money authorities. It also provides some indication of the policy 
applied by the central bank on the banking sector. Overall, banks borrowed less than 5% 
of their assets from the central bank, except for two occasions, in 1993 (10%) and 1996 
(7%). It seems that Algerian banks are not significantly dependent on central bank 
funding. Also, as the central bank of Algeria has substituted direct monetary control with 
market-based indirect monetary policies. This has probably helped reduce the size of 
central bank funding in bank's balance sheets. 
In Algeria, over 1990-1999, the equity to assets ratio stood at less than four percent, and 
was even sometimes negative for some banks such as BDL. One main explanation for 
this under-capitalisation was the large amounts of accumulated non-performing assets of 
government-owned enterprises. This ratio improved after 1999, due to the repeated 
purchase of non-performing loans by the government (due on its enterprises) and cash 
inflows from the government to the banking sector. 
Overall, there a number of main observations inspired from Table 3-4 that can be made 
about the balance sheet structure of Algerian banks over 1990-2001. First, non- 
performing loans appear to be the main cause of the under-capitalisation of banks during 
this period, due to the former directed lending to public enterprises and sectoral credit 
specialisation. Second, bank deposits increased due to the positive rates of interest rates. 
Third, credits to the public sector still appear to be significant due to the weakness of the 
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private sector. Fourth, it seems that banks are not financing long-term investment and 
are, instead, concentrating on financing the working capital of enterprises, mainly, in the 
industrial sector. Fifth, Algerian banks' compliance with the capital adequacy ratios 
appears to be dependent on the large share of claims on the government in their balance 
sheets and the implicit government guarantee on non-performing loans to government- 
owned enterprises'0' Finally, the primary factors shaping Algeria's non-performing 
loans include the extensive administratively controlled policy of planned lending within 
the period prior to liberalisation, low financial performance of the government-owned 
enterprises, and lax internal credit risk controls of the government-owned banks. 
3-7-2 Morocco 
Table 3-5 shows the balance sheet structure of the Moroccan banking System from 1990 
to 2001. (See Table A2-6 in Appendix A2 which shows the total balance sheet of 
Moroccan banks as a proportion of total assets). 
1°'Ms Mentouri, one of the government's reformists, minister delegate for banking reform, noted that State 
banks had received over $18bn from the state to re-capitalise over the period 1991-2000 ( 
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Table 3-5: Morocco: Structure of Bank Balance sheet in Morocco from 1990 to 
2002 in Billion Moroccan Durham 
Ratios Assets 
Year Cash Deposits at External 
Credits to the 
Credits to 
the Portfolio Others 
Total 
Central Bank Assets Government Economy 
Assets 
1990 1.016 6.812 6.281 29.766 34.095 1.101 15.955 95.026 
1991 0.945 11.460 5.621 28293 48500 1.011 18.479 114.309 
1992 0.962 6.275 5.408 39545 56.581 0.994 14.129 123.894 
1993 1.090 7.682 5.002 44.652 62351 0355 14.425 135.557 
1994 1.061 7344 6.765 50.746 70.408 1.409 16.703 154.436 
1995 1.086 8.059 5.533 49.633 81.777 1.637 17.005 164.730 
1996 1.443 8.112 5.855 50.048 90.545 0.627 20276 176.906 
1997 1.6299 9.654 3.703 58.616 151203 25580 - 251.038 
1998 2.698 10.682 4392 58.614 167.602 29.834 - 274.022 
1999 5.242 11.858 4.812 54.917 183331 33.017 - 293.377 
2000 5.640 13340 6356 61.729 204.446 34312 325.823 
2001 8.542 20.528 5.805 72318 207.013 22.801 14.095 351102 
2002 6.447 2333 8.532 75.179 214284 24.580 15.16 367512 
Ratios Liabilities 
Demand Time & 
Credits from 
External 
Credits Non- Total 
Year savings the Central from other Residents Equity Other Assets deposits 
deposits 
Liabilities Bank banks Deposits 
1990 54.171 24.143 1.819 5.862 0312 1.507 6.491 2.540 95.026 
1991 61.757 30383 2.179 8398 0339 1.804 8.376 3216 114.309 
1992 66.636 36.425 3.205 2566 0.499 2.706 10382 4.680 123.894 
1993 70.033 42.687 3.729 0.965 0.465 3.264 12.973 5.170 135.557 
1994 79.099 45.958 6.020 1.108 0.713 5307 14.832 7A19 154.436 
1995 84.606 50.552 3.745 1.232 0.831 2.914 16.285 8310 164.730 
1996 87323 54.692 4579 2508 1.488 3.091 17.950 9384 176.. 906 
1997 116.054 64.121 3.409 1209 2203 1.206 38.743 27.502 251.038 
1998 126.767 65.114 4276 3381 3.194 1.082 44.973 29.511 274.022 
1999 140.895 69389 4.605 1.346 3289 1316 47.759 29.383 293.377 
2000 156.545 76.281 4322 7.161 3.891 0.431 53.736 27.751 325.823 
2001 166.238 98.497 12.035 0.007 12.876 0.641 54.611 6.197 351102 
2002 183.704 943 11.659 0.001 15.258 0.527 57.198 4.865 367512 
Source: AMF Report, 2002 
92 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Table 3-5 points out that, in Morocco, the assets size of the banking sector increased by 
three times, in nominal terms, over 1990-2001, from around DH95bn in 1990, to more 
than DH340bn in 2001. Credits to the economy, which are the main component on the 
assets structure of banks, outgrew total assets by nearly seven times, particularly from 
1996-1997, to be more than DA21 Obn by 2001. As a share of total banking sector assets, 
credits to the economy increased from around one third in the early nineties to two-thirds 
by 2000-2001. The growing importance of credits to the economy can also be expressed 
by the behaviour of domestic credits to GDP. This ratio ranged between 45-60% in 1991- 
96, and increased to more than 80% over 1997-2001. The strong trend in domestic credit 
growth is mainly related to growth in commercial bank lending to the private sector. 
The growing importance of the private sector also expressed by the ratio of credits to 
private sector to GDP. As a share of GDP, credits to privately-owned businesses rose 
from less than 30% over the 1990-1996 period to more than half of GDP during 1998- 
2001(see Table A2-4 in Appendix A2). Credit deregulation and privatisation 
programmes started significantly in 1993, both seem to explain the behaviour of 
increased commercial bank lending to the private sector. Chaput et al. (2000) report that 
Moroccan banks' balance sheets are characterised by short-term assets matched by short- 
term deposits, as long-term loans represent only one tenth of banking credits. 
The second main component figuring on the assets side of Moroccan banks' balance 
sheet are credits to the government. Over the period 1996-2001, credits to the 
government to total bank assets were around thirty percent, and mainly in the form of 
Treasury securities. This level is higher than in Tunisia, even though the mandatory 
holding of government papers has been annulled. The behaviour of credits to the 
government is strongly associated with the government budget balance. If the 
government budget records a deficit, more credits will appear on the assets side of banks. 
During the period 1990-2001, the Moroccan government suffered from a sustainable 
budget deficit averaging at 2.5% of GDP, which mainly explains the relatively high 
levels of credit to the government over this period. 
The share of portfolio investments (securities) in total bank assets experienced significant 
increases from less than 1% before 1997, to around one tenth of the balance sheet by 
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1997-2001. This increase is considerably related to the conspicuous importance of the 
stock exchange derived from the privatisation programme. The market capitalisation of 
Casablanca stock exchange increased from 23% of GDP in 1996, to within 42-32% over 
the period 1997-200043 
Reserves at the central bank were relatively stable over the 1990s, at around 5% of total 
banking sector assets. Similar to the Banque d'Algerie, Bank Al-Maghrib uses indirect 
market-based monetary instruments in the money market to oversee the supply of money. 
It appears that the Bank Al-Maghrib has not made significant changes to impose high 
rates on reserve requirements as this explains their stable levels. 
In terms of assets quality, the Moroccan banking sector is relatively more exposed to 
credit shocks more than their Algerian (and Tunisian) counterparts. More than half of 
Moroccan bank lending are allocated to activities that tend be highly cyclical in nature 
such as tourism, agricultural and agro-industrial industries and the textile sector. That is, 
the asset quality of banks is strongly related to the health and performance of the 
country's leading borrowing sectors, including agriculture, tourism and textile and agro- 
related businesses. In addition, Bank Al-Maghrib (2001) reports that the level of overdue 
loans in the banking sector increased to 15% of total bank lending by 1999-2000, 
representing 5% of GDP, compared to 12.6% in 1998, and 8% in 1992. The former 
specialised banks, BNDE, CIH and BNCA, accounted for a large share of these overdue 
loans. Over the period 1997-2002, Ingrives and Abed (2003) report that the ex- 
specialised banks held approximately 23.8% to 36.4% of non-performing loans to total 
loans compared to 12% to 18% for other banks. In 1998, approximately, 90% of overdue 
loans of the former specialised banks were considered unrecoverable, according to the 
new classification rules introduced in 1993 and supposed to be implemented by the end 
1996. However, the former specialised banks did not strongly comply with the new 
classification procedures by that date. 
On the liabilities side, it seems that demand and time deposits dominate banking sector 
funding in Moroccan banking. Over the period 1900-2001, these two components 
43 According to the Casablanca Stock Exchange Fact Book 2002, (page 20), the capitalisation of the CSE 
was DH75bn in 1996, DH 118bn in 1997 and DH 145bn in 1998. 
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represented, on average, more than two thirds of total liabilities and capital. Deposits 
grew by more than threefold over the period 1990-2001, in particular from 1997 
onwards. From 1997, real interest rates increased and banks actually might have sought 
to raise deposit finance to help fund stock market investments. 
Most Moroccan banks, apart from the former specialised banks, managed to bring their 
capital ratios in line with the BIS international standards. The capital equity share of total 
assets of banks has been higher than the minimum international rate of 8%, since 1992. 
The equity to assets ratio increased from seven percent in 1990-1991 to within 8-10% in 
1992-1995 and to more than 12% over 1996-2001, particularly greater than 16% since 
1998. Lee (2002) notes that capital adequacy ratio of Moroccan banks stood at an 
average rate of 12% over 1990-2001, whereas the central bank reports (2000,2001 and 
2002) state capital adequacy ratio between 11.1 and 12.6% over the 2000-2002 period. 
Over the 1990-2001 period, the balance sheet structure of Moroccan banks was 
characterised by five main features. First, credits to the economy represented the prime 
item on the assets side, of which more than 75% was borrowed by private enterprises. 
Second, bank credits are allocated to sectors that tend to be cyclical in nature such as the 
agricultural and tourism sectors. Third, banks have devoted a growing proportion of their 
funds to investment in the stock market. Fourth, banks have experienced substantial 
deposits growth due to positively high real interest rate in recent years. Finally, 
Moroccan banks are complying with the standard BIS 8% international capital adequacy 
ratio requirement. 
3-7-3 Tunisia 
Table 3-6 shows the balance sheet structure of the Tunisian banking system from 1990 to 
2001. (See Table A2-7 in Appendix A2 which shows the total balance sheet of Tunisian 
banks as a proportion of total assets). 
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Table 3-6: Tunisia: Structure of Bank Balance sheet in Tunisia from 1990 to 
2001 in Billion Tunisian Dinar. 
Ratios Assets 
Deposits at External 
Credits to Credits to Total Year Cash Central Assets the the Portfolio Others Assets Banks Government Economy 
1990 44.029 73.623 221.329 762.406 5,160.876 140.269 1397.086 7,781.621 
1991 42.714 87.559 189.844 792.925 5,648.587 198.665 1503.929 8,464.123 
1992 39.797 96.776 211.521 536.613 6,494.843 256.438 2018.211 9,654.199 
1993 50.738 130.368 275.757 535.911 7,054.548 274.756 2399.801 10,721.879 
1994 56.620 237.104 326.869 544.023 7,681.393 304.816 2559.038 11,709.863 
1995 55.724 219.278 306.534 341.103 8,463.401 334.933 2838.667 12,559.640 
1996 83.722 675.849 533.206 291.296 8,776.006 344.661 3527.645 14,232358 
1997 78.000 73&418 675.310 632.224 9,760.767 420.182 3622.774 15,977.679 
1998 83.913 271.716 271.697 682.224 10,649.749 487.034 4611.855 17,371.307 
1999 95.688 757.716 777.891 556.073 11,732.749 568.862 4706.335 19,581.046 
2000 118.191 321.449 927.965 1,561.303 14,683.732 758.386 5512.560 23,911.576 
2001* 144.446 604.934 807.507 1,486.887 16,241305 797.120 6,195307 26,277.506 
2002* 138.727 530.070 957.253 1,558.762 17,122207 1,019.805 5,688381 27,015.205 
Ratios Liabilities 
Year ýe uasi- Monetary External the Central i Equity Others Total it deposits Li abilities Bank ýý Resou Assets 
1990 1,536.697 2,891559 377.902 564280 668.102 591.837 1151.244 7,781.621 
1991 1,401236 3,195.569 424.452 696313 736285 710.073 1300.195 9,464.123 
1992 1,516.184 3,489.746 532.895 679.094 784.837 887.669 1763.774 9,654.199 
1993 1,622.856 2,766343 613.852 788323 824.454 1,053390 2052.461 10,721.879 
1994 1,892933 3,991.165 780358 605556 933.730 1,254.435 2260.686 11,709.863 
1995 2,024.104 4,165537 816.498 690.882 838.636 1,671.550 2352.433 12,559.640 
1996 2,288219 4,735.228 1,076.138 170.862 856375 1,913.972 3187964 14,232.358 
1997 2,724.138 5,654.754 1,213.727 131.189 903.645 2,150.449 3199.777 15,977.679 
1998 2,937.003 5,870.984 1,260.459 126.917 919370 2,361.021 2895.553 17,371.307 
1999 3,249521 7,121590 1,683.701 112.830 935.717 2,577.180 3900.507 19,581.046 
2000 3,585364 8,372276 1,839.446 469.695 1,787.909 2,935236 4921.650 23,911.576 
2001* 3,959325 9,292.966 1,826.848 869.957 2,003.697 4880.967 5,443.746 26,277.506 
2002* 3,696.699 10,118.780 2,006.096 504.091 2,353.680 3,075.831 5,260.028 27,015.205 
Source: AMF, 2001. 
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Source: Banque Centrale de Tunisie, Statistiques Financieres, No. 136, Sep. 2001. 
* Source: Banque Centrale de Tunisie, Statistiques Financieres, No. 144, Sep. 2003 
Table 3-6 indicates that, over the period 1990-2001, banking sector assets in Tunisia 
increased by threefold in nominal terms, from DT7.8 in 1990, to more than DT24bn in 
2001. Similar to Morocco, credits to the economy constituted the main part of banking 
sector assets with an average of 60% of assets and half of GDP, over the period. Due to 
the programme of privatisation and the encouragement of the role of private ownership 
and investment, bank credits to government-owned enterprises represented only a small 
share of total credits to the economy amounting to around 7% of total credits and 5% of 
GDP. In contrast, credits to the private sector have grown during the nineties reaching an 
average of 45-50% of GDP and more than 90% of total credits to the economy. 
Compared to Algeria, bank credits to government-owned enterprises in Tunisia (and 
Morocco) are the lowest, suggesting an advanced privatisation process. 
In terms of maturity and activity, Banque Centrale de Tunisie (2001) states that Tunisian 
bank lending appears to be largely short-term, and similar to Morocco, heavily 
concentrated in cyclical sectors such as in services (including tourism), and industries 
that belong to the export-oriented sectors, which face fierce competition in foreign 
markets such as in textiles (Chabrier and Ingrives, 2002). Over the period 1990-2001, on 
average, short-term credits accounted for around three fifths of total credits. Also, on 
average, services sectors accounted for 60% of total bank credit to the economy. Credits 
to the agricultural sector were mainly medium and long-term with 90% of total medium 
and long-term credits, whereas the remaining 10% were allocated to other sectors 
including the services and light industrial sectors. Overall, banks lending to the 
agricultural sector to total credits fell over 1990-2001. Inders et al. (1998) explains that 
agriculture in Tunisia has received less bank lending due to the annulment of the 
preferential treatment for refinancing, and the termination of compulsory lending to the 
sector since 1996. Also, the decrease in bank lending to the agricultural activities has 
been driven by relative high risk and volatility of the sector itself. The largest borrower 
of bank loans is the services sector, from around 40% in 1999 to 60% of total credits in 
2000-2001. This increase has been driven predominantly by the development of the 
tourism industry. 
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The share of the industrial sector in total bank lending fell from 50% in 1990 to less than 
40% in 2000-2001. As most of these credits were allocated to the ex-government-owned 
enterprises, the programme of enterprise privatisation and bank privatisation allowed for 
the reduction of these. The IMF (1997) states that loans to government-owned enterprises 
were most responsible for bank non-performing assets and this represented up to a third 
of total credits to the economy over the 1990 to 1997 period. The decisions of lending to 
government-owned enterprises can be considered as being the main cause of the high 
level of non-performing loans. 
Whereas in Algeria and Morocco, the governments opted for bond-debt swap policies in 
dealing with non-performing loans (mainly to public enterprises); the Tunisian 
government followed another approach. Chabrier and Ingves (2002) state that, in 1997, 
the government allowed the creation of private asset management companies (AMCs) 
charged with the purchase and collection of non-performing loans. These companies 
were subsidiaries of the respective banks, playing the role of an in-house non-performing 
loans recovery company. Measures taken by these structures include converting all the 
non-performing loan assets of ex-government-owned banks that have been liquidated or 
privatised into non-interest bearing claims on the government with a 25-year re-payment 
period (more than 60% of non-performing claims were on govemment-owned 
companies). The approval of this measure has improved the relative performance and 
soundness of the banking system. Chabrier and Ingves (2002), however, report that the 
level of non-performing loans still amount to a fifth of total credits, with only two fifths 
of total provisioning by 1999-2001, 
Credits to the government represented an average of 6% of total Tunisian bank assets 
over 1990-2001. As in Morocco, the magnitude of credit to the government is 
significantly positively related to the level of the government budget balance, which 
witnessed a deficit of 3.3% of GDP over 1990-2001. Also, Enders at al. (2000) reports 
that the increase in bank credits to the government from 1997 onwards, was due to the 
government purchase of a stock of non-performing loans from the agricultural-oriented 
bank Banque Nationale de 1'Agriculture (BNA), the largest public bank in Tunisia (in 
1997). Whereas as explained by Enders et al. (1998,2000), the decrease in bank credits 
to the government over the period 1990 to 1996, was due to the abolishment of forced 
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holdings of government securities and the reduced budget deficit. Prior to major reforms 
in the late 1980s, the government financed its deficits by requiring banks to hold 
government paper (IMF, 1996). In 1989, this requirement was discontinued and, instead, 
the government introduced a new procedure through which banks were forced to finance 
government deficits by holding treasury bills at market conditions (Tunisia, 2001b). By 
1995, government credit allocation gradually disappeared that allowed banks to have 
greater autonomy in their lending activities (IMF, 1996). Moreover, bank deposits at the 
central bank have declined and remained relatively low during the period 1991-2001. In 
addition, Tunisian banks invested an estimated of quarter of their assets in securities. 
Deposits from households and enterprises constitute the main part of Tunisian banking 
sector liabilities side. Over the period 1990-2001, this item accounted for an average of 
half of total assets. This ratio implies that deposits from households and enterprises 
accounted for than three quarters of total bank lending. 
The capital adequacy ratio was less than 8% in 1990-1996, but increased to over 10% 
after 1996. According to Inders et at. (1998), the increase in equity and capital has been 
promoted by the new prudential regulations introduced in 1991, and by the re- 
capitalisation of a number of under-capitalised public banks in order to meet the required 
8% capital adequacy ratio requirement. Further measures were implemented in 200144 to 
accentuate the importance of banks in meeting international standards. The greater focus 
on prudential supervision during the 1990s has helped strengthen the capital adequacy of 
the Tunisian banking system, in particular over 1997-2001. For instance, the capital 
adequacy ratio of Tunisian banks has increased from 5% in 1996 to 12% by 2000 (Sfar, 
2001). The improvement in Tunisian banks' soundness may be also explained by the 
decline in non-performing asserts from 28-25% between 1993 and 1995 to less than 20% 
over the period 1999-2001. In addition, Chabrier and Ingves (2002) believe that the 
significant exposure to credit risk suggests that the level of risk-weighted capital is 
sensitive to credit risk shock. Chabrier and Ingves (2002) estimate the capital adequacy 
of Tunisia banks at 11% in 2000-2001. However, the aforementioned authors think that 
this level of capital adequacy is over-estimated. They detect that regulation in Tunisia 
44 Central Bank circular No. 2001-04. 
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does not require the provisioning of loans backed up by real estate collateral. As a 
consequence, they argue that the weighted capital ratio at 11% does not reflect this, and 
for example, if 100% collateral was unrecoverable, it would result in a reduction of the 
risk weighted capital ratio from 11% to 0.5%. This ratio would decline to 6% if only half 
of the collateral was unrecoverable. Overall, however, Chabrier and Ingrives (2002) do 
recognise that loan provisioning of Tunisian banks has improved. 
In general, the balance sheet structure of Tunisian banks are characterised by four main 
features. First, credits to the economy and credits to the private sector appear to be the 
main constituent on the assets side. Second, even though non-performing loans are 
decreasing, these are still substantial accounting for 20% of total loans. Third, a large 
proportion of bank loans tends to be short term and concentrated in sectors that are 
cyclical in nature and face fierce. competition from foreign markets. Fourth, 
approximately half of Tunisian banks' liabilities and capital consist of interest-bearing 
deposits from households and enterprises. Finally, Tunisian banks have met the 
internationally adopted minimum capital adequacy ratios in the late 1990s. 
3-8 Efficiency and Profitability of Banks in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia45 
Overall, our ratio analyses of the profitability and efficiency of the banking systems 
under study suggest that Algerian banks are not as profitable and efficient as banks in 
Morocco and Tunisia. Algerian banks have tended to suffer from low rates of returns on 
their assets as well as higher levels of costs to income ratios compared with Moroccan 
and Tunisian banks. 
Studies that have investigated the profitability and solvency of the banking sector in 
Algeria have typically found poor performance and soundness according to the 
international and regional comparison over the period 1990-2001. Chabrier and Kapur 
(2000) found that the return on assets of Algerian banks was very low, compared to 
banks in Morocco and Tunisia, at less than half a percent. The aforementioned study 
as Due to the difficulty of collecting detailed information about profitability and efficicncy indicators on banking sectors in the three countries used study over the period of investigation, the thesis uses the 
analyses of authors who examined these themes. 
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refers to the characteristics of Algerian banks' balance sheet structure to present potential 
causes for this low level of returns. Algerian banks sustained relatively high levels of 
non-performing claims on loss-making government-owned enterprises. Due to the 
influence of (past) governments on banks46, and despite the autonomy of decision- 
making granted to bank managers regarding credit allocation, Algerian banks had to 
continue providing funds to public enterprises to support their working capital, especially 
wages and salaries. Banks might have liquidity constraints created by the large amounts 
of government bonds swapped within the framework of the bank-recapitalisation 
programme, currency devaluation losses, and non-performing claims on government- 
owned enterprises. These bonds might have also yielded lower interest income than 
expected. In addition, Algerian banks have found it difficult to enlarge their net interest 
revenue or interest spread. Over the period 1990-2001, the fall in deposit interest rates 
was larger than the decrease in lending rates, thus lower profitability in lending business 
(particularly in sectors outside the upstream hydrocarbon sector). 
In Morocco, Chaput et al. (2000) and Ingvis and Abed (2003) study the profitability of 
Moroccan banks in recent years. Unlike in Algeria, Moroccan banks experienced 
relatively large (but overall stable) net interest revenues of up to eight percent despite the 
larger decrease of lending interest rates compared to deposits interest rates. Banks 
benefited from the abolishment of mandatory credits for priority sectors over the period 
1990-1995. Also banks benefited from the discontinuation of the forced holding of 
government securities at administratively low-interest rates, and subsequently, banks 
have substituted these securities for debt instruments yielding market interest rates (as 
well as Treasury bills). Chaput et al. (2000) reports that Moroccan banks income from 
treasury securities increased by half between 1993 and 1998. In addition, Chaput et al. 
(2000) notes that large and relatively stable Moroccan banks' net interest margins imply 
that financial liberalisation measures did not significantly influence the degree of 
competition among banks. High levels of interest spread may reflect the fact that the 
Moroccan banking sector is still highly concentrated, and banks are not competing on 
interest rate business. 
46 In Algeria, the chief executives of government-owned banks are still nominated by political authorities 
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In Tunisia, Chabrier and Ingrives (2002) report that Tunisia's commercial banks 
increased their ROA from 0.6-0.8% in 1996-1997 to an average of 1.2% over 1998-2001. 
However, ROE decreased from 28% in 1990 to 14% by 1999-2001. The aforementioned 
study suggests that the level of profitability of Tunisian banks is relatively high. One 
potential explanation of this phenomenon is a large interest spread driven by the possible 
absence of competition (possibly due to the high levels of industry concentration). In 
terms of costs, the operating costs to average assets ratio experienced a relatively stable 
trend at approximately 2.3% over the 1990-2002, compared to 2.2% in Morocco and 2% 
in the Euro area (Chabrier and Ingrives, 2002). 
Inders et al. (1998) comments that Tunisian banks were experiencing ROA rates in the 
range of those experienced in the OECD countries, with private-owned banks persistently 
outperforming government-owned banks. The aforementioned study suggests that the 
high level of ROA was driven mainly by the large net interest revenues. Tunisian banks 
were lending, on average, 2.7% above the money market rate while deposits were 
remunerated at approximately 0.5% below the money market rate. 
In addition, Ben Naceur (2003) investigates the determinants of the profitability of the 
banking sector (ten deposit banks) in Tunisia using data representing the period 1980- 
2000. Two measures of performance are used; Net Interest Margin and ROA. Also, five 
banks' characteristics indicators are used as potential internal determinants of 
performance. They comprise the ratio of overhead to total assets (OVERHEAD), the 
ratio of equity capital to total assets (CAP), the ratio of bank's loans to total assets 
(BLOAN), the ratio of non-interest bearing assets to total assets (NIBA) and the log of 
bank assets (LNSIZE). Also, two macro-economic variables are used: inflation (INF) and 
GDP per capita growth (GROWTH). The study also examines how the performance of 
the banking sector is related to the relative development of the banks and stock markets. 
Ben Naceur (2003) finds that proportion of loans to assets has had a positive and 
significant impact on banks' interest margins. He also finds that size has mostly negative 
and significant coefficients on the level of net interest margins. This latter result may 
simply reflect scale inefficiencies. In addition, banking market concentration is found to 
be less beneficial to the Tunisian commercial banks than competition. Ben Naceur (2003) 
suggests that banks to improve their performance, they need to reduce the proportion of 
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non-interest bearing assets of large banks can achieve optimal levels. At their national 
level, Ben Naceur (2003) recognises that concentration should be reduced to spur 
competition, and equity market should be developed as in order to improve bank 
performance and stock market developments have been found to be complementary. 
Thus, according to studies that have investigated the profitability and cost behaviour of 
banks in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, it appears that Moroccan and Tunisia banks are 
more profitable and efficient than banks in Algeria. This evidence suggests that standard 
accounting measures imply that Algerian banks are likely to be more profit and cost 
inefficient than those located in the two neighbouring countries under study. 
3-9 Conclusion 
During the period prior to the implementation of financial liberalisation in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the financial and monetary authorities in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
relied predominantly on three instruments to regulate the financial sector. First, there was 
a State monopoly over the banking sector in terms of ownership and management. 
Private and foreign capital was not allowed to establish banking structures in the local 
banking market due to its "strategic character". Second, there were quantitative controls 
on credits within the framework of the French style scheme known as "1'encadrernent du 
Credit". According to this scheme, financial intermediaries were obliged to maintain a 
pre-determined proportion of their lending portfolios to assigned pre-defined sectors 
deemed as `strategic' or `priority' by the respective governments. Substantial directed 
lending took place to sectors such as agriculture, export-oriented (Morocco and Tunisia) 
and public enterprises or import-oriented sectors (Algeria), even if these sectors were 
unprofitable or loss-making. Finally, borrowing and lending interest rates were 
administratively determined, and usually fixed for long periods. The implementation of 
these measures resulted in financial repression. 
The financial and banking systems of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia witnessed 
substantial liberalisation reforms that have helped re-shape the structure of their 
respective systems and relaxed aspects of financial repression that were evident 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. As part of the reform process, first, the monetary 
authorities changed monetary policy practices and introduced indirect market-based 
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instruments such as open market operations and reserve requirements. Second, lending 
and borrowing rates have been gradually deregulated and are allowed to respond to 
internal. Third, the encadrement du credit style has been discontinued and banks are (in 
theory at least) given autonomy in their credit allocation decision making, and are 
encouraged to consider only market criteria when approving lending. Fourth, various 
specialisations and entry barriers have been dismantled to allow private and foreign 
ownership to operate in the banking systems with the respective States have made 
commitments to privatise their banks. Finally, internationally-accepted banking 
supervision norms have been introduced and banks are required to meet these levels. 
The results of financial liberalisation measures on the balance sheet structure of the 
respective banking systems can be identified in certain aspects. First, both private and 
foreign banks currently operate in local banking markets. Second, bank lending to private 
enterprises has grown while credits to government-owned enterprises have fallen. Third, 
interest rates have become more market based. Fourth, banks are now meeting the 
internationally-accepted BIS capital adequacy level of 8%, especially in Morocco and 
Tunisia. In general, however, the structure of the local banking systems still show high 
levels of concentration and non-performing assets are still relatively high. Credits are 
concentrated in certain sectors that are relatively short-term. Credit concentration also 
occurs in sectors that are cyclical in nature or face fierce competition from international 
markets. Banks also still enjoy stable and relatively large interest margins due to low 
levels of competition in the respective operating environments. Algerian banks appear to 
be less profitable and cost efficient than their Moroccan and Tunisian counterparts. These 
findings we wish to investigate in a more formal fashion in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4 The Theory and Empirics of Cost 
and Profit Efficiency Measurement in 
Banking 
4-1 Introduction 
The present chapter introduces the theoretical framework related to the investigation of 
cost and profit efficiency in banking. The chapter provides a description of the concept of 
bank efficiency and its types including productive X-efficiency and scale and scope 
economies. Also, the present chapter covers the description of the major statistical 
frontier approaches that have been extensively used to measure efficiency, namely, the 
parametric and the non-parametric approaches (Bauer et al., 1997). 
These two approaches provide quantitative measures of relative firm-level performance 
as they estimate best practice according to a variety of assumptions, including input and 
output choice. In banking, the efficiency estimates derived using the two families of 
approaches are indicative of a banking institution's performance relative to the best 
practice banking institutions that lie on (or are close to) the frontier. While the parametric 
approach requires the estimation of a cost or profit function, the non-parametric approach 
does not require the specification of a functional form; instead, it employs linear 
programming techniques to envelop the observed dataset so as to produce a linear 
frontier. Empirical studies have extensively applied these two approaches to investigate 
the efficiency characteristics of banking and financial systems across various countries 
with different economic and financial features. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section outlines the notion of 
efficiency, its main types. Also, the section discusses the concepts of economies of scale, 
economies of scope, and productive X-efficiency. These concepts will be referred to later 
in the empirical chapter of the thesis where efficiency levels in the banking sectors of 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are analysed. The second section reviews the parametric 
and non-parametric estimation techniques. The third section presents the three main 
mathematical functional forms that are broadly employed to derive efficiency and 
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productive levels estimates including, as noted by Berger and Mester (1997), the cost, 
standard profit, and alternative profit functional forms. The empirical analysis conducted 
in later chapters utilises cost and alternative profit features to measure the efficiency 
levels in the banking sectors of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
4-2 Efficiency Definition and Measurement 
4-2-1 Efficiency Definition 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) note that the concept of X-efficiency or productive 
efficiency is related to the process of evaluating the relative change in performance based 
on comparing an entity, a firm or Decision Making Unit (DMU), to the best practice 
(other entities, firms, or DMUs), in terms of a variable or scores of variables. The 
efficiency of a firm is defined relative to the best practice firms observed in the industry 
and requires the estimation of a production, cost or profit frontier. That is, productive or 
X-efficiency is derived as the distance an individual (banking) DMU is from the 
`optimal' or `best practice' DMU existing on a (cost or profit) production function, in 
which the `best practice' DMU firms is defined with reference to all the DMUs in the 
dataset. 
A production frontier is a relationship that describes the maximum output that an 
efficient firm can produce using a combination of inputs over time. Similarly, Oster and 
Antiosh (1995) relate the concept of efficiency in banking to how well a bank utilises its 
resources relative to the existing production possibilities frontier or best practice. That is, 
how a banking institution simultaneously minimises costs and maximises revenues, based 
on an existing level of production technology. Bank efficiency analysis can be considered 
similar to an intra-industry comparison that involves both technological and relative 
pricing. 
Bank cost and profit efficiency studies have used both parametric and non-parametric 
approaches to quantify the maximum outputs that an efficient "best practice" banking 
firm can produce from any given combinations of defined inputs over a specified period 
of time. Frontier efficiency approaches estimate the deviations in performance from that 
of "best-practice" banking firms that lie on or are closer to the frontier. That is, these 
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approaches measure how well a banking firm performs compared to the predicted 
performance of the best practice banking firms in the industry experiencing the same 
market conditions. 
4-2-2 Farrell's Study (1957) 
A seminal study on the concept of efficiency and how it can be measured was by Farrell 
(1957). As noted by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), Farrell (1957) was the first to outline 
the operational procedure to measure technical and allocative efficiency. Farrell (1957) 
employs two inputs and a single output example to illustrate how technical efficiency can 
be measured. The procedure of efficiency estimates takes the following steps. First, 
assume that there are five decision making units (A, B, C, D, and E) that produce a single 
output, y, and use only two inputs, xi, and x2. Second, a reference point or firm can be 
defined, and used as a benchmark to estimate the efficiency levels of every DMU. The 
reference firm is obtained by lying up the actual observations closest to the axis, and then 
these observations are enveloped to construct the best practice frontier, QQ'. Figure 4-1 
displays both combinations of inputs/outputs and the efficient frontier of the concerned 
firms. 
Figure 4-1: Distance Measure of technical Efficiency 
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Figure 4-1 shows that the DMU A, C and E are the most efficient firms as they lie on the 
best practice frontier curve, QQ', which gives them the privilege of serving as a 
benchmark norm for other firms. A firm operating at the point k, or any position under 
QQ' is not technically feasible. Similarly, firms on points above the curve QQ' are 
technically inefficient. For instance, the firm B produces the same amount of outputs as 
the best practice firms but uses extra units of inputs. If a firm operated at the best practice 
level, it should lie on QQ' at point a. Farrell (1957) suggests that the assessment of 
technical inefficiency for firm B is possible by measuring the ratio of OA to OB. As a 
distance measure, the ratio of OA to OB represents the ratio of inputs technically 
necessary to the inputs actually used to produce one unit of output, given the actual input 
mix. 
4-2-3 Efficiency Types: Allocative and Technical 
4-2-3-1 Efficiency Decomposition 
Efficiency frontier studies investigate efficiencies as defined as the relationship between 
the level of production of outputs and either cost input minimisation or profit 
maximisation in certain regulatory competitive and technological environments. As noted 
earlier, frontier approaches measure the deviation of a bank's costs or profits from the 
efficiency or best practice frontier, which depicts the maximum attainable output for a 
given level of outputs. According to Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996), firms that lie off the 
frontier are known as inefficient or X-inefficient, a term introduced by Leinbenstein 
(1966), who noted that, for a variety of reasons, people and organisations normally work 
neither as hard nor effectively as they could. 
X-efficiency, as defined by Evanoff (1999) as the suboptimal use of inputs, can be 
decomposed into two major components, namely, allocative efficiency and technical 
efficiency. Technical efficiency (TE) can be also decomposed into pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). The decomposition of technical efficiency 
helps investigate the source of inefficiencies and determines the position of banks in 
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terms of operating at the most productive scale size (MPSS), increasing return to scale 
02 (IRS) or decreasing returns to scale (DRS)l 
Farrell (1957) distinguished between two components of the economic, cost or profit 
efficiency of a decision-making unit (DMU); technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency. First, technical efficiency reflects the ability of the DMU to obtain maximum 
output from a given set of inputs. Second, allocative efficiency indicates the ability of the 
DMU to employ inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices and a given 
production technology. Leinbenstein (1966) states that errors, lags between the choice of 
the production plan and its implementation, human inactivity, distorted communication, 
and uncertainty cause deviations from the efficient frontier, which are called X- 
inefficiencies. 
Allocative efficiency and technical efficiency both measure the deviation from the 
efficient frontier where the best practice banking firms operate, which are characterised 
as minimum costs or maximum profit input usage in the industry. Berger, Hunter and 
Timme (1993) indicate that X-inefficiencies in banking account for approximately 
twenty percent or more of total banking costs, while scale and scope efficiencies, when 
they can be accurately estimated, are usually found to account for up to five percent of 
total banking costs. Similarly, Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey the efficiency 
literature in banking and found that cost X-inefficiencies are within the range of twenty 
to thirty percent, and they tend to dominate the effects of scale and scope economics, 
which are found to be within the range from five to ten percent. 
De Young (1997) explores the efficiency frontier analysis approaches and their 
advantages over classical accounting ratios. Cost and profit frontier analysis does not 
require the construction of peer groups of banks with similar characteristics, but uses, in 
lieu, statistical technique to select the best practice banks. De Young (1997) observes 
that bank efficiency is a complicated phenomenon and this requires the use of 
sophisticated analytical tools to solve optimisation problems. On the other hand, 
accounting ratio analysis does not control for input mix and output mix and other factors 
that may explain differences in firm-level efficiency. Efficiency frontier analysis allows 
102 This tends to be done using the DEA approach. 
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users to estimate bank inefficiencies for any size of sample that may include thousands of 
observations, solving, as a consequence, the problems related to peer group selection. 
4-2-3-2 Allocative Efficiency 
Allocative inefficiencies, as defined by Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993), consist of the 
increase in costs or losses of profit from making poor choices of inputs and outputs, 
including poor production plans. A banking firm might produce too much of one type of 
loan but too little of another based on misperceptions of their relative returns. For 
instance, a bank might conduct a poor assessment of the relative credit risks, or it may 
not embrace the benefits of diversification, or a bank might incorrectly assess the effects 
of interest rate changes in the value of fixed-rate investments. Lovell (1993) defines 
allocative efficiencies as the ability of the banking firm to avoid waste by either 
producing as much output within the optimal usage of inputs. 
According to Evanoff (1999), allocative inefficiency occurs when inputs are employed in 
suboptimal proportions, due mainly and typically to regulations. Regulation may require 
banks to use inputs in pre-defined proportions, such as the requirement of using more 
capital than deposits, or visa versa, in certain funding operations. These required 
proportions would most likely result in a production or intermediation process that would 
be less efficient than the unrestricted process. In addition, Evanoff (1999) highlights the 
role of regulations that frequently results in unintentionally inefficient bank behaviour. 
For instance, price restrictions aiming at providing banks with an inexpensive source of 
funding may result in significant bank expenses to avoid the restrictions. In addition, 
bank entry regulations may result in low-quality bank services, as entry barriers may 
restrict the mechanism that make poor quality banks be driven out of the market by 
efficient banks. Thus, regulation is a major reason for the existence of allocative 
inefficiency. 
4-2-3-3 Technical Efficiency 
Technical inefficiencies, as defined by Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993), consist of the 
increase in cost or losses in profits from failing to meet plans designed at the choice- 
making level. Technical inefficiencies could occur if a bank produces fewer outputs or 
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uses more inputs than hypothetically a fully efficient bank. For instance, a technically 
inefficient banking firm is associated with the characteristic of making fewer loans than 
would be the case for a technically efficient banks that has the same objectives. Evanoff 
(1999) relate technical inefficiency to the underutilisation or mismanagement of inputs. 
Technical efficiency can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency. First, according to Webster, Kennedy and Johnson (1998), pure technical 
efficiency measures the proportional reduction in inputs that could be achieved if the firm 
operated on the variable returns to scale frontier. If the firm is able to achieve this, then 
further input reductions could be achieved by operating at the constant returns to scale. 
Evanoff (1999) notes that pure technical efficiency occurs when more of each input is 
used than should be required to produce a given level of output. This implies that banks 
employ the proper mix of inputs but mismanage them. Second, according to Oster and 
Antiosh, (1995), scale efficiency refers to banks or branches achieving an optimum size 
for producing financial services and thereby, ensuring operations at the minimum point 
of the average cost curve. Scale efficiencies reflect a situation where a firm can produce 
its current level of output with fewer inputs assuming constant returns to scale, which 
refers to the ability to avoid waste by operating at the most productive scale. 
4-3 Scale and Scope Economies103 
4-3-1 Scale Economies for a Single Output form 
De Young (1997) defines scale economies as cost savings from spreading fixed costs 
over larger quantities of outputs and from making better use of specialised labour and 
capital inputs. They reflect how costs are affected when output expands, by referring to 
the relationship between a firm's per unit average production cost and production 
quantities. 
Economies of scale are calculated as the ratio of the proportional change in costs relative 
to the proportional change in outputs. If the proportional change in costs is equal to the 
proportional change in outputs, a bank is said to be operating at constant returns to scale. 
103 Frequently attributed to Schumpeter (1942), the association of form size with scale and scope economies, 
market power, and the ability to aggregate inputs is widely asserted to confer performance advantages on large 
forms. 
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If the proportional change in costs exceeds the proportional change in outputs, a bank is 
said to be operating at decreasing returns to scale. Thus, scale diseconomies occur when 
average production costs start to rise with outputs beyond certain quantities of 
production. Scale diseconomies may arise because it may be more costly to manage a 
very large firm, or because the managers of a large firm become entrenched and therefore 
concerned more about maximising their own welfare than that of shareholders. 
Berger and Humphrey (1994) and Clarke (1996) review surveys by Mester (1987), 
Clarke (1988), Humphrey (1990), Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) to conclude that 
scale economies in banking are represented by an average cost curve that tends to have a 
relatively flat U-shape with medium-sized banks being slightly more scale efficient than 
either large or small banks. Only small banks appear to have the potential for scale 
efficiency gains, but the measured scale economies are in the order of up to five percent. 
William, Gilbert and Yeager (2001) note that hypothetical or actual cost and profit 
efficiency gains can be obtained through greater geographic or industry diversification. 
They refer to Boyd and Graham (1998) who found significant cost and profit efficiency 
gains after small-bank mergers. If the average cost curve is U-shaped104, it implies that 
there is an optimal scale of production at which the peer unit average production cost is 
minimised. 
Thus, for a single output bank, scale economies are related to the relationship between 
the behaviour of both total costs and output. De Young (1997) states that banking 
deregulation allows banks to grow bigger by acquiring and merging with other banks and 
entering new geographic markets, which will be reflected in reducing unit costs. That is, 
consolidation and market and geographic diversification may hypothetically result in 
reducing per unit cost by capturing scale economies. 
4-3-2 Scale Economies for a Multi-Output form 
Even though scale economies for a multi-product form are based on the same concept as 
in the case of a single output firm'°5, there are some complications in terms of 
measurement. Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) note that measuring scale economies in 
104 Due to economies of scale at a low output level and diseconomies of scale at a high output level. 1' In both cases, scale economies reflect the behaviour of total costs and output(s). 
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the case of single-output firms tend to be relatively simple and can be undertaken by 
measuring total cost change to the total output change ratio. However, the 
aforementioned authors recognise that in the case of multi-product firms, measuring scale 
economies tends to be more complicated, as changes in all outputs produced by a bank 
have to be included. Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) suggest the concept of Ray 
Average Cost (RAC) or Ray Economies of Scale (RES) to overcome scale economies 
measuring complications that occur in the case of multi-product firms. The RAC or RES 
concept is illustrated in Figure 4-2, which present scale economies for a firm with multi- 
outputs. 
Figure 4-2 Scale Economies for a Multi-output formt06 
Total Costs 
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qm 
As Figure 4-2 shows, and taking an example of two outputs, a bank's ray economy of 
scale is calculated as the sum of the cost elasticities of output for its three output services: 
oIn 7(' (4.1) Lam, 1 In qj 
Since the derivatives are functions of the observed bank inputs and outputs and not 
merely of the estimated parameters, each ray economy of scale is applicable only to a 
106 Source: Mulvncux, Altunbas and Gardener (1996). p 141. 
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given bank at a given mix of output. A ray economy of scale measures the total elasticity 
of production of the bank, showing whether costs will increase by more or less than one 
percent for each percent increase in production of all three services. Elasticity's greater 
than unity imply diseconomies of scale and values less than unity imply economies of 
scale; whereas unity denotes constant returns to scale. 
4-3-3 Scope Economies 
William, Gilbert and Yeager (2001) mention that economies of scope are present if cost 
savings or performance benefits are realised when two or more activities are conducted 
jointly in comparison to when these activities are conducted separately. In the standard 
analysis of production, scope economies result when activities can share productive 
inputs at little or no additional cost. Similarly, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2003) note that 
economies of scope refer to whether it is better for financial services organisations to 
specialise in a narrow range of products or to offer a diversity of products to their 
customers Thus, scope economies refer to cost savings from simultaneously producing 
several outputs in the same banking firm, rather than producing each output separately in 
a specialised firm. De Young (1997) notes that the trend of deregulation and product de- 
specialisation and diversification are major sources of scope economies in banking. 
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) outline that scope economies quantify the cost 
savings from producing quantities of the two outputs jointly within a single institution 
relative to specialised production by two institutions. This measure thus represents the 
economies of simultaneous production relative to specialised production. According to 
Pulley and Braunstein (1992) and Pulley and Humphrey (1993), economies of scope are 
measured by evaluating the cost of specialised versus joint production firms. 
Mathematically, scope economies can be calculated as follows; 
SCOPE=[(C(qi, 0........ 0; r) + (C(O, q2,0......., 0; r) + C(0....... 0, gm; r) - (ql + q2 ....... + 
qm; r)/ C(ql + q2 +....... + qm; r) (4.2) 
Where C() refers to the cost function, q;, (i= 1,2, ..... m) refers to outputs, and r 
is a 
vector of n input prices. 
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Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2003) state two major hypotheses about economies of scope. 
These are the conglomeration hypothesis, which holds that operating a diversity of 
business can add value by exploiting cost and revenue scope economies, and the strategic 
focus hypothesis, which holds that firms can best add value by focusing on core 
businesses. 
According to the conglomeration hypothesis, scope economies can originate from cost 
complementarities, including the sharing of inputs such as brand names, customer lists, 
and managerial expertise. Other potential sources of cost economies of scope include 
earnings diversification, which permits the banking firm to operate with higher leverage 
ratios, more efficient use of capital through internal capital markets, and other factors. 
Economies of scope also can arise due to revenue complementarities, resulting from the 
creation of "one-stop banking" opportunities for consumers that reduce search costs and 
enhance consumer value and product quality. 
The strategic focus hypothesis holds that conglomeration is likely to destroy firm value 
by introducing cost and/or revenue diseconomies. Operating a conglomerate rather than a 
focused firm may increase management and coordination costs, exacerbate principal- 
agent conflicts, and create costly cross-subsidization among subsidiaries due to 
inefficient internal capital markets. On the revenue side, conglomeration may destroy 
firm value if specialised firms develop superior expertise that is valued by consumers or 
if specialisation facilitates the reduction of informational asymmetries that can foster 
adverse selection. The development of electronic (intemet) market channels also may 
have reduced the value to consumers of financial supermarkets. Because scope 
economies are most likely to exist for closely related products focusing on a single, 
broadly defined industry enables us to provide a strong test for the existence of both 
production and consumption scope economies. 
Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987) identify four major sources of scope economies, 
which relate to the spreading of fixed costs, information economies, risk reduction, and 
consumer cost economies. Pulley and Humphrey (1993) also identify two main sources 
of scope economies in banking, which are related to cost spreading and cost 
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complementarities. First, economies of scope can arise by spreading fixed costs over an 
extended product mix. For instance, a bank may produce deposits and loan services 
jointly rather than separately. Also, a bank may use the same inputs, including 
computers, accounting information, branches and labour to produce new loans and 
products. Second, banks can realize economies of scope through cost complementarities 
among different products. For instance, if a bank can predict a customer's qualities based 
on his-her history regarding depositing funds, this will be an advantage in evaluating 
his/her creditworthiness. As a consequence, the bank can lower credit losses and, at the 
same time, can lower marketing costs through cross-selling new products to the same 
customer. Third, Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987) state that economies of scope 
can arise from the consumption concept of "one-stop shopping or banking". Customers 
can reduce their transaction, transportation, and search by utilizing the same system for 
different products. This concept lies behind the concept of universal banking as it offers 
bank customers the advantage of opening a universal account with different product 
access. 
4-3-4 Problems Relating to the Computation of Scale 
Scope Economies 
In their review of the scale and scope efficiency literature, Berger, Hunter and Timme 
(1993) observe that, in banking, the average cost curve has a relatively flat U-shape, with 
medium-sized firms being slightly more scale efficient than either very large or very 
small banks. They also note that scale and scope economies studies vary with regards to 
the location of the bottom of the average cost U curve, which is the most efficient point 
indicating optimal firm size. 
Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) and McAllister and McManus (1993) note that there is 
no consensus as to the optimal bank size in the empirical literature. This is the 
consequence of the fact that studies investigating bank scale and scope economies, vary 
in terms of their examined sample and size. For instance, taking the US case, Berger, 
Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) find that efficient scale banking organisations tend to be 
medium sized within the range of $100 million to $25 billion of assets. However, 
Wheelock and Wilson (2001) apply the parametric and non-parametric approaches for 
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the period 1985-94, and locate the maximum efficient scale banks within the range size 
of $300 million and $500 million of assets. Banks below this range face increasing 
returns to scale, while banks in or above the range face constant or decreasing returns to 
scale. 
In addition, Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) and McAllister and McManus (1993) note 
that there is no consensus in terms of methodological approaches used to estimate scale 
and scope economies, due to the fact that studies investigating scale and scope use 
different methodological approaches to evaluate the concerned economies as there is also 
limited sufficient information on specialised banking firms. Some functional forms that 
have been used to model the cost characteristics of the banking industry may not be 
capable of incorporating the technologies of both large and small banks. For instance, the 
aforementioned authors note that the use of a translog cost function specification to 
estimate scale and scope economies may be a poor approximation when applied to banks 
of all sizes. The cost translog functional form forces large and small banks to lie in a 
symmetric U-shaped average cost curve and disallows other possibilities, including an 
average cost curve that falls up to some output point and remains constant thereafter. To 
overcome this problem, it is suggested that more researchers use flexible functional 
forms such as the Fourier Flexible functional form (Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993), or 
use non-parametric methods (McAllister and McManus, 1993), or replace the cost 
function by a profit function (Hunter and Timme, 1995), and focus on X-efficiency 
measurement rather than scale and scope economies. 
4-4 Efficiency Concepts: Cost, Standard Profit 
and Alternative Profit 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997) identify three concepts that 
offer a definitional framework for the examination of cost and profit efficiency in 
banking. These are cost efficiency, standard profit efficiency, and alternative or non- 
standard profit efficiency. These concepts are believed to be founded on economic 
optimisation in reaction to market prices and competition, as banking firms prefer to 
represent the best practice in the industry, in terms of maximising profits or minimising 
costs. Cost efficiency studies in banking appear to be more widespread than 
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profit/revenue efficiency studies. The majority of studies surveyed by Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) examined cost efficiency. This survey which covered 130 bank 
efficiency studies in 21 countries, reviewed only 14 papers that examines revenue and/or 
profits efficiency. 
Economies of scale and scope are different from X-efficiency. The measurement of 
economies of scale and economies of product mix involves the consideration of the 
characteristics of a function or frontier. Productive efficiency measurement differs from 
the measurement of economies of scale and product mix in that inefficiency of an 
individual institution is viewed as a distance from the best practice function or frontier. 
4-4-1 Cost Efficiency 
Cost efficiency measures the closeness of a bank's cost to the best-practice bank's cost. 
Mathematically, cost efficiency is represented in a form of a selected cost function107 that 
relates the variable costs to the prices of variable inputs, the quantities of variable 
outputs, and any fixed netputs, (including control and environmental variables), and 
random error, which may temporarily give banks high or low costs. In addition, the cost 
function includes an inefficiency factor that incorporates both allocative inefficiency 
(price component) and technical inefficiency (physical component). While allocative 
inefficiency pccurs from a bank failing to react optimally to the relative price of inputs, 
technical inefficiencies arise from employing too much of the inputs to produce a certain 
mix of outputs. 
Berger and Mester (1997) note that the cost efficiency ratio is a useful indicator to 
measure bank efficiency. This ratio is calculated as the proportion of costs or resources 
that are used efficiently, and range over [1,0]. It assigns one for a best practice within the 
observed data and zero for the most cost inefficient within the same dataset. A bank with 
a cost efficiency ratio of 0.70 is seventy percent efficient or equivalently wastes thirty 
percent of its costs relative to a best practice experiencing the same regulatory 
conditions. 
107 This is the case of parametric approaches. 
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Hence, the cost efficiency of a bank is defined as the estimated cost required to 
producing the bank's output vector if this bank was as efficient as the best practice bank 
in the sample facing the same set of variables divided by the actual costs of the bank, 
adjusted for random error (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
4-4-2 Standard Profit Efficiency 
Standard profit efficiency provides a measure of how close a bank is to producing the 
maximum possible profits as a best practice firm on the frontier, given a particular level 
of inputs and output prices and other exogenous variables. Standard profit efficiency 
estimates are derived from a profit function that specifies variable profits and takes 
variable output prices as given. The profit function uses a measure of the variable profit 
as a dependent variable, which allows for consideration of revenues that can be earned by 
varying outputs as well as inputs. The consideration of exogenous output prices allows 
for inefficiencies in the choice of outputs when responding to these prices or to any other 
arguments of the profit function. 
The standard profit efficiency measure is represented in terms of a ratio that predicts 
actual profits to the predicted maximum profit that could be earned if the bank was as 
efficient as the best practice bank in the sample, net of random error. A bank with a ratio 
equal to one is considered as the best practice bank. A bank with a 0.70 ratio indicates 
that because of excessive costs or deficient revenues, or both, the bank is losing about 
thirty percent of the profit if could be earning. 
Berger and Mester (1997) consider that the profit efficiency concept dominates over the 
cost efficiency concept for evaluating the overall performance of banks according to the 
argument that profit efficiency is founded in the more accepted economic objective of 
profit maximisation. The latter requires that managerial duties should equally concentrate 
on raising the marginal dollar of revenues and reducing a marginal dollar of costs. For 
example, a bank that spends one dollar to generate two dollars of revenues, all else held 
equal, would appropriately be measured as being more profit efficient, but might 
inappropriately be measured as being less cost efficient. In addition, profit efficiency is 
based on a comparison with the best practice point of profit maximisation with the 
sample of observations. In contract, cost efficiency evaluates performance by holding 
119 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
output constant at its current level, which generally may not correspond to an optimum. 
A bank that is relatively cost efficient at its current output may or may not be cost 
efficient at its optimal output level, which typically involves a different scale and mix of 
output. 
Berger and Mester (1997) conclude that the standard profit efficiency measure may take 
better account of cost inefficiency than the cost efficiency measure itself, due to the fact 
that it captures cost inefficiency deviations from the optimal point. However, the use of 
the standard profit function assumes that output markets are perfectly competitive so that 
banks are price-takers in both output and input markets as is specified as a function of 
input and output prices. In contrast, the alternative profit function, discussed below, 
assumes that banks can have some power in determining output prices. 
4-4-3 Alternative Profit Efficiency 
Alternative profit efficiency measures how close a bank comes to earning maximum 
profits given its output level rather than its output prices. It is measured as the ratio of 
predicted actual profits to the predicted maximum profits for a best practice bank. The 
alternative profit measure uses the same dependent variable as the standard efficiency 
measure and the same exogenous, explanatory and independent variables as the cost 
function. That is, the alternative profit efficiency function employs output quantities 
rather than output prices as in the standard profit efficiency function'08 (Berger and 
Mester, 1997). 
Berger and Mester (1993) state four major situations in which the alternative profit 
efficiency function specification is preferred over the standard profit specification. These 
are; first, when there are differences in the quality of banking services; second, when 
markets are not perfectly competitive so banks might have relative market power in 
pricing their outputs; third, when outputs are not continuous variables, so that banks can 
not achieve every output scale and products mix; and finally, when output price 
information is not available. 
10B This is the case of parametric approaches. 
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4-5 Approaches to Measure Bank Efficiency: 
Parametric and Non-Parametric Approaches 
The bank cost and profit efficiency literature has used two major families of 
methodological approaches to estimate banking efficiency scores. These are the 
parametric and non-parametric approaches. The parametric (or econometric) approaches 
derive efficiency estimates from an assumed functional specification based on the three 
concepts of efficiency elaborated by Berger and Mester (1997) (cost, standard and 
alternative profit efficiency). The non-parametric approach, mainly Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), is a linear programming technique that can be used to measure 
efficiency distances between a bank observation and the best practice banks within an 
examined sample. 
According to Mustafa (1999), the main difference between parametric and non- 
parametric approaches relate to varying assumptions about random noise and the 
structure of the production technology. The parametric approach attempts to distinguish 
between the effects of noise from the effects of inefficiency. The parametric model 
requires the specification of functional forms and it confounds the effects of mis- 
specification of functional form with inefficiency. In contrast, the non-parametric 
approach uses a linear programming technique that assembles noise and inefficiency 
together and calls this combination "inefficiency". Lee and Holland (1999) state that the 
non-parametric approach estimates efficiency relative to other observed units in the 
sample without specifying a functional form, and therefore, avoids making errors of 
specification associated with functional forms. 
Bauer et al. (1997) identify four major statistical approaches to modelling bank 
efficiency. This includes one non-parametric approach, represented by Data Envelopment 
Analysis, and three parametric approaches, which are the Stochastic Frontier Approach, 
the Thick Frontier parametric Approach, and the Distribution-Free Approach. 
Bauer et al (1997) proposes consistency tests that comprise undertaking a number of 
consistency conditions and making efficiency measures derived from any of the 
parametric or non-parametric approaches subject to these consistency conditions. For 
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example, this can be carried out by conducting a simple rank correlation to check 
whether efficiency estimates are consistent across different methodologies. 
4-5-1 Parametric Approaches 
The parametric approach is an econometric (stochastic) approach that has been 
extensively used in studies that investigate bank cost and profit efficiency109. The 
econometric approach specifies a cost or profit functional form resulting in a structure 
being imposed on the shape of the frontier. As noted above, the family of parametric 
approaches include the stochastic frontier approach, the thick frontier approach, and the 
distribution-free approach. 
4-5-1-1 The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
According to the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), a bank is inefficient if its costs 
(profits) are higher (lower) than efficient banks (best practice), assuming they have the 
same outputs/inputs composition. As documented by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the 
stochastic frontier approach (SFA) was first suggested by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977), and since it has been extensively used in the analysis of the cost and profit 
efficiency of banking sectors. For instance, Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas (1994), Kwan 
and Eisenbeis (1996), and Einsenbeis, Ferrier and Kwan (1999) employ the stochastic 
frontier analysis to investigate cost efficiencies for various samples of US banks. 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) developed a stochastic production model by 
appending a random disturbance term to the production function. The error term is 
assumed to be the sum of two random components. These are a noise term component, 
which is symmetrically distributed around zero to model measurement errors and 
unobservable shocks, and an error term component, which is strictly negative to measure 
inefficiency. 
Mathematically, the stochastic frontier model can be shown as: 
TCorTP=f(Q;, Pi, B; )+c (4.3) 
109 Examples of studies that use parametric methods are reviewed in the next chapter. 
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and E; = v; + µ; (cost function), and ci = v, - µ; (alternative profit function) 
(4.4) 
Where 
TC; is the observed total costs, 
TP; is the observed total profits, 
Q; is the vector of outputs, 
P, is the vector of inputs, 
B, is a vector of parameters 
ci is the vector term from the cost function, in which v is a random error and assumed to 
follow a normal distribution; and µ>0 is inefficiency and assumed to follow a half- 
normal distribution, and 
According to Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), the stochastic frontier approach 
assumes that the composite error components, µ and v, are independently distributed. The 
inefficiencies component, g, follows an asymmetric half-normal distribution; g=N(0, 
aµ ), reflecting a positive disturbance to capture the effects of inefficiency, whereas the 
random error, v, follows a symmetric two-sided standard normal distribution with zero 
mean and variance, a2, to capture the effects of the statistical noise. Both components of 
the composite error term are orthogonal to the inputs, outputs and or any other cost or 
profit efficiency regressors specified in the modelling equation. Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) state that the efficiency estimation of each banking firm is based on the 
conditional mean of the inefficiency effects term component, g, given the residual, which 
is the estimate of the composed error. Maximum likelihood procedures are used to 
quantify the unknown parameters of the model (Battese and Coelli, 1992 and 1995). 
Thus, the stochastic frontier suggests that a bank's observed total costs deviates from the 
cost efficient frontier due to random noise and possibly inefficiency. 
One major disadvantage of the stochastic frontier approach is the arbitrary choice of the 
distributional assumption in terms of the inefficiency component of the composite error 
term. For instance, earlier studies such as Stevenson (1980) and Greene (1990) use the 
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half-normal and gamma distribution models, respectively. Cebenoyan et al. (1993) adopts 
the truncated normal model where Mester (1993) and Allen and Rai (1996) use the half 
normal distribution. More recent studies include Vennet (1998), who assumes both 
distributions; the half-normal and exponential, and finds little difference between the two 
distributions. However, Altunbas and Molyneux (1994) claim that efficiency estimates 
are relatively insensitive to different distributional assumptions when testing the half 
normal, truncated normal, exponential and gamma distributions, as they find that all these 
distributions generate relatively similar inefficiency estimate levels for a sample of 
German banks. 
4-5-1-2 The Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) 
The Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) was suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1992a), to 
be used as an alternative method to the stochastic frontier approach for investigating cost 
and profit efficiency. As in the case of the stochastic frontier approach, the thick frontier 
approach employs an underlying functional form to the cost or profit function. However, 
Bauer et al. (1997), Bauer et al. (1999) and Berger and Humphrey (1997) mention that 
the thick frontier approach is different from the stochastic frontier approach by the fact 
that the thick frontier approach sorts the examined sample into quartiles according to 
average costs, or average profits. The approach proceeds with the estimation of two 
"thick frontiers", one for the lowest and one for the highest average cost/prof it quartile of 
firms. The regression of the thick frontier approach is estimated using only the best 
performing best practice quartile. This quartile includes firms that have the lowest 
average cost (or highest average profit) for their class size. 
Thus, the thick frontier approach assumes that X-inefficiencies are estimated by 
measuring deviations in predicted costs between the lowest cost (or highest average 
profit) quartile and the highest average costs (or lowest average profit) quartile. The cost 
or profit frontier is constructed using efficiencies of the lowest average cost or highest 
average profit quartile. Other banks in the remaining three quartiles are assumed to 
include inefficient observations. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) state that the thick frontier approach does not require the 
imposition of distributional assumptions on the functional form inefficiency error terms. 
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The only assumption that the thick frontier approach has, is that inefficiencies exist, and 
represent differences between the lowest average cost (or highest average profit) quartile 
and the highest average cost (or lowest average profit) quartile. Bauer et al. (1997) notes 
that the difference represented by the two quartiles, indicates the general level of overall 
efficiency of the sample. The thick frontier approach, however, does not provide point 
estimates of cost and profit efficiency for all individual firms or banks in the sample. 
4-5-1-3 The Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) 
The Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) was introduced by Berger (1993), and since it 
has been used in the literature on bank efficiency, particularly, on panel data samples. For 
instance, Alan and Rai (1996) employ the distribution-free approach to estimate cost 
efficiency for banks operating in fifteen developed countries over the period 1988-1992. 
Similar to the other two abovementioned approaches, the distribution free approach 
requires the specification of a functional form for the cost or profit function applied to 
cross-sectioned or time-series data. However, Bauer et al. (1997) notes that the 
distribution-free approach does not require the imposition of a specific shape on the 
distribution of the inefficiency term as in the case of the stochastic frontier approach. The 
distribution-free approach assumes that there is "core" efficiency or average efficiency 
for each firm, which tends to be constant over time. Although the distribution free 
approach does not require any assumptions regarding the distributional features of the 
inefficiency term as in the stochastic frontier approach, it does rely on the strong 
assumption that inefficiencies are constant over time. 
There are three main approaches suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Bauer et 
al. (1997) that can be used to derive distribution-free efficiency estimates. These are the 
DFA-P WITHIN, the DFA-P GLS (Generalised Lest Squares) and DFA-P TRNCATED 
approaches. 
First, DFA-P WITHIN is a fixed-effects distribution-free model. It estimates inefficiency 
from the value of a firm-specific dummy variable derived by measuring the firm's cost 
function variables relative to deviations from firm-specific means. Efficiency is estimated 
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using the deviation from the most efficient firm's intercept term. Single sets of 
parameters are to be obtained so inefficiency is fixed over time. 
Second, the DFA-P GLS applies generalised least squares to panel data to obtain single 
sets of parameters. It assumes that banks inefficiencies are fixed over time and that 
inefficiency is uncorrelated with the regressors. In the cost function estimated by Bauer 
et al. (1997), a separate intercept for each firm is recovered from the panel estimates, and 
considered as an average residual for that firm over time. The firm that has the smallest 
average residual is presumed to be the most efficient firm. The latter is used as a 
benchmark to measure the inefficiency of all other firms in the sample. 
Third, the DFA-P TRUNCATED approach is used to estimate cost or profit function 
separately for each year. The average efficiency estimates are based on the average 
residuals for each bank. Berger (1993) suggests that if average residuals are extreme, 
their effects could be limited by truncating the residuals at both the upper and lower one 
percent of the distribution. 
Overall, different parametric approaches are characterised by the way in which random 
error and inefficiency are broken down. While the results of the stochastic frontier 
approach appear to be dependent on a priori distributional assumptions, the thick frontier 
approach sorts the data in arbitrarily selected groups, and the distribution-free approach 
makes assumptions as to the evolution of efficiency over time. This is in contrast to the 
non-parametric approaches, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which ignores 
the random element and assumes that all deviations from best practice can be assumed to 
be inefficiency. 
4-5-1-4 Efficiency Measurement Functional Forms"° 
The parametric approach derives efficiency estimates from an assumed functional form, 
or a mathematical relationship between output and inputs prices, based on the concepts of 
efficiency recommended by Berger and Mester (1997). These relate to cost, standard and 
alternative profit functional forms. Each of these functions can be represented in a wide 
range of forms. The most common of which have been the Translog and Flexible Fourier 
"o For more details on efficiency measures (translog and Fourier Flexible, see Barger et al. (1997), Altunbas et al 
(1999), and Kumbakhar and Lovell (2000). 
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form't' For both functional forms, efficiency is measured as the distance from a cost or 
profit function or frontier, which is estimated including a disturbance term. This 
disturbance term has two components, inefficiency and random error. While the random 
error is assumed to be distributed as a symmetrical two-sided term, efficiency is 
represented by a one-sided disturbance component where efficiency represents all the 
effects of the data. 
4-5-1-4-1 The Translog Functional Form 
The translog function, which is used in the empirical analysis in this study, can take the 
following form; 
Ln (TC or TB)=ow+y" , alnQi+ 
(31n(P, )+2[ýjInQInQ- t 1n(P, )1n(I; )J 
mn (4.5) 
+ FER1nQ1n(P, )+E i=1J=1 
Where: 
TC, and TP; are Total costs and Total Profit, respectively. 
Q; is Output I vector for firm i; 
Pi is input price vector for firm i; 
E; = v; + pi (cost function) and E; = v, - µ, (alternative profit function) is an error composite 
term that is composed of i) v,, is two-sided term error term representing statistical noise 
which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed; and ii) µl, is non- 
negative (or one-sided) random variable that represents inefficiency effects and assumed 
to be distributed independently v,,. 
The standard symmetry is also imposed on the translog terms of the function; that is, 
5U=5j;, and y=y;;, a well as the assumption of linear homogeneity in factor prices: 
R 
EßýJ=L±y, =0 and ±p,, =0" ý`t 1't ,: t1 
in These two extensively used functional forms are discussed in the empirical chapter. The empirical analysis 
conducted later in this thesis uses the translog functional form. 
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4-5-1-4-2The Fourier Flexible Functional Form 
The Fourier Flexible functional form, suggested by Gallant (1981), contains besides the 
translog terms, Fourier terms. The Fourier is a cost or profit function that includes the full 
translog tems and all-first, second, and third-order trigonometric terms as well as X- 
efficiency and random error terms. The Fourier Flexible function can take the following 
form; 
Ln(TC or T =ow+: ýmlnQ , 
iRln(P, )+ Z[ 1roW+ y, ln(P, )ln(Pj)+j 1=1 J-1 f=, Jýi I-IJ_, 
rýýg1nýl]n(P, 
)+ ýCOSH, +6, SINz, ]+=kCO4z, +z)+A, S1Mz, +z, )J(46) 
mmm 
ýJkCOS(ZJ 
+z, +Z, ) +O SIl +z, +ZJ]+F, 
i=1 Pt kz j 
kxi 
Where 
TC; and TP, are Total costs and Total Profit, respectively; 
Q is Output vector for firm i; 
P, is Input price vector for firm i; 
E; = v; + µ; (cost function) and s; = v; - pi (alternative profit function) has the same 
characteristics as the composite error term as in the translog functional form. z, is 
adjusted terms of the natural log of output LnQ; so that they span the interval 
[. 1.1;,. 0.2it]; the formula for z, is (. 27r-µ. a+µ, InQ; ) where [a, b] is the range of 1nQ; and 
µ=(. 9.2n-. 1.1a)/(b-a). Thus, the Fourier terms are included only for outputs and do not 
affect input prices as these are only expressed by the translog terms. 
Similar to the translog functional form, the standard symmetry is also imposed on the 
translog terms of the function; that is, 5; j=S;;, and yj= yji, and the assumption of linear 
ww 
homogeneity in factor prices is also imposed; Eßii =1; 
±yy =0 and Ep,, = 0. 
J-1 1-1 J-11 
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4-5-1-5 Cost, Standard Profit and Alternative Profit Efficiency 
Functional Forms. 
4-5-1-5-1 Cost Efficiency Functional Form 
As noted earlier, cost efficiency can be measured by how close a bank's cost is to a best 
practice bank producing the same output bundle under the same conditions. Cost 
efficiency estimates are derived from a cost function, in which variable costs depend on 
the prices of variable inputs, the quantities of variable outputs and any other netputs or 
control variables and environmental factors' 12, and random error as well as efficiency. 
Such a cost function may be written as follows 
TC, =f (P,, Q., pi, z;, v,, u; ) (4.7) 
Where 
TC; denotes Total Costs for firm i; 
f, " denotes some functional form that describes the relationship between Total Costs, 
TC; and the other variables included in the equation; 
P; is the vector of prices of variable inputs; 
Q; id the vector of quantities of variable outputs; 
ß; is a vector of the estimated coefficients; 
Z, indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs, which are included to account for the 
effects of these netputs on variable costs (such as environmental variables); 
v; and gi denote the random error term that incorporates measurement error that may 
temporarily give banks high or low costs. While v, represents statistical noise (a set of 
exogenous variables that may affect costs, such as external shocks, weather); gi denotes 
an efficiency factor that may raise costs above the best practice level, and which 
incorporates both allocative inefficiencies from failing to react optimally to relative 
"'The control variable is included in the Log variable terms of the model to control for differences and biases, 
whereas the environmental variables are used a separate terms and included to measure the effects of these on 
cost or efficiency, and are usually include as dummies (see Berger and Mester (1997) for more details). 
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prices of inputs, P;, and technical inefficiencies from employing too much of the inputs to 
produce Q. 
To simplify the measurement of cost efficiency, the inefficiency and random terms are 
assumed to be separable from the rest of the function, by transforming the two sides of 
the above equation into natural logs; 
ZnTC; =f (P;, Q;, Z., ) + lnv; + lnµ; (4.8) 
Where 
Inv; + liiµ; is a composite error term. 
The cost efficiency of bank b is defined as the estimated cost required to produce bank 
b's output vector if the bank were as efficient as the best practice bank in the sample 
facing the same exogenous variables divided by the actual cost of bank b, adjusted for 
random error, i. e., 
COST EEF= 
TO . (4.9) 
The cost efficiency ratio is the proportion of costs or resources that are used efficiently. 
For example, if a bank b has a cost EFF of 0.70, it is said to be seventy percent efficient 
or equivalently is wasting thirty percent of its costs relative to a best practice facing the 
same conditions. Cost efficiency ranges between zero and one, and equals one for the 
best practice firm within the observed data. 
4-5-1-5-2 Standard Profit Efficiency Functional Form 
The standard profit efficiency function measures how close a bank, b, is to producing the 
maximum possible profits given a particular level of input and output prices and other 
variables. The standard profit function specifies variables profits (instead of variable 
cost) and assumes output prices as given. The profit dependent variable allows for the 
consideration of revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as inputs. The 
standard profit efficiency function is modelled as 
in OCi +0 
m+1) -Ji 
(Wi, Qi, 
13i, 
Zi) + lf? Vi - Ln i (4.10) 
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Where 
7, is the variable profits of a firm that includes all the interest and fee income earned on 
the variable output minus variable costs; 
Am+i is a constant added to every firm's profit so that the natural log is taken as a 
positive number; it consists of the minimum total profit in the sample (7r1, ) plus one; 
W, is a vector of prices of the variable output; 
Q; id the vector of quantities of variable outputs; 
(3; is the vector of estimated coefficients; 
Z; indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs, which are included to account for the 
effects of these netputs on variable profits; 
vi and µ, represent is a set of environmental or market variables that may affect profits. 
While v; represents random error term; and µ; represents inefficiency effects that reduce 
profits. 
Standard profit efficiency is measured by calculating the ratio of the predicted actual 
profits to the predicted maximum profits of a best practice bank facing the same 
conditions, net of random error, i. e., 
PROFITEFF= 
TPm 
(4.11) 
TP; 
The standard profit efficiency ratio is the proportion of profits (variables) that are gained 
efficiently. For example, if a bank b has a profit EFF of 0.70, it is said to be seventy 
percent efficient or equivalently is wasting thirty percent of its profits relative to a best 
practice facing the same conditions. Similar to cost efficiency, standard profit efficiency 
ranges between zero and one, and equals one for the best practice firm within the 
observed data. 
4-5-1 -5-3 Alternative Profit Efficiency Functional Form 
The alternative profit function measures how close a bank comes to earning maximum 
profits given its output levels rather than output prices. The alternative profit efficiency 
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function has two similarities with the cost and standard profit functional forms. First, the 
alternative profit function uses the same dependent variable as the standard profit 
function, but employs the same exogenous variables as the cost function. 
The alternative profit efficiency function can be stated as 
ln(i; + Om+l) =. f ( Pi, Q,, Zm+l) + In 14 -1nµ, (4-12) 
Where 
7r; is the variable profits of a firm, which includes all the interest and fee income earned 
on the variable output minus variable costs; 
em+l is a constant added to every firm's profit so that the natural log is taken as a 
positive number, and it is calculated in the same manner as in the standard profit 
efficiency functional form; 
P, is the vector of prices of variable inputs; 
Q, is the vector of quantities of variable outputs; 
Z, indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs, which are included to account for the 
effects of these netputs on variable costs; 
In v; represents random error; and 
In µ; represents inefficiency effects that reduce profits. 
This form is identical to the standard function except that P, replaces W, in the function, 
generating different values for the inefficiency term, In v;, and random error term 
representing noise, while ingi is a error term representing inefficiency effects. The 
alternative profit efficiency measure is the ratio of the predicted actual profits to the 
predicted maximum profits for the best practice bank. 
The ratio of alternative profit efficiency can be written as; 
ALTENATIVE PROFITEFF = 
TPm 
(4.13) 
TPA 
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Similar to the standard profit efficiency, the alternative profit efficiency ratio is the 
proportion of profits (variables) that are gained efficiently. For example, if a bank b has a 
profit EFF of 0.70, it is said to be seventy percent efficient or equivalently is wasting 
thirty percent of its profits relative to a best practice facing the same conditions. Similar 
to cost efficiency, standard profit efficiency ranges between zero and one, and equals one 
for the best practice firm within the observed data 
Berger and Mester (1993) state that the alternative profit function may be helpful when 
firms exercise some market power in setting output prices, because it takes output prices 
as given and incorporates the assumption that the bank can sell as much outputs as it 
wishes without having to lower its prices. 
4-5-2 Non-Parametric Approaches 
The main non-parametric approach is represented by Data Envelopment analysis (DEA). 
This approach has been extensively used to investigate the input-output features of a 
variety of decision-making units (DMUs) including banking firms. One characteristic of 
the non-parametric method is that it does not impose any specific functional form. Data 
envelopment analysis originated from the work of Farrell (1957) and was later developed 
by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Chames and Cooper (1984). Many 
studies have used Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate efficiency in banking, such as 
Miller and Noulas (1996). The DEA constructs a non-parametric piece-wise frontier that 
envelops the data, under which all the entities lie on or below. The inefficiency score 
calculated by DEA is defined as the percentage reduction in the use of all inputs that can 
be achieved to make an observation comparable with the best observations(s) in the 
sample with no reduction in outputs. Thus, the most efficient banks are located on the 
frontier, whereas less efficient of inefficient banks are positioned under the frontier. 
4-5-2-1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
4-5-2-1-IDEA Definition 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a mathematical programming technique that 
measures the efficiency of a decision-making unit (bank or branch) relative to other 
similar decision making units. The DEA model is based on two assumptions: Constant 
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Returns to Scale (CRS), as suggested by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), and 
Variables Returns to Scale (VRS), as suggested by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). 
The concept of efficiency in data envelopment analysis measurement is based on either 
input-oriented or output-oriented approaches. First, the output-orientation approach refers 
to the ability of the decision-making unit to avoid wasting inputs by producing as much 
output as input usage allows. An output-orientated valuation seeks a projected point such 
that the proportional augmentation in outputs is maximised. This valuation aims to reach 
efficiency by focusing on productivity gains while preserving the current combination of 
inputs. Second, the input-orientation approach refers to avoiding wasting inputs by using 
as little as output production allows. An inputs-oriented valuation seeks a projected point 
such that the proportional reduction in inputs is maximised. This approach helps the 
management of the decision-making unit being evaluated to gain efficiency by 
maintaining current levels of outputs and decreasing the levels of inputs. 
The DEA constructs a frontier that envelops the observed data point in which the data lie 
on or below the production or cost frontier. The distance from the computed best practice 
frontier represents the measured efficient frontier. A DEA efficiency score for a specific 
bank is defined relative to other banks in the set of banks data. 
4-5-2-1-2DEA Illustration 
Yue (1992) illustrates graphically the data envelopment analysis frontier of six decision- 
making units; C,. This illustration is based on the original work of Farrell (1957), which 
uses the single-input and single output case. Figure 4-3 shows the illustration, in which 
the inputs of each decision making unit is shown as Xi (i= 1,2,3,4,5,6), and the 
outputs of each decision making unit is shown as Yi (i= 1,2,3,4,5,6), and the input- 
output combination of each decision making unit can be shown as Cs (s= 1,2,3,4,5,6). 
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Figure 4-3 DEA Production Frontier 
Output Y 
Y5, 
h 
Y, 
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As displayed in Figure 4-3, the input-output combinations for decision-making units C1, 
C;, C5 and C6 define the production frontier. The connection between these three points 
constructs the efficient frontier that represents achieved efficiency. Decision-making 
units, C., and C4, lie below the frontier, which makes them inefficient since the same 
quantity of output can be produced with fewer quantities of inputs. However, C2 and C4 
can both become efficient by travelling to any point on the frontier "facets" of C1-C; and 
C5- C6. For example, C2 will become efficient if it rises to point B, by producing more 
quantities of output, or by moving to A, by using fewer quantities of input for fewer 
quantities of outputs. C, will become more efficient if it lies anywhere on the facet AB. 
4-5-2-1-3Scale Efficiency in DEA: Constant and Variable returns to 
Scale 
Data envelopment analysis can be used to estimate sale efficiencies based on two 
assumptions: constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS). While 
the assumption of constant returns to scale is appropriate when all decision-making units 
are operating at the optimal scale, where production does not affect efficiency, variable 
returns to scale, in contrast, allows the scale of production possibilities to affect 
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efficiency. Yue (1992) states that constant returns to scale occur if all proportionate 
increases or decreases in inputs or outputs move the firm further along or above the 
production frontier. 
Figure 4-4 illustrates the difference between efficiency measures estimated under CRS 
and VRS assumptions using a single-input-single-output model (y, x) for four decision- 
making units located at points A, B, C, and D. 
Figure 4-4: Constant and Variable Returns to Scale Illustration 
Output Y 
Input x 
Figure 4-4 shows that the decision-making unit at point C appears to represent the best 
practice reference technology assuming constant returns to scale. The point C exhibits 
constant returns to scale because proportionate increases or decreases would place it 
outside the production frontier. The frontier represented by the solid purple line crossing 
through the points A, C, and D is constructed on the variable returns to scale assumption. 
Under the latter assumption, the Farrell distance efficiency measure for the point B 
requires the decision-making unit B to be compared against other decision-making units 
lying on the frontier represented by the purple solid line (labelled VRS frontier). The 
point a VRS on the frontier shows how much of input x that is strictly required to 
produce the same amounts of output, y. This point serves as a benchmark or reference 
point for the decision making unit at B. Total technical efficiency shows the relationship 
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between the maximum productivity and observed productivity. The point a CRS shows 
the necessary input usage if the decision-making unit at point B was both technically 
efficient and operated at optimal scale. 
4-5-2-1-3-1 Constant Returns to Scale (CCR Version) 
According to Bowlin (1999), the constant returns to scale model is the basic data 
envelopment analysis model, which was introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978,1979, and 1981), and commonly known as the CCR version. The CCR model is 
designed to evaluate the performance of a number of decision making units, assuming 
that a decision-making unit j, is an entity responsible for using inputs, X; j, to produce 
outputs, YT). Bowlin (1999) introduces the CCR model using the following notation: 
j =1,2,3 . .........., n, represents the number of 
Decision Making Units (DMU); 
r= 1,2,3, .........., s, represents the output, 
Y, of DMUU; 
i= 1,2,3, .........., m, represents the 
inputs, X, of DMUj; 
Y, >0 is constant and represents the observed amounts of the eh output of DMUu, 
X; j <0 is constant and represents the observed amounts of the ith input of DMUJ, 
µr is a vector of output weights, and 
v; is a vector of input weights. 
The CCR model is based on maximising the following ratio form of DEA, h;, which 
provides a measure of all outputs over all inputs; 
Maximise hj = 0: 5 [2: 14 Ytj /2: v; X1 ] <_ 1 (4.14) 
In inequality (4.14), the numerator, Yg Yj, represents a set of desired outputs obtained 
by the denominator, v; Xjj, which represents a set of used inputs. A decision-making 
unit j would prefer to obtain an optimal value of efficiency, by maximising the ratio hj, 
which ranges from zero, if fully inefficient, to one, if fully efficient. 
4-5-2-1-3-2 Variable Returns to Scale (VCR Version) 
The variable return to scale non parametric approach is commonly known as the BCC 
approach, as it was suggested by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). The main 
difference between the CCR and BCC approaches relates to the treatment of returns to 
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scale. The BCC approach extends the CCR approach by incorporating variable returns to 
scale. To consider a decision-making unit as CCR efficient, it must be both scale and 
technically efficient, but for to consider a decision making unit as BCC efficient, it is 
only requires to be technically efficient. 
Miller and Noulas (1996) explain the BCC model using a sample that considers N banks. 
Each bank produces in different output using n different inputs. The inefficiency, h, of a 
bank, s, is measured as follows; 
hs=[114Yjg/Y, vj Xis] (4.15) 
Where 
s= 1,2,3 . .........., s, represents the number of 
banks; 
i= 1,2,3 , .........., m, represents the output, 
Y, of DMUJ; 
j=1,2,3, .........., n, represents the 
inputs, X, of DMU;; 
Y1e >0 is constant and represents the observed amounts of the it' output of DMUJ, 
X; j, < 0 is constant and represents the observed amounts of the jth input of DMUJ, 
gi is a vector of output weights, and 
vv is a vector of input weights. 
The efficiency ratio, h, for a bank, s, is maximised subject to the following constraints: 
Maximise hg = [jµ; Y; g /E vj X Xg 
] <_ 1 for s =1,2,..... N. (4.16) 
14 and vv >0 (4.17) 
The inequality (4.16) ensures that the inefficiency ratios for the banks cannot exceed one. 
The inequality (4.17) requires that weights are positive. The maximisation of the 
efficiency ratio for each bank is possible by determining the weights for each output and 
inputs. 
The transformation of the fractional linear programme into an ordinary linear programme 
is undertaken as follows 
First 
Maximise h, _ Y, µ; Yis (4.18) 
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Subject to yp; Y;, -EvjXj,: f 0, for s=1,2 , ............ 
N 
EvjXN, µ;, =1 
Or second 
Minimise P. 
Subject to Y_4pa Y;, Y_ v, X, s :A0, for s=1,2 . ............ 
N 
Evjxj. pi, =1 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
(4.22) 
(4.23) 
The variable P. represents the overall technical efficiency and lies between zero and one. 
4-5-2-2 The Two-Stage Approach: the Tobit Regression 
Analysis 
Bowlin (1999) suggests the use of a regression approach (any censored regression 
approach) in a second stage data envelopment analysis' 3. The so-called "second-stage" 
approach is undertaken to examine the determinants of inefficiency scores. Using the 
regression analysis, the data envelopment efficiency or inefficiency scores (Y; ) can be 
regressed against K vector of different explanatory variables factors (Xi). 
Mathematically, the regression analysis can be written as follows 
Y; =f (K, X) or (4.24) 
Y1 bjl Xjl + bj2 Xjg + ............ + 
bin Xjm (4.25) 
Where 
X (1,2, .... X. 
) is the vector of explanatory variables, and K (b1, b2, .... 
b) is the vector 
of parameters or coefficients, including a constant term bo. 
In the regression analysis, the estimated slope coefficients or (b's) can be interpreted as 
marginal effects for those observations. A positive bj,,, indicates the n'h explanatory 
variable has a positive influence upon efficiency or inefficiency scores (Y; ). The 
asymptotic t-ratio associated with the estimated bj coefficient is used to test the 
113 The TO1IT regression analysis can also be used as a second stage in parametric efficiency approaches. 
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significance of the effects of the nth explanatory variable upon technical efficiency or 
inefficiency scores. 
Thus, Bowlin (1999) suggests the use DEA and TOBIT statistical regressions jointly in a 
two-stage complementary manner. While stage one uses DEA to identify efficient and 
inefficient decision-making units in the sample, stage two uses this information by 
incorporating it in the form of a dependent variable in regression formulations using a 
number of selected exogenous variables as independent variables. 
4-5-2-3 Advantages and Disadvantages of DEA 
Yue (1992), Siems and Barr (1998), Bowlin (1999) and Sarafidis (2002) discuss the 
characteristics of the Data Envelopment Analysis approach. They state two major 
advantages of DEA as a non-parametric approach over the parametric approach. First, 
Yue (1992) and Siems and Barr (1998) state that the DEA has a strong benchmarking 
power for measuring and comparing inefficiency estimates, due to its feature of 
identifying the best practice decision-making units that lie on the efficiency frontier. The 
DEA analyses each decision-making units in the examined sample independently, and 
then measure relative efficiency taking into account the whole population under 
investigation. Second, Bowlin (1999) and Sarafidis (2002) claims that the DEA approach 
is relatively more flexible that its parametric counterparts. This is due to the fact that it 
does not require an explicit specification of the functional form relating inputs to outputs, 
nor a statistical distribution for decomposing inefficiency scores. As already elaborated, 
the DEA method constructs an efficiency frontier incorporating the best practice and 
under which inefficient decision-making units lie. 
However, Colwell and Davies (1992) and Bowlin (1999) state the DEA suffers from a 
number of shortcomings. First, Colwell and Davies (1992) mention that DEA is 
extremely sensitive to outlying observations as only one observation may cause a shift in 
the frontier. This observation, however, may emerge from a measurement error and, as a 
consequence, might overstate the technological capacity of the industry. Second, Bowlin 
(1999) states that DEA cannot be used to investigate the influence of exogenous 
explanatory variables on a decision-making unit's efficiency. Observations that are found 
to be below the frontier are considered relatively inefficient, only under the assumption 
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that the management of the decision-making unit has a perfect control over all factors 
that affect total output and inputs. This assumption cannot be held valid in terms of 
reality, as there are some exogenous variables represented by measurement errors and 
unobservable shocks or factors that may affect decision-making unit's efficiency. The 
factors can be beyond the sphere of influence of the management team of the decision- 
making unit, and may result in making the decision-making unit fluctuate around the 
frontier without inevitably being inefficient. 
Thus, while the parametric approach derives efficiency estimates from assumed 
functional forms, the non-parametric approach, mainly data envelopment analysis, is a 
linear programming technique that can be used to measure efficiency distances between 
an observation and the best practice of the examined sample. 
4-6 Defining Bank Outputs and Inputs 
Allen and Santomero (1996), Santos (2000) and Casu and Molyneux (2001) note that 
banking institutions are the core of the financial and payment system of any economy. 
The primary activity of a banking institution or firm is to act as an intermediary. This 
traditional function consists of collecting deposits and funds from depositors, and 
delivering loans to borrowers, or investors. Freixas and Rochet (1997) also note that 
contemporary banking theory also extends the functions of banking institutions to include 
the provision of an extensive range of non-traditional services. This encompasses the 
provision of liquidity and offering access to payment system, the transformation of 
deposits into assets of different types and maturity, the provision of collected information 
and monitoring services, and the provision of risk management services. As such, it 
becomes evident that banking institutions, principally commercial banks, are multi- 
product providers. The growth in new activities, such as off-balance sheet operations, has 
generated disagreements about to which bank definition is preferable where one 
considers choosing outputs and inputs when measuring bank efficiency. 
Primarily, there are two major approaches that bank efficiency studies have extensively 
used in the definition of banking inputs and outputs to estimate efficiency, namely, the 
production approach and the intermediation approach (Humphrey, 2000). Both of these 
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approaches apply the specification of traditional microeconomic theory of the 
banking 
firm, however, they differ in the specification of banking activities. Intarachote (2001) 
states that the adoption of either approaches depend upon the specification of 
bank 
objectives. For example, Leightner and Lovell (1998) employ net interest income and 
non-interest income as proxies for outputs within a bank's main objective of profit and 
revenue maximisation. 
4-6-1 Production Approach 
Casu and Molyneux (2001) discuss the production approach under which the production 
of services to deposit lenders and loan borrowers constitutes the primary activity of 
banking institutions. According to the production approach, the traditional production 
factors, such as labour and physical capital, are considered as inputs to produce various 
types of outputs, such as loans and deposits accounts. One characteristic of the 
production approach is that it does not require the use of monetary values of outputs; 
instead, it uses the number of accounts of each type. For instance, outputs are measured 
by the number of deposits and loans accounts, or by the number of transactions 
performed on each type. Besides, Miller and Noulas (1996) state that the production 
approach excludes interest expenses from total costs and uses only operating costs as 
total costs used to produce outputs. Consequently, the production approach considers 
labour and physical capital as inputs, and the number of processed loans and deposits as 
outputs. 
The consideration of deposits as outputs is based on the argument that providers of 
deposits to banking institutions will observe their deposits turning into loans, which 
consists of deposits and added value. The value-added represents the services performed 
by the banking institution such as security and record-keeping. These services are only 
performed by two factors of inputs, labour and physical capital. However, a study by 
Hughes and Mester (1991) tests whether deposits should be considered as an input or 
output using the production approach. This study finds that deposits should be considered 
as an input. Other studies treats deposits in a different manner, such as Hancock (1985), 
who splits deposits into demand deposits as an output and time deposits as an input. 
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4-6-2 Intermediation Approach 
The intermediation approach was first suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977), and it has 
been extensively used in bank efficiency studies, such Miller and Noulas (1996) and 
Berger, Leusner and Mingo (1997), who support the choice of this approach since it 
captures the intermediary activities of a banking firm. The intermediation approach 
asserts that with the assistance of labour and capital, the banking firm has an 
intermediary activity that consists of transforming the funds deposited by savers into 
loans allocated to borrowers. According to Rebelo and Mendes (1999), the 
intermediation approach treats a banking institution as a multi-product firm that produces 
three main outputs (loans, financial applications and other banking products) by 
employing three main inputs (deposits, labour and capital). According to this, deposits, 
capital and labour are treated as inputs, while loans and investments outstanding are 
treated as outputs. Ferrier and Lovell (1990) state that the intermediary approach seems 
to be appropriate for examining cost minimisation in banking. 
Unlike the production approach, the intermediation approach adopts the monetary 
expression of inputs and outputs, and includes interest on deposits into total costs 
together with labour and capital expenses, and defines earning assets (loans and 
investments) as outputs. Also, Intarachote (2001) views the treatment of deposits as input 
by the intermediation approach as convincing, since banking institutions use deposits as 
the funding source for earning assets. 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) suggest three forms for the intermediation approach; 
namely, the assets approach, the added value approach, and the user-cost approach. First, 
the assets approach views banks as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers, so 
loans and other earning assets are treated as outputs, and deposits and other liabilities are 
treated as outputs. Second, the value-added approach uses the quality of banks' assets 
and liabilities to define inputs and outputs, based on their share of value-added. The 
approach uses only outputs from activities that create high value added such as loans, 
demand deposits and time and saving deposits. Finally, the user-cost approach uses the 
degree of the contribution to bank revenues to select the bulk of outputs and inputs used 
in the analysis. 
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The relationship between the production and intermediation approaches is displayed in 
Figure 4-5. 
Figure 4-5: The relationship between the production and intermediation 
approaches114 
Monetary Inputs Non Monetary Inputs 
E. g. Deposits E. g. Labour and Capital 
Included in flee intermediation approach included in both intermediation and production approaches 
The production or Transformation process 
Monetary Outputs Non Monetary Outputs 
E. g. Loans E. g. Deposits Services 
Included in the intermediation and production included in both intermediation and production 
approaches 
Figure 4-5 displays the difference between the production and intermediation approach. 
While the production approach uses non-monetary inputs and ignores the effect of 
monetary inputs, the intermediation approach can include both monetary and non- 
monetary outputs. The intermediation approach implies that the processes used in the 
transformation of funds drive bank production, whereas the production approach 
distinctively incorporates real operating functions of the bank. 
4-7 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines the main theoretical issues and empirical approaches used to 
examine cost and profit efficiency in banking. The chapter demonstrates that efficiency is 
related to scale and scope economies as well as to productive or X-efficiency. The 
chapter has also discussed the main frontier approaches that are extensively used to 
114 Source: Ashton (1998), PP. 11. 
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Figure 4-5 displays the difference between the production and intermediation approach. 
While the production approach uses non-monetary inputs and ignores the effect of 
monetary inputs, the intermediation approach can include both monetary and non- 
monetary outputs. The intermediation approach implies that the processes used in the 
transformation of funds drive bank production, whereas the production approach 
distinctively incorporates real operating functions of the bank. 
4-7 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines the main theoretical issues and empirical approaches used to 
examine cost and profit efficiency in banking. The chapter demonstrates that efficiency is 
related to scale and scope economies as well as to productive or X-efficiency. The 
chapter has also discussed the main frontier approaches that are extensively used to 
1 14 Source: Ashton (1998), PP. 11. 
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estimate cost and profit efficiency in banking. Frontier analysis is divided into parametric 
and non-parametric approaches. Eisenbeis, Ferrier and Kwan (1999) agree that both 
families of efficiency measurement approach have advantages and disadvantages. The 
parametric approach allows for noise in the measurement of inefficiency, using a number 
of assumptions about the particular form of the economic function being estimated and 
the distribution of inefficiency. In contrast, the non-parametric approach is a linear 
programming approach that does not require any specification of the functional form or 
its distributional assumptions. The non-parametric approach is based on measuring all 
deviations from the frontier, which are attributed to inefficiency. The extant literature 
does not provide strong guidance as to which is the preferred approach to use in 
estimating bank efficiency. As all the approaches are different in their distributional 
assumptions to dislocate X-efficiency differences from the random error, Barr et all 
(1997) suggests a series of consistency tests when seeking robustness of the results. 
The chapter also displays the main approaches that are used to define banks inputs and 
outputs. First, the production approach, being more concerned with the technical 
efficiency of financial institutions, defines bank activity as a production of services. 
Deposits are counted as outputs and interests paid on deposits are not included in bank 
' total costs (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). According to this approach inputs and outputs are 
measured in physical quantities (number of accounts, transactions processed, etc. ). 
Second, the intermediation approach, which is extensively used in the bank efficiency 
literature, views banks as institutions that collect and allocate funds in loans and other 
assets; deposits are included among the inputs and interests in the total costs. The 
intermediation approach has three main types. First, the asset approach is a variant of the 
intermediation approach where liabilities are considered as inputs and assets as output. 
Second, the value added approach identifies any balance sheet item as output if it absorbs 
a relevant share of capital and labour, otherwise it is considered as an input or non 
relevant output; according to this approach deposits are considered as an output since 
they imply the creation of value added. Third, the user cost approach assumes that it is 
the net contribution to bank revenues that defines inputs and outputs; in this case deposits 
are counted as outputs. 
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The following chapter reviews the empirical findings of bank efficiency studies that have 
used both parametric and non-parametric approaches to estimate bank-level efficiency. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Evidence on Banking 
Sector Efficiency: A Literature Review 
5-1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the empirical literature on scale, scope and X-efficiency in banking. 
These studies use both parametric and non-parametric approaches to investigate bank 
efficiency across a variety of banking systems. The studies are motivated by the desire to 
examine whether such things as mergers and acquisitions, economic reforms and 
financial deregulation influence bank efficiency. 
This chapter reviews studies that investigate bank efficiency, not just in the US and 
selected European economies, but also in other recently deregulated economies. The 
focus of attention of these latter studies is to see whether financial deregulation and 
liberalisation measures, including the lifting of entry constraints on non-governmental 
types of ownership, have positive or negative effects on banking sector performance and 
efficiency. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section provides a review of the 
scale and scope economies literature focusing on US and European studies. The second 
section reviews the literature on bank efficiency in the USA using both parametric and 
non-parametric approaches. The third section reviews a number of European studies that 
have evaluated banks' efficiency employing parametric and non-parametric approaches. 
The final chapter discusses selected studies on bank efficiency in recently-deregulated 
banking systems'' 
5-2 Scale and Scope Economies116 
Casu and Molyneux (2001) note that the empirical literature on bank scale and scope 
economies has witnessed three major developments. First, the earliest studies used 
1 15 The chapter will tabulate other studies at the end of each section using the structure suggested by Casu and 
Molyneux in Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2001). 
116 A number of comprehensive reviews of scale and scope literature on US and European banking can be found 
in Berger (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1994), Casu and Molyneux (2001. 
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accounting and balance sheet information to calculate ratios relating to bank costs and 
outputs, such as Alhadeff (1954), Schweiger and MacGee (1961), and Gramley (1962). 
Second, in the 1960s, a new route for bank scale and scope economies was unveiled by 
Benston (1965, a and b), who was the first to use the Cobb-Douglas cost function to 
evaluate economies of scale in banking. Third, in the 1980s, Benston, Hanweck and 
Humphrey (1982), introduced the translog functional form to estimate scale economies in 
banking. Later advances use more flexible functional forms such as the translog and the 
Flexible Fourier functional forms to estimate bank efficiency. 
5-2-1 Scale and Scope Economies in US Banking 
Alhadeff (1954) was the first to investigate scale economies in banking using the earning 
assets to assets ratio as a measure of output to reflect the used capacity of the bank. His 
study consisted of comparing the costs of Californian branch with unit banks' 17 of 
different sizes over the period 1938 to 1950. Alhadeff (1954) found evidence of scale 
economies in branch banking showing that they produced greater output per dollar than 
unit banks. He found that large and small banks tended to have increasing returns to 
scale, while mid-sized banks realised constant returns to scale. Using the same 
methodology, Schweiger and MacGee (1961) and Gramley (1962) use total assets as a 
measure of bank outputs. Schweiger and MacGee (1961) found that large banks tended to 
have a cost advantage over small and medium-sized banks, whereas Gramley (1962) 
found that average cost declined as bank size increased and, therefore, larger banks had a 
cost advantage over small banks. 
Benston (1965a, b) employed the Cobb-Douglas cost function to estimate scale 
economies in banking, and found that economies of scale were present, but were small. A 
review by Greenbaum (1967) concluded that economies of scale were generally 
exhausted after banks' assets size exceeded US$10 million. Banks with more than US$ 
10 million in assets were therefore inefficient, because of high overhead unit costs, high 
transaction costs, and the lack of sufficient specialisation and limited diversification. 
Berger and Humphrey (1994) state that the results of studies that used Cobb-Douglas 
"' Unit banks operate out of only one office, with no branches, as required bb states having unit-banking laws. 
Unit banks are single office institutions primarily serving their local communities. 
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functional form to investigate how bank costs vary with bank size, suggest that banks that 
doubled their size, all else held constant, would experience reductions in average costs in 
the order of about five to eight percent, regardless of bank size. 
Scale economies studies considered incorporating technological change and other 
developments that affected the banking sector. In their review of the 1970s' literature, 
Casu and Molyneux (2001)118note that it has emerged that if there were economies of 
scale in banking, they were not sufficient to preclude small and medium-sized banks 
from viable competition. 
In the 1980s, Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey (1982) introduced the use of the translog 
cost function 119 as a new relatively flexible functional form to estimate scale economies. 
They suggested using it instead of the Cobb-Douglas cost function, due to the latter's 
disadvantages. Berger and Humphrey (1994) explain that the Cobb-Douglas functions 
used in earlier studies were restrictive, as it allows only three possible outcomes, which 
are constant, decreasing, or increasing average costs for all banks. The Cobb-Douglas 
function does not allow, for example, a U-shaped cost curve in which small banks have 
decreasing average costs, medium-sized banks have approximately constant average cost, 
and large banks experience increasing costs. Berger and Humphrey (1994) state that the 
use of more flexible functional forms when evaluating scale and scope economies has 
allowed research to; i) show a U-shaped average cost curve if one exists in the dataset; ii) 
expand data samples to include large banks with over US$ I billion in assets, or focus 
exclusively on large banks; and iii) to determine scale economies at the level of the 
banking firm, rather than at the level of the average branch office. Benston, Hanweck and 
Humphrey (1982) applied the translog functional form and found a U-shaped cost curve 
indicating that diseconomies of scale were present for banks with more than US$ 50 
million in deposits, while banks in branching states experienced small economies of 
scale. 
1 18 These studies are Schcitzer (1972), Murphy (1972), Daniel et al. (1973), Kalish and Gilbert (1973), 
Longbrake and Haslem (1975), Mullineaux (1975) and Mullineux (1977). 
19 More comprehensive reviews of studies that used the cost translog function to estimate scale economics in the 
eighties and early nineties can found in Berger et aL (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1994) and Casu and Molyneux (2001). 
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Casu and Molyneux (2001) conclude that the majority of the literature conducted in the 
1980s using the translog functional form reported that scale economies were present up 
to a very low level of output, typically around US$ 100 million. Berger et al., (1993) and 
Berger and Humphrey (1994) conclude from studying analyses by Mester (1987), Clark 
(1988) and Humphrey (1990), that the average cost curve in banking has a relatively flat 
U-shape with medium-sized banks realising slightly more scale economies than either 
large or small banks. Only small banks appear to have the potential for scale economy 
gains and the measured economies are usually small, in the order of five percent or less. 
Overall, the empirical studies on US banking conducted during the 1980s using the 
translog functional form provide non consensus as to the location of the bottom of the 
average cost curve U, which is the scale efficient point. Berger and Humphrey (1994) 
elaborate that studies that include all sizes of banks usually find that average cost was 
minimised within the range US$ 75-100 million in assets. Studies that examine only 
banks with more than US$ 1 billion in assets find the minimum average cost point to be 
within the range US$ 2-10 billion in assets. According to Berger et al. (1993), these 
differences in results are caused by the translog functional form employed in such 
studies. This functional form may not be capable of incorporating the technologies of 
both large and small banks together in a single model. Or, some significant factors that 
vary with bank size that might have been excluded from the modelling process. In 
addition, Berger and Humphrey (1994) note that the differences in economies of scale 
studies may be due to the fact that the largest banks produce a distinct variety of 
products, including off-balance sheet items, that they have different technologies, or that 
they have a different range of cost dispersion than smaller banks that confounds the 
measurement of scale economies. 
McAllister and McManus (1993) claim that the translog cost function generates a poor 
approximation when banks of assorted sizes are used. This translog functional form 
forces large and small banks to lie on a symmetric U-shaped average cost curve and 
disallows other possibilities, such as an average cost curve that falls up to some output 
point and remains constant thereafter. Based on this argument, Berger et at. (1993) 
illustrate that it may the case that scale diseconomies found for larger banks can simply 
be the imposed reflection of the economies found for small banks. Overall, despite the 
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differences in the location of the scale-efficiency point, the fact that almost all estimates 
place this point well below the size of the largest banks clearly suggests that there are no 
significant overall scale economies to be gained through increases in bank size, apart 
for 
very small banks. 
Saunders and Walters (1998) measure scale and scope economies for 133 of the largest 
200 banks in the world at year-end 1988 using a translog cost model. It is found that, 
while banks with loans less than $USIO billion and more than $25 billion exhibited scale 
diseconomies, banks in the intermediate range realise scale economies. In addition, scope 
diseconomies between fee-earning and interest-earning financial services existed. As the 
analysed sample covers banks operating in multiple countries, Saunders and Walters 
(1998) conclude that international expansion may well suggest potential for economies of 
scale opportunities for many financial institutions. They also conclude that it was too 
early in the 1980s to make clear inferences about potential scope economies, which they 
believed might materialise after some initial fixed costs of expanding beyond traditional 
commercial banking activities had been incurred. 
To overcome problems of poor approximation generated by the use of the translog 
functional form, McAllister and McManus (1993) suggest the use of non-parametric 
estimation approaches such as data envelopment analysis. However, Berger and 
Humphrey (1994) state that the use of non-parametric methods generally yields the same 
basic results that scale economies are important only for very small banks. 
Bos and Kolari (2003) employ a stochastic translog functional form frontier cost model 
to estimate and compare economies of scale and scope for multi-billion dollar European 
and US banks in the period 1995-99. First, the cost model estimates suggest decreasing 
economies of scale for European banks. An increase of one dollar in total output would 
result in an increased cost of almost $1.127 for European banks, implying cost 
diseconomies of scale. Scope economies are found to be negative and insignificant for 
the cost model. European banks that produce a disproportionate amount of a particular 
output have total costs that are approximately 34% lower (but statistically insignificant) 
than banks that have a more balanced output mix. The insignificance of this estimate may 
suggest that scope economies are small in general. Second, overall economies of scale for 
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US banks significantly decrease but are smaller in magnitude than those for the European 
cost model, 112.7% and 104.2% for European and U. S. banks, respectively. Scope 
economies for large US banks are found to be negative and significant (at the 1% level). 
Cost scope diseconomies for US banks are about three times larger than for European 
banks. This difference in results could be due to the greater number of specialised banks 
in the US and universal banks in Europe. Scope estimates were generally not significant, 
with the exception of cost diseconomies of scope among US banks 
Overall, previous US large banks studies on scale and scope economies are generally 
mixed, with relatively small economies or diseconomies as mentioned earlier (e. g., see 
Pulley and Humphrey (1993) and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) and citations therein). 
5-2-2 Scale and Scope Economies in European 
Banking 
Traditionally, there have been fewer studies on scale and scope economies on European 
banking compared to the US120. It is important to state the scale economies studies on 
European banking have followed the patterns experienced in the US, in which the Cobb- 
Douglas cost function and accounting ratios were first used in the 1970s, then the 
translog cost function approach in the 1980s, and a mixture of the translog and the 
Flexible Fourier, thereafter. Earlier studies on scale and scope economies in European 
banking emerged in the mid-1970s, when Maes (1975) and Levy-Garboua and Levy- 
Garboua (1975) examined the cost characteristics of French and Italian banking systems. 
Both of these studies found that scale economies were substantially present. 
Gough (1979) uses data from 1972 to 1979 to estimate a linear cost function. He finds no 
evidence of scale economies for UK building societies. Similarly, Barnes and Dodds 
(1983) analyse data from 1970 to 1978, and find no evidence of scale economies for UK 
building societies. However, Cooper (1980) finds evidence of scale economies for UK 
building societies with assets less than £100 million, and diseconomies of scale for larger 
building societies. Hardwick (1989 and 1990) found evidence of scale economies for 
relatively smaller building societies and no evidence of scope economies. 
120 Altunbas and Molyncux (1996) and Casu and Molyneux (2001) review studies that investigate scale and 
scope economies in many European banking systems. 
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Mckillop and Glass (1994) estimates a hybrid translog cost function applied to data 
obtained from the 1991 annual returns for a sample of eighty-nine UK national, regional 
and local building societies. They found evidence of significant augmented economies of 
scale for both national and local societies, but only constant returns for scale for regional 
societies. They also found no evidence of economies of scope. Drake (1995) uses a 
translog multi-product cost function but found no evidence of scale economies for his 
sample of building societies, although Drake (1992) found mild economies of scale for 
societies with assets within the range £120-500 million, he found no evidence of scope. 
Ashton (1998) investigates the presence of scale economies in the British retail-banking 
sector12' using a distribution-free translog model over the period 1987-95. In terms of 
economies of scale, overall, this study finds slight diseconomies of scale using the 
intermediation approach (1.195), but substantial diseconomies of scale using the 
production approach (1.632). Constant returns to scale are found with the intermediation 
model for banks within the assets range of £0-5 billion (a value of 1.069 is recorded), 
with diseconomies of scale rising with increases in total asset size thereafter. The 
production approach produces different results, as banks with the assets range £0-25 
billion broadly display constant returns to scale. Diseconomies of scale are reported for 
banks within the assets range of £25-50 billion. In terms of economies of scope, over 
time and across asset sizes substantial and statistically significant diseconomies of scope 
are found using the intermediation model, as an overall value of -53.21% for economies 
of scope is reported. This indicates banks that produce loans and investments separately 
could gain cost economies. However, diseconomies of scope appear to slightly decline as 
total asset size increases. A value of 70.76% for the banks in the £0-5 billion total asset 
group is recorded, falling to -43.10% for banks within the greater than £100 billion total 
asset group. Ashton (1998) also produces a variety of results using the production 
approach. Substantial loan specific economies of scope are recorded both over time and 
asset size. Overall the level of loan specific economies of scope is 124.97%. The size of 
loan specific economies of scope is seen to fall both over time and with increasing total 
'Z' Twelve banks are analysed in this study: the Royal Bank of Scotland, Standard Chartered, TSB, Barclays, 
Clydesdale, The Co-operative Bank, Lloyds, Midland, NatWest, Bank of Scotland, Abbey National and 
Yorkshire. 
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asset size. A value of 63.69% is reported for the 1985-1989 period rising to a value of 
59.70% in the period 1994-97. A value of 98%is reported for banks in the £0 - £5 billion 
asset group declining to 52.85% for banks in the greater than £100 billion asset group. 
Reported investment specific economies of scope estimates are insubstantial. Overall 
investment specific economies of scope are -0.42%. Estimates of deposit specific 
economies of scope are slight both overall and over time. Overall levels of deposit 
specific economies of scope are 0.44%. Substantial deposit specific diseconomies of 
scope appear as the total asset size of banks rises above £75 billion increasing from - 
6.95% for banks in the £0-5 billion in asset group to -120.01% for banks in the over 
£100 billion total asset group. 
Molyneux et at. (1996) employs a hybrid translog cost function to investigate scale and 
scope economies in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. They find differences in cost 
characteristics between these four countries and scale and scope economies appear to be 
evident in each country. Similarly, the European Commission (1997) found evidence of 
both economies of scale and scope in European banking during the nineties. Increasing 
returns to scale were found preponderant in the case of small banks, particularly in 
France and Germany. Strong evidence of economies of scope was also found for the 
largest banks. 
Huizinga, Belisson and Vander Vennet (2001) investigate whether unexploited 
economies of scale exist in European banking due to the intensive European bank 
mergers and acquisitions movements that occurred throughout the 1990s. The 
abovementioned authors argue that economies of scale are often invoked by banks 
involved in consolidation operations, as one of the main motivations behind mergers. 
This study uses a sample consisting of 52 bank mergers covering 14 EU countries, over 
the period 1994-98, i. e., the period immediately preceding the introduction of the Euro. 
The findings of this study indicate that there are significant unexploited economies of 
scale in European banking, also for the very large banks. The results of this analysis 
show that, all groups, with the exception of mortgage banks with total assets above ten 
billion euro, exhibit economies of scale. In particular, the existence of scale economies is 
most pronounced for small mortgage banks. In addition, commercial banks are found to 
have a greater potential to realise scale-related cost gains than cooperative and savings 
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banks. Nevertheless, the larger the size of the commercial bank, the smaller the 
advantage, as the scale economies indicator (RSCE) amounts to 81% for the smallest 
group of commercial banks and 89% for the group of large banks. On the other hand, no 
major scale economies are found to be present for cooperative and savings banks, with 
the exception of the smallest and largest, as all intermediate size groups show a value 
within the range 91-93%. Also, it is found that the off- balance sheet items increase the 
potential for scale economies for cooperative and savings banks for all size groups. For 
the commercial banks, this only holds for banks with total assets up to 5,000 million 
euro. The group of `other banks' shows considerably larger economies of scale, with the 
exception of the smallest size group. The larger mortgage banks also exhibit economies 
of scale. Huizinga, Belisson and Vander Vennet (2001) conclude that their results 
indicate the presence of economies of scale for commercial banks, cooperative and 
savings banks, mortgage banks with total assets up to 10 billion euro and for all but one 
size group of `other' banks. These findings at least partly contradict the wide consensus 
based on data from the 1970s and the 1980s that only very small banks have a potential 
to achieve scale economies. Huizinga, Belisson and Vander Vennet (2001) believe that 
their results confirm the findings by Berger and Mester (1997), Berger et at. (1999), and 
Vander Vennet (2001) who also observe economies of scale for large banks using data 
from the 1990s. The finding of potential scale economies provides a rationale for the 
occurrence of bank mergers. In fact, mergers, as opposed to internal growth, may be the 
fastest way to realize the associated cost benefits. 
Maggi and Rossi (2003) analyse the efficiency of European and US commercial banks 
over the period 1995-98, by employing a broad definition of efficiency, which covers 
scale and scope economies, as well as cost efficiency. This study compares scale and 
scope economies scores derived from different model specifications to identify any mis- 
specification arising from the translog form and the robustness of the evidence provided. 
The results of this study indicate increasing global scale economies for US commercial 
banks and less pronounced evidence for EU banks, in favour of small (and medium- 
sized) banks. However, in the EU case, the results suggest that there is evidence in favour 
of increasing returns to scale particularly in the case of small banks. In contrast, translog 
functional form scale economies results are found to be approximately constant both 
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overall and for different bank size (the same results are found using the Fourier-Flexible 
functional form). Maggi and Rossi (2003) detect evidence of scope diseconomies using 
the three functional forms, both in Europe and in the US. Such evidence, which is 
consistent with the significant level of inefficiency indicated, is, as suggested by the 
authors, likely to be associated to the consolidation process for Europe and to lower 
operational constraints in US banking. 
Overall, scale and scope economies studies have evolved through the use of more 
flexible functional approaches. While accounting ratios were used in the 1950s, the 
Cobb-Douglas cost function approach was used in 1960s and 1970s, and the translog cost 
function has been more widely adopted thereafter. Berger et al. (1993) conclude that 
banking sector average cost curves have a relatively flat U-shape, with medium-sized 
banks being slightly more scale efficient than either very large or very small banks. 
However, the location of the bottom of the curve tends to be uncertain. Huizinga, 
Belisson and Vander Vennet (2001) state that potential scale economies are more 
pronounced in the 1990s than in previous decades, both in the US and the European 
banking markets (although X-inefficiencies are still found to dominate scale 
inefficiencies). 
5-3 Cost and Profit X-Efficiency122 
This sections reviews leading studies on cost and profit X-efficiency in banking. As 
noted in the previous chapter, Leibenstein (1966) was the first to identify X-efficiency, 
which consists of the differences in costs and revenues between (banking) firms and best 
practice firms. Inefficiencies that are not associated with size (scale) and product-mix 
(scope) are called X-inefficiencies. X-inefficiency comprises allocative and technical 
inefficiencies. While allocative inefficiency is defined as the decline in performance due 
to the selection of an ineffective production plan, technical inefficiency is defined as the 
poor implementation of this production plan. The empirical studies reviewed in this 
section are relatively recent. In the 1990s onwards, bank efficiency studies using 
This section adopts the structure suggested in Casu and Molyneux (2001) by reviewing parametric and non- 
parametric frontier studies on US banking followed by studies on European banking and, then those that focus 
on recently-deregulated and other banking systems 
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parametric (with translog and Fourier Flexible functional forms) and non-parametric 
(DEA) approaches have prospered. 
5-3-1 Cost and Profit Efficiency in US Banking 
Efficiency studies investigating the US are both recent and voluminous. Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) review 130 studies in 21 countries, three quarters of which are on US 
banking. Casu and Molyneux (2001) review 48 studies, twenty-five of which cover US 
banking. Most of the efficiency studies on US banking have used data from the 1980s 
and early to mid-1990s to investigate the effects of de-branching23 on bank efficiency, as 
well as examining whether significant variations in efficiency have emerged after the 
consolidation process that has occurred in the US banking during the period under study. 
Other cost and profit efficiency studies in US banking are shown in Table 5-1. 
5-3-1-1 Parametric Approaches 
As noted earlier, a growing number of parametric-based studies using the translog and 
Flexible Fourier functional forms have been undertaken to investigate US banks' 
efficiency since the early 1990s. 
Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993) use the profit function to derive output and input 
efficiency estimates. The profit function allows for the measurement of inefficiencies on 
both the inputs and outputs sides of the banking firm. It incorporates the revenue affects 
of producing at incorrect levels (or mixes) of output in addition to the cost effects of 
employing the inappropriate levels (of mixes) of inputs. Besides the two fixed netputs of 
core deposits and physical capital, the variable outputs of this study include business 
loans and consumer loans, whereas the variable inputs include labour and purchased 
funds. The aforementioned authors argue that core deposits need to be specified as a 
fixed variable due to the fact that they are determined by external factors, which are 
outside the sphere of control of the bank. Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993) apply 
the distribution-free frontier approach on the dataset that includes three panels of 384 to 
599 banks, each from 1984 to 1989. This study finds that profit efficiency estimates 
appear to be within the range of 52-66%, with larger banks being more efficient, in 
123 Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. 
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general, than smaller banks. This study also fords that technical inefficiencies tend to 
dominate over allocative inefficiencies, suggesting that banks are not particularly poor at 
choosing input and output plans, but rather are poor at executing these plans. The other 
finding of this study suggests that output inefficiencies are greater than input 
inefficiencies, implying that more than half of all profit inefficiencies are in the form of 
deficient revenues rather than excessive costs. 
Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas (1994)124 apply the translog stochastic frontier approach to 
investigate the efficiency of 5548 US commercial banks, including larger banks with 
over US$ 1 billion in assets. The analysis of this study incorporates different factors that 
may appear to affect bank efficiency such as the density of population within a particular 
US State, whether States have branching restrictions, and various proxies for managerial 
quality and portfolio riskiness. Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas (1994) follow Ray (1988) 
who argues that outputs are a function of a large number of inputs, which are not entirely 
under the sphere of control of the banking firm. The model of this study includes four 
variable outputs (i) loans to individuals and households, ii) loans secured by real estate, 
iii) commercial and industrial loans, and iv) federal funds sold and securities held in 
trading accounts, four variable inputs (interest-bearing deposits except certificates of 
deposits above $100,000, the sum of certificates of deposits above $100,000 and federal 
funds purchase plus demand notes and other borrows money, number of employees, and 
premises and fixed assets), and one quasi-fixed variable netput (non-interest bearing 
deposits). Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas (1994) find overall cost efficiency to be around 
ninety percent, with a positive relationship between increasing risk and inefficiency. That 
is, a higher ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and a lower ratio of equity capital 
to total assets both lead to increase cost inefficiency. Also, Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas 
(1994) also find a positive relationship between cost inefficiency and bank size, with the 
largest banks being twice as inefficient as the most efficient group with $75-150 million 
in assets. The findings of this study reveal various implications for the banking industry 
as encouraging banking firms, in terms of regulation, to be bigger may create a suitable 
environment for increased cost inefficiency. 
lu Kaparkis, Miller and Noulas (1994) review eight studies and conclude that technical and/or allocative 
inefficiencies are present in banking, and they tend to be positively correlated with bank size. 
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Berger and De Young (1997) use a model that tests four hypotheses125 to address the 
relationship between the problem or non-performing loans and cost efficiency in US 
commercial banking. The first hypothesis is the bad luck hypothesis, which states that 
such external factors as local plant closures may precipitate an increase in problem loans 
for a banking firm. When loans become past due, the banking firm begins to expend 
additional managerial efforts and expenses dealing with these problem loans. 
Consequently, the increase in problem loans would decrease cost efficiency, as the 
additional operating expenses associated with bad loans create the appearance of lower 
cost efficiency. The bad luck hypothesis, hence, has a negative relationship with cost 
efficiency. The second hypothesis is the bad management hypothesis, which asserts that 
low measured cost efficiency is an indicative of poor management practices regarding 
daily operations and loan portfolio management. Banking firms with incompetent 
managers have not the appropriate qualities to make adequate decisions about loan 
underwriting, monitoring and control. This is mainly due to the lack of adequate 
monitoring by managers as they have mediocre skills reflected by the choice of making a 
higher proportion of loans with uncertain, low or negative net present values. This 
inadequacy may lead to an increase in non-performing loans, and consequently, an 
increase in cost inefficiency. The bad management hypothesis, hence, is negatively 
associated with cost efficiency. The third hypothesis is the skimping hypothesis, which 
maintains that loan quality and cost efficiency are affected by the amount of resources 
devoted to underwriting and monitoring loans. A banking firm may choose to have lower 
costs in the short-term in order to maximise long-term profit. To reach such a target, the 
banking firm may skimp on the resources allocated to underwriting, monitoring and 
controlling loans. However, this choice may create future problems regarding the 
performance of loans and increased costs to deal with these. Berger and De Young 
(1997) argue that, in the short-term, a banking firm may appear cost efficient because of 
the reduced expenses related to loan and credit management. The level of non- 
performing loans may have no influence, but over time, an important stock of non- 
performing loans would build up. The skimping hypothesis, hence, implies a positive 
125 Berger and De Young (1997) argue that bank supervisors and researchers should use the findings of cost 
efficiency studies that test these four hypotheses as predictors of financial fragility. 
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causation between cost and increased problem loans. The final hypothesis is the »: oral 
hazard hypothesis, which states that the increase in loan portfolio riskiness can be 
interpreted as a response to moral hazard incentives made by banking firms with low 
levels of capital. This hypothesis, therefore, implies that low levels of capital cause an 
increase in non-performing loans. 
Berger and De Young (1997) apply the stochastic frontier approach to data on US 
commercial banks over the period 1984-94, and report overall average cost inefficiency 
of eight percent over the entire sample. They find that when loans become past due, 
operating costs increase as a result of hunting these loans down. If the impact were 
severe, this would lead to decease in cost efficiency, as predicted by the bad luck 
hypothesis. Berger and De Young (1997) also find evidence of the bad management 
hypothesis, indicated by the fall in non-performing loans levels after the decrease in 
measured cost efficiency. This effect would be greater for banking firms if they have a 
relatively risky loan portfolio mix. In addition, Berger and De Young (1997) find that 
some highly efficient banks are skimping as their cost efficiency causes higher levels of 
non-performing loans. They also find some support for the moral hazard hypothesis 
reflected by the positive relationship between higher levels of future problem loans and 
banking firms with low capital driven by greater level of portfolio risk. 
Overall, the four hypotheses tested by Berger and Humphrey (1997) can jointly explain 
the relationship between cost efficiency and non-performing loans, suggesting some 
implications for economic policy. Under the bad luck hypothesis, the failure of a banking 
firm is a consequence of uncontrollable external events. This implies that prudential 
regulation could reduce the risk of failure by limiting or insulating banking firms' 
exposure to external shocks. This includes implementing measures in the form of 
imposing limits on loan concentration, and encouraging relatively acceptable low loans 
to assets ratios and higher levels of capital. Under the bad management hypothesis, the 
failure of banking firms can be driven by major risk caused by relatively controllable 
internal factors. Banking firm managers should ensure that the available labour has all 
the necessary abilities to implement the production plans of the bank as well as having 
the suitable skills in terms of loan underwriting, monitoring and controlling. 
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Bauer et al. (1998) proposes six consistency conditions that efficiency estimates derived 
from the parametric and non-parametric frontier approaches (SFA, TFA, DFA, and DEA) 
should ideally meet for adequate decision-making purpose. The first three conditions 
state that efficiency generated by different modelling approaches should yield consistent 
results to one another in terms of their efficiency levels, rankings, and identification of 
best and worst banking firms. The remaining three conditions stipulate that efficiency 
estimates should be consistent over time, with the competitive conditions of the market, 
and with non-frontier measures of efficiency and performance. The latter three conditions 
help determine the degree to which efficiency estimates generated by the frontier 
approaches are consistent with the reality and are `believable'. Bauer et al. (1998) 
attempts to evaluate to what extent four frontier approaches estimating cost efficiency 
meet the six conditions by examining a dataset of 683 large US banks operating in States 
where branching was allowed over the period 1977-1988. 
Bauer et at. (1998) finds that the efficiency estimates generated by parametric approaches 
are consistent with one another, but inconsistent with DEA estimates. The three 
parametric approaches tended to yield the same distributions of efficiency (condition 1), 
rank banks approximately in the same order (condition 2), identify mostly the same 
banks as the best practice and worst practice (condition 3), be more consistent with what 
was generally believed given competitive conditions in the markets (condition 5), and 
generally were highly correlated with the standard non-frontier performance measures 
(condition 6). The three parametric approaches generated relatively high scores of 
efficiency for the vast majority of banks reflecting the state of competition in banking 
markets, as cost efficiency estimates were found within the range of 67.4-93.3%. 
The non-parametric approach generated much lower average efficiencies, ranked the 
banking firms differently, and identified the best and worst banks differently from the 
three parametric approaches. But, the DEA approach appeared to be more consistent with 
non-frontier measures of performance such as ROA and various cost ratios, but overall, 
less strongly related to other indicators of firm performance. The DEA results yielded 
low efficiency estimates for most banks, possibly reflecting the confounding of random 
error and inefficiency, as cost efficiency was found to range between 21-38.5%. Bauer et 
al. (1998) conclude that when performing bank efficiency analysis, the use of multiple 
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techniques and specifications is likely to be supportive. If the six consistency conditions 
are met for two or three approaches, then the drawn conclusions are likely to have some 
confidence. 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) examine the effects of entry regulation imposed on US 
banking structure and find that heavy entry barriers would lead to an increase in the 
number of inefficient banking firms. US banking firms were prevented from expanding 
their presence inter-state due to branching restrictions. This policy resulted in the 
chartering of thousands of unit banks. But, this regulation was discontinued in the 1980s, 
as State branching deregulation in the US became permitted and widespread. Jayaratne 
and Strahan (1998) find that banking firms in states where branching was restricted were 
less profitable than banking firms in states where branching was unrestricted. They also 
find that average US banking firms' efficiency improved markedly when inter-state and 
state-wide branching restriction were lifted, manifested by decreasing loan losses and 
operating costs by approximately one half and one tenth, respectively. These reductions 
in banks' costs should be beneficial for bank client if they are passed on to them in the 
form of lower loan rates. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) conclude that the improvements 
following branching deregulation appear to occur because better banks grow at the 
expense of their less efficient competitors. 
Similarly, Berger and De Young (2000) assess the impact of branching regulation on US 
bank efficiency employing both cost and profit efficiency analyses. This study uses the 
Fourier Flexible function form applied to over 7000 US commercial banks. While overall 
cost efficiency was found to be 76.4% for small banks with less than US$ 100 million in 
assets, overall cost efficiency was found to be 78% for larger banks with more than US$ 
100 million in assets. For the same two categories of banks, average measured profit 
efficiency was found to be 66.3% and 66.8%, respectively. Berger and De Young (2000) 
find a positive relationship between geographic expansion and bank efficiency, as banks 
expanding in nearby regions tend to improve their levels of cost and profit efficiency. 
This efficiency improvement was explained by the export of managerial skills and 
practices from parent banks to new branches and affiliates. This finding may have some 
implications for the structure of the banking industry. First, the geographic expansion of 
efficient banks nation-wide or cross-region would result in pushing inefficient banks to 
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improve their efficiency or face being put out of business. Second, if a parent bank is 
efficient in one region, its branches and affiliates operating in other regions are likely to 
be efficient. 
Bos and Kolari (2003) compare cost and profit efficiency estimates for a sample of 
European and US banks over the period 1995-99, using the stochastic translog frontier 
model. Consistent with the intermediation approach, three bank outputs are defined 
(loans, investments, and off-balance sheet activities). Based on these cost and profit 
models, X-efficiency scores reveal that, on average, European banks have lower cost and 
profit efficiencies compared to U. S. banks. In absolute terms U. S. banks have lower 
(higher) cost (profit) ratios. X-efficiency estimates based on the cost model for European 
banks are found to be 94.7%, whereas the X-efficiency estimates based on the profit 
model for European banks are on average considerably lower at 72.1%. For the US, the 
average cost X-efficiency score is 97.6% (or higher than European banks), whereas for 
the profit model the average X-efficiency score is also relatively higher compared to 
European banks at 74.9%. US banks' average cost and profit efficiency scores are higher, 
average cost ratios are lower, and average profit ratios are higher compared to European 
banks. Higher profit efficiency is positively and significantly correlated with the profit 
ratio. Cost and profit ratios are positively and significantly correlated. Cost X-efficiency 
is on average 0.743 and 0.871 for small European and US banks, respectively. Cost 
economies of scale are negative, especially for small U. S. banks. Regarding the small 
bank profit efficiency results, average profit X-efficiency is 0.607 in Europe and 0.644 in 
the US. One possible implication of these findings is that small banks face less 
competitive pressure to be cost and profit efficient than large banks. If this is indeed true, 
an efficiency motive for large banks to merge or acquire small banks exists. Bos and 
Kolari (2003) conclude that their empirical results tend to support the notion that 
potential profit efficiency gains are possible in cross-Atlantic bank mergers between 
European and US banks. Thus, an economic motivation appears to exist in favour of 
geographic expansion in the years ahead. 
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5-3-1-2 Non-Parametric Approaches 
Non-parametric frontier techniques, mainly using the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), have been applied to estimate the cost and profit efficiency of US banking firms 
by many authors. 
Grabowski, Rangan and Rezvanian (1993) use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
approach to investigate the relationship between US bank efficiency and type of bank 
organisational form, over the 1980s, and compare the relative efficiency of bank holding 
company and branch banking structures. Using the intermediation approach, five outputs 
(real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, investment loans, 
and other loans) and three inputs (labour, capital and purchased funds) were selected. The 
findings indicate that the entire sample generates an overall average cost efficiency of 
68%. Other results include average allocative efficiency, 72%, average technical 
efficiency, 72%, average scale efficiency, 94%, and average pure technical efficiency at 
77%. In addition, Grabowski, Rangan and Rezvanian (1993) find that the branch banking 
organisational form seems to be more efficient than the multi-bank holding company 
organisational form. Branch banks are more technically efficient as they generate more 
output from the used inputs compared to bank holding companies. The abovementioned 
authors argue that branch banks raise the availability and convenience to services to their 
clients, which enables them to achieve economies of large-scale operations. Also, branch 
banks seem to have the privilege of being able to lower the risk of failure through 
geographic diversification. In contrast, bank holding companies tend to hold higher 
operating expenses derived from the need for a board of directors, separate staff, offices, 
documentation, and technology for each of its affiliates. Grabowski, Rangan and 
Rezvanian (1993) conclude that the branch banking organisational form appears to be 
more efficient compared to the multi-bank holding company organisational type. 
Miller and Noulas (1996) employ the DEA approach to examine scale and pure technical 
inefficiency for 201 large-sized banks, with assets in excess of US$lbn, over the period 
1984-90. This study specifies four variable inputs (total transactions deposits, total non- 
transactions deposits, total interest expenses, and total non-interest expenses) and six 
variable outputs (commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, real estate loans, 
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investments, total interest income, and total non-interest income). Miller and Noulas 
(1996) find that scale and pure technical inefficiency to be approximately 2% and 4%, 
respectively, but, for the highest profit quartile, scale and pure technical inefficiencies are 
found to be equal to 2%. This result indicates that the most profitable banks tend to be 
relatively the most efficient. Miller and Noulas (1996) conduct a further regression 
analysis to explain the differences in efficiency scores across profit quartiles in the 
context of bank size, profitability, market power, and geographic location. The results of 
this analysis show that bank size and profitability are significantly related to pure 
technical efficiency, but lower technical efficiency levels are found associated with 
greater market power. The geographic location issue seem to be related to the branching 
and inter-state deregulation process launched in the 1980s, which forced US banks to 
embrace greater competition, compelling them to be more efficient. 
Barr et al. (1999) employ the DEA model to examine bank characteristics in the context 
of evaluating the relative productive efficiency of a sample of US commercial banks. 
This study uses five variable inputs representing resources required to operate a bank 
(salary expenses, premises and fixed assets, other non-interest expenses, interest 
expenses, and purchased funds), and three variable outputs (earning assets, interest 
income, and non-interest income). Barr et al. (1999) find that high levels of efficiency are 
associated with higher levels of interest and non-interest income, earning assets, and 
returns on assets. Also, high levels of efficiency are found to relate to lower levels of 
salary expenses, interest and non-interest expenses, fixed assets, purchased funds, non- 
performing assets, and loans to assets. 
Eisenbeis, Ferrier, and Kwan (1999) examine the cost efficiency of a sample of 254 US 
bank holding companies (BHCs), over the period 1986-96, using both the stochastic 
frontier and DEA approach in order to test the robustness of the findings. Five variable 
outputs (investment securities, real estate loans, consumer loans, commercial and 
industrial loans, and off-balance sheet items) and three variable inputs (physical capital, 
purchased funds and labour) were selected. The findings of this study indicate that 
substantial inefficiencies exist in US banking, averaging between 8% and 19% of total 
costs using the stochastic frontier approach, and between 28% and 40% using DEA. The 
findings also show that inefficiencies are, on average noticeably larger for smaller 
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banking companies than for bigger banking companies. In addition, the study finds a 
strong association between inefficiencies and bank risk-taking using the stochastic 
frontier estimates. Inefficient banking companies tend to have higher common stock 
variances, lower capitalisation, and larger loan charge-offs. Eisenbeis, Ferrier, and Kwan 
(1999) conclude that their findings show that the stochastic frontier approach appears to 
provide more informative scores as compared to those from the DEA 
Overall, parametric and non-parametric efficiency studies on US banking have examined 
a wide range of issues including the impact of branching regulation and consolidation on 
bank efficiency. Overall, as identified by Berger and Humphrey (1997), existing studies 
on US banking indicate that X-inefficiencies constitute around one fifth or more of costs, 
while scale and scope inefficiencies account for up to five percent of costs in banking. 
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5-3-2 Cost and Profit Efficiency in European Banking 
There is a growing number of studies that have examined bank efficiency in European 
banking using both parametric and non-parametric approaches. Most of the European 
bank efficiency studies use datasets covering the 1990s onwards, and have principally 
investigated whether there are any gains that can be derived from the process of bank 
restructuring taking place in EU countries. Maggi and Rossi (2003) state three main 
factors that have contributed to the increase in competition among EU financial 
institutions in the last few years. First, deregulation promoted by the Second European 
Directive on Banking and Financial Services, has led banks to compete not only in the 
domestic markets but also potentially all over the EU (and world). Second, efforts 
towards creating a European Monetary Union have increased the level of competition in 
the banking sector. Third, technological advances and deregulation have favoured a 
process of de-specialisation, allowing banks to lend at any maturity, and reducing the 
differences among sectors. Banking institutions have reacted to the increased European 
competition with an intense process of restructuring and growth leading the banking 
sector to experience an unprecedented level of consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions among large financial institutions. The consolidation process aims at reaping 
profitability, reducing cost inefficiency, increasing market power, and exploiting scale 
and scope economies. Table 5-2 a summary of the cost and profit efficiency studies 
undertaken on European banking. 
5-3-2-1 Parametric Approaches 
Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) investigate the impact of ownership forms (private, 
public and mixed or mutual) on European bank efficiency by estimating cost and profit 
Fourier-Flexible stochastic frontiers based on the distribution-free approach'26 . 
Five 
variable outputs (mortgage loans, public sector loans, other loans, other earning assets, 
and off-balance sheet items) and three variable inputs (labour, physical assets, and 
deposits) were selected according to the intermediation approach. Covering the period 
126 This study uses the hypothesis provided by empirical evidence stating that state-owned banks perform less 
efficiently than private-owned banks 
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from 1989 to 1996, the sample of banks consists of 1195 private commercial bank, 3486 
public bank, and 3486 mutual cooperative bank observations. Unusually, Altunbas and 
Molyneux (1996) find greater levels of cost and profit inefficiency within the private 
sector, as public and cooperative banks tend to be relatively more cost and profit 
efficient. This finding can be explained by the fact that public banks tend to have lower 
funding costs as their customers are less interest-rate sensitive than the depositors at 
commercial private banks, which are more corporate and wholesale-oriented. 
Ashton (1998) investigates cost efficiencies of twelve retail banks from the UK over the 
1987-95 period. This study employs the distribution-free translog specification using two 
models: the production and intermediation approaches. An average efficiency of 84.5% is 
recorded for the production model and an average of 82.2% is provided for the 
intermediation model. It is found that the smaller retail banks appear to relatively more 
efficient than their larger counterparts. This provides further support for the suggestion 
that substantial diseconomies exist for British retail banks with greater than 15 billion in 
total assets. 
Battese, Heshmati and Hjalmarsson (1998) study a sample of 156 Swedish banks over 
the period 1984-95, to examine the efficiency of labour use in the Swedish banking 
market. This study estimates an operating cost model based on the translog functional 
form. The model includes variables with respect to bank-ownership, the size of bank's 
branch network, total transactions and time. Battese, Heshmati and Hjalmarsson (1998) 
finds average inefficiency of 11.7%, which increased between 1984 and 1991, before 
falling thereafter. The findings also suggest that cooperative banks, savings banks and the 
large commercial Handelsbanken are found to be more efficient in their labour use than 
other types of banks. A positive relationship between labour use inefficiency and the size 
of a bank's branch network is also found. 
Bikker (1999) applies the stochastic cost frontier approach to the European banking 
industry to measure the effects of increased competition on bank efficiency. The findings 
of this study note that, on average, Spanish, French and Italian banks appear to be less 
efficient that their counterparts operating in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
Banking firms transacting in Luxembourg, Belgium and Switzerland are found to be the 
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most efficient. These findings seem to be consistent with those of Maudos, Pastor and 
Perez (2002), who find average cost and profit efficiency levels of 82.5% and 45%, 
respectively, for ten EU countries. Austria and Germany emerged as the most cost 
efficient banking systems and Luxembourg and Portugal as the most profit efficient. 
Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener (1999) investigate the main determinants of Italian 
banks' cost efficiency over the period 1993-96, using an unbalanced panel of 1958 bank 
observations. Also, they examine cost efficiency of banks across geographical regions to 
identify the most efficient banks according to their location (North West, East, Centre 
and South). This study uses the intermediation approach to define variable outputs and 
inputs used within the selected Fourier-Flexible stochastic cost frontier model. Two 
output variables (total loans and securities) and three input variables (labour, deposits, 
and physical capital) were defined. In addition, following Mester (1996), this study 
includes two fixed netputs representing financial capital (total equity) and assets quality 
(non-performing assets to assets ratio) to control for the quality and riskiness of bank 
output. The findings of this study show that average overall cost efficiency seems to 
range between 85% and 87% of total costs and tends to increase over time for all bank 
sizes. Also, economies of scale were found to be present and significant and at higher 
levels for the popular and credit cooperative banks. The results of the second-stage 
logistic regression indicate that inefficiencies appear to be inversely correlated with 
capital strength and positively related to the level of non-performing assets in the balance 
sheet, but, no clear relationship is found between assets size and bank efficiency. Also, it 
is suggested that quoted banks seem, on average, to be more efficient than non-quoted 
banks. 
Schure and Wagenvoort (1999) investigate the impact of the Second Banking Directive 
implemented in 1992 on the efficiency of a sample of 1,974 financial institutions from 
fifteen countries within the EU. The Second Banking Directive introduced the single 
banking license in the EU, standardised minimum capital requirements, and other 
measures to reduce barriers to cross-border trade and establishment. Using the standard 
translog cost functional form, this study finds that more than eighty percent of the banks 
in the examined sample are not located on their cost frontier. Also, the overall cost 
inefficiency score is found to be 16%, and it tends to decrease at around 4% over the 
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sample period. Schure and Wagenvoort (1999) find that UK banks were able to reduce 
cost inefficiencies from over 20% to essentially zero within a period of five years after 
the implementation of the Second Banking Directive. Although some countries 
experienced rapid improvements in bank efficiency, in other countries such as Austria, 
France, Germany and Luxembourg, more mixed results were found. 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) compare estimated separate and pooled common cost 
frontiers for the French and Spanish banking systems to investigate the impact of 
environmental conditions on bank efficiencies. Their study applies the translog functional 
form based on the distribution free approach, on data covering the period 1988-92. The 
separate frontier analysis finds approximately similar inefficiency scores of 11.9% and 
11.7% for the French and Spanish banks, respectively. The pooled common frontier 
analysis finds different results, as Spanish banks (90.7%) appear to be far more cost 
inefficient than French banks (41.9%). Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) explain the 
differences in cost efficiency scores between the two analyses to the effects of 
environmental conditions, and believe that country-specific variables, including 
environmental and regulatory variables represent important factors in explaining 
efficiency differences, and thus, they should be included in bank efficiency modelling 
(otherwise efficiency estimate will be overestimated). Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) 
re-estimate the cost efficiency frontier in the separate country analysis taking into 
account country-specific environmental variables including density of population, 
income per capita, density of demand, concentration index, capital ratio, intermediation 
ratio, and number of branches per square kilometres. The results of this re-analysis reveal 
approximately similar inefficiency scores in the former separate country-specific analysis 
for the French banks (11.2%), but lower new inefficiency estimates in the case of 
Spanish banks (25.2%). Hence, it can be concluded that the inclusion of environmental 
differences between different banking systems can influence efficiency estimates. 
Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2000) examine the impact of ownership on efficiency in 
the German banking market by estimating individual and pooled variable cost and 
alternative profit efficiencies for over 1,800 German banks of different ownership type 
between 1989 and 1996. The structure of the banking market analysed in the study 
includes savings banks, cooperative banks, and large national and regional joint stock 
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commercial banks. The model used is the Fourier-Flexible functional form with the 
distribution-free approach. Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2000) hypothesise that 
different ownership forms can lead to varying estimates of efficiency based on the type 
of relationship between bank owners and management. The lack of a capital market 
discipline may obstruct shareholders from the implementation of necessary measures of 
control over bank management. The latter may suffer from a lack of incentives and 
motivations to perform their management duties in a way desired by the shareholders. 
However, the authors recognise that factors such as competition and universality of 
banking services supply may lead managers (of all bank ownership types) to be familiar 
with the practices of cost minimisation and profit maximisation. The main result of this 
examination indicates that overall inefficiency estimates are 16.2% and 21.1% for the 
pooled cost and profit efficiency estimates. Partial results suggest that privately-owned 
banks are more inefficient than their publicly-owned counterparts. Also, banks of public 
and mutual ownership types are found to have small cost and profit advantages because 
of the possible advantages in terms of lower funding costs. 
Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore (2001) employ the stochastic frontier 
approach to investigate the cost efficiency of a large sample of European banks between 
1989 and 1997. Applying the Fourier-Flexible functional form, the overall efficiency 
scores are found to be increasing over time from 75.5% in 1989 to 82.1% in 1997. The 
findings also suggest that cost efficiency estimates tend to vary considerably across 
countries and assets size groups. In general, efficiency decreases with bank size for the 
larger categories of banks. Individual frontier estimates reveal that the lowest cost 
inefficiencies estimates are for Italian and German banks, 12.6% and 13.5%, 
respectively. The least cost efficient banks are found to operate in Belgium, Ireland and 
Luxembourg, with over 30% of cost inefficiency. 
Huizinga, Belisson and Vander Vennet (2001) examine the performance effects of 
European horizontal mergers and acquisitions, using a sample of 52 bank mergers from 
14 EU countries' 27, over the period 1994-98. The banking institutions included in this 
analysis include commercial banks, cooperative and savings banks, mortgage and real 
127 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
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estate banks, and other types of bank128. The study analyses whether there are substantial 
cost and profit X-inefficiencies in the European banking sector and for the banks 
involved in merges and acquisitions whether these persist throughout the 1990s. The 
study involves the use of a non-homothetic functional form of the distribution-free 
translog type'29 , to estimate the cost and alternative profit efficiency scores. 
This study employs total costs and returns on equity as independent variables, whereas 
the inputs variable are deposits and labour, and the output variables are loans, securities 
or other earning assets. The fixed netput quantities included in this study include off- 
balance sheet items and equity, whereas the environmental variables are equity as a 
proportion of total assets, and non-interest costs as a proportion of total costs, (these two 
have included in order to measure possible differences in risk and output quality). 
Dummy variables for bank's size are included in the efficiency estimations. 
The average cost efficiency of European banks is estimated at 91%, which is comparable 
to the results obtained by Berger and Mester (1997) for US banks. The authors believe 
that the degree of inefficiency found is lower than observed in the 1980s, suggesting that 
technological progress and increased competition may have moved the average bank 
towards the efficient frontier. Cooperative banks are found to exhibit a higher degree of 
cost efficiency than commercial banks (96% versus 82.2%). Mortgage banks and other 
banks are found to be more efficient, on average, than commercial banks. When the 
estimates are compared across countries, the Greek and Portuguese banks appear to be 
the least efficient banks. The average profit efficiency is estimated at 64.2%, which is 
considerably lower than the average cost efficiency level. The authors note that their 
findings are consistent with the results reported in Berger and Mester (1997) for US 
banks and Vander Vennet (2001) for European banks. Mortgage banks are found to be 
more profit efficient than commercial and cooperative banks. 
The findings of this study also report that the cost efficiency of European banking 
systems, as well as the relative efficiency of those banks which engaged in mergers, 
varies considerably. Comparing merging banks with their non-merging counterparts, 
large merging banks are found to exhibit a lower degree of profit efficiency than average, 
128 Medium and long term credit banks and specialised governmental credit institutions 
129 This functional form is used following Lang and Wetzel (1996). 
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while small merging banks are found to exhibit a higher level of profit efficiency than 
their counterparts. This study finds evidence for what the authors call the low cost 
efficiency hypothesis stating that the increase in cost efficiency is likely to be larger when 
both banks have relatively low pre-merger cost efficiency levels. With respect to profit 
efficiency, mergers are found to tend to reduce profit efficiency for large banks, while 
profit efficiency rises for the set of small banks. Finally, deposit rates are found to tend to 
increase following a merger, which indicates that merging banks are unable to exercise 
greater market power. Huizinga, Belisson and Vander Vennet (2001) conclude that the 
findings for cost efficiency suggest a role for mergers to enhance the X-efficiency of the 
consolidating banks. The impact may be even more pronounced for profit efficiency. 
Rime and Stiroh (2001) investigate bank efficiency and scale and scope economics for a 
sample of 290 "universal" Swiss banks from 1996-99. This analysis uses the 
intermediation approach to define outputs and input variables used in the translog and 
alternative profit function modelling. Four output variables (loans to banks, consumer 
loans, mortgages and of balance sheet items), two input variables (labour and interest 
expenses on all liabilities), and two fixed netputs (equity capital and physical capital) are 
defined in this translog model. Rime and Stiroh (2001) find overall cost and alternative 
profit efficiencies to be 57% and 48% for their sample, respectively. They also find little 
evidence of scale and scope economics for the largest banks, and that regional and 
cantonal banks did not appear to be less efficient than other large commercial banks. The 
efficiency findings are similar to that of Sheldon (1994) who found overall cost 
efficiency for the Swiss banks of 56%. 
Maggi and Rossi (2003) investigate and compare cost efficiency between 15 EU 
countries and the US. This study uses a panel of data covering the period 1995-98 and 
including 338 European commercial banks and 279 US commercial banks. The final 
sample of this study includes two separate balanced panels. While the EU panel consists 
of 1352 observations, the US panel comprises 1116 observations. This study adopts the 
distribution free approach applied to three different cost function specifications: the 
translog; flexible Fourier and the Box-Cox cost function specification. One innovation of 
this study is the use of different approaches of defining outputs and inputs to compare the 
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EU and US banking systems. While the production approach130 is applied to the EU 
countries, the value added approach"' is thought to be appropriate for the US. The 
authors argue that the value added approach seem to better fit the data for US commercial 
banks. The results of this study indicate that Box-Cox specification generates lower rates 
of inefficiency compared to the other functional forms, which produce consistent 
outcomes. For the EU countries, the average inefficiency levels are found to be 32% 
using the translog, 36% with the Fourier-Flexible and, 21% using the Box-Cox 
specification. For the US commercial banks, the average inefficiency levels are found to 
be 37% as per with the translog, 38% using the Fourier-Flexible and, 17% as using the 
Box-Cox specification. Besides, using the Fourier Flexible form, no significant 
differences in inefficiency levels of banks in different sizes are found for the two panels. 
Using the translog and Box-Cox specifications, small banks (35% and 26.7%) are found 
to be more inefficient than large (30% and 21%) and medium sized (31% and 17%) 
banks, respectively. As for the US experience, the results show no significant differences 
between the results derived from the Fourier Flexible and translog functional form 
estimates across asset size categories. However, the Box-Cox specification suggests that 
large (18%) and small banks (19%) are more inefficient than medium sized banks (15%). 
5-3-2-2 Non-Parametric Approaches 
Various authors that have used the DEA methodology to examine efficiency in European 
banking. While earlier studies are reviewed in detail in Casu and Molyneux (2001), in 
this part of the section, we review the relatively recent studies, including Berg at at. 
(1993a, b), Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1997), Pastor, Perez and Quesada (1997), Dietsch 
and Weill (1998), Mauros and Pastor (1999), and Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan 
(2001). Table 5-2 annexed to this section presents other studies. 
Berg et al. (1993a, b) uses the DEA methodology to estimate a common pooled efficiency 
frontier and separate individual country frontiers for Scandinavian banking systems 
10 Under this approach, interests paid on deposits are counted as inputs, while the volume of deposits is 
considered to be output. Three outputs are considered by this study, deposits, loans and services, all expressed as 
Dollar amounts. The services variable is constructed as the total value of services income fee based, net revenues 
from security and currency trading). The three inputs used are the prices of labour, capital and deposits. 
131 Under this approach, deposits, loans and services are counted as outputs, whereas labour and capital are taken 
as inputs. 
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(Finland, Norway and Sweden). These two studies extend the sample used in an earlier 
study 132, to cover Finish and Swedish banks. The findings of the pooled common frontier 
estimations suggest that the average Swedish bank is more efficient than the average 
Norwegian bank, which, in turn, are more efficient than the average Finnish bank. Under 
variable returns to scale, the levels of efficiency are found to be 89%, 78%, and 58% 
(Berg et al., 1993a) and 78%, 57% and 53% (Berg et al., 1993b) for the Swedish, 
Norwegian and Finnish banks, respectively. Berg et al. (1993a) find that banks, which 
had efficiency scores over 90%, are mostly large Swedish banks and only one Finnish 
bank, but no large Norwegian banks. Similarly, using the same methodology, Berg, Bukh 
and Forsund (1995) extend the samples used in Berg et al. (1993a, b) to include Danish 
banks and find that the largest were the most efficient in the pooled sample. 
Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1997) employ the DEA approach to investigate Spanish 
commercial and savings banks efficiency over the period 1986-93. The findings of this 
study suggest average inefficiency of 6.5% for the savings banks and 4.3% for the 
commercial banks. Similarly, Lozano-Vivas (1997) uses the translog functional form 
based on the thick frontier approach to estimate alternative profit efficiency for a panel of 
54 Spanish savings banks for the period 1986-92. Lozano-Vivas (1997) finds that 28% of 
the difference in predicted profits between high and low profits banks are due to 
inefficiency. 
Pastor, Perez, Quesada (1997) investigate the level of productivity and efficiency in the 
Spanish banking system. This study applied the DEA methodology to a sample of a 427 
commercial banks from EU and US for the year 1992, to compare Spanish banking 
efficiency to European and US banking efficiency. Pastor, Perez, Quesada (1997) find 
that the banking industries in the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal (85%0, Spain (82%), 
Belgium (78%0, Denmark (71%), and Luxemburg (59%) are the most efficiency 
compared to those in the UK (56%), Germany (51%) and France (3 7%). 
Dietsch and Weill (1998) use the DEA approach to study the efficiency of a sample of 
661 commercial, mutual and savings banks from eleven EU countries for the period 
1992-1996. This study finds an increase in efficiency when measuring cost and profit 
132 This study was by Berg, Forsund and Jansan (1991) who examine only the Norwegian banking system 
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frontiers. However, an exception applies to France, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK as 
they witnessed decreasing cost efficiency measures over the study period. Productivity 
levels were found to have increased due to technological advances. This study concludes 
that European integration appeared to have small but positive effects on efficiency on the 
banking sector prior to 1996. 
Maudos and Pastor (1999) analyse the efficiency in costs and in profits of the Spanish 
banking sector spanning the period 1985-96 using the DEA approach.. Two outputs 
(profitable assets8 and securities portfolio) and three inputs (loanable funds, number of 
employees; and physical capital) are defined according to the intermediation approach. 
The results indicate, overall, higher efficiency levels for commercial banks (90.9%) and 
80.2% for savings banks. In addition, the results show higher standard profit efficiency 
levels for commercial banks (66.5%) than savings banks (47.2%). Similar to cost and 
profit efficiency levels, commercial banks also enjoy higher levels of alternative profit 
efficiency (52.9%) than savings banks (34.7%). Referring to the disparities in the found 
efficiency levels, Maudos and Pastor (1999) believe that higher costs incurred by 
products of higher quality are not offset by higher revenues (since profit efficiencies are 
lower than cost efficiencies) and that market power exists in the setting of prices in 
Spanish banking (since alternative profit inefficiency is higher than standard). Maudos 
and Pastor (1999) think that the full economic and monetary integration between EU 
countries, this will increase the pressure of competition, and consequently, reducing 
market power and obliging Spanish banking sector to reduce its levels of cost and profit 
inefficiency. 
Sheldon (1999) attempts to assess the possible impact of the Second Banking Directive 
that came into effect in 1993 on bank EU banks' efficiency. This Directive abolishes the 
requirement to obtain a license from the regulatory authorities in the guest country, and 
therefore permits banking institutions that are licensed in one EU country to operate in 
other member countries. Sheldon (1999) applies the DEA approach to unconsolidated 
dataset consisting of 1,783 commercial and savings banks in the EU, Norway, and 
Switzerland for the period 1993-97. This study finds that large banks, specialised banks, 
and retail banks are more cost efficient than small banks, diversified banks, and 
wholesale banks, respectively. Sheldon's (1999) average frontier efficiency was 
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relatively low, at approximately 45 % of total costs and 65 % of total profits. While 
banks in Denmark, France, Luxembourg, and Sweden are found to have the highest 
average efficiency, banks in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and UK are found to have the 
lowest average efficiency. In addition, Sheldon (1999) finds that estimates of economies 
of scale in costs and profits indicate that most banks in their sample were sub-optimal in 
size, with optimal scales in the range of US$ 0.5-1.5 billion. Decreasing cost and profit 
returns to scale are reported for most multi-billion dollar banks. Sheldon (1999) believes 
that these may lead them to conclude that inefficient operations, rather than unexploited 
economies of scale, explain cost and profit differences across European banking. Also 
this study concludes that since measured efficiency increases with size and decreases 
with scope, large and/or specialized banks would be at an advantage. 
Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan (2001) examine the impact of the unification of EU 
banking sectors due to the Second Banking Directive on bank's efficiency using the DEA 
approach. This study uses the 1993 data on 612 commercial banks from 10 EU countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and the United Kingdom). Using the value-added approach, loans, deposits and other 
earning assets are defined as outputs whereas labour and physical capital are accounted 
for as inputs. Four other environmental variables out of ten are selected and included in 
the analysis with the assumption of exerting potential impact upon bank efficiency. These 
variables reflect the main economic conditions (salary per capita and density for 
demand133), the accessibility of banking services for customers (income per branch) and 
regulatory and competitive conditions (equity over total assets). Using the basic DEA 
model, the overall efficiency measure is found to be 28.23%. The results show that 
Luxembourg and Belgium score the highest average basic efficiency estimates, 49.49% 
and 42.20%, respectively while Portugal and Spain obtain the lowest efficiency 
estimates, 15.19% and 18.9%, respectively. However, when environmental variables are 
accounted for, the new model yields an overall efficiency estimate of 62.14%. 
133 Density for demand is measured by the ratio of deposits per square kilometre, and is assumed by Lozano 
Vivas et al. (2001) to be a relevant feature in determining bank efficiency. Banks, which operate in markets with 
a lower density of demand, incur higher expenses and may cause to deter the potential of attainable efficiency 
level by banks and its branches. 
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Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium improve their average efficiency scores 
by around 12%. However, Denmark and Spain obtain an improvement of around 60% in 
their average efficiency scores. Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan (2001) note that by 
obtaining the coefficient of variation in the efficiency scores of the banks in our sample, 
the authors observe that the dispersion of efficiency across banks is 82.4% (49.8%) when 
the common frontier excludes (includes) environmental variables. This implies that, 
when including environmental variables, measured efficiency rises and efficiency 
differential across banks decreases. Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan (2001) conclude 
that environmental conditions are divisive in explaining banks' efficiency. They conclude 
that the EU market would increase cross-border competition and further adjustments are 
required about a much more competitive environment. 
Overall, parametric and non-parametric studies on EU banking systems investigate 
mainly the impact of the transformation of EU countries into a single market and 
consolidation, upon bank efficiency. Overall, these studies have utilised the cross-border 
comparison analysis and find levels of efficiency not significantly different from those 
found in the US. 
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NUMBERING 
AS ORIGINAL, 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
5-3-3 Efficiency Studies on Recently-Liberalised or 
Emerging Markets 
In their comprehensive international literature review on bank efficiency, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) highlight the fact that, out of nearly 130 efficiency analyses of 
financial institutions across twenty-three countries, only a small number have examined 
banking sectors in developing countries. The relatively scant literature on bank efficiency 
outside the US and Europe focuses on efficiency differences among banks with various 
ownership types and assets size. This may be due to the fact that the banking systems in 
developing countries are still in their infancy and markets are usually characterised by 
high state-ownership, newly privatised banks, and the recent entry of foreign banks. The 
policy issues often investigated in these studies address the questions regarding 
liberalisation measures including the effects of ownership, privatisation and entry 
deregulation on bank efficiency. We are aware that there is only one study that covers 
Maghreb countries, and this is by Cook, Hababou and Roberts (2001), who examine the 
Tunisian experience using the DEA approach. A summary of the cost and profit 
efficiency studies undertaken on banking sectors in transition economies are summarised 
in Table 5-3. 
5-3-3-1 Financial Liberalisation and Financial Repression 
Gruben and McComb (1997) state that developing countries have historically been more 
aggressive than industrialised countries in their detailed control of the banking system. 
Governments have imposed far higher requirements in order to control financial and 
other resources and their utilisation by the financial sector. Capital markets traditionally 
did not exist, and if did, they have (in general) not sufficiently developed to influence 
economic growth. 
Gemech and Struthers (2003) review the literature on financial repression/liberalisation 
starting from McKinnon (1993) and Shaw (1973), who introduced the Coinpleinentarity 
Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, artificial ceilings on interest rates would reduce 
savings and accumulation capital necessary for investments as well as allocate available 
financial resources inefficiently. Thus, the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis states that the 
190 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
removal of financial restrictions in "financially-repressed countries" is processed by the 
means of allowing markets forces to determine real interest rates to their market level. 
Besides, McKinnon (1973) indicates that financial repression may generate the dualism 
effect. That is, enterprises (usually government-owned firms) that benefit from subsidised 
financial resources stated in the central economic plans seem to tend to invest in 
relatively capital-intensive technologies, while enterprises that are not privileged by 
central planners (usually private-owned firms) seem to tend to invest in high-yielding 
projects with shorter maturity. 
Fry (1997) uses the term "financial repression" to express the situation where the market 
is not liberalised. According to Griffiths and Wall (1999), financial repression occurs 
when the real rate of interest is negative and below the equilibrium rate of interest. 
Griffiths and Wall (1999) argue that financial repression is incorporated in the Keynesian 
idea that investment is elastic with changes in interest rates. This relationship makes 
financial repression seem to stimulate investment and growth. However, advocates of 
financial liberalisation say that the availability of savings rather than the cost of 
borrowing effectively determines the level of investment Fry (1997) suggests that 
financial repression is damaging for the banking industry and from the perspective of 
economic growth. Financial repression consists of indiscriminate distortions of financial 
prices including interest and foreign exchange rates. The result of this type of financial 
policy is to reduce the real rate of growth and the real size of the financial system 
(McKinnon and Shaw, 1973). Most developing countries have operated for longer a 
substantial period under financial repression. Commercial banks, that typically dominate 
financial systems in these countries, they are, by consequence, most affected by financial 
repression. They typically allocate credits by considering non-economic criteria. Many 
factors may influence the lending decision, including political pressures, name of 
borrower, loan size and requirements to lend to priority sectors. 
Hao, Hunter and Yang (1999) and Gilbert and Wilson (1998) agree that even though 
financial repression enabled Korea to achieve high growth rates during the 1960s and 
1970s, it resulted in heavy costs to the banking industry. Overall, they state that the 
governmental interference had a negative effect on the productivity and development of 
the Korean banking sector. 
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Overall, financial liberalisation consists of four major measures: 1) liberalisation of 
interest and exchange rates, 2) promotion of market-based credit allocation, 3) the 
privatisation of government-owed banks, and 4) the relaxation of restriction on banks' 
portfolios. 
The most important measure on which the financial liberalisation programme is 
centralised is the liberalisation of interest rates. The advocates of this argue that 
liberalised interest rate would make them positive and this would stimulate savings. An 
increase in real interest rates has two main effects. First, it should raise savings and, 
hence, encourage investments and economic growth. Second, it would force investors to 
invest in projects that have a higher output-input ratio. That is, when investment is of 
higher productivity, the resulting gains in efficiency will lead to higher growth rates. 
The privatisation of state-owned banks is one important measure in financial 
liberalisation. As in the corporate sector, privatisation involves transferring the 
ownership or management of the bank from the hands of the state to national and foreign 
private agents. Gruben and McComb (1997), for instance, report that the Mexican 
government privatised its 18 banks between June 91 and July 92. The proceeds were used 
to pay down the public debt left over from the financial crisis of the 1980s, and led to an 
improved competitive environment Gorton (1992) notes that one implication of financial 
liberalisation is the appearance of new or newly-privatised banks. The creation of such 
banks leads to an increase in lending activity and more competition in the system. 
Gemech and Struthers (2003) present arguments that support financial repression and 
those that favour financial liberalisation. First, arguments praising the advantages of 
financial repression include Stiglitz (1994), who argues that financial repression can 
produce positive effects. By lowering the levels of interest rates, banks will have low- 
cost resources, and the rate of credits would accelerate if credits are allocated towards 
more profitable sectors such as export-oriented industries. In addition, Gemech and 
Struthers (2003) invoke the effects on the domestic financial sector. Capital account 
liberalisation would permit resident enterprises to be listed non-resident markets. This 
would tend to reduce liquidity in the domestic market, and consequently restrain its 
development. Gemech and Struthers (2003) refer to Diaz-Alejandro (1985) to claim that 
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financial liberalisation is adequately linked to macroeconomic instability. The 
liberalisation experiences of South American countries in the 1970s, often led to financial 
crises manifested by insolvencies and massive government interventions resulting in 
nationalising private institutions and low domestic savings. 
Second, Gemech and Struthers (2003) state that arguments favouring financial 
liberalisation indicate that financial deregulation measures tend to improve the 
functioning of the domestic financial systems, increase the accessibility to funds 
available on foreign markets, and allows cross-country risk diversification. Obstfeld 
(1998) indicates that international financial markets can facilitate the access to world 
savings to their most productive utilisation irrespective of geographical location. Stolz 
(1999) and Mishkin (2001) argue that financial liberalisation would promote 
transparency and accountability, reduce adverse selection and moral hazard, and alleviate 
liquidity problems in domestic financial markets. The entry of foreign banks into the 
domestic financial market helps facilitate access to new technology and reduce 
inefficiencies. 
Therefore, financial liberalisation consists of breaking down barriers that restrict the 
operations of a financial market or an economy. Liberalisation of the banking sector 
refers to a situation where entry and exit barriers to the banking industry are removed. 
Under this, banks have the liberty of fixing and adjusting charges for the services they 
render and the incentives they offer to their clients. The effect of such an approach is to 
enhance competition, improve efficiency in banking institutions, ameliorate the quality of 
financial services, increase financial depth and breadth as more banking firms would join 
the industry, widen the range of financial instruments, and lower costs of banking 
services. 
5-3-3-2 Bank Efficiency in Recently-Liberalised Financial 
Systems Derived from Parametric Approaches 
Parametric approaches, particularly the stochastic frontier method, have been widely 
used to investigate bank efficiency in emerging economies. 
Hasan and Marton (2000) introduce the experience of the Hungarian banking sector 
during the transitional period from a centralised economy to a market-oriented system. 
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During the 1990s, Hungary privatised its banking system and designed policies to 
promote foreign capital involvement in the domestic banking system. By 1998, all major 
banks were privatised and newly established banks grew rapidly. By then, Hungary 
became the first country in Eastern Europe to establish a fully privately owned banking 
sector that successfully overcame the constraints of problem loans, under-capitalisation 
and high concentration. Hasan and Marton (2000) investigate the effects of liberalisation 
measures on Hungarian banks, both domestic and foreign-owned institutions, over the 
transitional period 1993-1997. Using a sample of 145 bank observations over 1994 to 
1997, they employ the Fourier Flexible stochastic frontier approach to estimate alterative 
profit and cost efficiency scores for their sample of banks operating in Hungary. Three 
output variables (total loans, total investment, and total borrowed funds) and inputs (price 
of labour and price of borrowed funds) are identified. The results indicate that, overall, 
average cost efficiency is 21.62% and alternative profit efficiency is 29.08%. The results 
also indicate that domestic-owned banks are more cost (24.84%) and alternative profit 
(29.93%) inefficient than their foreign counterparts, 20.96% and 25.24%, respectively. 
Banks with higher involvement of foreign capital tend to have lower levels of 
inefficiency. Hasan and Marton (2000) conclude that the privatisation of state-owned 
banks and an increase in foreign ownership in banking institutions are associated with 
improved efficiency, particularly, profit efficiency. 
Mertens and Urga (2001) investigate cost and profit efficiency in the Ukrainian banking 
system for the year 1998, using two parametric approaches, SFA and TFA. The sample 
of this study includes data on 79 commercial banks that account for three quarters of total 
assets of the Ukrainian banking system in 1998. Mertens and Urga (2001) use three 
outputs (inter-bank loans, clients loans, Investment in securities and other investments), 
two inputs (labour and deposits), and two netputs (bank's capital and share of non- 
performing loans in total loans). The results show cost efficiency of 67.2% and 80.5% 
using the SFA and TFA, respectively. The results also show that profit efficiency of 
71.66% and 65.77% using the SFA and TFA, respectively. In terms of cost efficiencies, 
small banks (68.6%, SFA, and 81.6%, TFA) are more cost efficient than large and 
medium-sized banks (63.1%, SFA, and 77.5%, TFA). In terms of profit efficiencies, 
large and medium-sized banks (73.15%, SFA, and 67.19%, TFA) are more profit 
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efficient than small banks (71.54%, SFA, and 65.22%, TFA). These results imply that 
small banks operate efficiently in cost terms but are less efficient in profit terms. The 
results also indicate that large banks show significant diseconomies of scale while small 
banks show significant scale economies. 
Weill (2001) analyses differences in the cost efficiency between domestic and foreign 
owned banks in the Czech Republic and Polish banking systems, using a number of bank 
characteristics in the comparative analysis including the degree of risk preferences, size 
and structural of activities of every bank. The sample of this study comprises 31 Polish 
(19 domestically-owned and 12 foreign-owned) and 16 Czech banks (8 domestically- 
owned and 8 foreign-owned) for the year 1997. This study employs the stochastic 
translog cost functional form and the intermediation approach in which outputs are loans 
and investments, and inputs are labour, physical capital and borrowed funds. The model 
also includes the level of capital proxied by equity in order to control for the difference in 
risk. The results suggest that foreign banks have better management reflected by higher 
mean efficiency level than domestically owned banks. Foreign banks tend to benefit from 
higher levels of allocative efficiency in output, suggesting that their choice of output and 
pricing is more optimal. However, Weill (2001) states that the differences in inefficiency 
between banks in these two countries cannot be only explained by ownership. 
Management of domestically owned banks tend to have the advantage of having better 
knowledge of the local market than foreign-owned managers who may have poor 
information on local borrowers, resulting in adverse selection for foreign-owned banks. 
Weill (2001) concludes that foreign-owned banks appear to be more exposed to moral 
hazard problems in countries in transition due to the uncertainty of accounting 
information, which leads to mis-evaluation of collateral and equity. 
Williams and Intarachote (2001) attempt to establish whether financial liberalisation 
policies, which are designed to increase the competitiveness of the banking system, 
would improve the profit efficiency of Thai banks. Williams and Intarachote (2001) 
argue that financial deregulation affects cost and revenues efficiencies in three ways. 
First, the restructuring of the financial sector is expected to realise economies of scale. 
Second, inefficiencies are postulated to fall as banks move closer to the best practice. 
Finally, abnormal bank profits often associated with financial repression and oligopolistic 
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behaviour are expected to erode. The alternative profit approach based on the stochastic 
frontier is applied using panel data to determine whether efficiency is increasing, 
decreasing or constant. The sample used includes 29 banks operating in Thailand 
between 1990 and 1997, of which 15 banks are domestically owned and 14 banks are 
foreign-owned. Using the global advantage hypothesis, Williams and Intarachote (2001) 
pre-suggest that foreign -owned banks outperform domestic banks in developing 
countries. The presence of supposedly more efficient foreign-owned banks is expected to 
raise domestic banks' efficiency, which explains why financial deregulation programmes 
specify reducing entry barriers for foreign capital. The results of this study indicate that, 
on average, between 1990 and 1997, domestic owned and foreign-owned Thai banks lost 
15.14% and 14.74%, respectively, due to inefficiencies. Particularly, the most efficient 
banks operating in Thailand seem to be Japanese capital-owned. The two smaller assets 
size classes of Thai banks lost a smaller proportion of potential profits to inefficiencies 
than the two larger assets size classes. Williams and Intarachote (2001) conclude that the 
deregulation-induced expansion of banking activities ultimately did not decrease the 
financial fragility of Thai banks. 
Kasman (2002) uses a Fourier-flexible cost function specification to investigate cost 
efficiency, scale economies, and technological progress in the Turkish banking system 
over the deregulated period 1988-98. Similar to Zaim (1995), this study attempts to 
investigate the impact of financial liberalisation measures, including the lifting of entry 
constraints foreign banks. Consistent with the intermediation model, three outputs (short- 
term loans, long-term and specialised loans, and securities), three inputs (borrowed 
funds, labour and capital), one control variable (Number of branches), and two 
environmental variables (the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; and the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets) are defined. Kasman (2002) finds average cost inefficiency of 
23.6%, and efficiency of the banks improved over the sample period. Kasman (2002) 
believes that the fall in average inefficiency over time was due to the deregulation even 
though the Turkish banking sector remains relatively more inefficient than its US and 
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European counterparts134. In addition, Kasman (2002) finds evidence of significant 
economies scale over the sample period. The average scale economies are found to be 
74.3%. The results also suggest that scale inefficiencies dominate X-inefficiencies. No 
clear relationship between size and cost inefficiency is found. Medium-sizes banks, with 
assets within the range US$400-600 million, and the largest banks (with assets in excess 
of US$ 2 billion) are the most efficient. The less efficient banks are both large banks and 
small banks. The results of Kasman (2002) also suggest the existence of significant 
economies of scale for all classes. In contrast to the findings of the other empirical 
studies where larger banks were usually seen to be facing scale diseconomies or 
decreasing scale economies (e. g. Berger et at., 1987), this study finds evidence of scale 
economies for each bank size class. The magnitude of scale economies ranges from 
41.2% for the very smallest banks to 12.2% for largest banks. 
Kasman (2002) argues that the presence of significant economies of scale for small and 
medium-sized banks should motivate these banks to react to this opportunity and move 
rightward on their average cost curve, either by increasing output levels or by merging 
with other banks. The Turkish banking sector has not witnessed any merger activity 
among private banks in its recent history, but because of significant economies scale in 
the industry, more merger activity between small and medium-sized banks should (he 
argues) be encouraged. That is, an increase in size would realize some cost advantages 
for all banks, especially small and medium-sized ones. 
Kraft, Hofler, and Payne (2002) examine the effects of bank privatisation and foreign 
capital entry on bank efficiency in Croatia, over the period 1994-2000. They estimate a 
Flexible-Fourier stochastic cost frontier model with a truncated normal distribution on 
the inefficiency term. The results suggest that new private and privatised banks are not 
the most efficient through most of the period. Privatisation is found not to have 
immediate effects on improved efficiency. Foreign-owned banks, however, have 
substantially better efficiency scores than their domestic counterparts. Kraft, Hofler and 
Payne (2002) conclude that, from a policy point view, liberalisation in the form of 
"' Berger et al. (1993) found that the X-inefficiency for the U. S. depository institutions is approximately 20% of 
costs; whereas Allen and Rai (1996) report that the average cost inefficiency for the European countries is 
approximately 15 % of cost. 
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privatisation and opening the local banking market to foreign-capital 
is not necessarily a 
productive measure. 
Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2003) use data from 1996 to 2000 and an unbalanced panel 
consisting of 220 banks covering 830 observations to investigate the effects of 
foreign 
ownership on banking sector cost and profit efficiency across eleven transition 
countries135. Foreign participation in domestic banking institutions in these eleven 
transition countries has increased dramatically in the second half of the 1990s. Bonin, 
Hasan and Wachtel (2003) suggest that foreign bank entry has generated more efficient 
and more competitive banking sectors. The stochastic translog frontier approach is used 
in this study with four output variables (total deposits, total loans, total liquid assets and 
investments other than loans and liquid assets) and two input prices (the price of capital 
and the price of funds). Overall, the results indicate that banking sectors in these 
countries became more efficient and more competitive toward the end of the 1990s. The 
mean cost and alterative profit efficiencies are found to vary within the range 23.21- 
94.99% and 88.22-90.14%, respectively. Larger banks in these transition countries are 
found to be unambiguously less efficient. The largest banks in many of these countries 
are specialised government banks ongoing from the previous state-owned period. 
Government-owned banks are found to be less efficient than their private counterparts. 
Majority foreign-owned banks are found to more efficient than their private domestic 
counterparts. Particularly, banks with international institutional capital have higher 
returns on assets and are more efficient by profit measures than other foreign-owned 
banks. However, these banks are found to not exhibit significantly better cost efficiency 
than their counterparts. Hence, it can be concluded that international institutional 
investors are more interested in banks with high financial performance than in facilitating 
the transfer of new technology and modem banking practices. 
Green, Murinde and Nikolov (2003) investigate whether foreign-owned banks are more 
efficient than domestic banks in Central and Eastern Europe. Their study applies the 
translog stochastic frontier to panel data of 273 foreign and domestic banks located in 
"' These countries are four northern European countries, the Czech Republic, I iungary, Poland, and Slovakia; 
four southern European countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia, and the three Baltic countries, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
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Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania over the period 1995-99. While labour, deposits and capital are used as inputs, 
loans, other earning assets and non-interest income are employed as outputs. One finding 
of this study is that, with the exception of the Czech Republic and on average, banks in 
Central and Eastern Europe have exhibited small or negligible economies of scale and are 
effectively operating at or close to scale-efficient levels. In addition, Green, Murinde and 
Nikolov (2003) find that the mean efficiency of foreign banks does not appear to be 
significantly different from the mean efficiency of domestic banks in the sample 
economies. They conclude that there is no string evidence to sustain the argument that 
foreign ownership of banks is a vital factor in improving banks efficiency, and thus the 
positive effects of liberalisation bank efficiency can be questionable. 
Huang and Wang (2003) who investigate bank efficiency in Taiwan by applying the 
Fourier Flexible functional form over the period 1981-97. This study uses 22 domestic 
backs of whom 11 banks are private-owned. The results of this study suggest that cost 
savings can arise from optimising the inputs mix more than from improving technology 
used and managerial performance. Overall, technical inefficiency was 12% of total costs 
whereas allocative inefficiency was bout 15.8%, which tends to decrease over time due to 
the effects of liberalisation. 
5-3-3-3 Bank Efficiency in Recently-Liberalised Financial 
Systems Derived from Non-Parametric Approaches 
Data envelopment analysis, DEA, has also been extensively used in studies investigating 
bank efficiency in recently liberalised economies. 
Zaim (1995) investigates the effects of liberalisation policies implemented over the 
period 1981-90, on Turkish commercial banks' cost efficiency. The investigated dataset 
represent only two years, 1981 and 1991, to differentiate between the pre- and post- 
liberalisation periods and compares efficiency scores of different bank ownership types 
over the period. In the 1980s, Turkey implemented various deregulation measures in the 
financial sector including interest rate, credit and entry liberalisation. Zaim (1995) uses 
DEA and the intermediation definitions of inputs and outputs to examine banking sector 
efficiency over the selected years. This study finds that technical efficiency increased by 
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an average of 10% between 1981 and 1990. Pure technical inefficiency is found to be the 
major source of most of Turkish banks' efficiency as they were operating at the constant 
returns to scale area in both the pre-and post-liberalisation periods. In addition, privately 
owned banks are found to be the most effficient. Government-owned banks were found to 
be adversely affected by allocative inefficiency, which resulted in closing and/or the 
reduction of staff of unprofitable branches. Zaim (1995) concludes that while 
liberalisation measures had a severe impact on unprofitable banks and branches (that 
were forced to exit the market), they succeeded in stimulating commercial banks to take 
measures that would enhance both technical and allocative efficiency. 
Isik and Hasan (1998) investigate the impact of structure, control and governance on the 
cost of efficiency of Turkish commercial banks. This investigation employs the DEA 
approach at three separate points in time; 1988,1992 and 1996, in order too account for 
the changes in the macro-economy and regulatory environment. The intermediation 
approach is used to define four output variables (short-term loans, long-term loans, off- 
balance sheet items and other earning assets) and three input variables (labour, capital 
and purchased funds). The study estimates the average efficiency score for the sample 
over the three investigated years at 72%. Average efficiency scores are found to have 
consistently fallen over time, from 78% in 1988, to 71% in 1990 and to 68% in 1996. 
Technical inefficiencies are found to be the dominant source of cost inefficiency in 
Turkish commercial banking (rather than allocative inefficiencies). Also, assets size is 
not found to be significantly correlated with efficiency, implying that banks of different 
sizes might be equally efficient. However, being a large bank in Turkey is strongly 
positively associated with levels of pure technical efficiency and negatively related to 
scale efficiency. In addition, Isik and Hasan (1998) find that chief executive officers of 
efficient banks tend not to be chairman of the board. This implies that the banks that 
separate decision management (the CEO) from decision control (the Chairman) would 
have higher levels of efficiency. Overall, this study finds that privately owned banks 
tends to be the most efficient firm in the Turkish banking system. 
Similarly, Jackson, Fethi and Inal (1998) apply the DEA methodology to examine the 
productivity growth performance of thirty-eight Turkish commercial banks over the post- 
liberalisation period 1992-96. Using the Value-added approach, they construct a model 
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that defines two inputs (Number of employees, and the sum of non-labour operating costs 
and direct expenses on buildings and amortisation expenses) and three outputs (loans, 
demand deposits, and time deposits). This study finds that Turkish commercial banking 
experienced a productivity growth over the period of study with the exception of 1993 
and 1994, when economic growth contacted in Turkey. Among the three types of 
ownership, private ands foreign banks showed greater productivity compared to the state- 
owned banks. Sumerbank, which was privatised in 1995, experienced enormous 
productivity growth in the post-liberalisation period. Jackson, Fethi and Inal (1998) 
conclude that the productivity growth of both private and state-owned banks were due to 
technological advancements that is, the outcome of competition which rose in the post- 
liberalisation period. 
Cook, Hababou and Roberts (2001) investigate the impact of financial liberalisation on 
bank efficiency in Tunisia. The sample of their study includes ten banks operating in 
Tunisia between 1992 and 1998, of which five banks are government-owned and the 
remaining are domestic or foreign private owned. Using the DEA approach, the 
investigation adopts the intermediation approach, in which the specified inputs are 
interest expenses and non-interest expenses (as proxies for funding costs and operating 
costs, respectively. This study estimates the level of average inefficiency at 45%. 
Government-owned banks (55%) are found to be more inefficient than private banks 
(36%). Inefficiency is found to be associated with the importance of non-performing 
loans, as troubled banks have inefficiency scores averaging at 52% compared to less 
troubled banks' inefficiency of 40%. Also, this study finds that inefficiency arises with 
size implying that the larger the bank the more inefficient it is. The small, medium-sized, 
and large banks have average inefficiency estimates of 20%, 42% and 68%, respectively. 
The authors conclude that efficient banks in Tunisia tend to have private ownership, 
carry fewer problem loans, record higher foreign equity participation, and are generally 
smaller. Financial reforms, however, have been less successful in closing the inefficiency 
gap between public, domestically owned private, and foreign owned banks. 
Burki and Niazi (2003) investigate the impact of liberalisation reform policies, including 
privatisation, entry access to foreign and private capital and central bank autonomy, upon 
the banking sector in Pakistan over the 1990s. They apply the DEA approach to a sample 
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of 366 observations of nearly all commercial banks (divided into state-owned, private 
and foreign banks) operated within the period 1991-2000. Based on the intermediation 
approach, three outputs are defined (i- loans and advances, ii- investments, and iii- contra 
accounts) and four inputs are identified (i- labour, ii- physical capital, iii- operating cost, 
and iv- financial capital). Burki, and Niazi (2003) find mean cost efficiency over the 
entire period to be 74.5%, which varied from the highest efficiency of 92.3% in 1991 to 
lowest efficiency of 46.4% in 1996. Overall, allocative efficiency (83.6%) is found to be 
contributing more to cost inefficiency than technical efficiency (88.2%). Moreover, Burki 
and Niazi (2003) find foreign-owned banks (79.7%) to be more efficient than private 
banks (75.1%) while least cost efficiency was achieved by state-owned banks (60.5%). In 
addition, Burki and Niazi (2003) found that individual reforms promoting competition 
has not led to an improvement in average efficiency of banks in the post-reform period as 
hypothetically expected. The complete liberalisation of the banking sector, also led to a 
significant decline in all the efficiency measures. Burki and Niazi (2003) explain that the 
adverse impact of liberalisation reform policies on banking efficiency could be due to the 
unfavourable macroeconomic performance of the Pakistani economy during most of 
1990s. The lower GDP growth rates in 1990s affected certain sectors in which banking 
sector loans and investments were concentrated. Lower growth rates have generated 
problems associated with weak debt servicing of borrowers, and thus increasing loan 
defaults and credit risks. Therefore, in Pakistan, the poor economic growth recorded in 
1990s led loan default rates to grow tremendously during the period. Burki and Niazi 
(2003) hypothesise that individual policy reforms would generate better results if 
economic growth environment is also conducive. 
Stavärek (2003) estimates commercial banks' efficiency in the Visegrad136 countries 
before joining the EU using the DEA approach. Stavärek (2003) attempts to identify 
which of the banking sectors in the respective countries is the most efficient and whether 
there has been an improvement in banking efficiency spanning the period 1999-2002. 
Since 1990, the four countries have witnessed liberalisation reforms in order to create 
136 This group includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and is called according to the Hungarian 
town of Visegrad, where the agreement of cooperation were signed by presidents of former Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Hungary on 15 February 1991. 
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market-driven banking sectors. Reforms include mainly relaxing restraints on private and 
foreign banks, ownership restructuring and recapitalisation, as well as management of 
nonperforming loans. The dataset of this study contains 59 banks in 1999,72 
banks in 
2000,70 banks in 2001, and 62 banks in 2002. Three inputs (labour, capital, and 
deposits), and two outputs (loans and net interest income) are employed. The results 
indicate average efficiency levels for the four countries to be 90% using the VRS 
approach. The Czech and Hungarian banking sectors are found, on average, to be the 
most efficient followed by the Polish banking sector, while the Slovak banking is 
evaluated as the least efficient. One finding of this study was the substantial increase of 
the Hungarian sector's average efficiency that may be explained by positive effects of 
relatively fast and successfully performed restructuring and privatization of the largest 
banks and banking system as a whole. To further investigate the determinants of 
efficiency of financial intermediation in Visegrad's countries banking sectors, Stavärek 
(2003) follow a two-stage approach with a Tobit regression, in which DEA efficiency 
scores are used as the dependent variable, whereas the independent environmental 
variables are related to geographic location (country dummy variables) and bank 
profitability (return on average equity), bank structure and size (equity on total assets and 
total assets) and bank ownership (dummy variable indicating type of ownership). 
Stavärek (2003) finds evidence of statistically significant factors of profitability, foreign 
ownership, and (to a certain extent) the size of a bank influences banks efficiency in the 
Visegrad countries. 
Thus, bank efficiency studies in recently-liberalised economies have concentrated on 
investigating the effects of the liberalisation and deregulation reform policies on the 
efficiency of the respective banking sectors. Particular reform policies include 
privatisation and the abolishment of entry barriers by allowing private and foreign banks 
to operate locally. For instance, while some of the studies find that allowing foreign- 
owned banks to enter the banking sector have improved the efficiency of banks, others 
find adverse effects. These conflicting findings are explained by Berger at al. (2000) 
according to two hypotheses. While the home field advantage hypothesis states that 
domestic-owned banks are more cognisant of needs of domestic banking markets, which 
increase their ability relative to the foreign-owned banks' ability, the global advantage 
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hypothesis states that foreign-owned banks are in more appropriate position of scoring 
higher levels of efficiency due to their relative technological advances and management 
superiority. 
A summary of both parametric and non-parametric studies of bank efficiency in 
developing and emerging economies are shown in Table 5-3 
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5-4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a literature review of a number of bank efficiency studies, 
including those that examine scale, scope and X-efficiency. These studies employ distinct 
methods for the estimation of cost and profit efficiency and its determinants as well as 
economies of scale and scope. Two major families of approaches have been extensively 
used; the parametric and non-parametric approaches. Overall, studies of efficiency on 
banking systems conclude that scale economies are significantly outsized by X- 
efficiency, and banks can realise savings through improving their X-efficiency more than 
through scale economies. 
The popular empirical literature that focuses on the US (Berger et at., 1993; Clark, 1996; 
Clark and Speaker, 1994; Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991; Gilbert, 1984; Humphrey, 1990; 
Mester, 1987; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996) generally shows that overall the average cost 
curve is relatively flat with some evidence of scale efficiency gains for small banks. 
Studies on scope economies are still more controversial with little consensus as to the 
existence and the extent of product mix efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1991 and 
1994). Bank efficiency studies in Europe provide more evidence that the average cost 
curve tends to be U-shaped and that scope economies exist. Overall, as concluded by 
Berger et al (1993) find that X-inefficiencies count for 20% of costs in banking whereas 
scale elasticities and scope economies count for 5%. 
Studies on efficiency in European banking systems have not arrived at different findings 
from those studies on the US banking system. They focused on investigating the 
relationship between efficiency and issues such as consolidation and allowing banks to 
operate in all countries in the EU. Bank efficiency studies in other economies investigate 
the effects of liberalisation reforms on bank efficiency. Conflicting results are found. 
Reform measures can improve bank efficiency, but equally they can reduce bank 
efficiency. Studies on liberalising financial systems do, however, appear, to show that 
private domestic and foreign banks, are more efficient that their state-owned 
counterparts. Foreign-owned banks and banks with foreign participation are also often 
found to be more efficient. 
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Chapter 6 Methodology, 
Definition and Results 
Data, Variables 
6-1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the cost and alterative profit efficiency of a sample of fifty 
financial institutions in the three North African countries of Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia over the time period 1994 to 2001. As noted in earlier chapters, this period 
witnessed a number of economic, financial and political events including the 
implementation of a number of economic and financial liberalisation measures. Two 
major liberalisation measures relate to the dismantling of restrictions on private and 
foreign capital access into the national banking industries through either direct 
investment or privatisation, and the deregulation of all price control including interest 
rates. Grigorian and Manole (2002) state that liberalisation measures incorporating legal 
and regulatory reforms, enterprise privatisation and prices deregulation are most 
responsible for improving the quality of services and financial soundness of banking 
institutions in transition countries. Within this configuration, one would therefore expect 
that financial liberalisation and possibly other potential factors would yield an important 
impact on the cost and profit efficiency of banks in the transition countries under study. 
This chapter attempts to explore empirically the conditions that are likely to be associated 
with cost and profit efficiency in Maghreb banking137. That is, a relationship may exist 
between the cost and profit efficiency levels of banking firms and a number of potential 
firm-specific and environmental variables. In particular, the extant literature, including 
Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2003), suggests that in the case of transition economies, a 
number of potential efficiency determinants are likely to exist and these are related to 
such factors as managerial competence, financial liberalisation and the degree of 
effectiveness of governmental and regulatory policies. 
137 This study takes a similar approach to Casu and Girardone (2003) who examine cost and (alternative) profit 
efficiency of large banking forms by defining a common EU frontier over the period immediately following the 
completion of the EU's Single Market Programme in 1992. More specifically, this paper employs parametric 
(Stochastic Frontier Approach, SFA) and non-parametric (Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA) methodologies. 
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This study uses a sample that comprises fifty banking firms that were functioning in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, consisting of a total of 281 observations over the time 
period 1994-2001. In terms of assets, the sample represents an estimated 70% of total 
banking sector's assets, and 90%, 85% and 80% of total banking assets in the three 
countries, respectively. The sample excludes the central banks and a number of other 
banks, including a number of offshore and specialised banks, due mainly to the 
unavailability of information. Using the intermediation approach, the stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA) with the translog specification and the Data Envelopment Analysis 
technique (DEA) will be applied to the sample to estimate cost, scale, and alternative 
profit bank efficiency scores as well as scale economies for the banking institutions in the 
respective countries. Besides, this chapter outlines the methodology used to estimate 
efficiency scores based on the frontier approaches suggested by Coelli (1996, a and b). 
The chapter explains the characteristics of the stochastic frontier and the DEA methods 
and the translog functional form, the calculation of efficiencies and scale economies. In 
the data section, the chapter examines the properties of the sample, including the 
descriptive statistics and the variables used to estimate banking sector efficiency. The 
final part of the chapter reports our results. 
6-2 Methodology 
As noted above, this thesis uses the parametric (and nonparametric) methods to estimate 
the "best practice cost and alternative profit frontier" for a sample of Maghreb banking 
institutions. These methods are the stochastic frontier approach with a translog function 
specification and DEA, respectively. The main methodological focus is on the translog 
stochastic frontier approach in both cost and profit efficiency estimation, while DEA 
estimates are used as a comparative benchmark to cross check results derived from the 
translog frontier approach results and to ensure that consistency conditions are met13s 
6-2-1 The Stochastic Translog Frontier Functional Form 
The estimation of cost and profit efficiency scores is based on the assumed existence of a 
relationship between measures of costs, total costs (TC), or total profits (TP), input prices 
"s The DEA approach taken is the VRS version. 
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(P) and output quantities (Q). Mathematically, this relationship is presented in a form of 
a cost or profit function. For instance, the cost function presented as TC = TC (Q, P) 
displays the relationship between production costs and the prices of variable inputs. 
The cost and alternative profit functions are specified as translog functions, that is, as 
mentioned in earlier chapters, more flexible than other specifications such as the Cobb- 
Douglas (see Berger and Humphrey, 1994). The thesis pools the banks in the sample into 
one model to take into account the differences in efficiency estimates at the national 
levels by including a set of country variable dummies as undertaken by Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas (2000). 
6-2-1-1 The General Form of the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
In this thesis, the stochastic cost and profit frontier model to be estimated for a sample of 
N banking firms can be given as 
LnTC, =f (Q,, P; , 
ßi, Z, )+( v, + µ; ); for the Cost function (6.1) 
LnTP, =f (Q;, P;, (ii, Zj) + (vi - µ, ); for the Alternative profit function (6.2) 
i=1,2,3,... 
.......................... N; 
Where TCf is observed total costs of bank i, TPi is observed total profits of bank i, Qi is 
the vector of output levels and Pr the vector of input prices for bank i, ß, represents a sect 
of estimated coefficients, and Z, represents a vector of environmental variables139. While 
Jo is a functional form in which 1nTC function is the predicted log cost function of a 
cost-minimising bank functioning at conditions of (Q,, P,, B, ), the InTPr function is the 
predicted log total profits function of a profit-maximising bank functioning at same 
conditions of (Q;, P;, B; ). v, and µ, both represent a two-component error term, c. While v, 
is a two-sided error term representing statistical noise (assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed and have a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance a'), µ, is 
non-negative random variables that account for technical inefficiency effects. 
The calculation of cost and profit efficiency scores using the stochastic model is based on 
the assertion that total costs or return on equity for a bank i will deviate from the cost or 
"' Environmental Variables are other variables that are nor included within the input and output variables. 
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profit efficient frontier due to the effects of the two-component error term, v, (random 
noise) and µ; (inefficiency effects). 
6-2-1-2 The Specification of the Translog Stochastic Frontier 
Approach 
In our analysis, we adopt the Translog functional form instead of the Fourier-Flexible 
functional form as suggested by McAllister and McManus (1993). While the Fourier 
Flexible form is a preferred specification it requires large amounts of data observations, 
and this requirement is impractible for our analysis, as the number of banks (50) and 
observations (257) is not sufficiently large. 
Thus, the functional form used to estimate cost and alternative profit efficiency scores 
and scale economies is specified as the translog form. The translog functional form for 
the cost and alternative profit efficiency frontiers is specified as: 
For the cost function: 
Ln (TC/Ps)=a+Ea1nQ+Zßln(P, /P) ZZ$1nQlng+ýý"y, ýln(P, /P)ln(P, /R) + 
r1 H J= iý r-1 
n 
rln(P, /P) +w; Z+vr+j. 
ýý i 
(6.3) 
For the alternative profit function: 
Ln (TP/A)=a+Ea1nQ+Zßln(P, /P)+1 [I: $1nQlrQ+EY-"y,, ln(RIP)ln(P, /P) + 
n 
jpylnQln(P, /P) +w; Z+v, -µ 
tý j=1 
(6.4) 
Where InTC is the natural logarithm of total bank production costs (operating and 
financial costs); 1nTP is the natural logarithm of total actual profits, InQ1 is the natural 
logarithm of bank outputs (i. e. loans, securities, off-balance sheet items), In P, is the 
natural logarithm of ith input prices (wage rate, interest rate and physical capital price); 
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Z; represents a vector of environmental variables, v; and pi is a two-components error 
term representing noise and inefficiency effects, and a, ß, 5, y, p and W are coefficients 
to be estimated. 
Since the duality theorem requires that the cost function be linearly homogeneous in 
input prices and continuity requires that the second order parameters are symmetric, the 
following restrictions apply to the factor prices of the cost and alternative profit functions 
3nn 
in the two above equations: .=1;; = 0; ptj =0 for all j. Moreover, the 
second order parameters of the cost and alternative profit efficiency functions must be 
symmetric, that is, Sii = 8;; and ij = yr for all i and j. 
We use the computer program FRONTIER Version 4.1 c (see Coelli 1996a) to estimate 
the maximum-likelihood estimates for the parameters in the Translog stochastic frontier. 
According to Coelli (1996a), the FRONTIER Version 4.1 can provide maximum 
likelihood estimates of the parameters of stochastic cost functions. This version can 
accommodate unbalance panel data and considers a number of variables that are directly 
correlated with the model. It can also accommodate panel data, time-varying and 
invariant efficiencies, cost and production functions, half-normal and truncated normal 
distributions, and functional forms which have a dependent variable logged or original 
un itS140. 
The Coelli (1996a) computer programme follows a three-step procedure in the process of 
estimating the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the stochastic frontier 
cost function 141 First, the programme obtains the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates of the function. Coelli (1996) states that the OLS estimates are unbiased due to 
the non-zero expectation of u1 . 
Second, the programme conducts a two-phase grid 
search across the parameter space of -y, which range from 0.1 to 0.9. That is, it is to 
evaluate the log-likelihood function for a number of values of y between zero and one. 
During this procedure, d; are set to zero and the values of Bo and a2 are adjusted 
10 However, FRONTIER Version 4.1 c cannot estimate efficiency assuming exponential or gamma distributions. 
'al The nature of the log-likelihood function of the model given the distributional assumptions on µ and v 
can be found in Battese and Coelli (1993) and Coclli, Prasada Rao and Battese (1998). 
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according to the corrected OLS formula for the half-normal model. Third, the estimates 
of the largest log-likelihood value in this later step are used in the last step as starting 
values in the iterative maximisation procedure in the estimation process. 
6-2-1-3 The Calculation of Efficiency Estimates using the 
Translog Stochastic Frontier Approach 
As seen in earlier chapters, cost or profit efficiency is measured as the distance between a 
firm and the best practice firms using the translog stochastic model for our sample. 
Therefore, the calculation of a bank's X-efficiency is equivalent to the ratio of the 
predicted cost or profit of the most efficient best practice bank to the predicted cost of 
profit of that bank. The prediction of individual firm cost or profit efficiencies are 
estimated using stochastic frontiers. For the stochastic cost frontier, the measures of cost 
efficiency relative to the cost frontier are defined as: 
Efficiency estimate (-µ; ); E(Yj*tU;, X; ) I E(Y1* U', =O, X; ), (6.5) 
Where 
*Y; is the cost of the i-th firm, which will be equal to Y; when the dependent variable is 
in original units and will be equal to exp (Y; ) when the dependent variable is in logs. The 
cost or profit EFF is defined as exp (-gi). If the above measure, cost or profit EFF, was 
found to be 0.70 for a banking firm, it implies that this firm is seventy percent efficient. 
Consistently, it also implies that a banking firm employs thirty percent extra cost or 
resources (or earns thirty percent less profits) relative to the best practice firm under the 
same environmental conditions to produce the same quantities of output vector. 
According to Resti (1997), the above measure incorporates a relationship between the 
minimum and the actual cost of banking firm i. While the nominator indicates the 
estimate of cost or profit required to produce a banking firm i's of output vector if the 
banking form were as efficient as the most efficient best practice banking firm in the 
population, the denominator of the same measure defines the actual cost or profit of 
banking firm i, adjusted for random error 
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6-2-2 The Calculation of Scale economies or elasticities 
using the Translog Cost Stochastic Frontier 
Approach 
Scale elasticities or economies are calculated to estimate whether the sample of banks 
under study are enjoying scale economies, and thus uncovering the effects of size on cost 
efficiency. Scale economies are usually referred to as a measure of the potential 
beneficial effects when two forms or more are considering a consolidation project. Ester 
(1996) indicates that scale elasticity is the proportioned increase in cost due to a small 
proportional increase in outputs. Following Mester (1996), within sample scale 
elasticities are estimated according to the following formula (the first differential of the 
cost function with respect to output); 
3 ainTC SE=ý 
i=1 
ö In Q, (6.6) 
By applying this formula to our translog stochastic cost frontier model, the above 
measure can be expressed as 
mmnmn 
SE= I: a, » 1nQ + pi ln(P, I P3) (6.7) 
t=1 t=1 J=1 t=1 J=1 
If the calculated SE is less than 1 then increasing returns to scale, implying economies of 
scale. On the other hand, if SE =1 then constant returns to scale and if SE <I then 
decreasing returns to scale, implying diseconomies of scale. 
6-2-3 The Calculation of Scale Efficiencies using the 
Translog Stochastic Frontier Approach 
Evanoff and Israilevich (1995) note that comparing scale economies (scale elasticities) 
with x-inefficiencies are misleading as the former is an elasticity and the latter is a 
relative efficiency measure. Thus, Evanoff and Israilevich (1995) suggest that one should 
calculate scale inefficiencies for accurate comparisons. 
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The scale elasticity measure, SE = älnTGälnQ, is an elasticity associated with a 
particular output level and indicates the relative change in cost associated with an 
increment change from this output level. Scale inefficiency (SI), on other hand, can be 
measured as the aggregate cost of N inefficient firms (c # 1.0) relative to the cost of a 
single efficient firm (c = 1.0); that is I= [N * CI / CE ]-1.0, where CI and CE are the 
cost of production at the inefficient and efficient firms, respectively. 
Therefore, the two concepts differ because elasticity is related to incremental changes in 
output, and inefficiency related to the change in output required to produce at the 
minimum efficient scale. The inefficiency measure is typically associated with 
significantly larger output changes as it measures the difference in total or average cost at 
distinct output levels. Furthermore, the cost savings realised by an incremental increase 
in output by a scale inefficient firm is irrelevant for measuring inefficiency since this is 
not the savings realised by producing at the efficient scale. Berger and Mester (1997) 
suggest that scale efficiency estimates the costs of production associated with producing 
a quantity of output of each banking firm relative to the minimum cost of production 
within a particular assets size class. In addition, Williams (2003) notes that the concept of 
scale efficiency calculates the change in outputs required if a bank is producing at the 
cost efficient scale. Williams (2003) suggests that policy implications regarding bank 
consolidation should be based on comparable measures of efficiency; that is, scale 
efficiency and X-efficiency as opposed to scale elasticity and X-efficiency. 
Given the following simple representation for the cost function: 
In C=a+b (In Q) + .5c (1nQ )Z , (6.8) 
Then the scale elasticity for inefficient firms C1 = SE = BInTC/tlnQ = b, on the other hand 
the scale elasticity for the efficient firms = 1.0; by definition. 
The scale inefficiency (see Evanoff and Israilevich, 1995) then can be written as: 
SI = c(. 
5/c)(1-c1)2 
-1.0, (6.9) 
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that is, scale inefficiency is a function of the first and second derivatives of the function 
(cost function as well as other functional forms) with respect to output (the second 
derivation aims to reach c which is the key for inefficiency calculation). Similar to other 
scale economies and X-efficiency measures, the measure of scale efficiency is bounded 
between one and zero. 
Furthermore, if the estimated scale elasticity value is insignificantly different from unity, 
this does not imply scale inefficiency is insignificantly different from zero because the 
statistical difference of the elasticity measure from a value of unity depends entirely on 
the standard error of the estimated coefficient b (the results of cost scale efficiencies are 
reported Table A3-6 in Appendix A3). 
6-2-4 Data Envelopment Analysis Approach (DEA) 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimates of bank efficiency are used in this thesis as 
consistency tests when we compare and test the robustness of the results derived from the 
translog stochastic frontier analysis. 
6-2-4-1 Constant Returns to Scale (CCR) 
The Data Envelopment Analysis is a non parametric technique that can estimate 
efficiency scores by maximising the ratio of outputs over the inputs. Coelli (1996b) 
elaborates the approach of DEA. Assuming a data set that includes K inputs (k = 1,..., K), 
M outputs (m = 1,..., M) for N firms 0 =1,..., N). Then for the i-th observation, the set of 
input and output can be represented by the column of input vector xi and the column of 
output vector y; and the sets of inputs and outputs for the i-th observation are Xk, and 
ym. The input matrix X= [KxN], and the output matrix Y= [MxN] represent the data 
for all N firms. The optimal weights are obtained by solving the mathematical 
programming problem: 
u, v(u'y; 
/ vex) , (6.10) 
s. t. u'Yj / V'Xj 51, j =1,2,..., N, (6.11) 
u, vz0. (6.12) 
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Efficiency scores represented by the ratio of all outputs over all inputs are calculated by 
maximising u'Yi / v'xi .u 
is a vector of output weights [Mxl ] and v is a vector of input 
weights [Kxl ]. The inequality equation requires that the weights are positive. The DEA 
selects the weights that maximise each firm's productive efficiency score. 
However, at this stage, a problem of the infinite number of solutions to linear 
programming is raised. To overcome this, the constraint v'xi =1 is imposed to provide 
the multiplier form of the DEA linear programming problem: 
max,, (p'yi), (6.13) 
s. t. v'Xi =1, (6.14) 
µ'yß - V'xjS 0, j=1,2,..., N, (6.15) 
fu, v z 0, (6.16) 
Where the change of notation from u and v to p and v is used to reflect the 
transformation. The dual envelopment form of the input-oriented CRS-DEA linear 
programme of equation (6.15) can be written as: 
(6.17) 
s. t. - y, + y2. k- 0, (6.18) 
0x; -XA. z0, (6.19) 
2,2: 0, (6.20) 
Where 0 is a scalar and A. is an Nx I vector of constants. The objective function seeks to 
minimise the efficiency score, 0, which represents the amount of radial reduction in the 
use of each input. The first constraint (the output constraint) implies that the production 
of the rth output by observation i cannot exceed any linear combination of output r by all 
firms in the sample. The second constraint involves the use of input s by observation i, 
and implies that the radially reduced use of input s by firm i cannot be less than the same 
linear combination of the use of input s by all firms in the sample. The value of 0 
obtained will be the efficiency score for the i-th firm that satisfy: 0S1. When 0 value is 
1 (the point is on the frontier), the firm is technically efficient according to the Farrell 
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(1957) definition. Equation (6.18) must be solved N times, once for each firm in the 
sample and then a value of 0 is obtained for each firm (see Coelli et al., 1998). 
Equation (6.18) above assumes that constant returns to scale are imposed on every 
observation in the sample. It does not take into account factors which make firms unique 
beyond the simple input-output mix (such as inefficiencies which result from operating in 
areas of increasing or decreasing returns to scale due to size constraints). 
6-2-4-2 Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) extend the Constant Returns to Scale model to 
account for variable returns to scale (VRS) when not all firms are operating at an optimal 
scale. The Variable Returns to Scale specification decomposes technical efficiency into 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Mathematically, this can be expressed 
by Oc7zs = ems "O. The CRS linear programming problem can be modified to account 
for VRS by adding a convexity constraint to provide: 
mine. j. (6.21) 
ST -. M+Y%>_0, (6.22) 
6Xi -Y A. z O, (6.23) 
Ni' %=1, (6.24) 
x=0, (6.25) 
where Ni is an Nx 1 vector of ones. This approach forms a convex hull of interesecting 
planes which envelope the data more tightly than the CRS . 
The convexity constraint 
N1',. =1 ensures that an inefficient firm is only benchmarked against firms of similar 
size. 
6-2-4-3 Constant, Increasing and Decreasing Returns to Scale 
Under the VRS specification, Coelli (1996) indicates that a form is operating in an area 
where returns to scale are constant, increasing or decreasing. To determine whether the 
firm is operating in the area of increasing or decreasing returns to scale, an additional 
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DEA problem with the non-increasing returns to scale formulation (NIRS) is required. 
This is executed by modifying the VRS constraint from equality that governs the sum of 
linear combination parameters to a constraint of less than or equal to one (by substituting 
the NFX=1 restiction with N 1'). <_ 1) to provide: 
mine. xl 
(6.26) 
ST - y+Y %2: 0, 
(6.27) 
9Xi-YX>_0, (6.28) 
N l' ?. <I, 1, (6.29) 
1>_0, (6.30) 
The nature of the scale inefficiencies due to increasing or decreasing returns to scale for a 
particular firm can be determined by considering whether the KIRS TE score is equal to 
the VRS TE score. If they are unequal, then increasing returns to scale exist for that firm 
but if they are equal then decreasing returns to scale apply, 
6-2-4-4 Economic, Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
The calcucaltion of technical and allcoative efficiencies in the DEA approach requires 
the avability of input price information and the choice of the type of optimisation 
objectives: cost minimisation or revenue maximsation. As our analysis is about cost 
minimisation uder the VRS assumption, the input-oriented DEA model is run to obtain 
technical efficiencies (TE), and this requires us to solve the following cost minimisation 
DEA problem: 
min x. x, PXs, (6.31) 
ST -y1+Y2, z0, (6.32) 
Xý -X 12t0, (6.33) 
Ni' X=1, (6.34) 
ß. z 0, (6.35) 
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where P; is a vector of input prices for the i-th firm and x; is the cost minimisation 
vector of input quantities for the i-th firm, given the input prices P; and the output levels 
y; . 
The total cost (economic) efficiency of the i-th form is calculated 
as: EE = P; x; / P; x;. (the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost, for the i-th firm), then 
the allocative efficiency is calculated as Allocative Efficiency (AE) = Cost Efficiency 
(CE) / Technical Efficiency (TE). 
6-3 Sample Characteristics 
The data sample used in this study represents a number of financial institutions 
functioning geographically in the three North African countries of Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia. The sample covers the time period from 1994 to 2001 and includes fifty banking 
and financial firms consisting of 281 observations. Information on this sample is drawn 
from the London-based International Bank Credit Analysis LTD's `Bankscope' database. 
Overall geographic location and assets size (in terms of assets) characteristics of the 
sample under study show that medium and large-sized banks represent nearly more than 
three quarters of the total sample, Algerian banks tend to be relatively large while 
Moroccan and Tunisian banks tend to be relatively medium and small-sized, and 
commercial banks dominate the sample in terms of assets size and number of banks. 
6-3-1 Total Assets and Number of Banks in the Sample 
6-3-1-1 Assets 
In terms of total assets, the sample represents more than two thirds of the financial 
industries in the three countries excluding the central banks and those financial 
institutions with no available information. Overall, the sample represents approximately 
87% of total bank assets in Algeria, 50% in Morocco and 70% in Tunisia. Table 6-1 
elaborates the quantitative importance of the sample in the three countries in terms of 
banking sector assets share. TableA3-1 in Appendix A3 reports selected financial 
aggregates and ratios statistics of our sample. 
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Table 6-1: the quantitative importance of the sample in Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia in terms of Assets (in million US$), and number of banks from 
1994 to 2001 
Countries Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Sample Total Sample Total Sample Total 
Countries Total Banking % Total Banking % Total Banking % 
Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets 
1994 24026.6 29987 80.12 9420 16781 56.13 20519 11576 1737 
1995 24135.7 25589 9432 109203 19289 56.61 111022 13279 83.61 
1996 249332 25482 97.58 14468.1 20297 7128 149855 14623 81.96 
1997 24135.7 25803 93.54 109203 26350 1.44 109473 14448 75.77 
1998 269332 27454 98.10 14468.1 28532 50.71 14586.6 15315 9524 
1999 205063 28887 70.99 15444.6 29925 51.61 14822.9 15.694 94.95 
2000 28174.4 30000 93.30 14468.1 30660 47.19 14550A 17261 8430 
2001 21765.1 30100 73.10 14551.4 30661 4730 15791.6 17261 8430 
Total 
194610.5 223202 87.19 1046660.9 202494 51.68 96838.4 138196 70.07 
Number of Banks in the sample 
Countries Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Years Number of Bank Average Number of Bank Average in Number of Bank Average 
in the sample Bank assets the sample Bank assets in the sample Bank assets 
1994 5 48053 5 1884.0 7 283.1 
1995 7 3448.0 6 1820.1 16 693.9 
1996 7 3591.9 7 2066.9 22 590.3 
1997 6 4022.4 7 1560.0 23 476.0 
1998 6 44889 7 2066.9 26 561.0 
1999 8 25633 8 1930.6 27 549.0 
2000 9 31305 10 1446.8 26 559.6 
2001 7 31093 7 2078.8 22 717.8 
Total 55 3538.4 57 1836.2 169 573.0 
Source: Bankscope (Sep 2002) 
As indicated in Table 6-1, the sample under study represents approximately 70% of the 
banking system banks in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, in terms of assets, over the 
period of analysis from 1994 to 2001. Total sample assets increased from approximately 
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US$35bn of total banking assets in 1994 to more than US$50bn in 1998-2001. The 
number of banks in the sample increased from 27 in 1994 to 43 banks in 1999 and 45 
banks in 2000, due to the greater availability of information in later years. Over the 
period of study, while Algerian banks represent nearly half of the total sample' assets, 
they represent only one fifth of total sample in terms of the number of banking firms. 
This indicates that Algerian banks, on average, are larger in size than in Morocco and 
Tunisia. Unlike Algerian banks, Tunisian banking firms included in the sample represent 
nearly a quarter and three fifths of our sample in terms of total assets and number of 
banks, respectively. This shows that Tunisian banks have the characteristic of being 
relatively small sized. Finally Moroccan banks represent almost a quarter and one fifth of 
the sample's banking assets and number, correspondingly. 
6-3-1-2 Bank's Type 
In the context of the bank type, five bank specialisations can be distinguished for banking 
firms included in the sample under study. It is very important to note that these banking 
firms in the sample are subject to the same regulatory and supervisory authorities and 
laws in the respective countries. These specialisation types are; commercial, specialised 
governmental banks, multi-lateral governmental banks, merchant and investment banks 
or securities houses, and other non-banking financial institutions including leasing and 
factoring firms. However, as seen earlier in chapter three, the newly amended banking 
legislations in the three countries have reduced the compartmental ities between these 
types of financial firms with the objective in favour of universal banking. 
First, the activities of commercial banks are related to four major functions. These are the 
collection of deposits from various households and other agents in any term or form; the 
allocation of any categories of loans allocated to financing firms' investments and 
households' consumption, the involvement in international trade transactions on behalf of 
their clients, and the trade in foreign exchange and provision of liquid and means of 
payments. 
Second, specialised governmental banks are traditionally used by the government to 
finance their budget development plans. The activities of specialised banks include the 
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collection of medium and long-term deposits (especially from government-owned 
enterprises) as well as giving long-term loans to government-owned enterprises. 
Third, multi-lateral governmental banks are development banks that existed in Tunisia 
that are equally owned between the Tunisian government and a number of Gulf and the 
Libyan governments. These banks are also known as development banks as they have 
activities related to giving long and medium-term loans and, (and under certain 
conditions short-term credit), they participate in enterprise capital, collect deposits of 
which term is more than one year, and they hold sight deposits of their personnel and 
enterprises of which they hold the majority of capital. 
Fourth, merchant banks or investment houses are banks that provide advice and 
assistance services in the field of corporate financing, financial management and 
financial engineering and in general all their services relate to the creation, development 
and restructuring of enterprises. 
Finally, other non banking financial institutions include leasing and factoring firms. 
Leasing banks activities include ensuring the financing of movable and immovable 
equipment acquisitions and providing their clients, economic agents, hire opportunities 
for professional usage. The economic operator has the possibility to finance the leased 
good and obtain a residual value at the end of the contract. Factoring firms have activities 
related to managing by means of appropriate financial management techniques 
customers' invoice accounts by purchasing their claims and ensure the collection of these 
claims. 
Table 6-2 categories the banking and financial firms used in the sample according to 
their core specialisation. 
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Table 6-2 : List and proportion of banks' sample according to bank type, 
1994-2001 
Algeria Morocco 
Specialised Specialised 
Commercial Banks governmental Commercial Banks governmental Other banks 
banks banks 
*Al Ryan Bank-Algeria *Banque *Banque Centrale Populaire *Banque Nationale *Societe 
*Al BarakaBank Alg6rienne de *Banque Commercial du de Developpement d'$quipement 
*Arab Banking Corporation- Ddvdloppment Maroc Economique Domestique et 
Algeria 
*Banque de Ddveloppement Local 
*Banque Alg6rienne de 
Developpement Local 
*Banque Exterieure de I'Algerie 
*Banque Nationale d'Alg6rie 
*Compagnie Algerienne de 
Banques 
*Banque Marocaine du 
Commerce ExtBrieur 
*Banque Marocaine pour le 
Commerce et 1'Industrie 
*Citibank (offshore branch) 
*Credit du Maroc 
*Crddit Immobilier et Hotelier 
*Socidtd Gdndrale Marocaine 
"Caisse Nationale Manager 
de Credit Agricole 
*Credit Populaire d'Algdrie de Banques 
*Wafabank 
Tunisia 
Specialised Multi-lateral Merchant Commercial Banks governmental governmental banks Other 
banks 
banks banks 
*Amen Bank *Banque de *Banque Arabe *Beit Ettamouil *Amen Lease 
*Arab Banking Corporation-Tunisia Ddv loppement Tuniso-Libyenne dc Saoudi Tounsi *Arab Tunisian 
*Arab Tunisian Bank Eeonomique en Dcveloppment ct du 
Lease 
*Banque de ('habitat Tunisie I; xtd n eur Commerce 
*Compagnie 
*Banque de Tunisie *Banque de de Tuni sie et 
Internationale de 
*Banque du sud Nationale de des Emirates Leasing 
*Banque Franco-Tunisicnne Devfloppement d'Investissment *General Leasing 
*Banque Internationale Arabe de Touristique *Tunisian -Kuwaiti 
*Tunisie Factoring 
Tunisie Development Banks 
*Banque Nationale Agricole *Banque Tuniso- 
*Banque Tunisidnne de Solidaritd Qatari 
*North Africa International Bank d'Investissements 
*Socidtd Tunisienne de Banques 
*Tunis Intonational Bank 
*Union Bancaire pour le 
Commerce et l'Industrie 
*Union Internationale de 
Banques. 
Banks' Algeria Morocco Tunisia All 
Commercial banks 80% 96% 85% 86% 
Specialised Governmental banks 
Multi-Lateral Governmental banks 
20% 3% 6% 12% 
0% 0% 3% 0.8% 
Investment/ Security houses 0% 0% 3% 0.6% 
Non-banking financial institutions (leasing and factoring pao 1% 3% 0.6% firms) 
Source: B scope (Dec. 2002) 
1 These percentages are according to total assets share if the sample. 
227 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria. Morocco and Tunisia 
In terms of bank type, Table 6-2 shows that commercial banks dominate our sample with 
a total of 80% of total assets in Algeria, 96% in Morocco and 86% in Tunisia. Overall, 
other non commercial banks represent approximately 15% of total assets of the sample. 
As detailed, non-commercial financial firms consist of specialised governmental banks, 
investment banks, non-banking financial institutions (leasing and factoring firms) and 
multi-lateral governmental financial institutions. In the three countries, commercial and 
non-commercial banks are subject to the same regulatory institution (Central Banks 
or/and Ministry of Finance). In addition, Algerian banks represent half of the sample 
under study while the other half is shared between Moroccan and Tunisian banks. 
Algerian commercial banks account for 40% of total assets of commercial banks 
included in the sample, while Moroccan and Tunisian commercial banks account for 35% 
and 25%, respectively. 
6-3-1-3 Assets Size Characteristics 
The following table displays the size dimension of banks under study in terms of their 
assets. Table 6-3 categorises the banking firms into nine size groups from the smallest to 
the largest. 
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Table 6-3: Distribution of Sample banks assets size between 1994 and 2001 
(in percent %) 
Assets Size 
in Million 
Us$ 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 All 
1-999 0.15 0.16 0.47 031 0.85 1A6 0.99 0.46 0.60 
100-249 129 139 1.65 2.05 2.61 231 236 323 2.35 
250-499 233 1.69 0.62 0.70 1.47 127 0.95 1.25 1.15 
500-999 2.01 11.00 10.79 12.46 1329 8.26 5.15 320 8.42 
1000-1999 16.24 17.81 14.18 16.13 22.18 23.20 20.72 27.60 21.18 
2000-2999 1454 11.62 22.04 23.89 9.83 11.75 14A2 24.66 17.86 
3000-3999 9.34 6.98 17.84 1259 1422 12.12 21.75 7.76 12.63 
4000-4999 0.00 9.85 0.00 8.77 936 15.94 13.98 17.03 11.50 
5000 + 54.10 39.49 32.41 23.11 26.19 24.07 19.68 14.81 24.32 
T. Assets (Us$' 35498.5 48777.2 56386.8 51746.8 487012 57352.6 66805.7 49698.2 414967.0 
millions) 
Source: Bankscope (Jan. 2000 & 2002) 
On average, financial institutions with total assets greater than US$5000mn account for 
approximately a quarter of the sample. Overall, small banks whose total assets are less 
than US$1000mn represent approximately 13% of total the sample. Medium-sized banks 
with total assets between US$1000mn and US$3000 account for about 40% of the 
sample. Large banks with total assets greater than US$3000mn represent more than 47%. 
As it has been already noted, in terms of geographic location, Algerian banks, on 
average, tend to be relatively large, whereas Moroccan banks and Tunisian banks tend to 
be relatively medium and small sized. 
6-4 Definitions of Variables 
6-4-1 Inputs and Output Definition: Intermediation 
Approach 
Following a number of studies such as Mester (1996) and Berger and Mester (1997), this 
thesis uses the intermediation approach suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977) to define 
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bank outputs and inputs to explore cost and profit efficiency in Maghreb banking. The 
intermediation approach assumes that a banking firm collects different types of deposits 
and savings to convert these into various types of loans, using labour and capital. 
Due to the extensive intermediary functions carried out by Maghreb banking, the 
intermediation approach seems to be appropriate for defining bank outputs and inputs. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) indicate that the intermediation approach may be more 
appropriate due to the fact it includes interest expenses, which often represent one-half to 
two-thirds of banks' total costs. Casu and Molyneux (2002) state that the intermediation 
approach may be superior for evaluating the importance of frontier efficiency to the 
profitability of financial institutions since the minimisation of total costs, not just 
production costs, is needed to maximise profits. Thus, the intermediation approach is 
employed to determine the selection of inputs and outputs for the analysis of Maghreb 
bank efficiency. 
This study follows Girardone (2000) who uses interest-bearing borrowed funds, labour 
and physical assets as inputs. While the latter item includes the costs associated with 
premises and fixed assets, the borrowed funds encompass all types of deposits (short- 
term, time and savings, industrial, etc... ), notes and debentures, and all other interest- 
bearing borrowed funds. The outputs include all loanable funds (Q1) and investment 
assets expressed as other earnings assets (OEAs, Q2). Following Stiroh (2001), we also 
include the numeral value of off-balance sheet items (OBS, Q3) as a third output. De 
Young (1997) supports the inclusion of OBS as an output as this type of business has 
become an increasingly important source of income and revenue in recent years, 
especially with the growth of universal banking. 
The prices of inputs used in this study are interest expenses, salaries, and other expenses, 
and these are calculated as follows. First, the price of borrowed funds (P1) is calculated 
by dividing total interest expenses by interest-bearing borrowed funds. Second, the price 
of labour (P2) is derived by dividing staff expenses by total assets. Following Altunbas et 
al. (2000), we use total assets instead of staff numbers, as information on the latter is not 
sufficiently available. Finally, the price of other physical and other assets (P3) is 
measured by taking other expenses excluding interest and staff expenses as a percent of 
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other physical assets. These expenses include total expenditure on premises and fixed 
assets. All the outputs, inputs and inputs prices are measured in nominal terms of 
millions of US dollars. In estimating cost efficiency, the dependent variable of the 
function to be modelled is total costs (TC). This variable is the sum total of interest 
expenses, labour, penses and non-interest and labour expenses. In estimating alternative 
profit efficiency, ROE or net income is used instead of TC. 
Table 6-4 displays quantitative and variable definitions, and summary statistics for 
inputs and output measures used in this study. Tables in Appendix 3 display the detailed 
descriptive statistics of the variables for the banks under study 
Table 6-4: Variable definitions for banks inputs and outputs for Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia over the period 1994-2001 
Variables Description Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total cost (includes Interest expense, 
Personnel expense, Commission 
TC expense, Fee expense, Trading 1.9 6469.0 93.6 111.4 
expense, other operating expense) 
(US$ millions). 
TP Total Profit before taxes 1.0 112.3 17.2 21.6 
Price of funds (%) (Total interest 
Pl expense/ total customer deposits 0.05% 125.00% 1.03% 0.55% (demand, saving and time deposits)). 
Price of labour (%) (Total personnel 
expense/total assets). 0.05% 3.72% 1.10% 0.61% 
Price of physical capital (Non- 
interest inest expense /total assets). 0.29 13.00% 11.98% 1.31% 
Q1 The value of total aggregate loans (all types of loans) (US$ millions). 3.7 6757.93 911.1 1206.6 
The value of total aggregate other 
earning assets (short-term 
Q2 investment, equity and other 1.0 3986.4 368 6 692 9 investment and public sector . . 
securities (US$ millions)). 
Q3 The value of the off-balance sheet 
activities (US$ millions). 1.0 6681.0 566.0 887.0 
Source: Bankscope (June 2003) 
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Table 6-4 reports the definitions, means, standards of deviation, maximum and minimum 
values of the input and output variables used in the stochastic frontier estimation. The 
table indicates that the average bank in the sample had total costs and total profits before 
taxes amounting to US$ 93.3 million and US$17.2million, respectively, and, in terms of 
the outputs, had US$911million in loans (Ql), US$368.6million in other earning assets 
(Q2), and US$ 566million in Off-balance sheet items (Q3). The average inputs prices are 
1.03% for the price of borrowed funds, 1.10% for the price of labour and 132% for the 
price of fixed assets. 
6-4-2 Potential Correlates of Efficiency 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) note that the inclusion of country and other specific 
information in common frontier estimations of bank efficiency is important as differences 
in bank efficiencies across countries can be explained by the differences in a country's 
economic situation142. Therefore, in addition to the traditional model and following 
Molyneux et al. (2000), this study includes a number of environmental variables that are 
believed might influence the behaviour of banking firms and these may be able to explain 
potential differences in cost efficiency levels across the three Maghreb countries under 
study. 
We use a combination of seven bank-specific variables, plus a time trend (t), alongside 
binary (dummy) variables assigned for geographical location and specialisation. These 
include variables that account for bank size (total assets), risk, solvency and capital 
adequacy (equity and equity to assets ratio), risk structure (loan loss provisions to net 
interest revenue ratio), liquidity (liquidity to total assets ratio), and profitability (return on 
equity ratio). In addition, dummy variables are included in the model to distinguish the 
geographical location of the respective banking systems in Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. Also, dummy variables to distinguish between commercial banks and other 
types of banks are also included. The following table shows the descriptive of these 
environmental variables. 
142 The inclusion of variable other than firm-specific variables, including control and environmental variables, is used only in 
parametric modelling. 
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It has been suggested in previous empirical studies that efficiency and size are positively 
correlated. Hasan and Marton (2000), for instance, find that larger banks are more cost 
and profit efficient than smaller banks in Hungary, while Srivastava (1999) reports the 
existence of economies of scale in the Indian banking. Similarly, Leaven (1999) finds 
that Thai medium and large-sized banks are more profit efficient than small banks. 
Larger banks may benefit from scale and scope economies, and tend to have diversified 
lines of financial services associated with higher degrees of management competence 
However, Isik and Hassan (2002) investigate the cost efficiency for Turkish banks, and 
find a negative relationship between cost efficiency and banks size. Similarly, Leightener 
and Lovell (1998) find that size is negatively associated with productive efficiency for 
both domestic and foreign banks in Thailand. Thus, the relationship between efficiency 
and bank size seem to be ambiguous. 
Table 6-5: Descriptive statistics of the efficiency correlates variable 1994- 
2001 
Dimension Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Bank Size Total Assets (US$ 
millions) 
23.1 7829.7 1458.6 1740.2 
Solvency and 
it l d Equity (US$ millions) 2.4 489.6 111.5 101.8 a a equacy cap 
Assets Quality Loan Loss Provisions to Net Interest Revenues (%) 1.41 1500.00 41.24 194.40 
Liquidity Liquid Assets to Total Assets (/o) 0.03 89.80 16.50 19.04 
Source: Bankscope (June 2003) 
The equity is included in the model as an indicator of bank soundness. The variable 
reflects two aspects: the level of risk and bank capitalisation, which is about 16%, on 
average, for the sample 143 The level of equity or capital reflects the bank's solvency risk 
and its ability to absorb losses. The inclusion of capital adequacy aggregates, therefore, 
in efficiency modelling allows us to control for the risk preferences of banks. Having 
higher levels of risk would be associated with higher levels of equity sufficient to absorb 
any loan losses. One would expect higher levels of risk to lead to greater costs and 
143 Which is satisfactory considering the 8% recommended by the Basle Committee (1992). 
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therefore cost inefficiency. On the other hand, equity leads deposits as the first funding 
source available to bank management, and it is considered more costly than deposits. 
That is, banks will tend to have higher costs if they are more dependent on equity than 
deposits as a funding source. Large banks depend more on deposits and debt financing 
for their lending than small banks, thus controlling for equity could reduce scale bias. 
Also, Berger and Mester (1997) include the financial capital variable in their model and 
find a positive relationship between well-capitalised firms and efficiency. Efficient banks 
tend to control costs by allocating their assets into less risky projects through either 
greater scrutinising of lending or using the advantages of diversification. This is 
consistent with moral hazard and agency conflict between managers and shareholders 
where less monitored mangers with lower equity have incentives to expense preference. 
Thus, well-capitalised bank face lower costs of going bankrupt and then the cost of 
funding is reduced. 
The loan loss provisions to net interest revenue ratio (LLP/NIR) is also included in the 
model as an additional indicator of banking risk and also as a medium to measure bank 
management efficiency in the credit allocation process. Many studies use similar 
indicators, for example, Hughes et at. (1996, a and b), Mester (1996), and Girardone 
(2000), use the non performing loans to total loans ratio to account for risk in bank 
efficiency modelling. However, the unavailability of data on nonperforming loans has 
led us to include loan loss provisions as a proportion of net interest revenue as our 
alternative assets quality variable. For the sample, the average estimate of this ratio is 
41%, but it is negative in Algeria (-13%), and positive in Moroccan (24%) and Tunisia 
(75%), indicating that assets quality problems have been extreme in Algeria, and the ratio 
appeared to be not much better in Morocco, although Tunisian bank provisioning levels 
appear relatively strong. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1994) and Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
find a positive relationship between problem loans and inefficiency, whereas Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) note also that non-performing assets can be caused exogenously by 
economic shocks according to "the bad luck theory" or endogenously by either 
inefficient loan allocation management according to "the bad management theory" or the 
management decision to diminish short-term expenses by cutting back on loan 
origination and monitoring resources according to "the skimping theory". All the banking 
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firms in this study have lent substantially to the non-profitable government-owned sector 
in the respective systems, and this sector has been responsible for the large amount of 
non-performing assets in the respective systems over the period under study. 
While the liquidity dimension is represented by liquid assets to assets ratio, which is 
estimated at an average of 16.50% for the sample, banking firms in the sample are 
categorised into two types; commercial banks and non commercial banks. Similarly, 
banking firms are categorised according to the geographical allocation. Dummy variables 
are included to distinguish between these types of specialisation and country location. 
Thus, the additional variables included in the model include a measure of banks' size 
(total assets), quality of bank's loans (LLP/NIR), the level of its financial capital (equity), 
and liquidity (liquid assets to assets), and also variables that include a time trend (t), 
specialisation, and geographic location. Dummy variables take the value one when the i- 
th bank is located respectively in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
6-5 The Translog Cost and Profit Functions 
6-5-1 Standard Cost and Profit Frontier Specifications 
Based on the translog stochastic specification elaborated earlier, the translog cost and 
alternative profit equations are estimated using the FRONTIER 4.1 software suggested 
by Coelli (1995) which estimates the maximum likelihood function. 
For the cost function: 
Ln(TC)=aD+E alnQ, '+F, ß1n(PJP3)+-[±eirQlnQ+± S19ln(P/P 3)ln(P, /P3)+ P3 ,.,, -1 
33 (6.36) 
+yE p, lnQ1n(P, /P3)+yrZ+& i=1r=l 
For the alternative Profit function: 
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Ln(TP)=ow+E a nQ, +E (31n(PJP3)+ 2 6jWlnQ+±14ln(P, /P3)1n(P, 
/P3)+] 
(6.37) 
33 
+EE p, 1nQ1n(P, /P3)+yZ+& i='J=l 
Where (i=1,2,3) and 6=1,2,3) with the following restrictions: 
Symmetry S; j = Sji K ij =K ji ; 
Linear Homogeneity , P, =1 
E xý =02:, q=0 ; 
TC= Total costs and expenses of production; 
TP= Total profits; 
Q; 1= Total all types of loans; 
Qi2= Total other earning assets including securities; 
Qi3 = Total Off balance sheet items; 
P; 1= Price of Deposits; 
Pie = Price of Labour; 
Pi3= Price of Physical capital; 
Z; = Environmental efficiency correlates 
ej _ (v; + pi) for the cost efficiency function and c; = (v; - pi) for the alternative profit 
efficiency function is a stochastic error term; which is composed of v; (representing 
noise) and gi (representing inefficiency effects); 
a, ß, 8, u, p, and w are parameters to be estimated. 
In accordance with the linear homogeneity in prices and following Kwan and Eisenbeis 
(1994), Berger and Mester (1997), Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener (2000), and Weill 
(2001), TC, TP, P1, and P2 are normalised by the price of physical capital, P3. 
6-5-2 Coelli and Battese Models (1992 and 1995) 
According to Sena (1999), FRONTIER 4.1 has been created specifically for the 
estimation of production frontiers. As such, it is a relatively easy tool to use in estimating 
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stochastic frontier models. It is flexible in the way that it can be used to estimate both 
production and cost functions, can estimate both time-varying and invariant efficiencies, 
or when panel data is available, and it can be used when the functional form have the 
dependent variable both in logged or in original units. The FRONTIER 4.1 programme 
solves two general models, which are the Error Components Model (Coelli and Battese 
Models (1992)) and the Technical Efficiency (TE) Effects Model (Coelli and Battese 
Models (1995)). 
The translog stochastic analysis is based on two models Battese and Coelli (1992) and 
Battese and Coelli (1995). The Battese and Coelli models have the main advantages that 
i) panel data of the banking firms do not require to be complete, i. e., unbalanced panel 
data can be used, and ii) estimates of efficiency for each banking firm for each time 
period can be obtained, and these estimates are bound between one, the most efficient, 
and zero, the least efficient. This thesis uses both Battese and Coelli (1992) and Battese 
and Coelli (1995) specifications to examine the cost efficiency of a number of Algerian, 
Moroccan and Tunisia financial and banking firms over the 1994-2001 period. While the 
Battese and Coelli (1992) specification includes the firm-specific variables to examine 
the firm-specific-related effects on cost efficiency, the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
specification extends the first specification to include a number of control and 
environmental variables. 
6-5-2-1 Coelli and Battese Models (1992): The Fixed Effects 
Model 
The models in this stage are estimated utilising Battese and Coelli's (1992) time-varying 
approach. This approach gives some flexibility concerning the distribution of inefficiency 
term in the stochastic frontier, truncated or half normal. Furthermore, it allows us to 
examine the time-varying efficiency model against the time-invariant model. Therefore, 
one of the advantages of the time-varying inefficiency model is that the technical 
inefficiency changes overtime can be distinguished from technical change, provided the 
latter is specified in the model parameters, in the frontier function. This discrimination is 
only possible given that the technical inefficiency effects are stochastic and have the 
237 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
specified distributions. However, this approach does not allow us to add the efficiency 
correlates directly into the model. 
The Battese and Coelli (1992) model, error components model, can be formulated as 
Y;, = X; t b+ (V; t - Ua) (6.37) 
Where Y; t is the (logged) output obtained by the i-th firm in the t-th time period; X;, 
is a 
(kxl) vector of (transformation of the) input quantities of the i-th firm in the t-th time 
period; b is a (kxl) vector of unknown parameters; and V, are assumed to be iid N(0, s2) 
random errors, and U# = U, exp (-h(t-7)), where U, are assumed to be iid as truncations at 
zero of the N(m;, su2). 
Some other models can be accounted for as special cases of the fixed effects model and 
can also be solved using the FRONTIER 4.1 software. As noted earlier, setting h=0, the 
time invariant model of Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989) is obtained. The Battese and 
Coelli (1988) model results from the previous one for the particular case of problems in 
which balanced data is available. If we add m=O to the aforementioned assumptions, the 
Pitt and Lee (1981) model results. If we finally set T=1 in the Pitt and Lee model (1981), 
we obtain the original cross-sectional data model of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). 
If h>O, the inefficiency term, UA, is always decreasing with time, whereas h<O implies 
that Un is always increasing with time. That could be one of the main problems when 
using this model, technical efficiency is forced to be a monotonous function of time. 
Thus, while Cebenoyan et al. (1993) use the truncated normal model; Stevenson (1980) 
and Greene (1990) use the normal and gamma distribution respectively. Second, Mu (µ) 
is restricted to be zero in order to get the Pitt and Lee's (1981) half-normal model. Allen 
and Rai (1996), Kaparakis et at. (1994) and Mester (1996) use the half-normal 
specification to model inefficiency in banking. Third, both Mu (µ) and Eta (ri) are 
restricted to be zero to obtain the time-invariant model as outlined in Battese, Coelli and 
Colby (1989). 
All the above models assume that the inefficiency term to be independently and 
identically as truncations at zero of the N(µ, a'. ) distribution. This definition of the 
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inefficiency term matches the original definition of the stochastic frontier, which was 
proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van de Broeck (1977). 
Therefore, Battese and Coelli's (1992) model defines the inefficiency term U; as non- 
negative random variables which are assumed to account for technical inefficiency in 
production and are often assumed to be iid. as truncations at zero of the N(p, au2) 
distribution. The inefficiency term ur in this model is assumed to be an exponential 
function of time, involving only one unknown parameter. The technical inefficiency 
effects are assumed to be defined by 
u, = {exp[- I (t - T)J}u; ,i =1,2,..., N; t=1,2,..., T; (6.38) 
Whereu,, is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i. i. d) as the 
generalised truncated-normal random variable and T is an unknown scalar parameter. 
6-5-2-2 Coelli and Battese Models (1995): The Technical 
Efficiency Effects Model 
According to Battese and Coelli (1995), the 1992 specification has a substantial 
disadvantage. Mathematically, the technical inefficiency effects of different firms at any 
given time period, t, are equal to the same exponential function 
(exp[- n (t - T)] = exp[n (T - t)]) of the corresponding firm-specific inefficiency effects 
at the last period of the panel (u, ). That is, the classification of the firms in accordance 
with to the magnitude of the technical inefficiency effects is the same at all time periods. 
Battese and Coelli (1995) imply that the time-varying model does not account for 
situations in which some firms may be relatively inefficient initially but become 
relatively more efficient in subsequent periods. Based on this analysis, it would be more 
elaborate to carry out estimations of both specifications (Battese and Coelli 1992 and 
1995) to our sample, and then carry out final selection of a preferred model according to 
Log-Likelihood ratio test (LR test). 
The Technical Efficiency (TE) effects model (Battese and Coelli 1995) can be expressed 
as Y1 = Xt b+ (V, - Ut), where Y; t, X j, b and Vet are as defined earlier and Uu -N(m;,, su2), 
where mit = Zad, Z,, is the vector of firm-specific variables which may influence the 
forms' efficiency. FRONTIER 4.1 programme offers also the solution of the model of 
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Stevenson (1980) which is a particular case of the previous model that can be obtained 
for the cases in which T is equal to 1 (for cross-sectional data) 
As noted earlier, this thesis uses the computer program FRONTIER 4.1 (see Coelli 1996) 
to estimate the maximum-likelihood estimates for the parameters in the Translog 
stochastic frontier for cost efficiency functions''. The estimation follows a three-step 
procedure in the process of estimating the maximum likelihood estimates. First, the 
programme obtains the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the function. Coelli 
(1996) states that the OLS estimates are unbiased due to the non-zero expectation of u, . 
Second, the programme conducts the two-phase grid search across the parameter space of 
y, which range from 0.1 to 0.9. That is, it is to evaluate the log-likelihood function for a 
number of values of y between zero and one. During this procedure, d; are set to zero and 
the values of Bo and a2 are adjusted according to the corrected OLS formula for the half- 
normal model. Third, the estimates of the largest log-likelihood value in this later step are 
used in the last step as starting values in the iterative maximisation procedure in of the 
estimation process. 
The estimation of efficiency scores using the approach suggested by Battese and Coelli's 
(1992, error components model), is processed without the inclusion of any of the 
environmental variables. This model requires only the inclusion of firm-specific variables 
directly into the model so some of the efficiency differences between banks across 
countries and overtime can be explained. Running this model constitutes one stage of the 
two-stage method in which efficiency estimates from the frontier are regressed on the 
influences of selected variables. Some authors, such as Pitt and Lee (1981) regress the 
efficiency scores obtained from this process upon a number of exogenous and non- 
exogenous variables. 
144 FRONTIER 4.1 is a single purpose package specifically designed for the estimation of stochastic 
production frontiers. The estimates of efficiency are produced as a direct output from the package. 
FONTIER allows for the specification of the distributional assumptions for the estimation of the 
inefficiency term in a program control file. According to Coelli (1996), the FRONTIER Version 4.1e can 
provide maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of stochastic cost functions. This version can 
accommodate unbalance panel data and considers a number of variables that are directly correlated with 
the model. It can also accommodate panel data, time-varying and invariant efficiencies, cost and 
production functions, half-normal and truncated normal distributions, and functional forms which have a 
dependent variable logged or original units. However, FRONTIER Version 4.1 cannot accommodate 
exponential or gamma distributions (for more details See Sena (1999). 
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6-6 Choosing and Deriving the Appropriate Cost 
and Profit Models using the Translog 
specification 
6-6-1 Standard Cost and Profit Frontier Specifications 
Our analysis consists of running a number of models with different combinations of 
environmental variables before selecting the preferred model that has the characteristic of 
best fitting our dataset The main cost and alternative profit efficiency models are derived 
from the banking efficiency literature with a number of various assumptions relating to 
the distribution of efficiency terms. The process of selecting the preferred model(s) is 
associated with testing a number of hypotheses. The modelling process will start by 
ignoring the environmental variables, and then these variables will be gradually added to 
the model to see if the new specification best fits the data. 
Table 6-6 summaries the models estimated for both cost and alternative profit efficiency 
functions in this study, and also contains the specifications of the models. In later 
sections, we differentiate between cost and profit efficiency models by assigning either C 
for cost efficiency models or P for the alternative profit efficiency models. Also, we 
differentiate between step 1 in which Battese and Coelli specifications (1992) are used, 
and step 2 in which the Battese and Coelli specification (1995) is used by assigning 1 for 
step 1 and 2 for step 2 just after the signs of C or P. For example, model 2-1 is the model 
that has the translog specification and the two variables of Assets and Equity modelled 
according to step 2 (using the Battese and Coelli specification (1995)). Model C-2-1 
refers to the same specification but for the cost efficiency function, and model P-2-1 
refers to the alternative profit efficiency function. 
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Table 6-6: A Summary of the estimated models selection 
Models Variables 
Stage 1: Model Estimation using Battese and Coelli Model (1992) 
Model 1-1: Eta Yes, Mu Yes 
Model 1-2: Mu Yes, Eta No 
Model 1-3: Both No 
Model 1-4: Mu No, Eta Yes 
Stage 2: Model Estimation using Battese and Coelli Model (1995) 
Stepl: Excluding environmental variables 
Model 2-1-0: 
Basic translog excluding logged bank-specific and 
other environmental variables 
Step 2: Including Non-logged Bank-specific and environmental variables 
Model 2-1 Assets, Equity. 
Model 2-2 Assets, Equity, Time trend (t). 
Model 2-3 Assets, Equity, LLP/NIR 
Model 2-4 Assets, Equity, LLP/NIR, Time trend (t). 
Model 2-5 Assets, Equity, LLP/NIR, Liquid Assets/Assets, 
Assets, Equity, LLP/NIR, Liquid Assets / Assets, 
Modelt-6 Time trend (t). 
Assets, Equity, LLP/NIR, Liquid Assets/ Assets, 
Model 2-7 Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Com, Non Com. 
Assets, Equity, LLP/NIR, Liquid Assets/ Assets, 
Model 2-8 Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Com, Non Com, Time 
trend (t). 
Mu is yes implies half-normal distribution 
Mu is No implies truncated normal. 
Eta is Yes implies time variant 
Eta is No implies time invariant 
Table 6-6 summarises the steps and models estimated during the process of arriving at 
the preferred cost and alternative profit efficiency models. First, we use Battese and 
Coelli (1992) specification to estimate eight (four cost and four alternative profit) 
translog frontier models. Second, we apply the Battese and Coelli (1995) model 
specification to estimate both cost and profit translog frontier models, including a range 
of environmental (country and specialisation variables) and other explanatory variables 
(bank-specific variables). The arrival at the preferred model will be carried out by 
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comparing the Log-likelihood ratio tests of the models at every step. These tests are 
explained next. 
6-6-2 Structural Tests 
In order to choose the model that best fits our data sample, we perform structural tests. 
These tests aim to use the Log-Likelihood Ratio Tests (LR) to examine whether a 
(reduced) model provides the same fit as a (fuller) model. The LR tests are undertaken at 
two main levels. These are Battese and Coelli (1992) time-variant against time-invariant, 
the Battese and Coelli (1992) half-normal against truncated normal, and the Battese and 
Coelli (1995) reduced model versus the Battese and Coelli (1995) full model'as Other 
tests include testing hypotheses whether all parameters equal to zero. Our selection of the 
preferred model is based on the comparison of LR tests. As a first step, we select the best 
model using the Coelli and Battese (1992) specification, then we select the best model 
from the Coelli and Battese (1995) specification, then we compare the two best models 
from the two specifications to choose the preferred model based on LR test estimates. 
The null hypothesis to test at every stage is that the model with a reduced number of 
eitherlboth bank-specific and environmental variables does not fit the data set better than 
other models with a larger number of variables. That is, to arrive at the preferred model, 
we test whether a model with a large number of parameters can be preferred over a 
nested simpler model with a smaller number of parameters. For this, we use the 
generalised likelihood ratio (LR) statistic as defined as: 
LR=-2 * [l (Ho)-1(H1)] (6.39) 
Whereby I (Ho) is the log-likelihood statistic of the reduced model and I (Hl) is the log- 
likelihood statistic for the extended model. The outcome of LR is then compared to the 
outcome obtained from the table of X2 distribution at a degree of freedom equal to the 
difference in the number of parameters between the two models, at a defined level 
significance, usually 5%. If the LR statistic is found to be significant, then we accept the 
'"s Full model implies a model with more parameters than the reduced model. Using the Battese and Coelli 
model (1995), hypotheses tests are performed at three sub-levels; models with only bank specific variables, 
models with only environmental variables and then models with bank-specific and environmental 
variables. 
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null hypothesis that the extended model fits better our dataset, but if it is found to be 
insignificant we, therefore, reject the null hypothesis and consequently retain the simpler 
model. 
Also, the other hypothesis tested uses the Gamma outcome (y) to see whether no 
technical inefficiency effects exist. The null hypothesis is Ho: y=0, whereas the 
alternative hypothesis is Ho: y>0. To test this hypothesis we require the outcome of the 
generalised likelihood ratio test produced by Frontier 4.1. If Ho: y=0, this test statistic is 
assumed to be distributed as a Chi-square random variable with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. Overall, if the outcome of the generalised likelihood ratio 
exceeds the 5% critical value at the given degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
restrictions involved, we reject the null hypothesis of no technical inefficiency. Thus, to 
retain a model, it has to fulfil the condition rejecting the null hypothesis that no technical 
efficiency effects are present (If we accept this null hypothesis, it implies that the model 
cannot follow a stochastic path and therefore should be discarded). 
6-6-2-1 Estimation According to Battese and Coelli (1992) 
Specification 
As explained above in Table 6-6, for exposition, we use notations C and P to distinguish 
between cost and profit efficiency estimates and 1 and 2 to distinguish between different 
estimation methodologies. 1 refers to stage one in which the Battese and Coelli Model 
(1992) is used, and 2 refers to stage two in which the Battese and Coelli model (1995) is 
employed. For example, model C-1-1 refers to the cost efficiency function model 
(truncated normal distribution and time-variant) estimated in stage 1 (Battese and Coelli, 
(1992)), whereas C-2-1 refers to our first estimated cost efficiency model in stage 2 
(Battese and Coelli model (1995)). Similarly, model P-1-1 refers to the alternative profit 
efficiency function model (time-variant) estimated in stage 1 (Battese and Coelli, 
(1992)), whereas P-2-1 refers to our basic cost efficiency model in stage 2, estimated 
using the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach. 
There are eight models estimated according to the Battese and Coelli (1992) 
specification; four models for cost efficiency estimates and four models for the 
alternative profit efficiency estimates. These eight models are models C-1-1 and P-1-1, 
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which assume the truncated normal distribution with inefficiencies evolving over time; 
models C-1-2 and P-1-2, which assume that a half normal distribution exists with time 
invariant characteristics, models C-1-3 and P-1-3, which both follow the truncated 
normal distribution but with time invariance, and finally models C-1-4 and P-1-4, which 
both have half-normal distribution, but are time-variant. 
The comparison of the time-variant models (models C-1-1 and P-1-1) against the time- 
invariant models (models C-1-3 and P-1-3) implies the formation of two null hypotheses. 
First, the specification of the estimated time-variant model (model C-1-1 and P-1-1) is 
compared with the time-invariant model (models C-1-3 and P-1-3). The preferred 
specified model is selected using the log-likelihood ratio test (LR test). The first null 
hypothesis states that the specification of the translog time-invariant model best fits the 
data compared to the time-variant model. The null hypothesis is rejected if the time- 
invariant model cannot be specified using the stochastic frontier methodology. 
Second, the translog truncated normal time-variant model is compared with the half- 
normal time variant model for both cost and alternative profit efficiency. The 
specification of the truncated time-variant model chosen from step 1 is compared with 
the half-normal time-variant model (models C-1-4 and P-1-4). The second null 
hypothesis outlines that the half-normal time-variant model specification best fits the data 
than the specification of the truncated time-variant model. Using the log-likelihood ratio, 
the null hypothesis is rejected given the appropriate degrees of freedom. The choice of 
the preferred model will be based on comparing the likelihood ratio estimates. 
Table 6-7 summaries the four cost efficiency models estimates using Battese and Coelli 
(1992) specification. 
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Table 6-7: Cost Function Model Estimation using Battese and Coelli Model 
(1992) 
Models Hypothesis LR test 
Log-L 
value 
Degree of r 
Freedom 
X 
O. 05 
Decision 
Model C-1-1: Mu 
Yes (truncated 
- 145.84 03 - Accept Ho normal, Eta Yes 
(time variant) 
Model C-1-2: Mu 
No Eta No (half- Ho--m=h=0 0 0.2 2 5.99 Reject Ho 
normal, time- 
invariant) 
Model C-1-3: Mu 
Yes Eta No 
(truncated normal, 
H0=h=0 144.12 0.3 1 3.84 Reject Ho 
time-invariant) 
Model C-1-4: Mu 
No Eta Yes (half- H9=0 125.13 0.2 1 3.84 Reject Ho 
normal, time variant) 
Table 6-7 summaries the four cost efficiency function models estimated using the Coelli 
and Battese (1992) specification. As Table 6-7 shows, we retain model C-1-1 as a 
benchmark model to which other models are compared. Model C-1-1 follows a truncated 
normal distribution with a time variant assumption. First, we compare model C-1-1 with 
model C-1-2 which assumes half normal distribution and time invariance. The LR test 
provides a value less than the 5% level of Chi-square 5.99 with 2 degrees of freedom. 
This implies that Model C-1-2 with time invariance and half normal distribution is not 
statistically different to our benchmark model C-1-1 with time variance and truncated 
normal distribution. Second, we compare the benchmark model C-1-1 with model C-1-3 
which has a truncated normal distribution and time invariance characteristics. The LR 
test provides a value 0, which is less than the equivalent Chi-square value of 3.84 at the 
5% significance level and 1 degree of freedom. Similar to the first step, the LR test 
outcome suggests that the benchmark model still remains the preferred choice based on 
data fitting criteria. Finally, we compare our basic model C-1-1 with model C-1-4 which 
assumes half normal distribution and time variance. The outcome of LR test is found to 
be less than the equivalent Chi-square value at the 5% significance level with I degree of 
freedom. From these three steps, it is apparent that LR tests indicate that the other three 
246 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
models are not statistically different from the benchmark model C-1-1. The LR tests may 
also indicate that any of the four models can represent our sample under study, even 
though they have different statistical assumptions. Thus, while we can conclude that 
model C-1-1 which assumes the truncated normal distribution fits our data, there is not 
sufficient evidence to assume that other models do not significantly represent our dataset. 
This result cannot distinguish between the different models under investigation so either 
one can assume a truncated normal or half normal efficiency score distribution, or time 
variance / invariance, and any specification reveals the same findings. This may imply 
that the quantity (or quality) of our data is not sufficient for analysis using the Battese 
and Coelli (1992) specification. Also, these findings are suggestive that we should 
consider other models, such as using the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification to 
choose the preferred cost efficiency model for the banking sample under study. 
Table 6-8 repeats the procedure outlined above and contains information on the 
alternative profit efficiency models estimated according to the Battese and Coelli (1992) 
specification. 
Table 6-8: Stage 1: Profit Functions: Model Estimation using Battese and 
Coelli Model (1992) 
Models Hypothesis Log likelihood Degree of 
value Freedom 
x0.05 Decision 
Model P-1-1: Mu 
Yes (truncated 
-0.1 normal), Eta Yes 
(time variant) 
Model P-1-2: Mu No 
Eta No (half-normal, Ho=m=11=0 -0.1 2 5.99 Reject Ho 
time-invariant) 
Model P-1-3: Mu 
Yes Eta No H=h. 0 -0.1 1 3.84 Reject Ho (truncated normal, 
time invariant) 
Model P-1-4: Mu No 
Eta Yes (half- Ho=m=O -0.1 1 3.84 Reject HO normal), time 
variant) 
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Table 6-8 shows that the Log-likelihood value for the three models P-1-2, P-1-3 and P- 
1-4 are the same (-0.1); this would provide an outcome of zero for the Log-likelihood test 
for the dual comparison of (model P-1-2 and model P-1-3) and (model P-1-2 and model 
P-1-4). This suggests that the efficiency estimates derived from the three models are not 
statistically significantly different. Following the steps undertaken on the cost efficiency 
model, we compare the benchmark model at this stage P-1-1 with a truncated normal 
with time variance with any of the other three models. The LR test provides a value that 
does not exceed the 5% critical level with degrees of freedom equal to 1 of 3.84. This 
suggests that model P-1-1 can be retained to derive efficiency estimates. However, once 
again, this finding leads us to suggest that the model P-1-1 is the preferred model 
representing our data. 
6-6-3 Battese and Coelli (1995): the Estimation of the 
Translog cost frontier including various 
environmental variables (Models 5 to 18) 
In this stage of our analysis, the cost and alternative profit efficiency models are 
compared using the approach suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995). This approach 
allows for the inclusion of a number of environmental variables, either related to the 
internal characteristics of the banks (bank-specific) or to the overall environment under 
which banks are operating (macroeconomic and regulatory). As noted in section 6-4, a 
number of variables have been selected from the established literature. These variables 
include total assets (size), equity (capital strength), liquid assets to assets ratio (liquidity), 
loan loss provision to net interest revenue ratio (assets quality), a time trend (t), country 
dummies (geographical location and economic conditions), and specialisation dummies 
(commercial and non-commercial). First, we run models that contain only bank-specific 
variables, then, we estimate models using only the environmental variables, and finally, 
we include a combination of bank-specific and environmental variables in our later 
models. It is crucial to note that the modelling in the next two stages is processed 
according to the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification. As the process of arriving at the 
preferred model is identical for both cost and alternative profit efficiency, we will 
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elaborate this process for the cost efficiency stage, but just keep it brief 
for our discussion 
of alternative profit efficiency so as to avoid repetition. 
6-6-3-1 Stage 1: Models with only Bank-specific Variables 
At the beginning of this stage, we estimate a model that does not contain any of the bank- 
specific or environmental variables. We call this model C-2-1-0 for the cost function, and 
model P-2-1-0 for the alternative profit function. Then, given our selection of bank 
specific variables, there are both seven cost efficiency and alternative profit function 
models that contain bank-specific and time trend (t) variables. The Log-Likelihood ratio 
(LR) test will be performed between the model including the two variables (total assets 
and equity) and other models (fuller model). The null hypothesis is that the cost or 
alternative profit efficiency model with these two bank-specific variables, or reduced 
model, better fits our data than other model specifications, or fuller models. 
Table 6-9 and Table 6-10 show the results of the hypothesis testing to arrive at the 
preferred model at this stage for cost and alternative profit efficiency functions, 
alternatively. 
Table 6-9: Stage 2: Cost Functions: Model Estimation using Battese and 
Coelli Model (1995) with bank-specific variables. 
Models LR test likelihood 
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 0.05 
x' Decision 
Model C-2-1-0 * -0.355 * - 
Model C-2-1 52.41 -0.95 - - Accept Hl 
Model C-2-2 56.87 -0.73 1 7.82 Reject Ho 
Model C-2-3 52.36 -0.95 1 7.82 Reject Ho 
Model C-2-4 56.97 -0.76 2 9.49 Reject Ho 
Model C-2-5 89.37 0.89 2 9.49 Reject Ho 
Model C-2-6 93.45 0.10 3 11.07 Reject Ho 
Table 6-9 shows that the very basic cost translog model has not produced a generalised- 
likelihood ratio statistic, a situation where this model cannot be used to compare other 
models. The generalised likelihood-ratio statistic serves as an indicator, if found 
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significant, as to whether our model follows a stochastic path. Also, Table 6-9 shows that 
all estimated models except for the basic cost efficiency translog model C-2-1-0 have 
significant values of the generalised likelihood-test at the 5% critical value with the 
correspondent number of degrees of freedom. This implies that these are consistent with 
following a stochastic pattern. Thus, as the C-2-1-0 specification cannot be retained as a 
benchmark in the selection of the preferred model, and in order to have a de novo 
benchmark; we retain model C-2-1 to compare with the others, since it has the lowest 
number of non-logged parameters (only the assets and equity variables). As mentioned 
earlier, the comparison is feasible if the two compared models are related to each other, 
that is, the reduced model is nested in the fuller models. 
First, we compare model C-2-1 which accommodates the Assets and Equity variables, 
with model C-2-2 which extends model C-2-1 to include a time trend (t) to control for 
technological change. The Log-likelihood ratio test produces an outcome of 0.44, which 
is less than the 3.84 chi-square value at 5% critical value with 1 degree of freedom. This 
implies that model C-2-1 (the translog with Assets and Equity variables) is the preferred 
model at this stage and no time effect can be detected from our sample. 
Second, as model C-2-1 is the preferred model at this point, we compare this with model 
C-2-3, which enlarges C-2-1 to contain the LLP/NIR variable next to Assets and Equity. 
The log-likelihood ratio test reports a value of 0, which is less than the Chi-square value 
of 3.84 at the 5% significance level with 1 degree of freedom. This implies that the 
inclusion of the LLP/NIR variable has not had any impact on our data. Thus, we suggest 
that model C-2-1 continues to be the preferred cost efficiency model using the Battese 
and Coelli (1995) approach. 
Third, we compare model C-2-1 with C-2-4 which includes LLP/NIR and time trend (t) 
variables (as well as Assets and Equity). The outcome of the Log-likelihood ratio test is 
0.38, which is less that the Chi-square value of 5.99 at the 5% significance level with 2 
degrees of freedom. This leads us to suggest that the inclusion of the LLP/NIR and time 
trend (t) variables in our benchmark model (C-2-1) has not significantly improved the fit. 
Thus, model C-2-1 with just the Assets and Equity variables remains the preferred cost 
efficiency model. 
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Fourth, the preferred model C-2-1 is compared with C-2-5, which contains, in addition to 
Assets and Equity, the variables of LLP/NIR and Liquid Assets/ Assets. The log- 
likelihood ratio test generates a value of 3.68. This value is less than 5.99, which is the 
Chi-square 5% critical value at 2 degrees of freedom. As in the former three steps, this 
value of likelihood ratio test shows that the addition of LLP/NIR and Liquid 
Assets/Assets variables to the de novo benchmark model C-2-1 has not changed the fit of 
the latter model. Consequently, we still retain the model C-2-1 with the assets and equity 
variables as our preferred cost efficiency model specification. 
Finally, we compare the preferred cost efficiency model (C-2-1) with model C-2-6. 
Model C-2-6 extends model C-2-1 to include LLP/N R, Liquid Assets/Assets and time 
trend (t) variables. The value of the Log-likelihood ratio test is found to be 2.1, which 
again is less than the correspondent chi-square value of 7.82 at the 5% significance level 
(with three degrees of freedom). Thus, the inclusion of additional variables (LLP/NIR, 
Liquid Assets/Assets and time trend (t)) to our benchmark model C-2-1 has not yielded a 
better fitting model to our data. Hence, we retain model C-2-1 with Assets and Equity 
variables as the preferred model for our cost efficiency estimates. 
To sum up, at this stage of including only non-logged bank-specific variables, we have 
arrived at the preferred cost efficiency model using Battese and Coelli (1995) 
specification. Next, after analysing the alternative profit efficiency models, we undertake 
a similar procedure to compare fuller models that include both country and specialisation 
variables. 
Similar to above, Table 6-10 displays the results of the null hypothesis testing that a 
model with a larger number of non-logged bank-specific parameters is a better 
representation of our data than a nested model with a reduced number of bank-specific 
parameters. 
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Table 6-10: Stage 2: Profit Functions: Model Estimation using Battese and 
Coelli Model (1995) with bank-specific variable. 
Log 
Degrees of öý Decision X0,05 Models LR test Likelihood freedom 
value 
Model P-2-1-0 10.52 -0.21 - 3.84 Accept Hl 
Model P-2-1 29.60 -0.19 1 5.99 Reject Ho 
Model P-2-2 33.13 -0.19 2 7.82 Reject Ho 
Model P-2-3 30.78 -0.19 2 7.82 Reject Ho 
Model P-2-4 36.17 -0.19 3 9.49 Reject Ho 
Model P-2-5 33.90 -0.19 3 9.49 Reject Ho 
Model P-2-6 44.49 -0.19 4 11.07 Reject Ho 
Table 6-10 shows, using the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification, the basic alternative 
profit efficiency model P-2-1-0, and the models that include only non-logged bank- 
specific variables, have values of the generalised likelihood ratio higher that the Chi- 
square equivalent value at 5% critical level with the corresponding degrees of freedom. 
This suggests that all the models displayed in Table 6-10 follow a stochastic pattern and, 
thus, can be used to select a preferred alternative profit efficiency model. 
In addition, Table 6-10 shows that the basic alternative profit efficiency model P-2-1-0 
has a log-likelihood ratio statistic of -0.21, while other specifications have the same 
values for this statistic at -0.19. This implies that there is little/no difference between 
these models when they are compared, as the likelihood ratio test statistic yields a null 
value. This may suggest that the inclusion of a greater number of non-logged bank- 
specific variables to our basic model does not improve the fit of our basic model. Also, 
when we compare the basic alternative profit efficiency mode P-2-1-0 to any of the other 
models shown in Table 6-10, the value of the likelihood ratio test is found to be the 
same; -0.04. This value is less than Chi-square value equivalent at the 5% critical value 
with the corresponding number of degrees of freedom. Consequently, this suggests that 
the basic model P-2-1-0 can be retained as the preferred model for alternative profit 
efficiency estimates, and the inclusion of any of the non-logged bank-specific variables 
does not improve the data fit. 
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Therefore, at this stage of just running a basic model and models with only bank-specific 
variables, we find that the cost efficiency model C-2-2 which contains Assets and Equity 
variables and the basic translog alternative profit efficiency model P-2-1-0 to be the 
preferred models specification. We use these two models in the next stage of our analysis 
in order to further choose the preferred model, but this time using only environmental 
variables. 
6-6-3-3- Stage 2: Models with Bank-specific and Environmental 
Variables 
Given our selection of environmental variables, which are bank type dummies 
(commercial and non-commercial) and country dummies (Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia); we run four new models (two for cost efficiency and two for alternative profit 
efficiency). Each of the models estimated contains four non-logged bank-specific 
variables (Assets, Equity, LLPINIR, and Liquid Assets/Assets) and five environmental 
variables (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Commercial and non-Commercial), and additional 
model is estimated which also includes a time trend (t) variable to control for 
technological change. The cost models estimated at this stage are models C-2-7 and C-2- 
8, and the alternative profit models P-2-7 and P-2-8. When these models are estimated, 
they will be compared to the preferred cost and alternative profit efficiency models that 
have been previously selected. These models are model C-2-1 with Assets and Equity 
variables for cost efficiency and the basic translog model P-2-1-0 for alternative profit 
efficiency. 
Table 6-11 and Table 6-12 summarise the hypothesis testing that the preferred models so 
far (models C-2-1 and P-2-1-0) better fit our data than the other models that extend to 
include both a time trend (t) and environmental variables (models C-2-7 and C-2-8, and 
models P-2-7 and P-2-8). 
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Table 6-11: Stage 2: Cost Functions: Model Estimation using Battese and 
Coelli (1995) Model 
Log Degrees of Models LR test likelihood freedom 
x005 Decision 
value 
Model C-2-1 52.41 -0.95 - 5.99 Accept H1 
Model C-2-7 215.11 0.71 7 16.91 Reject Ho 
Model C-2-8 144.96 036 8 18.31 Reject Ho 
First, Table 6-11 shows that the new two models of C-2-7 and C-2-8 have values of 
generalised likelihood ratio statistic higher than the correspondent Chi-square values at 
the 5% critical level with the correspondent number of degrees of freedom. This suggests 
that both models follow a stochastic path and, therefore, can be retained in the process of 
choosing a preferred model. 
Second, we compare the preferred cost efficiency model C-2-1 selected from earlier 
analysis, with that of model C-2-7 which includes the non-logged bank-specific and 
environmental variables (Assets/Equity, LLP/NIR, Liquid/Assets, Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Com, Non Com). The log-likelihood ratio test provides an outcome of 3.32, 
which is lower than the Chi-square value at the 5% critical level with the correspondent 
number of degrees of freedom. This suggests that the inclusion of the aforementioned 
variables does not significantly improve the data fit compared to the preferred cost 
efficiency model C-2-1 derived earlier. 
Finally, we repeat the exercise and compare the preferred cost efficiency model C-2-1 
selected from earlier stage, with that of C-2-8 which includes the non-logged bank- 
specific and environmental variables and time trend (t) (Assets/Equity, LLP/NIR, 
Liquid/Assets, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Com, Non Com, time trend (t)). The log- 
likelihood ratio test is -0.7, and therefore we reject the hypothesis that Model C-2-8 
provides a better fit than the preferred model previously selected. 
Therefore, the preferred cost efficiency model at this stage of our analysis still remains 
model C-2-1, which includes the two non-logged bank-specific variables of Assets and 
Equity. This is shown in later sections, and is used to derive our cost efficiency estimates 
to be analysed in the results section. 
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The next step is to test for the preferred alternative profit function model specification. 
The results are shown in Table 6-12. 
Table 6-12: Stage 2: Profit Functions: Model Estimation using Battese and 
Coelli Model (1995) 
Models LR test 
Log 
likelihood Degrees of X Decision freedom O. os 
value 
Model P-2-1-0 10.52 -0.21 - 3.84 Accept H, 
Model P-2-7 96.73 -0.16 8 18.31 Reject Ho 
Model P-2-8 91.81 -0.16 19 16.91 Reject Ho 
First, Table 6-12 displays clearly that, models P-2-7 and P-2-8 have generalised 
likelihood-ratio test higher than the equivalent Chi-square values at the 5% significance 
level with the corresponding degrees of freedom. This suggests that the model P-2-7; 
which contains the non-logged bank-specific and environmental variables of Assets, 
Equity, LLP/NIR, Liquid/Assets, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Commercial, and Non 
Commercial; and model P-2-8 which extends model P-2-7 to include a time trend (t), is 
not significantly different. That is, the inclusion of time trend does not change the fitness 
of model P-2-7. Thus, we compare the most basic translog preferred alternative profit 
model P-2-1-0 with model P-2-8. 
Second, we use the log-likelihood ratio test to compare between models P-2-1-0 and P-2- 
8. The value of the test is found to be 0.74, which less than the matching Chi-square 
value at the 5% critical value at the corresponding number of degrees of freedom. This 
result implies that extending our models to control for environmental differences does 
not improve the fit of the preferred model P-2-1-0 selected earlier. Thus, we retain the 
basic translog alternative profit efficiency model P-2-1-0 to estimate our alternative profit 
efficiency scores that will be used in the results analysis. 
To recap, in this section, we have utilised the Log-likelihood ratio test to arrive at the 
preferred model specification for estimates for both cost and alternative profit efficiency. 
A number of models with different combinations of non-logged bank-specific and 
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environmental variables have been tested. The comparison between the nested models 
and the fuller models has resulted in selecting model C-2-1 with Asset and Equity 
variables to be the preferred model for cost efficiency estimation, while the basic model 
P-2-1-0 has been found to be the preferred model for our alternative profit efficiency 
estimation. These two models are used in the following sections to derive efficiency 
scores upon which analysis of our results is undertaken. 
6-6-3-4- Choosing between Battese and Coelli (1992) and 
Battese and Coelli (1995) Models 
As noted above, we have used both Battese and Coelli (1992 and 1995) specifications to 
examine the cost efficiency of a number of North African banking firms over the 1994- 
2001 period. While the Battese and Coelli (1992) specification includes the log terms of 
the outputs and input variables, to examine the bank-specific-related effects on cost 
efficiency, the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification extends the first specification to 
include a number of environmental variables. 
Unfortunately, we cannot statistically compare the Battese and Coelli (1992) 
specification and the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification. This is because they are not 
nested. As such, we have to make a judgment as to which is the best approach to adopt. 
Guidance is given by Battese and Coelli (1995) who noted that Battese and Coelli (1992) 
specification has a substantial disadvantage. Mathematically, the technical inefficiency 
effects of different firms at any given time period, (t), are equal to the same exponential 
function (exp[- rj (t - T)J - exp[rJ (T - t)J) of the corresponding firm-specific 
inefficiency effects at the last period of the panel (the uu s). That is, the classification of 
the firms in accordance with the magnitude of the technical inefficiency effects is the 
same at all time periods. Battese and Coelli (1995) suggest that the time-varying model 
does not account for situations in which some firms may be relatively inefficient initially 
but become relatively more efficient in subsequent periods. 
Due to the disadvantages of the Coelli and Battese specification (1992), the results 
reported in the following section are derived from the preferred models using the Battese 
and Coelli (1995) Approach. 
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6-7- Results 
6-7-1- The Preferred Models 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the preferred translog models of cost and 
alternative profit efficiency are presented in Table 6-13 and Table 6-14. The translog 
cost efficiency model derived from the approach suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) 
includes logged-terms efficiency correlates and two environmental variables, assets and 
equity, while the alternative profit efficiency models contains only efficiency correlates 
and excludes other environmental variables. Asymptotic standard errors and t-ratios are 
presented beside each set of estimates in Table 6-13 and Table 6-14. T-ratios indicate 
the significance of the coefficients and they are defined as the ratio of the estimated 
coefficients to their corresponding standard errors. 
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Table 6-13: Maximum likelihood estimates of the preferred cost function 
model (Battese and Coelli (1995) with three environmental variables) for the 
whole sample over the period 1994-2001 
Parameters Variables Coefficient standard-error t-ratio' 
as Constant -0740)- 03475 -2.1298 
a, InQI 1.0328' 0.1054 9.8015 
(12 
InQ2 0.4280* 0.0666 6.4225 
al InQ3 -0.1685' 0.0713 -2.3624 
P 1, nPI/P3 03315' 0.1454 2.2799 
p lnP2/P3 0.4137' 0.1511 2.7368 
Gil tnQl lnQ1 0.0155-' 0.0108 1.4381 
612 InQIInQ2 
-0.1312' 0.0139 -9.4527 
6 InQlInQ3 0.0629' 0.0140 4.4965 
Pi i lnQ l InP I /P3 0.1091' 0.0095 11.4687 
P12 InQllnP21P3 -0.0575' 0.0136 4.2417 
8 22 lnQ2InQ2 -0.0004 0.0080 -0.0463 
$, ' InQ2lnQ3 0.0929' 0.0207 4.4884 
p21 1nQ21nPI P3 -0.1301' 0.0408 -3.1901 
P22 InQ21nP2/P3 0.0488" 0.0225 2.1661 
833 tnQ31nQ3 0.0267 0.0213 1.2523 
p31 InQ31nP 1 /P3 0.0100 0.0170 0.5888 
P 32 lnQ31nP2/P3 -0.0225"' 0.0139 -1.6151 
K ii InPI /31nP1 
/P3 
-0.0100 0.0261 -0.3829 
K 12 InPI /P31nP2/P3 0.0057 0.0176 0.3242 
K 22 InP2/P31nP2/P3 0.0059 0.0173 0.3421 
70 Constant 0.7793' 0.0783 9.9508 
9p, Assets 
-0.0001' 0.00(X) -5.2426 
'2 Equity -0.0060 0.0005 -11.7878 
sigma-squared (62) 0.1469' 0.02(x) 7.3312 
Gamma (y) 0.8590' 0.0411 20.8964 
Log likelihood function 
(195(111 93122(X) 
LR test of the one-sided error 52.3650 
" 1- t-ratio defines the ratio of the estimated coefficients to their- corresponding standard errors, 
indicates the significance of the coefficients and therefore some of the t-ratios of important coefficients of 
the cost functions. 
"* ** *** denote the significance of the parameters of the coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level using the t-distribution table and t-ratios obtained from the table at the given degree of 
freedom equals to the number of our observation in the sample minus the number of estimated coefficients 
in the ML model. The degree of freedom is the outcome of 281 minus 25, that is, 257. 
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Table 6-14: Maximum likelihood estimates of the preferred translog 
alternative profit function mode for the whole sample over the period 1994- 
2001 
Parameters Variables Coefficients standard-error t-ratio' 
«0 Constant -2.1315* O. 6268 -3. -1(x)7 
UK InQ1 0.6431' 0.1971 3.2637 
U2 InQ2 0 2019" 0.1356 1.4889 
a3 InQ3 0.1169 0.1384 0.8451 
Di I'll PI /P3 1.8020* 0.2804 6.4266 
I2 InP2/P3 -1.6239' 02883 -5.6327 
611 InQIInQI -0.0568 0.0204 -2.7848 
612 lnQIlnQ2 0.0426''* 0.0269 1.5813 
613 InQIInQ3 -0.0279 0.0260 -1.0708 
Pu InQIlnPl/P3 -0.0019 0.0201 -0.0923 
P12 InQI InP2/P3 -0.0331 0-0281 -1.1759 0 22 1nQ21nQ2 0.0451' 0.0153 2.9576 
6 23 InQ2lnQ3 -0.2078v 0.0400 -5.1944 
p11 InQ2InP l /P3 0.4050 0.0786 5.1551 
P22 InQ2lnP2/P3 -0.2114' 0.0430 -4.9185 
6 33 InQ3InQ3 -0.1123* 0.0398 -2.8228 
P31 InQ3InPl /P3 -0.0894' 0.0338 -2.6445 
P 32 lnQ3lnP2/P3 -0.0550" 0.0263 -2.0889 
Kill InPl/3lnPI/P3 0.0557 0.0481 1.1571 
K 12 InPI /P3InP2/P3 0.1021' 0.0341 2.9958 
K22 InP2/P3InP2/P3 0.0552"" 0.0326 1.69 W 
sigma-squared (S) 0.1249' 0.0124 10.0725 
gamma 0.6711' 0.0631 10.3655 
Log likelihood function -0.210) 198896(X)O 
LR test of the one-sided error 10.5248 
[note that this statistic has a mixed chi-squared distribution I 
" 1- t-ratio defines the ratio of the estimated coefficients to their corresponding standard errors, 
indicates the significance of the coefficients and therefore some of the t-ratios of important coefficients of 
the alternative profit function. 
" *, **, *** denote the significance of the p arameters of the coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level using the t-distribution table and t-ratios obtained from the table at the gi ven degree of 
freedom equals to the number of our observation in the sample minus the number of estimated coeffi cients 
in the ML model. The degree of freedom is the outcome of 281 minus 25, that is, 257. 
Table 6-13 and Table 6-14 report the Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the preferred 
cost and alternative profit functions models according to the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
approach. Primarily, these two tables provide us with a number of generic observations. 
First, it appears that out of twenty-two coefficients plus the two constants terms, there are 
ten coefficients with a negative sign for the cost efficiency model, and out of the twenty 
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coefficients plus the constant term there are ten coefficients with a negative sign. Second, 
the variables that are associated with highest values of coefficients in the cost efficiency 
model are Loans, Other Earning assets, and the Prices (P1 and P2), whereas for the 
alternative profit efficiency, they are Loans and Prices (P1 and P2). Third, the variables 
that are connected with high t-ratios in absolute terms are Equity, (LnQ1 Ln (P1IP3)), 
Loans and Total Assets for the cost efficiency model and prices (P1 and P2) and (1nQ2 
lnQ3) for the alternative profit efficiency model. Considering the definition of the t-ratio, 
the last observation may imply that the indicated variables can be relatively more 
important than the other variables in the model specifications in explaining the efficiency 
levels for our sample. Fourth, the environmental explanatory variables in the cost 
function have standard error of less than 5% with coefficients estimates values significant 
at the 1% critical value. Thus, both log-firm-specific and other explanatory variables are 
important in influencing inefficiency levels in North African banking. 
Besides, the cost efficiency and alternative profit efficiency models have values of 
0.8590 and 0.6711 for y (Gamma estimates reported at the end of the two tables) with 
0.0411 and 0.0124 as standard error estimates. Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998) mention 
that if a value of y is found to be zero, this indicates that the deviations from the frontier 
are entirely caused by noise or random error, whereas a value of one is indicative of that 
all deviations are entirely caused by technical inefficiency. Thus, the relatively 
(significant at 1% and 5% and) high values of -f found for our cost and alternative profit 
efficiency models suggest that most of the deviations from the frontiers are due to the 
technical inefficiency effects and that the random error is less that ten percent, especially 
for the cost efficiency model. 
6-7-2 Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia Derived from the Preferred Models 
Table 6-15 and Table 6-16 report the average cost and alternative profit efficiency 
estimates for our sample over the period from 1994 to 2001 derived from the preferred 
cost and profit models as outlined above. The two tables report estimates of efficiency 
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according to time (from 1994 to 2001), geographic location (Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia), and bank type (commercial and non commercial banks)"6. 
Table 6-15 Cost efficiency in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia banking over 
1994-2001 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 ALL 
Algeria 97.05 78.96 79.37 79.30 84.44 75.80 67.57 60.68 69.73 
Morocco 76.29 76.02 80.11 77.91 80.58 80.02 8237 7520 75.49 
Tunisia 67.45 67.19 70.33 72.45 70.17 6629 67.73 64.01 66.59 
Commercial 78.12 72.60 77.24 78.86 80.66 76.10 75.04 70.07 72.69 
Non Commercial 69.97 65.89 64.74 68.84 66.86 65.53 67.72 54.35 64.53 
Investment * 57.90 70.40 66.89 67.32 6423 68.42 53.63 65.21 
Specialised Banks 74.81 74.66 72.18 70.63 7222 72.60 74.92 56.54 71.00 
Non banking Ins. * * 45.41 44.35 46.75 43.85 4537 57.62 48.27 
Multi-lateral Bank 65.13 65.12 70.95 93.48 81.15 81.42 82.17 49.62 73.63 
All 75.81 71.86 73.99 74.66 74.23 70.61 70.95 65.54 72.21 
Asset Size (USS million) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 ALL 
1-99 58.30 38.18 53.25 44.35 51.82 46.11 4520 37.12 46.79 
100-249 65.98 58.47 66.99 69.57 7230 61.70 58.58 60.40 64.25 
250499 75.71 77.57 88.02 91.05 58.78 52.51 50.51 41.71 66.98 
500-999 64.45 66.58 73.29 72.55 76.64 75.68 76.87 78.16 73.03 
1.000-1.999 75.86 76.10 71.60 78.02 86.46 83.07 85.16 76.13 79.05 
2.000-2,999 75.12 76.36 80.84 80.23 8234 87.11 86.45 9323 82.71 
3.000-3,999 92.89 78.29 88.62 91.84 92.77 9538 9022 %. 03 90.76 
4,0(0-4,999 * 91.66 * 91.37 88.53 86.89 92.11 93.90 90.74 
5,000+ 90.03 92.19 91.60 91.11 95.01 95.40 9521 9335 92.99 
ALL 74.79 72.82 76.78 78.90 78.30 7598 75.59 74.45 75.95 
Assets in million 
US Dollar 
1-99 100-249 250-499 500-999 1,000-1,9992,000-2,9993,0003,9994,000.4,999 5,000+ 
Algeria 30.32 43.31 28.50 * 70.73 72.60 86.46 89.94 92.68 
Morocco * * 56.59 66.37 80.02 78.84 92.56 93.90 
Tunisia 4921 65.95 69.44 74.07 82.90 91.67 * * 
Commercial 48.01 57.77 37.48 74.69 81.49 85.03 9133 91.71 92.57 
Non Commercial 52.02 62.83 64.94 69.84 70.73 72.60 86.64 91.66 94.57 
Investment 60.31 68.92 54.93 *' * " + 
Specialised Banks * * 61.57 69. 84 70.73 72.60 86.64 91.66 94.57 
Non banking Ins. 43.72 44.83 56.59 ** * 
Multi-lateral Bank ' 74.73 86.68 ** * " " 
Source: Author's own estimation 
146 Table A3 -2 and Table A3-3 in Appendix A3 report cost and alternative profit efficiency estimate for every 
banking firm used in the sample under study. 
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Table 6-16: Alternative profit efficiency in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia 
banking over 1994-2001 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 ALL 
Algeria 73.18 71.15 76.11 79.12 74.49 82.05 78.08 44.77 66.87 
Morocco 68.11 67.14 64.28 59.63 58.01 46.03 53.09 90.68 63.81 
Tunisia 71.14 72.70 73.49 73.66 73.82 74.44 73.76 69.64 72.69 
Commercial 70.40 70.73 71.22 71.02 72.20 69.76 68.75 74.33 69.65 
Non Commercial 72.52 74.43 74.81 74.77 71.08 72.66 73.98 60.45 71.19 
Investment * 80.88 77.54 76.31 74.42 74.46 75.12 65.53 75.28 
Specialised Banks 70.52 71.71 74.08 70.62 67.81 75.49 79.99 47.82 69.62 
Non banking Ins. * * 75.41 74.43 67.30 74.76 73.93 46.13 66.72 
Multi-lateral Bank 74.52 70.72 72.22 77.70 74.81 65.95 66.86 82.32 73.14 
All 70.85 71.18 72.21 71.84 71.09 70.57 70.03 68.90 70.83 
Asset Size (US$ million) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 ALL 
1-99 72.43 72.53 77.03 74.43 73.32 71.49 71.36 58.14 71.34 
100-249 75.00 72.79 75.05 76.04 7429 71.85 73.41 55.74 71.77 
250-499 69.00 68.52 75.36 74.96 61.58 64.51 62.72 66.92 67.95 
500-999 62.57 73.94 71.97 69.96 72.68 70.17 73.01 71.19 70.69 
1.000-1.999 71.18 74.38 72.69 72.84 69.19 7130 72.58 69.88 71.75 
2,000-2,999 66.63 59.59 67.12 68.25 68.87 72.89 72.73 78.94 69.38 
3.000-3.999 64.27 60.11 60.53 53.36 53.13 49.78 55.93 7839 59.44 
4,000,999 * 77.55 * 84.20 76.99 64.72 6025 7038 72.35 
5.000+ 74.73 70.10 78.84 75.47 7725 73.17 80.09 71.84 75.19 
ALL 69.48 69.95 72.32 72.17 69.70 67.76 69.12 69.05 69.94 
Assets in million 1-99 100-249 250-499 500-999 1,000-1,9992,000-2 9993 000-3 9994 999 5,000+ 000-4 US Dollar , , , , , 
Algeria 68.26 72.57 72.40 * 72.76 75.39 64.98 69.81 75.27 
Morocco * * 51.52 61.46 70.03 64.50 55.88 7038 
Tunisia 71.71 70.11 70.99 72.66 72.96 74.11 * * 
Commercial 68.18 71.89 73.11 73.85 71.53 68.74 57.04 68.99 75.00 
Non Commercial 72.16 64.63 65.06 65.76 72.76 7539 74.82 77.55 79.82 
Investment 80.69 72.06 61.44 
Specialised Banks * * 68.50 65.76 72.76 75.39 74.82 77.55 79.82 
Non banking Ins. 72.16 60.93 51.52 * * * * 
Multi-lateral Bank * 68.33 75.16 * * ' * " * 
Source: Author's own estimation 
Table 6-15 and Table 6-16 display the technical efficiency estimates of banks in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia for the cost and alternative profit efficiency derived from the 
preferred models over the period of study 1994-2001. To facilitate analysis of the size- 
efficiency relationship, we divide our sample into nine asset size groups expressed in 
millions of US dollars, ranging from the smallest group, group one, with assets less than 
$100mn, to the largest group, group nine, with total assets greater than $5 billion. 
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Table 6-15 shows that cost inefficiency averages around twenty-eight percent for the 
whole sample (cost efficiency is 72.21% overall). This suggests that the same level of 
output could be produced with approximately three quarters of current inputs if the 
banking institutions under study operated on the most cost efficient frontier. For 
comparison, the average level of cost inefficiency found in Maghreb banking is higher 
than inefficiency levels indicated by Berger and Humphrey's (1997) survey of 130 
previous bank efficiency studies and Carbo et al. 's (2000) study that compared cost 
inefficiency in a number of EU countries, and found that bank inefficiency range 
between ten and fifteen percent, and around twenty-two percent, respectively. However, 
our results are found to be within the range of similar studies on developing countries, 
such as Rao (2002) on UEA banking system (25-31%), but higher than the results 
obtained in other studies such as Mertens and Urga (2001) on Ukrainian banking system 
(23%) and Hasan and Marton (2000) for Hungarian banks (21%). 
For alternative profit efficiency, average inefficiency levels are found to be slightly 
higher than cost inefficiency at about thirty percent. This suggests that the level of profit 
can be increased by approximately a third keeping the same level of outputs if the 
banking institutions under study were operating on the most profit efficient frontier. For 
comparison, the level of alternative profit inefficiency of Maghreb banking is higher than 
that suggested by Williams and Intarachote (2002) who estimate the alternative profit 
inefficiency of 29 banks operating in Thailand and found inefficiency levels averaged at 
15%, but approximately similar to that found by Mertens and Urga (2001) and Hasan and 
Marton (2000), 28% and 29%, respectively. In the context of our sample, the level of 
alternative profit inefficiency can be explained by factors linked to profit-related 
activities. Banks in the three countries under study are strongly influenced by potential 
pressure and other non-market forces that may force them to allocate resources to 
activities or firms that have experienced low levels of profits. Particularly, this factor is 
well observed in Algeria, where, for decades, banking institutions have made significant 
amounts of lending to the non-performing government-owned sectors. The selection of 
credits as well as government influence, importance of the public sector, and relative 
weakness of the private sector might have led the banking sector to subsequently absorb 
non-performing loans, and as a result record high levels of profit inefficiency. Thus, the 
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hypotheses of "bad luck" and "bad management" suggested by Berger and de Young 
(1997) may explain the relatively low level of (cost and) profit efficiency in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia's banking. 
The results can also be viewed in terms of bank type, geographic location and size. First, 
in terms of bank type, it seem that commercial banks are more cost efficient but slightly 
less profit efficient than non-commercial banks. Second, in terms of geographic location, 
Moroccan banks are more cost efficient than Algerian and Tunisian banks, whereas 
Tunisian banks are more profit efficient than Algerian and Moroccan banks. Third, in 
terms of size, large and medium-sized banks tend to be more cost efficient than smaller 
banks, but small and larger banks tend to be more profit efficient than their medium-sized 
counterparts. The results may imply that macro-economic conditions and regulatory 
measures in Morocco and Tunisia are relatively more favourable to have lower cost 
inefficiencies than in Algeria. As Casu and Molyneux (2000) note, country-specific 
characteristics can be important in influencing bank efficiency levels, including 
macroeconomic conditions and the degree and speed of financial, economic and 
regulatory reforms. Within this context, Tunisia and Morocco commenced implementing 
financial liberalisation and economic reforms in favour of private and foreign capital 
earlier and faster than Algeria--nearly more than half of banks' capital in Tunisia and 
Morocco is owned by foreign investors. Privatisation programmes in Morocco and 
Tunisia have strengthened the role of both domestic private and foreign-owned sectors in 
the economy compared to Algeria. The link between the size of the private sector and 
banking efficiency may indicate that the privatisation of state-owned enterprises to boost 
competition is significant in improving commercial bank efficiency. Besides, in the case 
of Tunisia, the country is characterised by higher rates of GDP per capita, and this may 
suggest that its banks may be more successful in attracting deposits and generating 
stronger cash flows than banks in Morocco and Algeria. Higher GDP per capita tends to 
generate more savings, and hence more deposits and consequently more bank lending. 
To conclude, it is found that cost and alternative profit inefficiency averaged about 30% 
over the period 1994-2001. It is also found that commercial banks are significantly more 
cost inefficient and less profit efficient than non-commercial banks. In addition, large- 
and medium-sized banks tend to be more cost efficient but less profit efficient than small 
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and medium-sized banks. Overall, in the three countries, it seems that cost inefficiency 
and alternative profit inefficiency experienced an increase over the time period from 
1994 to 2001, although it is higher in Algeria than in Morocco and Tunisia. This would 
suggest financial and economic reforms have not made an influential impact on the cost 
and profit efficiency performance of the banking sectors in the three countries under 
study. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the financial sectors in the three countries 
still seem to be suffering from the absence of competition and market pressures. 
6-7-3 Properties of Cost and Alternative Profit 
Inefficiencies: Characteristics of the Most and 
Least Efficiency 
Following Spong et al (1995), Bauer et al (1997) and Girardone (2001), this section runs 
consistency tests by comparing efficiency estimates derived from the preferred cost and 
alternative profit efficiency models on traditional accounting measures of performance in 
order to distinguish the characteristics of the most and least efficient banks. This is 
undertaken by ranking banks from the most efficient to the least, and then dividing the 
observations into two equal sub-groups, in which the first sub-group contains the first 
two upper quartiles, namely, the most efficient firms, whereas the second sub-group 
consists of the two lower quartiles, namely, the least efficient firms. 
This approach enables us to analyse the differences between the most efficient and least 
efficient banks and identify the properties that determine bank efficiency in North 
African banking. Similar to Girardone (2001), banks that operate well on both the cost 
and profit efficiency sides, would apparently be categorised into the most efficient sub- 
group, and vice versa. Banks in the most cost and profit efficient-sub-group are assumed 
to be using their resources more efficiently in the production process and as having better 
abilities in the profit generation process. 
To study the property of bank efficiency, we concentrate on the dimensions manifested 
by financial and accounting ratios, including: assets quality, liquidity, profitability, and 
balance sheet structure. Table 6-17 reports details of financial ratios of the most efficient 
and least efficient banks over the period of study from 1994-2001. 
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Table 6-17: Properties of banks cost and alternative profit efficiency in 
Algeria Morocco and Tunisia over 1994-2001 (In average Percentages %) 
Efficiency Type Cost Efficiency 
Alternative Profit 
Efficiency 
Properties of Banks Least Efficient Most Efficient Least Efficient Most Efficient 
Bank Efficiency 60.23 81.77 63.46 77.03 
Equity to Assets ratio 1.47 17.88 2.62 16.75 
LLP to NIR ratio 45.85 36.72 54.31 28.44 
Liquid assets to assets 15.61 17.38 15.59 1739 
Loans to assets ratio 63.78 62.41 64.46 61.81 
Deposits to assets 74.09 70.75 73.26 71.56 
ROE 19.45 27.09 19.65 26.88 
ROA 1.92 4.11 1.58 4.45 
Cost to assets ratio 9.99 7.43 9.52 7.91 
See Table A3-4 in Appendix A3 for the names or least and most cost and profit efficient banks. 
Table 6-17 provides us with the main differences between the characteristics of the most 
efficient and the least efficient banks in our sample. Overall, Table 6-17 shows that 
efficient and inefficient banks differ in some aspects, but have similar characteristics in 
other regards. 
First, on average, cost efficiency for the most efficient banks was 82%, while for the least 
efficient banks it was 60%. In terms of alternative profit efficiency, the most efficient 
banks have an average efficiency estimate of 77%, whereas the least efficient banks have 
an average efficiency score of 63%. 
Second, Table 6-17 shows that the most efficient banks, either in terms of cost efficiency 
or alterative profit efficiency, have lower levels of costs to assets ratio. That is, the most 
efficient banks tend to have overall lower rates for the price of funds, labour and other 
expenses, and therefore record higher levels of profitability. Thus, the most efficient 
banks tend to have the property of having low lower rates of expenses to assets, 
suggesting advantages in funding costs, and/or better be able to control operating 
expenses, specifically labour expenses. 
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Third, as to be expected, the most cost and alternative efficient banks have higher rates of 
ROE and ROA than the most inefficient banks suggesting that there might 
be differences 
in the way the most and least efficient banks generate income. The more efficient 
banks 
may be more selective in their investment and lending behaviour resulting 
in higher 
returns. 
Fourth, Table 6-17 also suggests that the most efficient banks have higher average equity 
to assets ratios, implying that well capitalised banks are more efficient than under- 
capitalised banks. This result is similar to the findings of previous studies that find that 
well capitalised banks are more efficient; for instance Berger and Mester (1997). A 
possible explanation for this could be based on the theory of moral hazard. According to 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) and Berger and De Young (1997), "the moral hazard 
hypothesis" predicts that inefficiencies are positively correlated with risk and 
consequently negatively with capitalisation. Under "the model hazard hypothesis, "banks 
with relatively low capital respond to moral hazard incentives by increasing the riskiness 
of its loan portfolio, which results in higher nonperforming loans on average in the 
future" (Berger and De Young, 1997, p5). That is, the managers of banks that are closer 
to bankruptcy will be more inclined to excessive risks, which are not necessarily in line 
with the owners' objectives. Therefore, it appears that banks with low cost efficiency 
tend to have lower levels of capitalisation. 
Fifth, the table shows that efficient banks have relatively lower rates of loan-loss 
provisions to net interest revenues ratios (LLP/NIR). According to Berger and De Young 
(1997), the bad management theory can be called upon to explain these differences. 
Under the `bad management' hypothesis, low measured cost efficiency recorded for 
inefficient banks is a signal of poor senior management practices. That is, "loan 
managers do not sufficiently monitor and control their operating expenses, which are 
reflected in low measured cost efficiency almost immediately. Managers in these banks 
also do not practice adequate loan underwriting, monitoring, and control' (Berger and 
De Young, 1997, p4). The theory presents a number of reasons to the weakness of 
management practices. First, "loan managers may have poor skills in credit scoring and 
therefore choose a relatively high proportion of loans with loin or negative net present 
values. Second, loans managers may be "less than fully competent in appraising the 
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value of collateral pledged against the loans. Third, "loan managers may have difficulty 
monitoring and controlling the borrowers after loans are issued to assure that covenants 
are obeyed" (Berger and De Young, 1997, p4). In contrast to the almost immediate 
reduction in measured cost efficiency, poor underwriting and monitoring practices lead to 
high numbers of nonperforming loans only after some time passes, the loan portfolio 
becomes seasoned, and delinquencies begin to mount. An increase in the value of non- 
performing loans will lead to an increase in the value of loan loss provisions. The bad 
management theory predicts that nonperforming loans will be negatively associated with 
cost efficiency. 
In summary, Table 6-17 shows that the most cost and profit efficient banks in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia are more effective in controlling their expenses side as well as 
having better profit generation capacity. These banks may tend to have better bank 
management reflected by controlling operating expenses and better risk management 
practices. 
6-7-4 Cost and Alterative Profit Efficiencies: 
Ownership Characteristics 
Literature on efficiency and ownership has hypothesised that privately and foreign- 
owned banks are more efficient than their public and domestic counterparts, but findings 
are varied. Bosco (2003) finds that foreign banks seem to outperform domestic banks in 
terms of profit and cost efficiency. Kraft, Kofler and Payne (2002) examine cost 
efficiency in Ukrainian banking over the period 1994 to 2000, and find that new private 
and privatised banks were not the most efficient banks through most of the period. In 
addition, they found that, overall, foreign-owned banks have substantially better 
efficiency scores than all types of domestic banks. Green, Murinde and Nikolov (2002) 
find that the foreign banks do not appear to be significantly different from domestic 
banks. Vasconcelos and Fucidji (2002) find no significant evidence for the hypotheses 
that i) the entry of foreign banks in Brazil would increase total bank credit; and ii) 
foreign banks are more efficient than their domestic counterparts, over the period 1994- 
01. 
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The cost efficiency estimates of Maghreb banking and financial firms according to 
ownership types, classified by country, are reported in the Table 6-18. 
Table 6-18: Cost Efficiency Estimates According to Ownership 
Years 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average 
All Banks 
Foreign 92.42 65.74 68.23 67.04 65.08 46.37 43.79 62.09 57.92 
Foreign Private 71.00 69.42 72.16 69.73 70.49 68.12 72.55 67.75 69.72 
Foreign Public 46.77 42.14 63.98 79.59 79.01 76.10 72.42 48.49 66.62 
Private 81.36 72.08 63.96 60.87 58.60 55.57 51.40 58.31 54.46 
Public 78.03 79.19 79.21 77.82 82.48 80.04 85.72 64.93 77.41 
Public-Private-Foreign 77.00 72.71 77.29 80.78 78.49 78.69 80.61 76.88 76.32 
Algeria 
Foreign * * * * * 25.42 28.84 63.66 48-57 
Foreign-Public * 38.18 46.17 52.65 62.01 51.70 39.92 50.83 48.78 
Public 87.05 85.76 84.91 84.63 88.92 88.21 86.43 61.99 83.56 
Private * * * * * * 14.03 61.66 37.85 
Morocco 
Public-Private-Foreign 86.35 83.78 86.54 88.76 89.49 89.44 90.92 79. % 86.86 
Foreign-Private 70.75 75.30 74.42 71.58 75.33 73.71 78.12 80.70 74.99 
Public 56.63 46.74 54.12 59.23 * * 80.80 62.85 63.4H) 
Private 81.36 82.73 86.08 88.21 76.66 72.14 73.70 * 72.13 
Tunisia 
Foreign 92.42 65.74 68.23 67.04 65.08 53.35 47.52 61.46 61.66 
Foreign-Private 71.13 67.45 71.71 69.36 69.53 67.01 71.43 63.43 68.67 
Foreign-Public 46.77 46.09 72.89 93.06 87.51 88.30 88.67 47.33 75.54 
Public 66.19 76.88 76.18 73.95 76.05 70.23 85.69 78.77 74-57 
Private * 61.43 52.90 51.75 49.58 48.95 49.95 57.64 511.72 
Public-Private-Foreign 58.30 67.18 72.00 77.35 74.36 73.31 75.46 74.83 71.04 
Author's own estimation 
The Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test indicates that cost efficiency estimates across all ownership type is 
significantly different at the level of 5% (pß. 00%). 
Foreign banks are banks which are fully owned by foreign capital. Foreign-Private banks are banks which 
are owned by both foreign and private capitals. Foreign-State banks are those which are owned by foreign 
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and government capitals. While public banks are fully owned by the government, private banks are fully 
owned by the private sector. Finally, the public-foreign-private ownership type reflects a quoted bank on 
either the Casablanca or Tunis Stock Exchanges, or public-foreign-private-owed banks are banks in which 
private, foreign and government ownerships cohabitate. 
Overall, Table 6-18 indicates that government-owned banks (77.41%) and banks with 
mixed ownership types (76.32%) are the most efficient banks in North Africa during the 
period 1994-2001. In contrast, private (54.46%) and foreign-owned (57.92%) banks are 
the least cost efficient banks over the same period. On the one hand, the table indicates 
that public banks (83.56%) are the most efficient in Algeria, whereas banks with mixed 
ownership types are the most cost efficient in Morocco (86.86%) and public banks and 
banks with foreign and public ownership types are the most cost efficient banks in 
Tunisia, 75.54% and 74.57%. On the other hand, Table 6-18 reveals that private 
(37.85%) and foreign (48.57%) banks in Algeria, public (63.00%) banks in Morocco, and 
private banks (50.72%) are the least efficient banks. 
In Algeria, private and foreign public banks are not the most cost efficient. As they are 
not pervasive throughout the territory, private and foreign-owned banks represent less 
than one tenth of total banking sectors' assets. It might be premature to expect to 
experience efficiency gains through privatisation in the form of new entry of private and 
foreign banks. Foreign and private-owned banks are in their early presence in Algeria, 
and the setting up of such banks requires substantial expenditures on new structures, 
offering higher salary packages to attract skilled workers, and substantial expenses to 
attract customers away from the existing government-owned banks. This shows that the 
banking sector in Algeria has not yet benefited the new private and foreign entrants, 
another indication of the absence of competition in Algeria. Within this framework, we 
significantly reject the hypothesis that, in Algeria, foreign and private-owned banks are 
more efficient than domestic and public counterparts. Thus, we find little empirical 
evidence to sustain the argument that bank ownership (foreign versus domestic and 
private versus government-owned) is an important factor in improving banks' cost 
efficiency in Algeria. 
In Morocco and Tunisia, the privatisation process and foreign bank entry into the 
banking sector might have led to increased cost efficiency in the banking sector. The new 
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(institutional) investors might have brought potential benefits to the banks in terms of 
better resource allocation, formation of human capital, higher efficiency, increased 
competition and increased stability (Levine (1996 and 1997) and Goldberg et al. (2000)). 
In Morocco, banks with mixed ownership and public-foreign-owned banks are the most 
efficient. Foreign capital may have opted for investing in existing banks rather than 
creating new structures. As seen in early chapters, foreign investors, mainly institutional, 
might have evaluated that investing in existing banks would be potentially more 
beneficial. The existing banks might have endured outdated management approaches and 
inappropriate risk assessment techniques associated with salient shortage of updated 
technology. Instead of this, the existing banks might have accumulated a strong 
background of expertise and knowledge about the banking needs of the local market 
banking. Based on this, new investors might have only injected new managerial and risk 
assessment techniques to match the experience and expertise of existing banks. Thus, it 
can be considered that privatisation in the form of allowing private and foreign investors 
to takeover government shares, has ameliorated the cost efficiency of the newly 
privatised banks. This remark is similar to the argument by Litan, Masson and 
Pomerleano (2001), who assert that the presence of foreign investors in the banking 
sector can be favourable to the local market as they tend to import with them improved 
technologies, increased liquidity and more experienced management. Levine (1996 and 
1997) and Goldberg et al. (2000) indicate that foreign entrants may hypothetically 
enlarge the quantity and quality of financial services supply available to customers by 
contributing towards upgrading the existing managerial skills and technologies current in 
the financial system. Our results on Morocco and Tunisia are similar to those by 
Bhattacharyya, Lovell and Sahay (1997), who use the DEA and stochastic frontier 
analysis to examine the efficiency of 70 Indian commercial banks during the early stages 
of deregulation (1986-91). They found that banks with mixed ownership (quoted) are the 
most efficient, followed by foreign-owned banks and privately-owned banks. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that banks in which foreign and private capital hold some 
stakes (because of privatisation), are more efficient in Morocco and Tunisia than those 
banks that are completely private and foreign ownership. 
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The efficiency differences across ownership types can also be captured thorough 
alternative profit efficiency. The alternative profit efficiency estimates of Maghreb 
banking and financial firms according to ownership types, classified by country, are 
provided in Table 6-19. 
Table 6-19: Alterative Profit Efficiency Estimates: According to Ownership 
Years 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 mean 
All Banks 
Foreign 79.13 75.78 77.90 72.66 69.93 69.68 77.70 47.59 62.34 
Foreign Private 71.83 74.04 75.50 73.66 74.72 70.56 69.37 78.02 74.16 
Foreign Public 73.29 69.70 72.15 76.73 74.35 75.21 75.23 68.31 72.95 
Private 6928 73.68 73.03 72.54 68.29 69.48 69.60 46.21 64.49 
Public 71.27 68.61 71.82 71.70 72.00 76.81 72.12 77.07 72.27 
Public-Private-Foreign 65.69 71.51 69.00 68.91 69.22 64.63 64.23 89.05 70.88 
Algeria 
Foreign * * * * * 70.28 77.03 31.70 46.75 
Foreign-Public * 72.53 74.70 78.47 79.46 84.35 86.05 42.63 74.03 
Public 73.18 70.92 76.35 79.25 73.49 83.63 78.57 68.93 77.21 
Private * * * * * * 83.24 18.35 50.80 
Morocco 
Public-Private-Foreign 6233 66.87 64.05 57.13 56.91 43.93 46.47 93.03 62.44 
Foreign-Private 67.15 70.17 65.89 64.34 64.71 53.47 51.36 83.92 65.12 
Public 79.47 62.32 61.87 61.89 * * 34.96 91.99 64.93 
Private 6928 69.73 65.99 63.29 56.48 43.61 45.40 * 53.45 
Tunisia 
Foreign 79.13 75.78 77.90 72.66 69.93 69.47 77.87 53.94 68.58 
Foreign-Private 74.17 75.32 77.42 75.53 76.73 73.97 72.97 76.06 75.97 
Foreign-Public 7329 66.87 70.88 75.87 71.80 70.64 69.83 81.16 72.41 
Public 62.41 66.10 66.07 64.71 70.51 68.63 69.47 94.68 68.28 
Private * 77.62 76.55 75.62 74.20 79.83 76.55 51.78 71.65 
Public-Private-Foreign 72.43 73.83 71.84 73.95 73.84 74.98 73.11 86.39 75.10 
Author's own estimation 
The Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test indicates that profit efficiency estimates across all ownership types 
are not significant at the level of 5% (p=59.7%). 
Table 6-19 indicates that the fully private and foreign-owned banks are the least 
alternative profit efficient in our sample, 64.49% and 62.43%, where banks with public 
and mixed ownership banks are found to be the most efficient, between 71% and 75% 
respectively. Similar to Bosco (2003), these differences may reflect inferior levels of net 
loans value and net profit (margins) for fully foreign and private-owned banks than other 
types due to either differences in market strategies or/and to differences in the 
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composition and behaviour of customers. Fully-private and foreign-owned 
banks might 
have found it relatively difficult to compete with long-established domestic banks. 
In Algeria, public and foreign-public-owned banks are the most alternative profit 
efficient with 77.21% and 74.03%, respectively, while fully-private and foreign owned 
banks are the least profit efficient, 50.80% and 46.74%, respectively. The large gap 
between the most and least profit efficient provides more evidence of limited competition 
in the Algerian banking system. As noted in early chapters, the government-owned banks 
dominate the banking system in Algeria, with more than 90% of total bank assets. Thus, 
the high alternative profit efficiency of government-owned banks appears to stem from 
their market power and an absence of competition in the Algerian banking system, where 
large state-banks compete along side relatively small foreign and private-owned banks. 
In Morocco, while private banks are the least profit efficient (53.45%), foreign private 
banks are the most efficient (65.12%), followed by public banks (64.93%) and banks of 
mixed ownership (62.44%). The relative small gap in efficiency between these ownership 
types reveals that the Moroccan banking sector has some indications of competition due 
to the entry of foreign banks. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) find that an increased 
presence of foreign banks is associated with a reduction in profitability and margins for 
domestic banks. They also find that banks with foreign shareholders tend to have higher 
profits than banks with non-foreign shareholders in developing countries, while the 
opposite is true for developed industrial economies. Overall, the most cost efficient banks 
in Morocco tend to be the most alternative profit efficient. This suggests that foreign- 
private-owned banks and those with mixed ownership are likely to have increased their 
profit efficiency by decreasing their cost inefficiency. 
In Tunisia, Table 6-19 indicates that foreign-private banks are the most alternative profit 
efficient (75.97%), followed by banks of mixed ownership (75.10%). Also the table 
shows that public (68.28%) and foreign (68.58%) banks are the least alternative profit 
efficient. Similar to Morocco, the Tunisian banking system seems to operate in a 
relatively competitive environment, since the gap in efficiency between the ownership 
groups is not as large as in Algeria. The presence of foreign and private capital in banks 
273 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
may orient managers towards adopting more revenue-focused strategies that generate 
greater profits. 
Overall, contrary to Algeria where the private sector and foreign banks have chosen to 
establish new banks, Private and foreign investors in Morocco and Tunisia have opted for 
investing in the existing banking firms rather than setting up new banks. The creation of 
the stock exchanges and the ambitious programme of privatisation, together with political 
stability have encouraged this option. While privatisation has helped banks with mixed 
ownership to have higher efficiency scores than their banks with just one type of 
ownership in Morocco and Tunisia, in Algeria, the government-owned banks still have 
high efficiency scores due (presumably) to their greater market presence. In Morocco and 
Tunisia, foreign participation in the banking sector is likely to have been beneficial in 
terms of importing capital (Krozner, 1998), and improving management of existing firms 
(Crystal et al., 2001). 
6-7-5 Explaining Cost and Profit Efficiency Differences 
in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
This section of the thesis examines the determinants and sources of bank efficiency by 
estimating a second stage efficiency regression. In this regression, the relationship 
between our efficiency estimates and a set of country, structural and financial firm- 
specific variables are explored. The second stage regression consists of regressing the 
efficiency scores derived from the preferred models on a set of independent variables, 
which are selected based on Hao, Hunter and Yang (1999) and Girardone (2001). 
In this regression, we use the logistic regression analysis, as according to Mester (1993, 
1996), the logistic analysis explores the relationship and correlation between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables, also; it allows us to use the 
uncensored data as the dependent variable as it ranges between zero, the least efficient 
banks, and one, the most efficient banks. 
The regression model can be estimated as follows 
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Cost or profit efficiency scores= f (LnA, EA, LLPINIR, ROE, CA, N /TI, 
Specialisation, Geographical Location) 147 (6.40) 
Where A is Total Assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLP/NIR is the ratio of loan 
loss provisions to net interest revenue, ROE is return on equity, Cl is cost to assets ratio, 
NIUTI is non interest income to total income ratio, Specialisation includes dummies for 
commercial and non-commercial banks, and Geographical Location includes dummy 
variables for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
The independent variables included in the model are defined as follows. The variable 
1nTA is the natural logarithm of total assets and is included to control for the impact of 
scale bias on efficiency. The variable LLP to NIR is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue. It is included to provide measures of the impact of non-performing 
assets on cost and profit efficiency. Equity capital to Assets ratio is included to adjust for 
different risk levels among the sample banks. The ROE is included to examine the 
relationship between the profitability of banks and their efficiency. The non-interest 
income over total income ratio is included to measure the impact of output mix on 
efficiency and income diversification. The coefficient of this ratio could be positive or 
negative depending on the bank's expertise and strategic objective. It is expected to be 
positive if a bank has the technical ability to offer non-interest income product lines, i. e., 
fee based services, which permit the bank to achieve a higher level of efficiency from its 
resources (especially its human capital). It is expected to be negative if the bank human 
capital resources and expertise is oriented more towards traditional commercial and 
industrial lending activities. The cost to assets ratio is included in the model to test for the 
consistency condition that banks with higher costs to assets ratios tend to be more 
inefficient. Country dummies are included in the regression model to capture the possible 
difference in efficiency between the banks in the three countries, Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia. A country dummy is equal to one if the bank is within the country and zero if it 
is not. The logistic regression model is estimated using Minitab and the results are 
reported in Table 6-20. 
147 These variables have been used by various authors such as Girardone (2001). 
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Table 6-20: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Cost and 
Alternative Profit Efficiency in Maghreb Banking Systems (1994-2001) 
Efficiency Cost Efficiency Alternative Profit Efficiency 
Parameter Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Constant 
Ln Total Assets 
0.124 0.0929 
0.013 0.0937 
0.823 0.0560 
-0.058 0.0732 
Equity/Asset 1.175 0.0342 0.386 0.0749 
LLP/N R -0.028 0.0662 -0.024 
0.0705 
ROE 0.448 0.0427 0.238 0.0655 
Cost/assets -0.688 0.0711 -2.019 0.0289 
Non Int Income/ Income -0.776 0.0486 -2.606 0.0036 
Commercial 0.006 0.0987 0.488 0.0181 
Non Commercial -0.006 0.0987 -0A88 0.0181 
Algeria -0.540 0.0148 -0.240 0.0513 
Morocco 0.760 0.0450 0.031 0.0339 
Tunisia dummy variable has been removed from the model by Minitab due to multicolinearity. 
Table 6-20 shows that all independent variables included in the table have p-values less 
than 10%. This indicates that there is sufficient evidence that the parameters of the two 
models are not equal to zero using a significant level of 10%148. Thus, as the coefficients 
are found to be significantly different from zero, this indicates that there is statistical 
evidence that banks in the three countries with different financial characteristics have 
varying levels of efficiency. 
To explore the relationship between the dependent variable, efficiency estimates, and the 
independent variables and the financial variables, the sign of the coefficients are 
examined. For both cost and alternative profit efficiency models, the Equity to Assets 
ratio, ROE, and Commercial and Morocco dummies have coefficients with positive 
signs, whereas LLP to NIR, Cost to Assets, Non Interest Income/ Income, and non- 
1' The variables of Equity/ Assets, ROE, Non Interest Income/ Income, Morocco and Tunisian dummies 
for the case of cost efficiency, and the variables of costs/ assets, Non Interest Income/ Income, bank type 
dummies, and Morocco dummy for the case of alternative profit efficiency, have p-value of less than 5%. 
The log-likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients associated with the predictors 
equal zero versus these coefficients not all being equal to zero. Given that the likelihood ratio of the two 
models has p-value smaller than the accepted significance of 10%, this indicates that there is sufficient 
evidence that at least one of the coefficients is different from zero. The goodness fit of tests have p-value 
greater than 1.312, indicating that there is insufficient evidence to claim that the model does not fit the data 
adequately. 
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commercial and Algeria dummies have coefficients with negative signs. Assets variable 
is the only one that has a coefficient with a positive sign in the both cost efficiency model 
and alternative profit model. 
The positive sign of the capital to assets variable coefficient suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between efficiency and capital ratios, conforming what we have just 
seen in the last section that banks the most efficient banks tend to have higher levels of 
capital to assets ratios than the less efficient banks. Banks with higher levels of efficiency 
seem to have more capital to assets and this enables them to absorb higher default risks 
of their customers and clients (typically the non-performing government-owned 
enterprises in many cases). Yildimir and Philippatos (2003) found similar results-higher 
levels of inefficiencies are associated with banks with higher levels of capital to assets 
ratio. 
The coefficients of LLP/NIR have a negative sign, that is, efficiency estimates are 
inversely correlated with LLP to NIR. LLP to N IR have two sides. First, a bank increases 
its loan loss provisions when it realises that the bulk of non-performing assets is 
increasing. This situation is consistent with the findings of the last section in which the 
most efficient group was found to have lower levels of risk. Second, an increase in the 
ratio of LLP to NIR may be the result of a greater increases in interest expenses 
compared to interest income, suggesting greater competition in the market, or increases 
in the levels of non-performing assets 
The positive sign on the ROE coefficient suggests a positive relationship between 
profitability and cost and profit efficiency (as would be expected). In addition, cost and 
alternative profit efficiencies tend to be negatively correlated with cost to assets and non- 
interest income to total income. Cost and profit efficient banks have lower levels of costs 
to assets reflecting lower levels of labour, interest and other expenses. In terms of 
geographic location and specialisation, Moroccan and Tunisian banks tend to be the most 
cost and profit efficient in the sample. This suggests that country conditions in Morocco 
and Tunisia are possibly more suitable for increasing banks' cost and profit efficiency. 
Moroccan and Tunisian banks have more private and foreign capital in their 
shareholdings than Algerian banks. Commercial banks are found to be more cost and 
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profit efficient compared to non-commercial banks. In addition, there 
is a positive 
relationship between the size and cost efficiency for Maghreb banks. 
6-7-6 Estimated Levels of Scale Economies and Scale 
Efficiencies 
6-7-6-1 Scale Economies 
Productive efficiency is associated with the optimisation of firm's behaviour at two 
levels, either output maximisation or input minimisation. In terms of output 
maximisation, efficient behaviour involves the production of optimal outputs at a lower 
level of cost per unit. That is, scale economies imply that for over a given range of 
output, per unit costs decline as output increases. Using the cost function, there are three 
cases related to scale; increasing return to scale, decreasing returns to scale, and constant 
returns to scale. Evanoff and Israilevich (1991) explain that economies of scale exist if, 
over a given range of output, per unit costs decline as output increases; a case for 
increasing returns to scale; however, scale diseconomies exist when, over a given range 
of outputs, per unit cost increase as output decreases; decreasing returns to scale. Scale 
efficient behaviour is the case when we have constant returns to scale suggesting that 
changes in output will result in proportional changes in costs. 
Following the explanation by Evanoff and Israilevich (1991) and using the translog cost 
function employed in our study, scale economies are calculated as the percent change in 
cost with respect to percent change in output149 Overall, the results of our scale 
economies analysis reveal that scale economies are present in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia banking and they lie within the range of 8.5% and 66.5% for our assets size 
classes. Table 6-21 provides more details on the scale economies estimates, while Table 
A3-5 in Appendix A3 reports scale economies estimates for every banking firm used in 
our sample over the period under consideration. 
'a9 The formula used to derive scale economies estimates are calculated according to the formula suggested 
in the methodology chapter. Scale economies can be estimated by differentiating the translog cost function 
with respect to outputs. 
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Table 6-21: Scale Economies estimates in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia 
banking over 1994-2001 
ý -, -1998 != 1999 -ý 2000 ° 2001 ALL't 
Algeria 4336 47.8 47.9 5134 50.72 5322 53.72 69.41 52.18 
Morocco 46.47 45.72 44.89 44.74 49.7 46.71 44.58 35.7 44.81 
Tunisia 73.36 66.73 67.65 68.54 67.94 72.66 70.76 65.03 69.08 
Commercial 49.98 5429 52.26 52.27 5529 54.6 53.12 53.02 53.10 
Non Commercial 68.17 68.61 94.16 75.77 7958 80.44 81.55 76A5 78.09 
Investment " 7233 7629 7836 80.66 80.81 80.46 69.73 76.95 
Specialised Banks 64.48 64.73 65.61 64.04 6459 63.61 58.95 61.55 63.45 
Non banking Ins. s t 9733 96.49 96.56 9557 95.53 85.82 94.55 
Multi-lateral Bank 75.56 75.44 72.76 70.11 75.07 7633 75.11 74.63 74.40 
All 54.40 53.42 53.48 54.87 56.12 57.53 56.35 56.71 55.36 
Asset Size (USS million) 
Year 1994 ° 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 ALL 
1-99 85.03 8136 88.24 96.49 9728 95.73 94.98 93.19 91.54 
100-249 7725 77.73 75.02 74.8 73.64 75.75 75.47 77.97 75.95 
250.499 6737 67.67 67.46 68.61 85.43 8134 76.09 64.43 7230 
500-999 61.98 6234 60.68 60.43 56.96 56.53 54.1 57.05 58.76 
1,000-1,999 47.11 44.49 5125 51.44 48.1 47.84 46.93 5121 48.55 
2,000-2,999 44.28 4538 46.05 53.79 62,44 56.04 51.62 40.07 49.96 
3,000-3,999 36.11 4135 50.68 36.02 34.69 31.78 31.79 27.49 36.24 
4,000-4,999 * 80.21 * 27.77 28.43 34.91 31.72 30.07 38.85 
5,000+ 54.61 28.53 30.7 34.98 34.91 29.89 31.88 22.11 33.45 
ALL 59.22 58.78 58.76 56.04 5799 56.65 54.95 5151 56.18 
Assets Million', 1-99 . 100-249 250.499 500-999 , 1,000-1,9992,000 2,9993,000-3,9994,0004,9 99 5,000+ U5 Doilar 1 
Algeria 90.69 81.19 62.98 » 4838 85.11 48.18 3852 32.79 
Morocco * * 90.64 51.58 46.12 42.47 33.04 30,07 
Tunisia 94.79 75.09 68.58 59.66 51.90 44.67 * * * 
Commercial 9126 74.41 62.76 58.08 49.07 4352 33.83 3120 30.15 
Non Commercial 96.19 77.13 74.60 61.16 4838 85.11 81.72 8021 77.78 
Investment 96.22 74.79 65.87 * » » » » * 
Specialised Banks * * 72.73 61.16 4838 85.11 81.72 8021 77.78 
Non banking Ins. 96.19 85.69 90.64 * * * » 
Multi-lateral Bank * 77.00 66.62 » » » » » * 
Scale economies estimates are significant in terms of geographical location, ownership, specialisation. at 
the 5%. Scale economies are also found not to be different from unity at a significance level of 10%. 
Table 6-21 reports the results for scale economies in our sample according to time, 
geographical location, specialisation and size. Overall, the economies of scale estimate is 
around 54% for the average bank in our study, which provides evidence of the existence 
of substantial scale economies in each year under consideration. Table 6-21 shows that 
scale economies estimates (46%) for our sample are not negligible; and tend to dominate 
over X-inefficiencies (29%). This finding opposes some findings in the literature. Berger, 
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Hunter and Timme (1993) and Berger and Humphrey (1997) find that X-inefficiencies 
(20%) tend to be larger than scale economies (5-10%). We believe that our results are 
different from that of the literature because of the small size of our sample. 
Table 6-21 also indicates that the magnitude of scale economies is in the range of 8.5% 
for very small banks (banks with total assets less than US$100mn) to 66.5% for very 
large banks (banks with total assets more than US$5bn). Bank scale economies seem to 
be greater in Morocco (55%) and Algeria (48%) than in Tunisia (31%). Also, commercial 
banks (47%) appear to be experiencing substantial realisable scale economies compared 
to non-commercial banks (22%). Table 6-21 also shows evidence of the presence of 
substantial economies of scale for all bank assets size classes, particularly bank with over 
US$100million, i. e., medium and large-sized banks. There is also no evidence that scale 
economies tend to exhaust over the period under study. Table 6-21 shows that overall the 
average cost curve for our sample tends to have a U-shaped curve with a downturn 
sloping, due to the use of the translog frontier function and implying a negative 
relationship between assets size and scale economies. A negative relationship has also 
been found in the literature, including Williams (2003) and Carbo, Gardener and 
Williams (2002). 
Our results suggest a relatively positive relationship between small size, constant return 
to scale, non-commercial bank type and Tunisia as a geographical location. This is in 
contrast to Mertnes and Urga (2001) and Kasman (2002), who find high levels of scale 
economies estimates for small banks. Because of the existence of scale economies in the 
Maghreb banking industry, more growth-related activities (either more expansion of 
outputs production, branching or consolidation) for medium and large-sized banks appear 
to be foreseeable, especially in Morocco and Algeria. As seen in Chapter 3, bank mergers 
seem to be happening in Morocco. Banque Commerciale du Maroc (BCM) and 
Wafabank have agreed to merge into one entity effectively in the first quarter or so of 
2004. This merger will create a new entity known as VCM-Wafabank and this will 
become the largest bank in Morocco in terms of assets, deposits and branches. Also, as 
noted in Chapter 3, the banking market in Maghreb region seems to be under-populated 
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as only one bank branch for less more than 20,000 capita in Algeria and Morocco and 
more than 10,000 capita in Tunisia, compared to one branch to less than 5,000 capita in 
some developed countries. Therefore, an increase in size through branching or number of 
accounts could be methods to realise economies of scale in the Maghreb area. Given our 
findings that Maghreb commercial banks enjoy relatively higher levels of cost 
inefficiency and substantial scale economies between 1994 and 2001, an increase in size 
could realise some cost savings, particularly for medium and large-sized banks. Medium 
and large-sized banks can diversify their assets, by spreading and lowering overall risk, 
which may result in diminishing non-performing assets. Medium and larger-sized banks 
may have greater resources to manage more efficiently the processing of customers, 
which can lead to lower credit losses. Also, large and medium-sized banks tend to 
concentrate on protecting their image and reputation, which may result in higher ratings 
and lower funding costs regarding purchased funds. 
Unlike Matousek (2004) who questions the role of small banks in the banking industry, 
the close-to-unity results for very small banks and the substantial potential scale 
economies for medium and large banks question the regulatory implications of having 
banks size of types in terms of their contributions to banking sector efficiencies overall. 
Small banks tend to be privately-owned and involved in specialised activities, raising the 
potential for obtaining costs savings through economies of scope. Although the results 
support the view that Maghreb regulators should promote small-size banking and 
specialised activities, the results also support the view that medium and large-sized banks 
should also be encouraged to grow so as to achieve constant returns scale. The regulator 
should relax branching and expansion requirements, encourage consolidation in the 
banking industry, and review bank output regulation measures so more population and 
economic sectors can be accessible. These measures, if taken, do not appear to harm the 
overall efficiency of the banking systems in the three countries as the optimal size cannot 
be absolutely identified. 
However, we must treat the above findings with caution as Maghreb banking systems 
seem still to be absorbing the effects of a prolonged period of financial repression. That 
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is, the absence of fully-fledged competition and the slow path of embracing technology 
and financial innovation, and the relatively high level of governmental interventions can 
be considered as important factors responsible for yielding the scale economies results 
reported above. Overall, our results show that banks can make cost savings by both 
changing their size (scale economies), and emulating industry best practice (X- 
efficiency). 
6-7-6-2 Scale Efficiencies 
As it is noted in earlier sections, scale efficiencies are different from scale economies. 
Williams (2003) notes that while scale economies measure the change in cost associated 
with an incremental change in output, scale efficiency measures the change in output if a 
bank is to attain cost efficiency scale. That is, scale efficiency measures the costs 
associated with producing outputs of each firm relative to the most scale efficient firm 
within a particular assets size class. Williams (2003) indicates that scale efficiency 
estimates should be used with X-efficiency estimates in order to derive policy and 
regulatory implication. Scale efficiency estimates are computed for our sample, and 
reported in Table 6-23 according to time trend, geographical location, specialisation and 
assets size. Table A3-6 in Appendix A3 reports scale efficiency estimates for every 
banking and financial firm in our sample and for each year under study. 
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Table 6-22: Scale Efficiencies estimates in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia 
banking over 1994-2001 
'Year' `" " -' 1994' =" 
1995. "_ 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 " -ALL 
Algeria 91.56 9156 9155 92.45 92.08 92b2 93.18 95.628 92.58 
Morocco 9233 92.43 92.05 91.96 92.43 91.88 9139 89.05 91.70 
Tunisia 98.02 96.99 96.86 96.85 97.17 97.14 96.73 96.08 96.98 
Commercial 92.58 96.93 93.55 93.64 93.85 93.59 93.21 93.16 93.44 
Non Commercial 9736 97.58 9823 98.13 9831 9826 9795 97.51 97.92 
Investment * 98.08 98.40 98.59 98.69 98.68 96.68 97.66 98.40 
Specialised Banks 96.49 96A3 9651 9622 96.17 95.93 94.81 9490 95.93 
Non banking Ins. 99.96 99.94 99.92 99.80 99.88 99.12 99.77 
Multi-lateral Bank 9822 98.22 98.06 97.75 98A4 98.62 98.44 9838 98.27 
All 93.97 93.63 93.49 93.76 93.89 93.88 93.83 93.58 93.75 
Asset Size (US$ million) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 .E .° 
1997 1998 "' "'1999 2000': 2001 ALL 
1-99 98.91 99.13 99.42 99.96 99.94 99.77 99.81 99.84 99.60 
100-249 99.01 98.69 9832 98.27 98.19 98.41 9835 98.56 98.40 
250-499 9730 97.35 9733 97.52 9924 99.04 98.09 96.80 98.40 
500-999 9634 9639 95.99 95.94 9524 95.12 94.60 9527 95.61 
1,000-1,999 92.78 92.96 93.76 93.87 92.98 92.92 92.71 93.44 93.18 
2,000-2,999 91.86 92.59 9237 93.83 94.83 93.79 93.00 90.63 92.86 
3,000-3,999 9832 91.07 92.37 98.29 88.82 87.73 87.72 86.04 89.05 
4 , 
0004,999 * 99.02 * 86.15 86.42 87.89 86.68 87.06 89.20 
5.000+ 90.14 8639 8724 88.90 87.88 86.90 87.71 83.72 87.36 
ALL 93.81 94.84 94.60 93.75 93.73 99.77 99.81 92.73 93.33 
Assets in million 
.. 
1 -99 ,, `ý'' 
- 
, 
100-249 250-499 500-999 000-3,9994,000-1,999 1,000-1 9992 000-2 9993 . 5,000+ 
, US Dollar , , , , 
Algeria 99.65 99.07 96.54 * 92.69 99.44 91.99 8925 98.66 
Morocco * * 99.76 93.99 9250 9129 88.18 87.06 
Tunisia 99.79 9836 97.47 95.80 93.98 92.02 * * 
Commercial 99.58 9826 9649 95.50 9325 91.64 8846 8748 87.00 
Non Commercial 97.88 97.90 9732 94.88 100.00 99.60 9945 9537 100.00 
Investment 99.96 9826 97.06 w w w w w 
Specialised Banks 98.11 96.01 92.69 99.44 99.09 98.77 98.76 
Non banking Ins. 99.90 99.61 99.76 * * * * * * 
Multi-lateral Bank * 98.63 97.19 * * * * * * 
Scale economies estimate are fount to be only significant in terms of geographical location, ownership, 
specialisation at the 5%. 
Table 6-22 reports the results of our scale efficiency estimates for our sample in terms of 
time, assets size, geographical location and specialisation. Average scale efficiency for 
our sample for all size classes is found to be around 93%. The results of scale efficiencies 
tend to be similar to the results of scale sconomies. Tunisian financial firms are found to 
be more scale efficient (97%), then Algerian (92.5%) and Moroccan banking firms 
(91.7%). Commercial banks are found to be less scale efficient 93.4%) than non- 
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commercial banking and financial firms (97.2%). The results reported in Table 6-22 can 
be interpreted as the percentage change in unit cost that is required for the different 
average-sized banks to operate at the cost efficient scale of each size classes. For 
instance, a bank with more than US$5bn in total assets seems to be able to make cost 
savings (13% less than the actual costs), if it operates at the optimal scale of banks within 
the same category of assets size class. 
Similar to the results in the scale economies section, Table 6-22 provides evidence of the 
negative relationship between assets size and scale efficiencies for our sample under 
consideration. Scale efficiency estimates are closer to unity for the smallest bank assets 
size class (99.6%) than for the largest bank size class (87.4%). Overall, banking firms 
with less than US$1000m tend to have scale inefficiency less than 5%, banking firms 
with assets size between US$1000m and US$3000mn are found to have scale 
inefficiency estimate of 7%, whereas banks with larger than US$3000mn have scale 
inefficiency of more than 10%. 
In summary, our findings suggest the presence of substantial scale economies and scale 
efficiencies for our sample under study, in particular for medium and large banks, and 
these tend to dominate X-inefficiencies. The results also provide evidence of a negative 
relationship between assets size and scale economics and scale efficiencies. Therefore, 
banking and financial firms in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia can achieve potential gains 
of costs savings if they realise economies of scale, operate at the optimal scale efficient 
level, and reduce X-inefficiencies. 
6-7-7 The Estimations of Efficiency Scores using the DEA 
Approach 
In this section, the cost efficiency for the banking systems under study is estimated using 
Data Envelopment Analysis. This process is carried out following Bauer et al. (1999) 
who suggests that we should conduct DEA type estimates as a consistency test to check 
the robustness of the results obtained using alternative approaches. The analysis will be 
undertaken using the assumptions of both CRS and VRS in order to localise scale 
efficiencies. The CRS appropriately holds when all the members of the sample are 
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operating at optimal scale. The VRS discards this optimality assumption and takes into 
consideration a number of factors that may influence banks' efficiency such as imperfect 
competition and constraints on finance. The CRS assumes that units operate at the 
optimal area, whereas the VRS assumes the opposite 
The technical efficiency results using DEA, assuming constant and variable returns to 
scale, averaged around 0.80 and 0.90 respectively, allocative efficiency around 0.55, and 
cost efficiency averaged at 0.51 over the sample period. As indicated earlier, the 
difference between the efficiency estimates under CRS and VRS is attributed to scale 
efficiency. The scale efficiency averaged around 0.88 for the financial institutions in the 
countries under study over (1994-2001) the sample period. 
The efficiency results of the DEA analysis for the whole sample are shown in Table 6- 
23. In Appendix A3, DEA estimates are reported for every banking firm used in this 
study for every year (1994 to 2001) from Table A3-7 to Table A3-15. 
Table 6-23: Results the whole sample DEA 
Year CSR VRS Scale eff 
Allocative 
Eff cost eff IRS CON DRS 
1994 0.8074 0.9258 0.8769 0.7082 0.6695 0.2353 0.4118 0.3529 
1995 0.7333 0.8296 0.8840 0.5331 0.4516 0.1724 0.3103 0.5172 
1996 0.7445 0.8806 0.8504 0.5357 0.4907 0.2222 0.3056 0.4722 
1997 0.8049 0.9641 0.8340 0.5337 0.5160 0.1111 0.3611 0.5278 
1998 0.8224 0.9207 0.8900 0.4995 0.4726 02564 0.3846 0.3590 
1999 0.8306 0.9053 0.9068 0.4609 0.4386 0.3023 0.3488 0.3488 
2000 0.8096 0.8887 0.9098 0.5519 0.5066 0.3111 0.3111 0.3778 
2001 0.8723 0.9277 0.9343 0.5585 0.5333 0.1714 0.4571 0.3714 
mean 0.8031 0.9053 0.8858 0.5477 0.5099 0.2286 0.3571 0.4143 
IRS, CON and DRS indicate the proportions of banks that are located in the increasing, constant and decreasing returns 
to scale areas, respectively. 
Table 6-23 suggests significant opportunities for efficiency gains in the financial and 
banking markets in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The DEA estimates suggest that, the 
average North African financial and banking firm could have reduced its costs by nearly 
50% over the period 1994-2001. Table 6-23 also reports that the average technical, 
allocative and scale efficiencies of North African banks over the period of 1994-2001 are 
90.35%, 54.77%, and 88.85%, respectively. This implies that, over the time period of 
1994 to 2001, cost efficiency change is mainly due to changes in allocative and technical 
285 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia 
efficiency more than scale efficiency. According to Evanoff 
(1999), allocative 
inefficiency occurs when inputs are combined in suboptimal proportions. Regulation and 
poor management are typically given as major reason for this. 
lso The average DEA cost 
efficiency score found in this study, around 50%, is lower than that 
found in other 
studies, such as Casu and Molyneux (2000) who found a score of 65% for a number of 
European banks and Dietsch and Weill (1998) who found average efficiency levels in the 
EU of 64% in 1996, but higher than those found by Darrat, Topuz and Yousef 
(2002) 
who found average cost inefficiency of 32% for Kuwaiti banks in 1994-97, and by Cook, 
Hababou and Roberts (2001) who found efficiency to be 45% for Tunisian banks. 
The decomposition of cost efficiency reveals that the most severe efficiency loss occurs 
as a result of allocative inefficiency, which averages only 54.77% over the time period of 
the study. That is, allocative inefficiencies can explain the cost inefficiencies by more 
than 40% than technical inefficiencies. This suggests that banks in our sample, on 
average, are not efficient in choosing the right cost minimizing combination of inputs. 
Evidently, this is a characteristic of a market that has been shielded from effective 
competition (Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2001). As we have noted throughout the thesis, 
banking institutions in Maghreb countries, in particular those with a major presence, tend 
to be more constrained by the lack of independence due to excess management control 
and political interference resulting in suboptimal utilisation of banking resources. The 
second major source of efficiency loss among the banks in our sample arises from 
technical inefficiency, i. e., the failure of the average bank to operate on the cost frontier. 
This type of efficiency averaged 90% over the time period from 1994 to 2001. Technical 
inefficiency is a limitation in a period of rapid technological change, suggesting that 
many banks must improve their technical performance dramatically to remain in the 
market. 
Cummins and Rubio-Misasm (2001) note that bank cost efficiency can be improved 
when firms move from either increasing or decreasing returns to scale to constant returns 
to scale. This move will involve wasting fewer returns due to firms being either too small 
I" An extreme example presented by Evanoff (1999) would be if regulations mandated that regulated 
forms use a particular process to produce a commodity. For example, no machinery can be used. Even if 
the inputs other than capital were used as effectively as possible, the ban on machinery would most likely 
result in a production process that would be less efficient than the unrestricted process 
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or too large. On this basis, if any of the Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian governments 
policies' has encouraged consolidation and been beneficial, then we expect the 
proportion of firms operating with increasing returns to scale to decrease (IRS) over the 
sample period, the proportion operating with constant returns to scale (CRS) to increase, 
and/or the proportion operating with decreasing returns to scale (DRS) to decline. Scale 
efficiency is relatively high, averaging 88% over the period of analysis 1994-2001. 
Approximately 41%, 23% and 36% of the sample are operating on the decreasing, 
increasing and constant returns to scale position of the best cost practice frontier, 
respectively. No major trend can be detected for the change in the proportion of 
increasing return to scale, suggesting that consolidation in the three countries has not 
increased the proportion of scale efficient firms. 
The average efficiency scores by firm size quartile are considered and shown in Table 6- 
24. The size quartiles in the table are based on total assets, with quartile 1 (Q1) 
containing the smallest firms and quartile 4 (Q4) the largest. 
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Table 6-24: The average cost efficiency scores by firm size quartile 
(average values) 
Efficiency Cost Efficiency Technical Efficiency 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1994 0.6405 0.5838 0.6600 0.7690 1.0000 0.8883 0.6710 0.8506 
1995 03860 02364 0.4390 0.7083 0.9737 0.6479 0.7967 0.8914 
1996 0.4552 03304 0.4450 0.7320 0.9289 0.8020 0.8363 0.9474 
1997 02800 0.4167 0.5393 0.8279 0.9963 0.9601 0.9089 0.9907 
1998 0.123 03986 03774 0.6669 0.9362 0.8667 09008 0.9735 
1999 0.4171 03766 0.3558 0.6029 0.8649 0.8866 0.8896 0.9762 
2000 0.788 05312 0.4234 05860 08875 0.9063 0.7924 0.9542 
2001 0.5529 0.4668 0.3483 0.7652 0.9649 0.9358 0.8727 0.9374 
Mean OA529 OA176 0.1485 0.7073 0.9440 0.8617 0.8335 09402 
Efficiency Allocative Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1994 0.6405 0.6495 0.6710 0.8392 0.9075 0.8405 0.7905 0.9508 
1995 0.3914 0.3519 0.5481 0.8026 0.8790 0.9791 0.7957 0.8825 
1996 0.692 03943 05133 0.7660 0.7383 0.9503 0.8208 0.8923 
1997 02807 0.266 05940 0.8337 0.8212 0.9033 0.7732 0.8382 
1998 0.4230 0.4588 0.4071 0.6746 0.7023 0.9878 0.9424 0.8873 
1999 0.4433 0.4169 03749 0.6070 0.7296 0.9876 0.9733 0.9207 
2000 0.4992 0.5663 0.5315 0.5700 0.7674 0.9813 0.9697 0.9198 
2001 0.5566 0.4853 03878 0.8043 0.9280 0.9690 0.9101 0.9300 
Mean 0.4630 0.4687 0.5035 0.7372 08092 0.9499 0.8720 0.9027 
Table 6-24 shows the largest firms have the highest efficiency estimates averaging 70%, 
whereas other bank sizes have much lower efficiency estimates of 43%. When quartile 
four is excluded from the analysis, in most of years in the sample period, it appears that 
there is no relationship between cost efficiency and size quartile. Thus, it is unclear if 
firm size is significantly related to bank efficiency. 
In all the quartiles, the decomposition of cost efficiency into allocative, technical, and 
scale efficiency reveals that the largest-firm cost efficiency advantage is primarily 
attributable to technical efficiency. Thus, larger banks primarily define the production 
frontier, suggesting a significant advantage in employing technology. However, bigger is 
better does not seem significant as the second largest banks have cost efficiency equal to 
the smallest-sized banks. Thus, there is little evidence that size and efficiency are related 
in dimension for the case of the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian banking using the 
DEA methodology. 
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Further analysis of efficiency by size quartile shows that a higher proportion of cost 
efficiencies is due to allocative efficiency rather than scale efficiency. Quartiles 3 and 4 
have the highest average allocative efficiencies. This suggests that any advantages 
conveyed by larger scale in terms of selecting optimal input quantities tend to be offset 
by the difficulties of allocating resources in larger and more complex organisations. Scale 
efficiency by size quartile provides important information regarding the governments' 
policies of encouraging banking industry consolidation. The table shows that the smallest 
quartile (Q1) is clearly less scale efficient than firms in the three larger quartiles (Q2, Q3, 
and Q4), suggesting that many firms in Quartile 1 are operating with increasing returns to 
scale. Thus, government policy makes sense if it enables small firms to attain more 
efficient scale, encouraging the merger of such firms into larger entities. However, the 
figures also suggest that there are limits to the efficiency gains from consolidation. Firms 
in Q4 are less scale efficient than firms in Q2 and Q3, implying that many large firms 
may be operating with decreasing retunes to scale. 
Table 6-25 reveals efficiency scores derived from the DEA estimation according to 
geographic location and bank type. 
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Table 6-25: Efficiency estimates according to Geographic location and 
Bank' Type (average Values) 
Years 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average 
Algeria 
Technical Efficiency 0.8370 0.8291 0.9139 0.9527 1.0000 1.0000 0.9662 0.9331 0.9290 
Allocative Efficiency 0.7686 0.7833 0.8116 0.8223 0.8433 0.6710 0.6708 0.4531 0.7280 
Scale Efficiency 0.9598 0.8879 09007 0.9180 1.0000 0.9388 0.9522 0.8883 0.9307 
Cost Efficiency 0.6896 0.6653 0.7717 0.7813 0.8433 0.6710 0.6588 0.4451 0.6908 
Morocco 
Technical Efficiency 09848 0.9038 09539 09555 0.8841 0.8261 0.8294 0.8857 0.9029 
Allocative Efficiency 0.7154 03513 03599 0.4380 0.1841 0.1565 0.3288 0.5073 0.3802 
Scale Efficiency 0.7646 0.7920 0.7666 0.6883 0.7954 0.9424 0.9236 0.9293 0.8253 
Cost Efficiency 0.7072 03105 0.3444 0.4317 0.1673 0.1343 0.2679 0.4549 0.3523 
Tunisia 
Technical Efficiency 0.9470 0.8020 0.8468 0.9713 0.9123 0.9006 0.8847 0.8847 0.8937 
Allocative Efficiency 0.6600 0.4919 0.5039 0.4800 0.5050 0.4767 0.5966 0.5966 0.5388 
Scale Efficiency 0.8980 0.9250 0.8611 0.8564 0.8901 0.8869 0.8898 0.9221 0.8912 
Cost Efficiency 0.6283 0.4110 04478 0.4668 0.4692 0.4477 05458 05458 0.4953 
Commercial Banks 
Technical Efficiency 0.9252 0.5318 0.8759 0.9714 0.9315 09374 0.9048 0.9376 0.9144 
Allocative Efficiency 0.7316 0.5382 05246 0.5422 0.5135 0.4791 0.5994 0.6648 0.5742 
Scale Efficiency 0.8644 0.8564 0.8663 0.8299 0.9200 0.9523 0.9520 0.9396 0.8976 
Cost Efficiency 0.6960 0.4535 0.4769 0.5288 0.4861 0.4621 0.5502 0.6350 0.5361 
Non-Commercial Banks 
Technical Efficiency 0.9268 0.8229 0.8806 0.9511 0.9034 0.8511 0.8531 0.9052 0.8868 
Allocative Efficiency 0.6653 0.5171 05170 0.5187 0.4771 0.4302 0.4468 03170 0.4862 
Scale Efficiency 0.9000 0.9709 0.7959 0.8413 0.8421 0.8301 0.8163 0.9221 0.8648 
Cost Efficiency 0.6210 0.4457 0.741 0.4933 0.4509 0.3989 0.4102 03021 0.4495 
Table 6-25 shows that are significant differences in cost efficiencies of banks in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia over the period of study. Algerian banks appear to be the more cost 
efficient compared with Tunisian and Moroccan banks. This finding is opposite to those 
derived from the parametric analysis in which Moroccan and Tunisian banks are the most 
cost and profit efficient in the sample. In terms of bank types, commercial banks tend to 
have higher rates of cost efficiency than non-commercial banks. 
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6-7-8 DEA and Translog Stochastic Estimates 
Comparison 
In this part of the thesis, we consider whether cost efficiency patterns observed from the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis are similar to those observed from the Data Envelopment 
Analysis using the Spearman rank correlation test. Also, in order to identify the most 
appropriate methodology and results that can be possibly used for regulatory and 
managerial purposes, we compare the ranking order of the efficiency scores with a 
simple accounting ratio of bank efficiency, the cost to assets ratio to see if the estimates 
relate to common financial measures of bank efficiency. 
First, comparing the cost efficiency derived using DEA (50%) with those of SFA (70%), 
the results from both methodologies are substantially different. Puig-Junoy (2000) 
mentions that DEA efficiency scores are lower that those obtained from the stochastic 
frontier. He argues that DEA estimates are typically lower because the stochastic frontier 
approach allows banks to depart from the frontier due to both random error and 
inefficiency, whereas DEA measured random error is part of inefficiency. 
Second, the Spearman rank correlation test between efficiency scores derived from the 
two methodologies is found to be around -4.2%'51While the stochastic cost frontier 
analysis suggests that commercial banks and Moroccan and Tunisia banks are the most 
cost efficient in our sample, the DEA results conclude that commercial banks and 
Algerian banks are the most cost efficient in the sample. Size, expressed in total assets, 
appears to have a relatively neutral influence in the DEA analysis. 
Third, the Spearman rank correlation that compares cost efficiencies derived from the 
two approaches and a simple cost to assets ratios shows that results from both 
methodologies are not significantly related. However, the stochastic frontier cost 
efficiencies estimates appear to be more correlated to the cost to assets ratio (25%) 
compared to the DEA ordering (-2.2%). Thus, given the sample test, we believe that 
translog stochastic frontier estimates appear to be more robust and consistent with the 
sample characteristics than the DEA results. 
151 This test has a p-value of 48%, which is not significant at significance level of 10%. 
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6-8 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the results of cost and alternative profit efficiency estimates derived 
from the utilisation of the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) with the translog function 
specification. The sample includes 251 observations for 50 financial firms operating in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia over the 1994-2001 period. This thesis finds mean cost 
and alternative profit efficiency levels in the three countries to be 29% and 32%, 
respectively, with no noticeable trend over time. Scale economies (average of 44%) are 
found to be present and substantial in the Maghreb banking system and these are 
dominating X-inefficiencies. Scale inefficiency are also computed and found to be within 
the range 1-13%. 
The findings according to bank characteristics are found to be mixed. Commercial banks 
are significantly more cost inefficient and less profit efficient than non-commercial 
banks. In addition, large-and medium-sized banks tend to be more cost efficient but less 
profit efficient than small and medium-sized banks. Overall, in the three countries, bank 
cost and alternative profit inefficiency is found to be higher in Algeria than in Morocco 
and Tunisia. This would suggest financial and economic reforms have not made an 
influential impact on cost and profit efficiency of the banking sectors in the three 
countries under study. Evidence also suggests that the financial sectors in the three 
countries still seem to be suffering from the absence of competition and market 
pressures. 
The overall results found in this study is that banking firms with mixed structures of 
ownership (a combination of private, public and foreign), or listed, are more cost and 
profit efficient than their counterparts with a single type of ownership. We suggest that 
the three types of ownership may combine so as to reduce various inefficiencies 
associated with single ownership types. For example, foreign ownership might bring new 
technology and updated systems of risk management, the private sector emphasises the 
profitability motive and lending to more profitable sectors, whereas government 
ownership brings experience and knowledge in the domestic market. These factors 
combined seem to result in a more efficient bank operating units than those that have sole 
ownership features. 
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Chapter 7 Main Findings and Limitations of 
the Study 
7-1- Introduction 
Financial deregulation measures have been implemented in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia over the last two decades. The primary objective of these measures is to 
encourage banks to function more competitively within a market-based regulatory 
framework. During the pre-deregulation period, banks were not permitted to make their 
balance-sheet decision-making autonomously. Interest rates were determined in circles 
outside money markets, (which did not exist), and I'encadrementdu credit was utilised to 
allocate credits centrally to secteurs publics, which were most favoured by planners, i. e., 
the central government. This conduct prevented banking firms from functioning 
according to market-based rules. Recently, various financial liberalisation measures have 
been introduced to encourage banks to function under market-based regulations, and this 
should encourage such firms to concentrate on improving their cost and profit efficiency 
levels. 
This study has sought to provide an overview of the political economy aspects of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia during the 1960s to date, and has also provided an overview of the 
recent developments in the three countries' banking sectors, including measures of 
financial deregulation and their banking sector developments. In particular, the principal 
objective of this study is to estimate the cost and alternative profit efficiency of a sample 
of 50 banking institutions in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia over the period ranging from 
1994 to 2001. Over this period, the financial sectors in the three countries experienced an 
unprecedented entry of foreign and private banks into local banking markets, as well as a 
substantial reorganisation of systems aimed at creating a more market-based system. 
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7-2- Main Findings of the study 
This thesis uses the translog stochastic frontier approach to estimate bank cost and profit 
inefficiency in Algeria Morocco and Tunisia. The results show that the average cost and 
profit inefficiency was estimated to be 29% and 32%, respectively, whereas the DEA 
cost efficiency estimates were found to be larger, 44-46%. Using the consistency 
measures including spearman rank correlation analysis, we found that the translog 
frontier analysis results appear to be more robust than the DEA results. The conflicting 
results derived from the two competing methodological approaches, however do not 
prevent us from concluding that there is significant scope to reduce the inputs of the 
respective banking systems without decreasing the levels of output. The analysis also 
principally reveals that; first, Moroccan and Tunisian banks are more cost efficient than 
their counterparts in Algeria, secondly, banks that are involved in traditional income- 
generating activities are more profit efficient that other banks, and thirdly, banks that 
have higher levels of loan loss provisions to net interest revenues are more cost 
inefficient than other banks. However, no significant relationship was found between cost 
and profit efficiency and bank size. Also, the analysis reveals the existence of substantial 
scale economies within the range of 8.5-66.5%, especially for medium and large-sized 
banks. This result may provide an incentive for further growth-related activities in the 
banking systems under study. In addition, the cost and profit inefficiencies that appear to 
prevail in North African banking, we argue, are likely to reflect the still limited presence 
of competitive pressures in the banking systems under study. Following Evanoff (1999), 
inefficient banks in North African countries continue to exist because they may be 
protected, especially as we know that the largest banks are typically State-owned or have 
major state shareholders. 
One aim of this study is to evaluate the degree to which the financial and economic 
reform measures implemented so far (in the 1990s) within the liberalisation programme 
have influenced cost and profit efficiency in North African banking. The levels of cost 
inefficiency found suggest that bank's managers as well as bank regulators in the 
respective banking systems need to increase their efforts to facilitate improvements in 
bank cost efficiencies. We consequently suggest that bank managers need to improve 
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their loan portfolio management by using more efficient loan and credit evaluation 
procedures. In addition, bank regulators should take further measures that orient the 
financial sector to be more competitive. As banks with private and foreign-owned capital 
appear to be more efficient, one possible policy measure may be to privatise state-owned 
banks, which still dominate Maghreb banking especially in Algeria. Due to the fact that 
local capital lacks experience in modem banking management instruments, the Algerian 
Government could consider seeking to transfer ownership of their state banks to foreign 
owners. Grigorian and Manole (2002) explain that foreign owned banks may have the 
ability to capitalise on their access to better risk management and operational techniques, 
which is usually made available through their parent banks abroad. In addition, as foreign 
ownership is likely to be concentrated, foreign owned banks are less prone to typical 
corporate governance conflict between (dispersed) owners and management. The other 
evidence also shows that well capitalised foreign owned banks are more likely to cherry- 
pick the best borrowers available in the market (especially those from their own countries 
of origin), thereby improving the quality of their loan portfolios and increasing ex post 
returns. On the deposit side, owing to a popular perception that, if necessary, a foreign 
owned bank will be bailed out by its more powerful parent institutions abroad, foreign 
ownership plays a role of implicit deposit insurance. 
In addition, one other aspect to improve cost efficiency is to implement further financial 
and economic liberalisation measures, especially full liberalisation of interest rates. This 
measure should help market conditions so foreign investors will be more attracted to 
North African markets. However, foreign investors might be obstructed from Algerian 
banking because of the absence of aspects of stabilisation including political stability and 
security. 
Adding to this, our study finds evidence for the existence of scale economies in Maghreb 
banking, especially in Morocco and Algeria. Commercial medium and large-sized banks 
appear to potentially realise the largest scale economies, thereby suggesting a greater 
incentive for growth-related activities, including consolidation between these banks. 
Although a number of financial liberalisation measures have been introduced in the three 
countries under studies, bank efficiency levels appear to be in need of further 
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improvements. In addition, general macroeconomic climate is likely to have had a 
negative impact on bank performance over the period of study. The presence of 
financial 
inefficiencies in the three countries may provide evidence that banks seem also to bear 
the long-living experience of financial repression. The unprofitability of public 
enterprises, where the high levels of non-performing bank loans are concentrated, is 
likely to have resulted in low, and sometimes negative, economic growth. As indicated 
earlier, slower economic growth is often associated with weak debt servicing of 
borrowers, it leads to more loan defaults and enhanced credit risks. This tends to be the 
case for North African countries where due to poor economic growth in most of the 
1990s loan default rates have increased. Thus, it might be hypothesised that economic 
and financial reform measures would generate better effects on bank cost and profit 
efficiency if the economic growth environment was improved. 
7-3- Financial RepressionlLiberalisation in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
The emergence of loi de la monnaie et du credit in Algeria (1990), la loi bancaire in 
Tunisia (1987), and the !a ! oi des banques in Morocco (1993) has brought a new era to 
the respective banking systems. The banking structures of the three countries are 
currently accommodating increasing levels of private and foreign ownership, which was 
once irreversibly denied to this allegedly strategic sector. Financial repression measures, 
which branded banks as administrative appendices rather than independent profit-making 
organisations, distorted local banking markets in terms of interest rates below their 
market levels, and produced the dualism effect. 
As elaborated in Chapter 3, widespread financial liberalisation measures were undertaken 
aimed at reducing the presence of government ownership in the banking sector, 
increasing the share of private and foreign bank ownership, as well as eliminating 
sources of distortions including the administrative determination of interest rates, and the 
directed allocation of credits. Also, universal banking is now allowed in all three banking 
systems. 
Although financial liberalisation measures have been widespread, their immediate effects 
seem to have been delayed. This may be due to the profound impact of long-established 
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financial repression measures. The level of non-performing assets of the infamous 
secteur public illustrates clearly this aspect. Thus, more time is required to see if the 
positive effects of financial liberalisation are realised. 
7-4- Limitations of the Study 
Our objective in this study is to estimate cost and profit efficiency in the three North 
African, countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia using contemporary methodologies. 
The stochastic frontier approach and DEA analysis have been extensively used to 
conduct research with such a purpose. However, while our analysis uses these two 
popular approaches; such approaches suffer from a number of shortcomings. 
First, the analysis may suffer from under-representation, resulting from the fact that some 
banks in our sample are not adequately represented in the dataset. While some banks are 
represented during the whole period, other bank observations exist just for a few years. 
Also, the consistency of data may be questionable. A single and original source of data 
would have been ideal, but we found it impossible to obtain data from all the banking 
firms in question, and therefore, had to rely on a "second" best alternative, Bankscope. 
Also, our results may also be questionable because we have mixed in our sample both 
very small financial firms with very large banking in our study. This inclusion may 
produce biased results that could be sensitive to either of the categories of banks. 
Second, the translog functional form used in the stochastic frontier approach has a 
number of drawbacks. Comparing to the Fourier-Flexible specification, the Translog 
form does not fit well the data that are far from the mean in terms of output size or mix. 
According to McAllister and McManus (1993), this disadvantage would be reflected in 
the results as some of the differences in scale economies using translog studies are 
caused by the poor fit of the data. Berger and Mester (1997) note that the local 
approximations of the translog may distort scale economy measurements since it imposes 
a symmetric U-shaped average cost curve. 
Finally, it appears to be difficult to link changes in policy, i. e., financial liberalisation 
measures, to changes in bank efficiency in the three countries under study. This is 
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because policy reforms are still ongoing and it may require a longer time span to examine 
whether liberalisation has really affected bank efficiency levels. 
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Al Appendix Al 
Table Al-1: Algeria: Selected Social Indicators 
Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Population 
Residents Population (in million) * 2838 28.85 2930 29.77 3025 30.75 3132 
Population aged 0-14 (in million) 11.1 11.1 10.7 10.6 10.6 
Rural population (%) 41.7 41.9 412 40.4 39.7 
Birth rate per thousand - 26.5 - 253 24.8 
Death rate per thousand 6.0 5.1 - 5.6 5A 
Growth rate (%) 1.8 1.7 1.6 1-5 1.5 1.6 2.4 
Health 
Infant mortality per thousand 37.0 35.3 - 34.0 33.3 - 39.0 
Physicians per thousands people - - 1.0 0.8 - 
Education 
Primary school enrolment (%) 94.1 -- 93.0 94.0 95.0 
Secondary school enrolment %) 563 - 58.4 57.0 60.0 62.0 
Illiteracy Rate 37.1 35.8 35.9 34.6 333 -- 
Employment 
Labour force (% of total population) * 22.02 20.16 20.45 20.40 20.63 21 A 32.03 
Unemployment rate 39 39 39 41 42 38 
Income 
GDP per Capita in US$ 1,641.8 1,6492 1,604.1,589.1 1,753. 
95 
Source: Various but mainly IMF (2003) and World Development Indicators (world, Bank, 2001,2004) 
* IMF, "International Financial Statistics", February 2004, p90-93. 
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Table A1-2: Morocco: Selected Social Indicators 
Years 1971 1987 1993 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Population 
Residents Population (in million) 15.4 22.7 25.6 273 27.8 28.2 28.7 29.17 29.64 
Population aged 0-14 (in million) 7.0 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.6 93 93 
Rural population (%) 10.0 122 12.6 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.9 
Birth rate per thousand 41.0 31A 273 232 22.8 22.4 21.9 
Death rate per thousand 17.4 7.4 7.0 63 62 6.1 5.9 
Growth rate (%) 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Health 
Infant mortality per thousand 1252 82.0 65.6 51.0 - 47.8 41.0 - 39.0 
Physicians per thousands people 13.7 4.4 3.1 2.8 2.6 2A 23 
Education 
Primary school enrolment (%) 52.5 71.7 883 88.6 - 79.0 84.0 88.0 
Secondary school enrolment 12.6 38.0 449 49.9 - 31.0 - 
Literacy Rate 14.0 34.0 45.0 49.0 51.7 51.7 49.0 50.0 51.0 
Employment 
Labour force (% of total population) 23.6 26.7 27.7 28.5 273 26.4 26.4 
Unemployment rate 23 14.4 15.9 16.9 19.1 22.0 21.5 
Income 
GDP pcr Capita in US$ 275.0 8191) 1,027 1224 1284 1239 1,159 
Source: Various but mainly IMF (2003) and World Development Indicators (world, Bank, 2001,2004) 
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Table A1-3: Tunisia: Selected Social Indicators 
Years 1980 1985 1994 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Population 
Residents Population (in million) 639 726 8.81 9A1 9.52 9.62 9.73 
Rural population (%) 48.0 46.0 39.0 35.0 
Life expectancy in years 62 66 71 72 72 - 73 
Birth rate per thousand 35 29 23 17 
Death rate per thousand 9 76 6 
Growth rate (%) 2.7 3.0 1.7 13 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Health 
Infant mortality per thousand 69 52 32 24 
Physicians per thousands people 03 05 0.6 0.8 
Education 
Primary school enrolment (%) 102 115 117 95.0 95.0 97.0 
Secondary school enrolment *%) 27.0 39.0 57.0 68.0 70.0 68.0 
Literacy Rate 45.0 53.0 64.0 70.0 71.0 72.0 73.0 
Employment 
Labour force (% of total population) 34A 34.2 37.5 38.9 
Unemployment rate 12.9 16.1 15.6 15.8 
Income 
GDP per Capita in US$ 635.0 966.0 1,791.0 1,736 
Source: Various but mainly IMF (2003) and World Development Indicators (world, Bank, 2001,2004) 
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Table A1-4: Selected Population Indicators 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Population Characteristics (in Million) 
Algeria 25.33 25.81 26.29 26.78 27.28 27.79 28.10 28.49 29.51 29.96 30.73 
Morocco 24.18 24.65 25.12 25.58 26.07 26.39 26.85 27.31 27.78 28.25 28.73 
Tunisia 8.10 8.26 8.43 8.60 8.78 8.96 9.09 9.22 9.33 9.44 9.56 
MENA 
219.07 224.01 229.84 235.71 241.80 247.64 253.27 259.28 265.92 272.18 278.46 
countries 
Populatio n Characteristics (in percent to MENA countr ies) 
Algeria 11.56 11.52 11.44 11.36 11.28 11.22 11.09 10.99 11.10 11.01 11.04 
Morocco 11.04 11.00 10.93 10.85 10.78 10.66 10.60 10.53 10.45 10.38 10.32 
Tunisia 3.70 3.69 3.67 3.65 3.63 3.62 3.59 3.56 3.31 3.47 3.43 
Total % 26.30 26.21 26.04 25.86 25.69 25.50 25.29 25.08 25.05 24.85 24.79 
Population Growth (in Percent) 
Algeria 2.91 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.09 1.41 3.56 1.55 2.35 
Morocco 2.03 1.94 1.91 1.83 1.92 1.21 1.75 1.72 1.70 1.70 1.70 
Tunisia 2.13 2.04 2.03 2.04 2.03 2.04 1.46 1.39 1.28 1.18 1.23 
MENA 
3.36 2.26 2.60 2.56 2.58 2.42 2.27 2.37 2.56 2.35 2.31 
countries 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 2001 
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Table A1-5: Selected GDP Indicators 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total GDP at Purchase Value in billion of US$ at current prices 
Algeria 62.05 45.71 47.87 49.77 41.97 41.26 46.85 47.87 47.36 48.07 53.80 
Morocco 25.82 27.83 28.45 26.80 3035 32.99 36.64 33.41 33.67 34.99 32.90 
Tunisia 12.31 13.01 15.50 14.61 15.63 18.03 19.59 18.90 19.92 19.91 19.44 
MENA 
466.52 450.96 484.09 486.10 494.47 534.80 584.76 605.54 585.85 623.94 708.42 
countries 
Share of GDP in MENA (in percent) 
Algeria 13.30 10.14 9.89 10.24 8.49 7.72 8.01 7.91 8.08 7.70 7.59 
Morocco 5.53 6.17 5.88 5.51 6.14 6.17 6.27 5.52 6.09 5.61 4.64 
Tunisia 2.64 2.88 3.20 3.01 3.16 3.37 3.35 3.12 3.40 3.19 2.74 
Total % 21.47 19.19 1&97 1&76 17.79 17.26 17.63 16.54 17.57 16.50 14.98 
Annual GDP Growth rates 
Algeria 11.7 -263 4.7 4.0 -15.7 -1.7 13.5 2.2 -1.1 1.5 11.9 
Morocco 13.0 7.8 2.2 -5.8 13.2 8.7 11.1 -8.8 6.7 -1.9 -6.0 
Tunisia 22.7 5.6 19.1 -5.7 7.0 15.3 8.7 -3.5 5.4 -0.1 -2.4 
MENA 
countries 
16.1 -0.9 9.8 1.3 4.3 11.2 8.4 5.8 -2.0 6.5 12.3 
GDP Per Capita in US $ 
Algeria 2,449 1,771 1,821 1,858 1,538 1,484 1,667 1,680 1,605 1,604 1,751 
Morocco 1,068 1,129 1,133 1,048 1,164 1,250 1,365 1,224 1,284 1,239 1,145 
Tunisia 1,520 1,574 1,838 1,698 1,781 2,013 2,155 2,051 2,135 2,109 2,022 
MENA 
countries 
4,998 4,834 5,284 5,185 5,080 5,259 5,629 5,782 5,191 5,610 6,676 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 2001 
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Table A1-6: Algeria GDP Indicators 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
In Million US S 
Total Exports 14.55 13.31 12.15 10.88 9.97 11.32 14.14 14.66 10.83 13.74 22.85 
Total Imports 15.47 10.79 11.46 11.56 11.94 12.85 11.20 10.64 11.11 11.27 11.27 
Resource Gap -0.92 2.52 Q69 -0.68 -1.97 -1.53 2.94 4.02 -0.28 2.47 11.58 
Private Consu. 35.27 21.91 24.72 27.26 23.55 23.02 24.44 24.44 25.96 24.86 22.47 
Public Consu. 9.97 6.73 7.69 8.65 7.05 6.50 7.69 8.01 8.57 8.16 7.49 
Consumption 45.24 28.64 32.41 35.91 30.6 29.52 32.13 32.45 34.53 33.02 29.96 
Investments 17.74 14.56 14.77 14.53 13.35 13.27 11.77 11.40 13.11 12.59 12.25 
GDP 62.05 45.71 47.87 49.77 41.97 41.26 46.85 47.87 4736 48.07 53.80 
In Percent of GDP 
Total Exports 23.45 29.12 25.38 21.86 23.76 27.44 30.18 30.62 22.87 28.58 42.47 
Total Imports 24.93 23.61 23.94 23.23 28.45 31.14 23.91 22.23 23.46 23.44 20.95 
Resource Gap -1.48 5.51 1.44 437 -4.69 -3.71 6.28 8.40 -0.59 5.14 21.52 
Private Consu. 56.84 47.93 51.64 54.77 56.11 55.79 52.17 51.05 54.81 51.72 41.77 
Public Consu. 72.91 62.66 67.70 72.15 72.91 71.55 68.58 67.79 72.91 68.69 55.69 
Consumption 28.59 31.85 30.85 29.19 31.81 32.16 25.12 23.81 27.68 26.19 22.77 
Investments 28.59 31.85 30.85 29.19 31.81 32.16 25.12 23.81 27.68 26.19 22.77 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 10&0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source-. Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 2001 
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Table A1-7: Morocco GDP Indicators 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
In Million US S 
Total Exports 6.34 6.16 6.40 6.10 7.55 9.09 7.99 7.72 8.09 8.55 8.72 
Total Imports 7.71 7.52 8.12 7.94 9.38 11.24 9.41 9.98 9.74 10.16 10.73 
Resource Gap -137 -1.36 -1.72 4.84 -1.83 -2.15 -1.42 -2.26 -1.65 -1.61 -2.01 
Private Consu. 16.67 18.57 18.78 17.33 20.50 22.56 24.71 21.81 22.82 21.39 20.24 
Public Consu. 4.00 4.33 4.78 4.84 5.20 5.74 6.17 5.94 6.46 6.76 6.38 
Consumption 20.67 22.9 23.56 22.17 25.7 28.30 30.88 27.75 29.28 28.15 26.62 
Investments 6.52 6.30 6.60 6.02 6.48 6.84 7.17 6.92 8.03 8.46 8.29 
GDP 25.82 27.83 28.45 26.80 30.35 32.99 36.64 33A1 35.67 34.99 32.90 
In Percent of GDP 
Total Exports 24.55 22.13 22.50 22.76 24.88 27.55 21.81 23.11 22.68 24.44 26.50 
Total Imports 29.86 27.02 28.54 29.63 30.91 34.07 25.68 29.87 27.31 29.04 32.61 
Resource Gap 
-531 -4.89 -6.05 -6.87 -6.03 -6.52 -3.88 -6.76 -4.63 -4.60 -6.11 
Private Consu. 64.56 66.73 66.01 64.66 67.55 68.38 67.44 65.28 63.98 61.13 61.52 
Public Consu. 80.05 82.29 82.81 82.72 84.68 85.78 84.28 83.06 82.09 80.45 80.91 
Consumption 25.25 22.64 23.20 22.46 21.35 20.73 19.57 20.71 22.51 24.18 25.20 
Investments 25.25 22.64 23.20 22.46 2135 20.73 19.57 20.71 22.51 24.18 25.20 
GDP 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 2001 
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Table A1-8: Tunisia GDP Indicators 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
In Million US S 
Total Exports 5.36 5.25 6.13 5.91 7.02 8.10 8.25 8.30 8.50 8.45 8.46 
Total Imports 6.23 5.90 7.20 7.01 7.48 8.8 8.55 8.77 0.14 8.78 9.12 
Resource Gap -0.87 -0.65 -1.07 -1.1 -0.46 -0.7 . 43 -0.47 8.36 -0.33 -0.66 
Private Consu. 7.83 8.12 9.57 9.06 9.69 11.34 11.94 1138 12.09 11.96 11.70 
Public Consu. 2.01 216 248 238 2.53 2.94 3.05 2.98 3.12 3.09 3.02 
Consumption 9.84 10.28 12.05 11.44 12.24 14.28 14.99 1436 15.21 15.05 14.72 
Investments 333 3.38 4.52 4.27 3.85 4.45 4.91 5.00 5.35 5.30 538 
GDP 1231 13.01 15.50 14.61 15.63 18.03 19.59 19.90 19.92 19.91 19.44 
In Percent of GDP 
Total Exports 43.54 40.35 39.55 40.45 44.91 44.93 42.11 43.92 42.67 42.44 43.52 
Total Imports 50.61 45.35 46.45 47.98 47.86 48.81 43.64 46.40 0.70 44.10 46.91 
Resource Gap -7.07 -5.00 -6.90 -7.53 -2.94 -3.88 -1.53 -2.49 41.97 -1.66 -3.40 
Private Consu. 63.61 62.41 61.74 62.01 62.00 62.90 60.95 60.21 60.69 60.07 60.19 
Public Consu. 79.94 79.02 77.74 78.30 78.31 79.20 76.52 75.98 76.36 75.59 75.72 
Consumption 27.05 25.98 29.16 29.23 24.63 24.68 25.06 26.46 26.86 26.62 27.67 
Investments 27.05 25.98 29.16 29.23 24.63 24.68 25.06 26.46 26.86 26.62 27.67 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 2001 
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Table A1-9: Algeria GDP per Economic Activity 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
i! c Mill 
Agriculture &other 6.44 4.22 5.24 5.14 4.01 3.99 4.97 4.52 5.27 5.08 4.51 
Mining S Other 13.98 12.67 11.49 10.71 9.53 V0.56 13.39 14.18 10.89 13.37 21.93 
Manufacture 6.45 4.73 5.46 6.08 4.83 4.34 4.06 4.09 4.60 4.04 3.89 
Electricity, gas and 0.40 0.30 0.48 0.56 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.47 - - - 
v% ater 
Construction 6.89 4.63 5.09 5.70 4.70 4.21 4.49 4.77 5.10 4.52 4.55 
Commodity Sector 34.16 26.55 27.76 28.19 23.5 13.04 27.36 28.03 25.86 27.01 34.88 
Distributive Sector 14.88 9.94 10.94 11.43 10.11 9.51 10.23 10.52 11.27 11.47 10.20 
Government Sector 8.07 5.27 5.97 6.25 5.33 4.83 5.72 5.97 6.37 6.05 5.58 
Service sector 8.07 5.27 5.97 6.25 5.33 4.83 5.72 5.97 6.37 6.05 5.58 
GDP (net of taxes) 57.11 41.76 44.67 45.87 38.94 27.38 43.31 44.52 43.5 44.53 50.66 
Net Indirect Taxes 4.94 3.95 3.2 3.9 3.03 13.88 3.54 3.35 3.86 3.54 3.14 
GDP 62.05 45.71 47.87 49.77 41.97 41.26 46.85 47.87 47.36 48.07 53.80 
I'l I" !k , ti :, I i, 1)1, 
Agriculture S other 10.38 9.23 10.95 10.33 9.55 9.67 10.61 9.44 11.13 10.57 8.38 
Mining S Other 22.53 27.72 24.00 21.52 22.71 25.59 28.58 29.62 22.99 27.81 40.76 
Manufacture 10.39 10.35 11.41 12.22 11.51 10.52 8.67 8.54 9.71 8.40 7.23 
Electricity, gas and 
water 0.64 0.66 1.00 1.13 1.02 1.21 0.96 0.98 - - - 
Construction 11.10 10.13 10.63 11.45 11.20 10.20 9.58 9.96 10.77 9.40 8.46 
Commodity Sector 55.05 58.08 57.99 56.64 55.99 57.20 58.40 58.55 54.60 56.19 64.83 
Distributive Sector 23.98 21.75 22.85 22.97 24.09 23.05 21.84 21.98 23.80 23.86 18.96 
Government Sector 13.01 11.53 12.47 12.56 12.70 11.71 12.21 12.47 13.45 12.59 10.37 
Senice sector 13.01 11.53 12.47 12.56 12.70 11.71 12.21 12.47 13.45 12.59 10.37 
GDP (net of taxes) 92.04 91.36 93.32 92.16 92.78 91.95 92.44 93.00 91.85 92.64 94.16 
Net Indirect Taxes 7.96 8.64 6.68 7.84 7.22 8.05 7.56 7.00 8.15 7.36 5.84 
GDP 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report. 2001 
338 
Bank ('ost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria. Morocco and Tunisia 
Table Al-10: Morocco GDP per Economic Activity 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Agriculture S other 5.47 5.34 4.38 3.94 5.62 4.82 7.07 5.16 6.05 5.16 4.03 
Mining S Other 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.64 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.61) 
Manufacturing 4.75 4.79 5.16 3.82 5.71 6.06 6.25 5.90 6.09 6.72 5.89 
Electricity, gas and 1.59 1.08 2.03 2.01 2.13 2.78 2.93 2.82 2.93 2.95 2.74 
Water 
Construction 1.38 1.38 1.41 1.29 1.31 1.46 1.54 1.55 1.61 1.66 1.65 
Commodity Sector 12.94 13.20 13.57 12.59 1533 15.71 18.43 10.28 17.44 17.25 15.00 
Commerce hotels 5.19 5.67 5.99 5.52 6.00 6.53 7.06 6.15 6.88 6.08 6.06 
Transport &comm. 1.60 1.60 1.80 1.77 1.80 2.05 2.06 1.95 2.06 2.12 2.09 
Distributive Sector 6.79 7.27 7.79 7.29 7.8 Mn 9.12 8.1 8.94 8.2 8.15 
Government Sector 3.07 3.36 3.63 3.50 3.71 4.34 4.67 4.55 4.92 5.04 4.79 
Other Services 3.02 3.08 3.45 3.43 3.85 8.70 4.40 4.22 4.37 4.43 4.41 
Service sector 6.09 6.44 7.08 6.93 7.56 13.04 9.07 8.77 9.29 9.47 9.2 
GDP (net of taxes) 25.82 26.91 28.44 26.81 30.69 37.33 36.62 27.15 35.67 34.92 32.35 
Net Indirect Taxes 
GDP 25.82 27.83 28.45 26.80 30.35 32.99 36.64 33.41 35.67 34.99 32.90 
Agriculture S other 17.70 19.84 15.40 14.70 18.31 12.91 19.31 19.01 16.96 14.78 12.46 
Mining S Other 2.52 2.27 2.07 1.98 1.82 1.58 1.75 2.76 2.13 2.18 2.13 
Manufacture 18.40 17.80 18.14 17.98 18.61 16.23 17.07 17.66 17.07 19.24 18.21 
Electricity, gas and 
water 6.16 4.01 7.14 7.50 6.94 7.45 8.00 10.39 8.21 8.45 8.47 
Construction 5.34 5.13 4.96 4.81 4.27 3.91 4.21 5.71 4.51 4.75 5.10 
Commodity Sector 50.12 49.05 47.71 46.96 49.95 42.08 50.33 37.86 48.89 49.40 46.37 
Commerce Hotels 20 10 21.07 21.06 20.59 19.55 17.49 19.28 22.65 19.29 17.41 18.73 
Transport &comm. 6.20 5.95 6.33 6.60 5.87 5.49 5.63 7.18 5.78 6.07 6.46 
Distributive Sector 26.30 27.02 27.39 27.19 25.42 22.98 24.90 29.83 25.06 23.48 25.19 
Government Sector 11.89 12.49 12.76 13.05 12.09 11.63 12.75 16.76 13.79 14.43 14.81 
Other Services 11.70 11.45 12.13 12.79 12.54 23.31 12.02 15.54 12.25 12.69 13.63 
Service sector 23.59 23.93 24.89 25.85 24.63 34.93 24.77 32.30 26.04 27.12 28.44 
GDP (net of taxes) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report. 2001 
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Table Al-11: GDP per Economic Activity 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
!n \lilli'+n I 
Agriculture $ other 1.94 2.17 2.50 2.15 1.96 2.05 2.69 2.51 2.50 2.55 2.35 
Mining S Other 0.83 0.81 0.87 0.60 0.61 0.65 0.75 0.69 0.65 0.69 0.72 
08 2 20 2 2.56 2.51 2.89 3.42 3.58 3.47 3.66 3.62 3.56 Manufacturing . . 
Iilectricity, gas and 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.36 0137 0.74 0.41 0.40 0.39 
water 
Construction 0.50 0.49 0.69 0.72 0.78 0.87 0.87 0.84 9.01 0.90 0.90 
Commodity Sector 5.6 5.92 6.91 6.25 6.53 7.35 7.89 8.25 8.13 8.16 7.92 
Commerce hotels 1.78 1.68 1.99 1.20 2.45 2.73 2.90 2.78 2.95 3.21 3.11 
Transport &comm. 0.84 0.87 1.11 1.10 1.18 1.35 1.44 1.46 1.53 1.57 1.60 
Finance; & Banks 0.43 0.49 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.74 0.81 0.70 0.76 0.80 0.81 
Distributive Sector 3.05 3.04 3.67 2.88 4.22 4.82 5.15 4.94 5.24 5.58 5.52 
Government Sector 1.55 1.69 1.96 1.92 2.01 2.49 2.63 2.61 2.74 2.62 2.53 
Other Services 1.06 0.71 0.89 0.82 0.72 1.05 1.04 1.09 1.19 0.91 0.91 
Service sector 2.61 2.40 2.85 2.74 2.73 3.54 3.67 3.70 3.93 3.53 3.44 
GDP (net of taxes) 11.26 11.36 13.43 11.87 13.48 15.71 16.71 16.89 17.3 17.27 16.88 
Net Indirect Taxes 1.05 1.65 2.07 2.74 2.15 2.32 2.88 2.01 2.62 2.64 2.56 
GDP 12.31 13.01 15.50 14.61 15.63 18.03 19.59 18.90 19.92 19.91 19.44 
III 1, k it, I'l ,I(,! );, 
Agriculture S other 15.76 16.68 16.13 14.72 12.54 11.37 13.73 13.28 12.55 12.81 12.119 
Mining S Other 6.74 6.23 5.61 4.11 3.90 3.61 3.83 3.65 3.26 3.47 3.70 
Manufacture 16.90 16.91 16.52 17.18 18.49 18.97 18.27 18.36 18.37 18.18 18.31 
Electricity, gas and 
water 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 16.00 
Construction 4.06 3.77 4.45 4.93 4.99 4.83 4.44 4.44 4.57 4.52 4.63 
Commodity Sector 45.49 45.50 44.58 42.78 41.78 40.77 40.28 43.65 40.81 40.98 40.74 
Commerce Hotels 14.46 12.91 12.84 8.21 15.67 15.14 14.80 14.71 14.81 16.12 16.00 
Transport &comm. 6.82 6.69 7.16 7.53 7.55 7.49 7.35 7.72 7.68 7.89 8.23 
Finance & Banks 3.49 3.77 3.68 3.97 3.77 4.10 4.13 3.70 3.82 4.02 4.17 
Distributive Sector 24.78 23.37 23.68 19.71 27.00 26.73 26.29 26.14 26.31 28.03 28.40 
Government Sector 12.59 12.99 12.65 13.14 12.86 13.81 13.43 13.81 13.76 13.16 11.0 1 
Other Services 8.61 5.46 5.74 5.61 4.61 5.82 5.31 5.77 5.97 4.57 4.68 
Service sector 21.20 18.45 18.39 18.75 17.47 19.63 18.73 19.58 19.73 17.73 17.70 
GDP (net of taxes) 91.47 8732 86.65 81.25 86.24 87.13 8530 8937 86.85 86.74 86.83 
Net Indirect Taxes 8.53 12.68 13.35 18.75 13.76 12.87 14.70 10.63 13.15 13.26 13.17 
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GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 loan 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 2001 
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Table Al-12: Merchandise Export and Imports 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Foreign Exchange: domestic currency per US Dollar (period average) 
Algeria 8.9575 18.473 21.836 23.345 35.059 47.663 54.749 57.707 58.739 66.640 75.285 
Morocco 8.242 8.707 8.538 9.299 9.203 8.540 8.716 9.527 9.604 9.804 10.627 
Tunisia 0.8783 0.9246 0.8844 1.0037 1.0116 0.9458 0.9733 1.1059 1.1343 1.2477 1.3853 
Imports (in Billion US Dollar) 
Algeria 9.68 7.68 8.65 8.76 9.57 10.78 9.10 8.69 9.83 9.72 9.69 
Morocco 7.91 7.52 8.02 6.85 8.06 8.53 8.25 7.88 10.27 10.80 12.41 
Tunisia 6.13 5.52 6.45 6.21 6.57 7.89 7.70 7.95 8.35 8.07 8.39 
MENA 104.82 103.02 121.01 118.34 118.86 132.59 139.47 139.54 153.91 150.27 161.55 
Share of import according to TOTAL MENA (in Percent) 
Algeria 9.23 7.45 7.15 7.40 8.05 8.13 6.52 6.23 6.39 6.47 6.00 
Morocco 7.55 7.30 6.63 5.79 6.78 6.43 5.92 5.65 6.67 7.19 7.68 
Tunisia 5.85 5.36 5.33 5.25 5.53 5.95 5.52 5.70 5.43 5.37 5.19 
Total 22.63 20.11 19.11 18.44 2036 20.51 17.96 17.57 18.48 19.03 18.87 
Exports (in Billion US Dollar) 
Algeria 11.00 11.79 11.37 10.10 8.59 10.26 13.22 13.89 10.95 12.45 19.93 
Morocco 4.23 4.28 3.98 3.69 3.97 4.71 4.74 4.67 7.14 7.51 7.96 
Tunisia 3.55 4.08 4.04 3.80 4.64 5.78 5.52 5.76 5.74 7.27 5.84 
MENA 141.01 125.98 130.39 122.25 127.63 14&63 174.12 177.39 139.85 174.89 248.55 
Share of E xports according to TOTAL MENA 
Algeria 7.80 9.36 8.72 8.26 6.73 6.90 7.59 7.83 7.83 7.12 8.02 
Morocco 3.00 3.40 3.05 3.02 3.11 3.17 2.72 2.63 5.11 4.29 3.20 
Tunisia 2.52 3.24 3.10 3.11 3.64 3.89 3.17 3.25 4.10 4.16 2.35 
Total 
13.32 15.99 14.87 14.39 13.48 13.96 13.48 13.71 17.04 15.57 13.57 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 2D01 
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Table Al-13: Selected Balance of Payment Indicators 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Trade Balance (in Billion US Dollar) 
Algeria 4.187 5.478 3.210 2.420 -0.260 0.150 4.120 5.690 1.510 3.360 12.300 
Morocco -2.072 -1.764 -2.463 -2.056 -2.107 -2.482 -2.193 -1.864 -2.319 -2.448 -3.197 
Tunisia -2.252 -2.141 -2.151 -1.955 -1.761 -1.989 -1.567 -2.064 -2.063 -1.199 -1.678 
Current Account (in Billion US Dollar) 
Algeria 1.420 2.367 1.300 0.800 -1.820 -2.250 1.250 3.450 -0.900 0.020 8.930 
Morocco -0.200 -0.418 -0.439 -0.524 -0725 -1.186 0.035 -0.087 -0.144 -0.167 -0.490 
Tunisia -0.821 -0.442 -0.675 -0.595 -0.478 -0.774 -0.610 -1.263 -0.966 -0.469 -0.476 
Capital Account (in Billion US Dollar) 
Algeria 
-1.000 -1.020 -0.100 -0.830 -2.540 -4.050 -3.350 -2.290 -0.630 -2.400 -1.360 
Morocco 
1.888 1.379 1.242 0.973 1.244 -0.189 0.031 0.465 0.231 1.679 -0.115 
Tunisia 
0.651 1.142 0.553 0.776 0.853 0.990 1.123 1.297 1.058 0.337 0.382 
Overall Balance (in Billion US Dollar) 
Algeria 0.084 1.047 -1.110 -0.030 -4.360 -6.300 -2.100 1.160 -1.530 -2.380 7.570 
Morocco 1.697 0.964 0.794 0.443 0.482 -0.982 0.292 0.553 0.247 1.639 -4.15 
Tunisia -0.205 0.738 -0.138 0.387 0.442 0.097 0.532 0.065 0.097 -0.55 -0.123 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 2001 
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A2 Appendix A2 
Table A2-1: Government Budget Indicators from 1990 to 2000 (in Percent) 
Ratios Total Revenues to GDP ratio Total Spending to GDP ratio Budget Balance to GDP ratio 
Year Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
1990 28.8 26.9 31.4 25.6 273 36.8 3.2 -0.6 -5.4 
1991 32.5 25.0 293 28.4 26.0 353 4.1 -1.0 -6.0 
1992 30.0 26.2 29.4 295 28.4 333 03 -2.2 -3.9 
1993 27.6 27.0 30.7 33.6 282 34.55 -6.0 -1.2 -3.8 
1994 29.5 24.4 31.7 31.4 29.5 33.7 -1.9 -5.1 -2.0 
1995 30.6 24.0 30.2 29.8 22.1 34.4 0.8 1.9 -4.2 
1996 32.9 23.5 30.6 29.0 28.8 35.5 3.9 -5.3 -2.9 
1997 33.5 23.5 28.7 312 263 32.6 23 -0.8 -3.9 
1998 27.8 25.5 29.6 31.7 302 32.0 -3.9 -4.7 -2.4 
1999 30.0 27.7 29.5 303 29.4 31.7 -03 -1.7 -2.2 
2000 393 26.2 29,4 29.6 32.7 32.7 9.9 -6.5 -3.3 
Average 31.1 25.6 30.0 30.0 28.1 339 1.1 -23 -3.3 
Source: Various. 
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Table A2-2: Money Supply Indicators from 1990 to 2000 (in Percent) 
Long-Run Mobilisation Magnetisation Ratio Ratios Ratio (Ml/M2) (M2/GDP) Ml/GDP 
Year Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
1990 78.8 87.9 50.8 63.0 44.7 42.4 492 393 21.5 
1991 782 87.1 47.9 48.0 45.1 423 37.5 393 20.3 
1992 71.7 872 47.1 48.0 47.8 38.1 34.4 41.7 17.9 
1993 712 87.0 46.1 52.7 49.2 43.1 37.6 42.8 19.9 
1994 65.8 863 472 48.6 48.9 43.1 32.0 422 203 
1995 64.9 85.4 48.9 39.9 51.7 423 25.9 442 20.7 
1996 64.4 84.8 48.7 35.6 483 43.0 243 41.0 21.0 
1997 62.1 84.4 46.9 39.2 52.4 45.7 243 442 21.5 
1998 63.2 83.6 47.7 463 523 44.5 293 43.7 21.3 
1999 60.6 833 46.1 463 58.0 49.0 28.1 48.5 22.6 
2000 62.8 83.7 44.6 412 61.1 51.7 25.9 512 23.0 
Average 67.61 85.54 47.45 46.25 50.86 44.11 31.68 43.46 20.91 
Source: Various, but mainly Arab Monetary Fund Statistics Report 2002. 
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Table A2-3: Selected Macro-economic and Monetary Indicators from 1990 
to 2000 (in Percent) 
Ratios Real GDP Growth Money supply 1 Growth M2 y pP y 
Credit to the economy 
Growth 
Year Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
1990 - 3.9 - 13.0 7.9 6.0 18.0 16.3 2.7 
1991 - 6.9 - 20.6 11.6 5.0 31.9 23.0 12.7 
1992 - -4.1 - 24.7 7.8 7.0 26.6 12.1 21.3 
1993 - -1.0 - 21.6 52 7.0 -46.6 5.5 2.0 
1994 - 10.4 32 153 11.5 8.0 38.9 92 7.7 
1995 - -6.6 2A 103 6.7 6.0 85.0 11.8 10.1 
1996 - 122 7.1 14.4 5.8 14.0 373 9.4 14.5 
1997 1.1 -2.2 5A 182 82 16.0 -4.6 6.7 9.7 
1998 5.1 7.7 4.8 19.1 7.8 5.0 -1.4 103 7.8 
1999 32 -0.1 6.1 14.0 11.6 20.0 27.9 9.8 - 
2000 2A 1.0 4.7 13.0 79 14.0 -17.0 7.7 - 
Average - 2.55 - 16.76 8.36 9.82 17.82 11.07 - 
Ratios Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate Population Growth 
Year Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
1990 - 15.8 15.5 202 7.0 6.5 2.55 2.03 2.13 
1991 - 173 15.7 253 8.0 82 2.91 1.94 2.04 
1992 - 16.0 15.7 31.0 5.7 5.8 1.87 1.91 2.03 
1993 - 16.0 15.6 21.6 52 4.0 1.87 1.83 2.04 
1994 24.0 20.0 15.6 31.7 5.1 4.7 1.87 1.92 2.03 
1995 28.0 23.0 15.6 28.4 6.1 63 1.87 121 2.04 
1996 28.0 18.0 15.6 203 3.0 3.8 1.09 1.75 1.46 
1997 28.0 17.0 15.9 5.7 1.0 3.7 1.41 1.72 1.39 
1998 28.0 19.0 15.6 5.0 2.7 3.1 336 1.70 128 
1999 29.9 22.0 15.8 2.6 0.7 2.7 1.55 1.70 1.18 
2000 30.0 22.0 15.7 03 1.9 3.1 235 1.70 1.23 
2001 28 - - 42 - 
2002 26 - - 1.4 
Average - 18.74 15.66 17.58 4.22 4.72 2.10 1.76 1.71 
tour ;v &Ious. 
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Table A2-4 Summary of Main Macroeconomic and Banking Indicators in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Country Alg eria 
Variables 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Real GDP per Capita 
-35.82 -27.08 -7.21 -5.91 -6.89 -4.2 9.18 -5.11 Growth 
Loans to private/ GDP 16.99 26.33 29.51 26.51 25.31 27.95 19 19.93 
Inflation 29 29 18.7 5.7 4.9 2.7 0.3 4.2 
Real Interest Rate -7.13 -6.05 -0.19 5.77 5.24 7.53 6.45 -0.82 
M2/ GDP 40.19 37.14 34.77 38.68 44.6 43.11 40.65 48.23 
Currency outside bank/ GDP 12.39 11.6 11.05 12.07 13.53 13.17 11.88 13.56 
Country Morocco 
Real GDP per Capita 2.01 -1.75 1.83 -14.26 1.08 -6.51 -9 99 -2 03 Growth . . 
Loans to private! GDP 25.89 29.27 28.08 46.58 50.77 51.99 56.99 53.47 
Inflation 5.2 6.0 3.0 1.0 2.7 0.7 1.9 0.6 
Real Interest Rate 6.74 3.83 5.26 6.82 3.51 4.91 3.44 3.82 
M2/ GDP 64.07 66.77 61.65 90.91 74.19 76.48 83.8 86.28 
Currency outside bank/ GDP 15.12 15.49 14.45 14.88 15.34 16.06 16.65 17.05 
Country Tunisia 
Real GDP per Capita 
Growth 0.08 6.36 3.26 -822 0.53 0.93 -10.17 -0.12 
Loans to private! GDP 54.92 54.1 47.92 48.61 57.63 48.57 48.59 59.2 
Inflation 4.8 6.3 3.7 3.7 3.1 2.7 2.9 1.9 
Real Interest Rate 3.83 2.36 3.97 3.06 3.66 3.09 2.89 4.06 
M2/ GDP 47.25 45.52 45.22 47.52 54.25 49.58 54.67 55.15 
Currency outside bank/ GDP 7.72 7.67 7.53 7.35 8.46 7.65 8.27 8.07 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund Statistics Report, 2002. 
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Table A2-5: Algeria: Structure of Bank Balance sheet in Algeria from 1990 
to 2001 in Percent. 
Ratios Assets 
Deposits at External Credits to Credits to Portfolio & Year Cash Central Assets the the Economy Others 
Total Assets 
Banks Government 
1990 0.21 0.42 1.91 9.49 5231 35.65 100.00 
1991 0.08 035 3.22 4.46 4520 46.65 100.00 
1992 0.07 0.70 2.76 3.76 54.64 38.06 100.00 
1993 0.08 430 192 34.95 25.61 33.13 100.00 
1994 0.13 0.53 4.27 19.46 29.09 46.55 100.00 
1995 021 0.23 2.73 12.76 46.29 37.77 100.00 
1996 0.19 0.73 232 10.14 55.68 30.95 100.00 
1997 0.27 0.99 1.55 18.34 49.78 29.06 100.00 
1998 035 0.63 1.71 25A5 4532 26.55 100.00 
1999 0.24 0.45 1.45 13.48 48.55 25.45 100.00 
2000 034 1.84 I A5 30.71 39.67 25.99 100.00 
2001 0.34 7.98 1.51 27.00 37.46 25.73 100.00 
Ratios Liabilities 
Demand Time & External Credits from Credits from Total Year 
deposits Savings Liabilities the Central the Equity Others Assets deposits Bank Government 
1990 2235 15.44 0.79 14.05 0.18 3.95 43.21 100.00 
1991 18.46 12.52 130 13.24 0.34 3.60 50.53 100.00 
1992 18.67 1938 1.77 10.43 0.78 3.46 45.51 100.00 
1993 21.97 21.00 1.51 3.42 10.49 4.14 37A7 100.00 
1994 18.69 2336 334 4.82 3.69 3.57 4235 100.00 
1995 1728 22.99 1.85 1532 3.65 435 3436 100.00 
1996 16.77 23.36 1.49 18.57 6.99 3.85 28.95 100.00 
1997 17.11 2753 0.98 14.71 5.67 3.75 3025 100.00 
1998 20.74 29.41 1.58 14.03 3.46 4.11 26.67 100.00 
1999 1832 30.06 1.60 16.15 2.94 3.69 27.24 100.00 
2000 31.61 136 8.72 1.71 4.42 28.63 31.61 100.00 
2001 38.45 1.67 0.00 1.23 5.60 28.84 38.45 100.00 
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Table A2-6: Morocco: Structure of Bank Balance sheet in Tunisia from 
1990 to 2000 in Percent. 
Ratios Assets 
Deposits at External 
Credits to Credits to the Total 
Year Cash 1ra1 Assets Government 
he Portfolio Others Assets 
E 
1990 1.07 7.17 6.61 3132 35.88 1.16 16.79 100.00 
1991 0.83 10.03 4.92 24.75 42.43 0.88 16.17 100.00 
1992 0.78 5.06 437 31.92 45.67 0.80 11.40 100.00 
1993 0.80 5.67 3.69 32.94 46.00 026 10.64 100.00 
1994 0.69 4.76 438 32.86 4539 091 10.82 100.00 
1995 0.66 4.89 3.36 30.13 49.64 0.99 1032 100.00 
1996 0.82 439 331 2829 51.18 035 1146 100.00 
1997 0.65 3.85 1.48 2335 60.23 10.19 - 100.00 
1998 0.98 3.90 1.68 2139 61.16 10.89 - 100.00 
1999 1.79 4.04 1.64 18.72 6236 11.25 100.00 
2000 1.73 4.09 195 18.95 62.75 1033 - 100.00 
2001 2.43 5.85 1.65 20.60 5896 649 4.01 100.00 
2002 1.75 635 232 20.46 5831 6.69 4.13 100.00 
Ratios Liabilities 
Demand Time & Credits from Credits Non- External Total Year 
deposits 
Savings th Liabilities e 
Centr al f rom othe r Residents Equity Other Assets deposits Bank banks D eposits 
1990 57.01 25.41 1.91 6.17 0.33 1.59 6.83 2.67 100.00 
1991 54.03 26.58 1.91 7.35 030 1.58 733 2.81 100.00 
1992 53.78 29.40 239 2.07 0.40 2.18 838 3.78 100.00 
1993 51.66 3149 2.75 0.71 0.34 2.41 9.57 3.81 100.00 
1994 51.22 29.76 3.90 0.72 046 3.44 9.60 4.80 100.00 
1995 5136 30.69 2.27 0.75 0.50 1.77 9.89 5.04 100.00 
1996 4936 30.92 239 1.42 0.84 1.75 10.15 542 100.00 
1997 4623 25.54 136 0.48 0.88 0.48 15.43 10.96 100.00 
1998 46.26 23.76 1.56 1.23 1.17 039 1641 10.77 100.00 
1999 48.03 23.65 137 0.46 1.12 0.45 16.28 10.02 100.00 
2000 48.05 23.41 133 2.20 1.19 0.13 16.49 8.52 100.00 
2001 4735 28.05 3.43 0.00 3.67 0.18 15.55 1.77 100.00 
2002 49.99 25.66 3.17 0.00 4.15 0.14 15.56 132 100.00 
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Table A2-7: Tunisia: Structure of Bank Balance sheet in Tunisia from 1990 
to 2000 in Percent. 
Ratios Assets 
Deposits at Credits to Credits to Total 
Year Cash Central Assets ý the the P ortfolio 
Others Assets 
Banks Government Economy 
1990 0.50 1.03 224 937 66.74 235 17.77 100.00 
1991 0.41 1.00 2.19 5.56 6727 2.66 20.91 100.00 
1992 0.47 122 2.57 5.00 65.80 2.56 2238 100.00 
1993 0.48 2.02 2.79 4.65 65.60 2.60 21.85 100.00 
1994 0.44 1.75 2.44 2.72 6739 2.67 22.60 100.00 
1995 0.59 4.75 3.75 2.05 61.66 2.42 24.79 100.00 
1996 0A9 4.62 423 3.96 61.09 2.63 22.67 100.00 
1997 0.48 1.56 1.56 3.93 6131 2.80 26.55 100.00 
1998 0.49 3.87 3.97 2.84 59.92 2.91 24.04 100.00 
1999 0.49 134 3.88 6.53 61.41 3.17 23.05 100.00 
2000 0.50 1.03 2.24 937 66.74 235 17.77 100.00 
2001 0.55 230 3.07 5.66 61.81 3.03 23.58 100.00 
2002 0.51 1.96 3.54 5.77 6338 3.77 21.06 100.00 
Ratios Liabilities 
Quasi- External Credits from Special Total Year 
deposits Monetary Liabilities the Central Resources Equity Others Assets deposits Bank 
1990 19.75 37.16 4.86 725 8.59 7.61 14.79 100.00 
1991 16.56 37.75 5.01 823 8.70 839 1536 100.00 
1992 15.70 36.15 5.52 7.03 8.13 9.19 1827 100.00 
1993 15.14 25.80 5.73 735 7.69 9.82 19.14 100.00 
1994 16.17 34.08 6.66 5.17 7.97 10.71 1931 100.00 
1995 16.12 33.17 6.50 5.50 6.68 1331 18.73 100.00 
1996 16.08 3328 756 120 6.02 13.45 22.40 100.00 
1997 17.05 35.39 7.60 0.82 5.66 13.46 20.03 100.00 
1998 16.91 33.80 726 0.73 529 13.59 16.67 100.00 
1999 16.60 36.37 8.60 088 4.78 13.16 19.92 100.00 
2000 14.99 35.01 7.69 1.96 7.48 12.28 20.58 100.00 
2001 15.07 3536 695 3.31 7.63 10.96 20.72 100.00 
2002 13.68 37.46 7.43 1.87 8.71 11.39 19.47 100.00 
351 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Table A2-8: Banking firms operating in Algeria 
Bank Name Symbol Specialisation 
Year 
Establishment 
Year 
Privatisation 
Ownership 
AI-Ryan Banque-Algerie Commercial 2000 Foreign 
Arab Bank Commercial 2000 Foreign 
Arab Banking Corporation- ABC-A Commercial 2000 Foreign 
Algerie 152 
Banque Algetienne de BADR Commercial 1982 Public Developpment Rural 
Banque de Developpment Local BDL Commercial 1985 Public 
Banque El-Baraka-Algerie El-Bazaka Commercial 
1991'3' Fog'ic 
Publ 
Banque Exterieur d'Algerie BEA Commercial 1967 Public 
Banque Generale BGM Commercial 
Private 
Mediterranienne 
Banque Nationale d'Algerie BNA Commercial 1966 Public 
BNP/Paribas Commercial Foreign 
Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et CNEP Commercial 1964 Public 
de Prevoyance154 
Citibank-Algerie155 Commercial 1998 Foreign 
Compagnie Algerienne de CAB Commercial 1999 Private 
Banques 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie CPA Commercial 1967 Public 
Natexis Banque" Natexis Commercial 2000 Foreign 
Societe Generale d'Algerie Commercial 2000 Foreign 
Algerian International Bank Merchant 2000 Private 
So-Finance Merchant Private 
Union Bank Merchant 1995 Private 
El-Mouna Bank Offshore 1998 Foreign 
Banque Algdrienne de 
Devcloppement BAD Specialised 1963 Public 
FINLEP Investment Private 
Societe de Refinancement Specialised 1998 Private 
ýsz 70% of this bank is owned by the parent banks based in Bahrain. 
This bank is equally shared between the Saudi-based banks Al-Baraka and the Algerian Bank BADR. ls" This banks was the State's biggest savings bank, but was transformed into commercial bank in 1997. iss This bank is working with Energy businesses. 
1-56 80% of this bank is owned by the parent banks, and the remaining by small Algerian capital 
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Table A2-9: Banking firms operating in Morocco 
BankName Symbol Specialisation Year Est. 
Year 
privatisation 
Ownership 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc1" BCM Commercial 1911 listed 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce BMCE Commercial Sep 1959 Listed Exterieur 
Banque Marocaine pour l'Afrique et BMAO Commercial 
I'Orient 
Banque Marocaine pour Commerce BMCI Commercial 1964 Listed 
et 1'Industrie159 
Banque Nationale de Cr&dit Agricole BNCA Commercial 
Private 
Credit du Maroc CM Commercial 1963 
(Credit 
Lyonnais 
(51%) 
Credit Immobilier et l'H6telier160 CIH Commercial 1920161 Public 
Banque Central Populaire (Credit BCP Commercial 1961 
Populaire du Maroc) 
51% Public. 
Banque Centrale Populaire BCP Commercial Feb 1961 And 49% 
private 
Societd Generale Marocaine de SGMB Commercial 
Banques162 
Societe Marocaine de Depot et Credit SMDC Commercial 
Wafabank163 Wafabank Commercial 1985 listed 
ABN-Amro Bank-Maroc Foreign 
Arab Bank- Maroc 
Citibank- Maroc 
Caisse Marocaine des Marches CMM 
Caisse de Depot et de Gestion CDG 
Bank Al-Aural Public 
Banque Marocaine 
Banque Nationale pour le 
DCveloppement Economique BNDE Specialised Public 
157 In 1992, Banque Commerciale du Maroc acquired Soci&td de Banque et de Credit. 
This bank was the first to be privatised. 
In 2001 the BNP Paribas's 51.5% subsidiary BMCI acquired the ABN Amro's local arm for Us$30mn. 
This bank used to be real-estate/mortgage bank. 
s Under the name la Caisse de PERTs immobiliers du Maroc, and was named CIII in 1967, and was 
allowed to operate as a deposit money bank in 1986.16' Created in 193 
162 SGMB is the only major non-Casablanca bourse listed bank, 50%-owned by Societe Generale France 
163 Established in 1964, but renamed to Compagnie Marocaine de Credit et de Banque in 1985, then to 
Wafabank in 19 April 1997, after absorbing Union Bancaire l lispano-Matrogi (1958). Wafabank increased 
its share of total bank deposits from 8.8% in 1994 to 12% to 2000. 
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Table A2-10: Banking firms operating in Tunisia 
Ownership 
Year Year Bank Name Symbol Specialisation 
Establishment Privatisation 
Amen Bank'" 
Arab Banking Corporation- 
Tunisia 
Arab Tunisian Bank 
Banque de 1'Habitat 
Banque de Tunisie 
Banque du Sud 
Banque Franco-Tunisienne 
Banque Internationale Arabe de 
Tunisie 
Banque Nationale Agricole 
Banque Tunisienne de 
Solidaritc 
Citibank 
Societe Tunisit nne de 
Banques'65 
Union Bancaire pour le 
Commerce et 1'Industrie 
Union Internationale de 
Banques166 
Union Tunisienne de Banques 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne 
de Developpment et du 
Commerce Exterieur 
Banque de Cooperation du 
Maghreb Arab 
Societd Tuniso-Saoudienne 
d'Investissement et de 
Developpement 
Banque de Tunisie et des 
Emirates d'Investissment 
Banque Tuniso-Kuweitienne de 
Developpement 
Banque Tuniso-Qatari 
d'Investissment 
Amen Lease 
Arab International Leasing 
Arab Tunisian Lease 
AM Commercial 1971-Listed 
ABC-T Commercial 
ATB Commercial 1982-Listed 
BH Commercial 1989-Listed 
BT Commercial 1984-Listed 
BS Commercial 1968-Listed 
BFT Commercial 
BIAT Commercial 1976-Listed 
BNA Commercial 1959-Listed 
BTS Commercial 
Citibank Commercial 
STB Commercial 1957 
UBCI Commercial 1961-Listed 
UIB Commercial) 
UTB Commercial 
Merchant, 
BATLDCE development 
and 
commercial 
BCMA Development 
STUSID Investment 
BTEI Development 
BTKD 
BTQI 
AL 
AIL 
ATL 
Development 
Merchant 
Leasing 
Leasing 
Leasing 
1963-Listed 
August 1983 
1981 
1996 
1997 
Private 64% Arab 
bank 
32% gov 
Private 
State 2.6% 
Private local 
(73%) 
Gov (18%) 
Gov 21 % 
Private 
50% Gov. 50% 
Libyan Arab 
Foreign Bank, 
Tripoli (50%) 
This bank is the first bank created fully by domestic private capital. '6s In 2000, this bank absorbed the Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique (1959)and Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisie (1959). 
166This bank has been acquired y France's Societe Generale of a 52% stake. 
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Compagnie Internationale de CIL Leasing Leasing 
General Leasing GL Leasing 
Tunisie Leasing TL Leasing 
Union Tunisidnne de Leasing UTL Leasing 
Banque d'Affaire de Tunisie BAT Merchant 
International Maghreb Merchan t Merchant Bank 
Alubaf Investment Bank Alubaf Commercial 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi BTST Islamic 1983 
Citibank-Offshore Offshore 
North Africa International Bank NAIB Commercial 1984 
Tunis International Bank TIB Merchant 1982 
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A3 Appendix A3 
TableA3-1: Descriptive Statistics of the our Sample (1994 to 2001, millions 
of US $) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Loans 911.1 1206.6 3.7 6756.9 
NEW OEA 368.6 692.9 1.0 3986.4 
Fixed Assets 183.1 241.9 0.2 1353.4 
Total Assets 1485.6 1740.2 23.1 7829.7 
Total Interest bearing deposits and 
funds 1219.3 1521.2 0.8 6719.2 
Total Liabilities 1374.1 1674.8 2.1 7666.8 
Equity 111.5 101.8 2.4 489.6 
New OBS 566.0 887.0 1.0 6681.0 
Liquid Assets (Memo) 216.8 357.0 0.1 2716.6 
Net Interest Revenue 35.4 51.0 -197.0 248.4 
Interest Income 91.0 109.6 1.0 648.5 
New Non Interest Income 17.4 28.3 1.0 247.3 
New Total Income 108.5 119.5 2.4 671.6 
New Interest EXP 55.6 773 1.0 525.2 
Personnel Expenses 13.4 132 0.2 53.0 
New Other Expenses 245 41.8 0.1 300.1 
New Total Expenses 93.6 111.4 1.9 646.9 
Loan Loss Provisions 14.8 30.6 -99.7 288.6 Profit before Tax 14.2 18.5 -2.1 109.0 Price of Funds 8.88% 14.07% 0.79% 125.00% 
Price of Labour 1.10% 0.61% 0.05% 3.72% 
price of Physical capital 131.98% 179.31% 0.29% 1300.00% 
ROE 13.39% 12.56% -20.83% 145.04% ROA 1.54% 1.23% -1.56% 6.73% Liability/ Assets 83.81% 15.99% 8.24% 99.26% 
Equity/Assets 16.19% 15.99% 0.74% 91.76% 
Loan Loss Provision / Net Int Rev 41.24% 194.40% 1.41% 1500.00% 
Equity / Net Loans 35.50% 61.59% 1.09% 632.43% 
Net Int Rev /Assets 2.73% 1.89% -5.09% 11.13% Non Int Exp /Assets 2.69% 1.55% 0.24% 12.55% 
Net Loans / Total Assets 63.23% 21.72% 5.44% 96.86% 
Net Loans / DUNDS 97.08% 56.84% 6.02% 462.50% 
Liquid /Assets 16.50% 19.04% 0.03% 89.80% 
Revenues/Assets 10.45% 9.75% 1.66% 53.44% 
Cost/Assets 8.71% 9.08% 1.74% 49.04% 
Cost to Income Ratio 82.72% 22.12% 38.46% 312.69% 
Source: Banksco 
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Table A3-2: Cost Efficiency estimates for Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian 
Banks over 1994-2001 - Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Avg. 
AI Rayan Algerian Bank + " " + " " * 54.91 54.91 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka äAlgerie " 38.18 46.17 52.65 62.01 51.70 39.92 50.83 48.78 
Alubaf International Bank 92.42 65.50 76.01 80,98 80.40 52.38 26.65 34.30 63.58 
Amen Bank + 61.43 63.80 68.59 68.62 72.42 76.23 68.87 68.56 
Amen Lease +   0 45.80 45.25 44.12 43.96 63.59 48.54 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria * " . " " 25.42 28.84 72.40 42.22 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie " " " " " " " 68.89 68.89 
Arab Tunisian Bank " 65.97 79.84 73.72 74.58 68.30 7281 70.54 72.25 
Arab Tunisian Lease " 0 48.83 46.41 40 26 39.37 44.17 68.79 47.97 
Banque Aig6rienne de Developpement - B. A. D. 94.57 91.66 86.64 74 87 75.20 7481 65.51 54.68 77.24 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Ddveloppement et do Commerce 
Exterieur 46.77 46.09 53.89 95.91 95.38 90.62 90.18 48.84 70.96 
Banque Centrale Populaire " " + " " " 80.80 62.85 71.82 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 93.62 90.64 91.22 9235 92.58 94.57 93.50 77.92 90.80 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisie 64.45 67.99 79.99 80.26 74.33 80.30 " + 74.55 
Banque de Ddveloppement Local 72.27 68.01 59.99 74.70 90.85 8988 85.18 58.40 74.91 
Banque do l'Agriculture et du Dcvcloppement Rural " 92.15 89.04 90.04 96.65 97.34 95.90 * 93.52 
Banque de 1'Habitat * 68.85 54.34 82.70 8682 87.79 90.55 75.91 78.14 
Banque de Tunisie * 53.41 62.32 70.99 72.63 75.60 79.52 75.13 6994 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates dInvestissement - BTEI   " 91.88 90.20 79.64 85.98 8715 45.81 80.11 
Banque du Sud " 81.90 86.35 89.79 87.44 87.42 90.19 70.52 84.80 
Banque Exterieure d'Alg6rie 80.10 89.40 91.32 92.18 93.38 93.45 94.53 71.84 88.27 
Banque Franco-Tunisienne + + " " 45.06 33.96 36.32 " 38.45 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT " 69.85 77.07 75.67 85.90 90.68 91.51 79.54 81.46 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Ext6rieur - BMCE " " 91.18 91.33 92.97 96.19 96.35 78.39 91.07 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce et l'Industrie BMCI " 81.31 83.58 " " 80.97 90.51 82.01 83.68 
Banque Nationale Agricole 0 91.68 86.46 92.23 92.96 93.64 94.64 78.77 90.06 
Banque Nationale d'Algerie 92.89 78.29 88.00 " " 89.44 89.57 + 87.64 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique 67.93 70.97 62.08 63.23 53.74 53.64 " * 61.93 
Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Economique - BNDE a " " 60.09 66,96 64.38 74.06 " 66.37 
Banque Tunisienne do la Solidarit6 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweitienne de Developpement BTKD-Tunisian - 
+ + " " 92.24 59.20 88.37 " 79.94 
Kuwaiti Development Bank 83.49 84.16 88.02 91.05 66.93 7222 7416 50.40 76.30 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements " " 53.24 46.44 55.52 57.73 67.68 + 56.12 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 58.76 60.30 64 85 58.64 67.93 68.81 69.74 " 64.15 
CAB-Compagnie Alg6rienne de Banques 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola 
Citibank NA (Branch) 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing 
Credit du Maroc 
Credit Immobilier et Hotelier 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 
General Leasing 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 
Soci&6 d Equipement Domestique at Menager 
+ 
" 
" 
" 
79.08 
56.63 
95.41 
" 
58.30 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
79 40 
46.74 
95.03 
" 
6256 
0 
+ 
a 
41.99 
80.18 
54.12 
94.44 
" 
71.99 
" 
" 
a 
40.86 
82.59 
59.23 
91.37 
" 
67.71 
" 
" 
a 
" 
42.49 
82.93 
" 
88.53 
41.95 
48.43 
63 83 
" 
a 
" 
40.64 
86.03 
" 
84.35 
46.26 
49.89 
51.39 
1403 
79.69 
46,46 
41.09 
83.31 
" 
94.64 
45.95 
42.81 
54 56 
61 66 
63.05 
64.80 
39.75 
81.51 
" 
0 
57.34 
" 
0 
37.85 
71.37 
55.63 
41.14 
81.88 
54.18 
91.97 
47.87 
57.39 
56 59 
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Forffn\year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Avg. 
Soaibtb Generale Marocaine de Banques 70.75 75.30 74.42 71.58 75.33 73.71 78.12 80.70 74.99 
Societe Tunisienne de Banque " " 86.35 86.63 90.44 87.27 95.15 78.46 87.38 
Tunis International Bank " 57.90 66.10 64 05 66.81 49.00 50.44 61.44 59.39 
Tunisic Factoring " " " " " 41.30 42.52 58.63 47.48 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et rlndustrie SA UBCI " 66.51 70.31 73.76 79.99 78.07 81.09 71.83 74.51 
Union Internationale de Banques " " 81.65 8016 88.60 83.10 91.69 76.05 83.66 
Wafabank 81 36 82 73 86 08 88 21 89.48 92 89 92 84 * 8766 
Average 75.81 71 86 73 99 74 66 74 23 70 61 70 95 65 54 72.21 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-3: Alternative Profit Efficiency estimates for Algerian, Moroccan 
and Tunisian Banks over 1994-2001 - Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Avg. 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank " " " " " " " 3499 34.89 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algetie " 72.53 74.70 78.47 79.46 84.35 86.05 42.63 74.03 
Alubaf International Bank 79.13 73.80 82.59 70.37 69.14 55.16 67.95 19.95 64.76 
Amen Bank " 77.62 75.22 74.73 72.07 70.05 63.71 74.20 72.51 
Amen Lease 0 0 " 76.18 75.61 82.46 79.26 40.70 70.84 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria " " " " " 70.28 77.03 28.50 58 60 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisia " " " " " " " 57.82 57.82 
Arab Tunisian Bank " 77.75 78.19 76.45 78.53 81.51 82.84 79.02 79.19 
Arab Tunisian Lease " 0 72.93 71.16 62.13 71.75 80.03 45.91 67.32 
Banque Algerienne de Develappement - B. A. D. 79.82 77.55 74 82 74.71 74.44 88.19 81.71 53.03 75.53 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement at de Commerce 
Exterieur 73.29 66.87 6908 80.44 76.73 7903 74.79 86.18 75.80 
Banque Centrale Populaire " " " " " " 34.96 91.99 63.47 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 53.79 49.90 4604 43.19 43.77 20.00 19.37 95.81 46.49 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisia 62.57 69.28 70.75 69.59 71.89 70.45 " " 69.09 
Banque de D6veloppement Local 77.44 77.53 86.00 86.42 61.52 87.62 8396 42.61 75.39 
Banque de l'Agriculture at du Developpement Rural " 69.11 81.54 84.38 79.36 71.52 83.97 * 78.31 
Banque de PHabitat 0 76.28 6503 73.03 72.74 76.51 76.25 92.28 76.02 
Banque de Tunisia 0 77.73 77.06 74 84 77.14 76.12 64.52 80.30 75.39 
Banque de Tunisia at des Emirates d Investissement - BTEI " " 72.67 71.29 66.86 62.24 64.86 76.13 69.01 
Banque du Sud 0 76.10 75 39 73.36 71.62 68 35 70.88 87.81 74.79 
Banque Exd6rieure d'Alg6rie 70.25 70.59 70.79 66.55 75.13 87.67 86.25 93.35 77.57 
Banque Franco-Tunisienne " " " " 71.13 77.81 72.63 " 73.85 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisia - BIAT " 78.19 77.14 73.47 70.60 67.59 65.34 91.52 74.83 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur - BMCE " " 68.03 63.54 62.49 27.31 40.48 96.03 59.65 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce at l'Industrie BMCI " 80.12 74.44 " " 59.93 61.52 9188 73.78 
Banque Nationale Agricola 0 66.55 62.72 66.87 74.44 65.10 65.39 94.68 70.82 
Banque Nationale d'Algerie 64.27 60.11 60.73 " " 80.45 89.94 " 71.10 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique 62.25 62.47 6474 65.85 73.51 79.38 " " 68.03 
Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Economique - BNDE " " " 56.51 57.70 51.80 74.31 " 60.08 
Banque Tunisienne de la Solidarit6 0 0 " " 75.03 76.44 68.70 " 73.39 
Kuwaiti Development Bank 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements 
Bait Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 
CAB-Compagnie Algerienne de Banques 
Caisse Nationale de Crodit Agricola 
Citibank NA (Branch) 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing 
Credit du Maroc 
Credit Immobilier at Hotelier 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 
General Leasing 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 
SocietC dTquipement Domestique at Manager 
Socidtb Gdn6rale Marocaine de Banques 
75.76 74.57 75.36 74.96 72.89 5287 58.92 78.46 70,47 
" " 83.08 83.65 80.24 84.13 84.72 " 83.17 
72.57 70.52 74 81 70.50 78.54 7957 78.20 " 74.96 
" " " " " " 83.24 18.35 50.80 
' ' ' ' " " 93.60 86.73 90.16 
" " " " " " 80.64 67.02 73 83 
" " 77.88 75.96 76.34 82.54 75.45 48.76 72.82 
70.86 70.58 67.67 64.66 64.48 68.49 64.52 87.40 69.83 
79.47 62.32 61.87 61.89 " " " " 66.39 
74.12 70.62 84.19 84.20 76.99 86.33 30.53 " 72.42 
' " " * 72.79 79.44 80.24 48.55 70,25 
72.43 71.88 73.81 79.57 75.00 76.91 82.17 " 75.97 
' " " " 49.65 47.67 44.49 " 47.27 
67.15 70.17 65 89 6434 64 71 53.47 51 
. 36 Ra oz 65 12 
359 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Form%Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Avg. 
Societb Tunisidnne de Banque e " 76.98 74.52 75.81 76.28 67.24 94.78 77.60 
Tunis International Bank * 80.88 76.88 74.00 76.15 77.01 75.79 5493 7366 
Tunisia Factoring * " " " * 84.67 84.10 46.71 71.83 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce at 1'Industrie SA UBCI " 62.79 57.20 68.31 73.21 74.60 72.53 77.30 69.42 
Union Internationale de Banques " * 77.24 75.10 79.29 81.96 80.59 89.14 80.56 
Wafabank 69.28 69.73 65.99 63 29 63.30 39 55 46.31 * 59.63 
Average 70.85 71.18 72.21 71.84 71.09 70.57 70.03 68.90 70.83 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-4: The Most and Least Cost and Profit Efficient in our sample. 
Cost Efficiency 
Year The Least Efficient Bank The Most Efficient Bank 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de 
1994 46.77 Dvveloppement et de Commerce 95A I Credit Populaire d'Algerie 
Exterieur 
18 38 
Albaraka ofAlgeria-Banque Al 95.03 Cr6dit Populaire d'Algbrie 
1995 . Baraka d'Algerie 
99 41 
Compagnie Internationale de 94.44 Cr6dit Populaire d'Alg6rie 
1996 . Leasing 
Banque Arabe Tuniso- 
1997 86 40 
Compagnie Internationale de 9591 
Libyenne de 
. Leasing Developpement et de 
Commerce Exterieur 
Banque Arabe Tuniso- 
1998 4026 Banque Franco-Tunisidnne 96.65 
Libyenne de 
Ddveloppement et de 
Commerce Exterieur 
1999 25.42 Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria 9734 
Banque de l'Agriculture et 
du Developpement Rural 
Banque Marocaine du 
2000 14.03 
CAB-Compagnie Algbrienne de 96.35 Commerce Extdrieur - Banques BMCE 
Banque Marocaine pour le 
2001 3430 Alubaf International Bank 82.01 Commerce et ('Industrie 
BMCI 
Overall CAB-Compagnie Algerienne de Banque de ]'Agriculture et 
37.85 Banques 9352 du Developpement Rural 
Alternative Profit Efficiencies 
Year The Least 
Efficient The Most Efficient 
53.79 Banque Commerciale du Maroc 79.82 
Blue Algerienne de Ddveloppement - 
1994 
49.90 Banque Commerciale du Maroc 80.88 Tunis International Bank 1995 
1996 46.04 Banque Commerciale du Maroc 86.00 Banque de Ddveloppement Local 
1997 43.19 Banque Commerciale du Maroc 86.42 Banque dc D6veloppement Local 
1998 43.77 Banque Commerciale du Maroc 80.24 Banque Tuniso - Qatari dinvestissements 
20.00 Banque Commerciale du Maroc 88.19 
Banque AlgErienne de Dhveloppement - 1999 B. A. D. 
2000 1937 Banque Commerciale du Maroc 93.60 Caisse Nationale dc Crddit Agricole 
18.35 CAB-Compagnie Algerienne 
de 
96.03 Banque Marocaine du Commerce Banques Exterieur - BMCE 
ýýAQ1 
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Overall 34.89 AI Rayan Algerian Bank 90.16 Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole 
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Table A3-5: Scale Economies Estimates derived from the translog cost 
function for Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Banks over 1994-2001 - 
Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Avg. 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank " " " " " " 91.52 91.52 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algerie " 48.26 94.16 96.66 91.14 91.15 92.42 62.98 82.39 
Alubaf International Bank 48.38 72.33 48.73 94.10 95.25 7867 75.03 96.54 76.13 
Amen Bank " 48.09 68.08 46.73 95.05 91.01 92.59 77.10 7409 
Amen Lease " 0 " 67.55 46.90 87.21 89.65 95.83 77.43 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria " " " " " 44.14 95.73 41.69 60.52 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie " " " " " " " 62.70 62.70 
Arab Tunisian Bank " 22.96 57.19 58.21 102.42 99.28 45.22 87.57 67.55 
Arab Tunisian Lease " 0.00 47.54 47.71 66.19 110.63 62.53 98.02 72.10 
Banque Algerienne de D6veloppement - B. A. D. 48.56 48.09 24.42 27.77 54 83 66 86 98.59 91.34 57.56 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de DBveloppement et de Commerce 
Exterieur 22.01 41.35 48.44 84.21 45.82 57.66 106.24 65.87 58.95 
Banque Centrale Populaire " " " " " " 66.34 49.89 58.12 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 36.11 80.21 33.53 37.62 28.43 46.48 47.79 40.77 43.87 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisie 77.78 34.27 81.72 54.58 86.42 36.16 " * 61.82 
Banque de D6veloppement Local 32.45 59.26 36.33 58.30 36.96 47.26 42.13 35.52 43.53 
Banque de I'Agriculture et du Developpement Rural " 65.31 56.53 50.90 53.91 33.65 28.77 * 48.18 
Banque de 11-labitat * 53 26 62.64 62.60 56.49 85.67 41.18 83.65 63.64 
Banque de Tunisie " 67.21 50.02 49.38 49.36 35.44 34.67 22.11 44.03 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates d'Investissement - BTEI ' * 63.09 42.66 56,05 54.16 84.13 55.58 59.28 
Banque du Sud * 53.97 53.07 61.23 51.31 52.71 36.22 31.73 48.61 
Banque Exterieure d'Alg6rie 69.68 58.17 44.41 73.13 40.93 44.96 54.09 52.30 54.71 
Banque Franoo-Tunisienne " " " * 60.40 56.46 35.49 * 50,78 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT " 69.99 56.65 54.03 75.80 46.50 51.68 41.91 56.65 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur - BMCE " " 73.27 56.23 52.28 41.21 43.36 60.58 54.49 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce et 1'Industrie BMCI * 63.47 54.08 " " 5990 58.11 41.99 55.31 
Banque Nationale Agricole " 82.17 75.81 7041 36,17 75.47 43.26 37.47 62.96 
Banque Nationale d'Alg6rie 70.18 7347 74.13 " " 49.12 37.92 " 60.96 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique 75.51 60.33 67.32 71.75 70.97 54.79 " " 66.78 
Banque Nationale pour le D6veloppement Economique - BNDE " " " 59.59 70.32 77.49 52.32 " 64.93 
Banque Tunisienne de la Solidarit6 " " " " 59.42 69.05 50.90 " 59.79 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweitienne de Ddveloppement IITKD-Tunisian - 
Kuwaiti Development Bank 48.47 46.06 45.47 45.50 42.96 54.12 53.31 53.28 48.65 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements " " 61.99 63.33 65.52 42.05 81.41 " 62.86 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounai - B. E. S. T. Bank 61.98 62.66 67.46 68.61 75.24 65.75 68.43 " 67.16 
CAB-Compagnie Alg6rienne de Banques " " " " " " 48.50 53.53 51.01 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agrioole " " " " " " 41.84 83.02 62.43 
Citibank NA (Branch) " " " " " " 76.53 4348 60.01 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing " " 78.06 71.61 7490 76.65 73.69 39.45 69.06 
Credit du Maroc 65.06 65.34 34.10 5312 34.60 76.42 30.43 75.65 56.84 
Credit Immobilier et Hotelier 86.06 85.53 36.79 35.83 " " " " 61.06 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 50.47 50.16 41.02 39.56 38.45 33.30 32.93 0 40.84 
General Leasing " " " * 69.65 35.96 68.47 73.61 61.92 
North Africa International Bank - NAIIB 38.09 36.79 69.07 68.92 81.77 70.38 78.67 " 63.38 
Societe d Equipement Domestique et Menager 0 0 0 0 34.78 89,81 28.31 * 50.97 
363 
Bank Cost and Profit Efficiency in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Form\Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Avg. 
Socie. 6 Generale Marocaine de Banques 43.02 42.92 82.49 80.59 27.77 30.26 49.53 28.41 48.12 
Socie46 Tunisibnne de Banque 0 * 37.64 36.22 95 69 24.34 27.55 83.81 50.87 
Tunis International Bank * 75.16 31.36 32.35 80.10 97.38 95.57 27.49 62.77 
Tunisia Factoring " " " " " 78.21 79.47 44.26 67.31 
Union Bancaire pour to Commerce at 1'Industric SA UBCI " 81.36 88.16 90.93 102.80 99.91 104.71 73.60 91.64 
Union Internationale de Banques " * 72.62 76.59 98.88 100.56 88.86 61.20 83.12 
Wafabank 85.03 28.37 100.50 98.72 94.80 94.15 93 67 0 85.03 
Average 56.40 57.81 59.39 60.76 64.63 64.22 61.96 60.15 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-6: Scale Efficiency estimates derived from the translog cost 
function for Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Banks over 1994-2001- 
Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Avg. 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank ' ' " " " " " 99.99 99.99 
Albareka of Algeria-Banque Al 13araka d'Algerie " 99.13 99.24 99.06 99.17 99.74 98.86 99.35 99.22 
Alubaf International Bank 97.76 99.21 98.53 97.80 97.88 98.73 99.14 99.28 98.54 
Amen Bank 96.96 96.47 95.58 95.18 9428 94.02 94.18 95.24 
Amen Lease " " ' 99.91 99.94 99.80 99.86 99.97 99.90 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria ' " " " " 98.86 98.44 96.54 97.95 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie " s " " " " 98.69 98.69 
Arab Tunisian Bank " 96.63 9462 95.12 95.11 94.79 94.43 94.49 95.03 
Arab Tunisian Lease " 0 99.92 99.97 99.80 99.81 99.86 99.82 99.86 
Banque Algerienne de D6veloppement - B. A. D. 98.77 99.02 99.17 99.38 99.54 99.49 99.37 99.33 99.26 
Banque Arabe Tuniao-Libyenne de Developpement at de Commerce 99.52 99.48 98.80 97.98 98.42 98.61 98.26 98.25 98.66 Exduieur 
Banque Centrale Populaire " ' " " " " 89.10 87.71 88.41 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 90.00 89.56 89.56 89.22 88.78 88.31 87.22 86.41 88.63 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisie 96.34 96.47 96.34 9660 97.00 97.04 " " 96.63 
Banque de Developpement Local 93.18 92.50 92.33 92.34 91.58 91.29 91.23 90.46 91.86 
Banque de ('Agriculture et du Developpement Rural " 86.40 87.58 87.95 86.15 84.71 86.06 86.47 
Banque de l'Habitat * 96.01 97.31 95.86 95.82 94 63 93.18 91.74 94.94 
Banque de Tunisie 0 95.79 95.19 94.74 94.58 94.64 94.62 94 97 94.93 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates d'Investissement - BTEI " " 98.12 98 63 99.01 98.81 98.95 98.25 98.63 
Banque du Sud " 95.56 95.22 96.19 96 02 95.71 94.19 94.42 95.33 
Banque Exterieure d'Alg6rie 87.99 88.66 89.40 89.84 89.62 89.09 89.36 83.72 88.46 
Banque Franoo-Tunisienne " " " " 100.00 100.00 99.69 " 99.90 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT " 94.42 93.59 93.83 93.42 92.18 91.70 91.25 92.91 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur - BMCE " 89.85 89.36 88.85 87.15 86.37 86.04 87.94 
Banque Marooaine pour le Commerce et Pindustrie BMCI " 9307 93.17 ' " 9294 91.02 89.11 91.84 
Banque Nationale Agricole " 94.59 94.37 93.42 93.93 9263 91.67 91.28 93.13 
Banque Nationale d'Alg6rie 89.32 91.07 88.39 " " 88.44 88.81 " 89.21 
Banque Nationale de D6veloppement Touristique 97.69 97.74 98.21 98.19 98.53 98.49 " * 98.14 
Banque Nationale pour le D6veloppement Economique - BNDE " " " 94.61 94.18 93.35 93.82 " 93.99 
Banque Tunisienne de Is Solidarit6 ' " " " 99.98 100.00 99.94 * 99.98 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweitienne de Ddveloppement BTKD-Tunisian - 
Kuwaiti Development Bank 96.92 96.97 97.33 97.52 98.46 9864 98.62 98.52 97.87 
nanque t umso - daran a tnvesussementa 99.65 99.80 99.95 99.98 99.95 " 99.87 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 96.50 98.24 98.32 98.00 97.79 97.59 97.49 " 97.99 
CAB-Compagnie Alg6rienne de Banques " " " " " " 99.95 99.96 99.96 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola " " " " " " 93.46 91.97 92.72 
Citibank NA (Branch) " " " " " " 96 45 9648 96.46 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing " " " 100.00 99.93 99.91 99.90 96.37 99.22 
Credit du Maroc 93.15 9312 93.25 92.69 92.74 91.93 92.25 91.18 92.54 
Credit Immobilier et Hotelier 93.71 93.63 94 62 94.39 " " " " 94.09 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 83.68 84.10 84.74 86.15 86.42 89.34 86.56 " 85.86 
General Leasing " 0 0 0 99,99 100.00 100.00 99.61 99.90 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 99.44 98.45 97.59 97.57 97.68 97.79 97.50 " 98.01 
Societe d'Equipement Domestique et Menager " 0 0 0 99.94 99.59 99.73 * 99.76 
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Form\Ye9r 1994 1995 1996 1997 1995 1999 2000 2001 Avg. 
Socidtb Gen6rale Marocaine de Banques 93.20 93.07 92.92 92.97 92.43 92.62 91.32 90.89 92.43 
Societ6 Tunisienne de Banque " " 92.01 91.49 90.94 91.03 89.95 89.79 90.87 
Tunis International Bank 0 98.08 97.44 97.35 97.12 97.23 97.14 97.06 97.35 
Tunisia Factoring " " " " " 99.72 99.90 99.81 99.81 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce at I'Industrie SA UBCI " 97.29 96.56 96 46 95.08 95.18 95.54 96.06 96.02 
Union Internationale de Banques " " 95.34 95.56 94.80 95.44 92 99 93.56 94.62 
Wafabank 91.59 91.57 90.97 90.49 90.13 89.27 88.17 0 90.31 
Average 9416 94.72 94.75 95.17 95.54 95.32 94.80 9463 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-7: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the period 1994-2000, Individual Bank Estimates 
Tech. Alloca 
Form\Year FM FM Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale Eff 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank 100.00 100.00 100.00 59.90 100.00 59.90 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algerie 98.27 15.85 15.55 8907 9827 90.80 
Alubaf International Bank 90.37 38.11 37.14 83.14 90.37 91.97 
Amen Bank 72.17 55.43 39.75 66.95 7217 93.45 
Amen Lease 86.58 21.28 17.95 47.98 86.58 53.20 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria 100.00 31.20 31.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie 100.00 100.00 100.00 10000 100.00 100.00 
Arab Tunisian Bank 78.76 44.68 35.58 73.30 78.76 93.82 
Arab Tunisian Lease 95.98 24.00 23.68 76.80 95.98 80.70 
Banque Alg6rienne de D6vcloppcment - B. A. D. 99.53 75.93 75.84 92.33 9953 92.56 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement et de 
Commerce Ext4rieur 97.49 31.91 31.11 96.24 97.49 9&74 
Banque Centrale Populaire 100.00 62.30 67-30 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 98.60 56.05 55.25 81.55 98.60 82.60 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisie 72.75 52.32 40.17 67.88 72.75 94.68 
Banque dc D6veloppement Local 74.27 51.40 40.67 65.47 7427 87.59 
Banque de 1'Agriculture et du Developpement Rural 94.32 97.36 92.44 76.74 94.32 81.48 
Banque de 1'1iabitat 100.00 100.00 100.00 94.53 100.00 94.53 
Banque de Tunisia 88.20 41.27 39.42 85.20 88.20 96.53 
Banque de Tunisia et des Emirates d'Investissement - BTEI 97.40 58.52 58.22 85.08 97.40 87.30 
Banque du Sud 81.47 38.38 31.82 79.75 81.47 97.40 
Banque Exterieure d'Alg6rie 91.04 81.19 77.86 89.84 91.04 9&77 
Banque Franco-Tunisi6nne 100.00 85.73 85.73 90.93 100.00 90,93 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisia - BIAT 88.94 60.98 53.34 80.08 88.94 89.06 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Ext4rieur- BMCE 97.28 46.84 45.42 76.24 97.28 7&82 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce et l'Industric BMCI 80.10 47.30 39.90 63.98 80.10 80.76 
Banque Nationale Agricole 85.98 90.34 79.96 78.42 85.98 90,82 
Banque Nationale d'Algbrie 85.70 84.16 71.70 80.56 85.70 91.42 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique 100.00 58.80 58 80 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Economique - 
ENDE 76.83 23.70 2207 73.80 76.83 9127 
Banque Tunisi6nne de la Solidarit8 93.60 70.23 69.57 85.63 93.60 90.53 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweiti6nne de DBveloppement BTKD- 
Tunisian - Kuwaiti Development Bank 
91.87 26.42 24.30 83.13 91.87 90.20 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements 100.00 83.13 83.13 77.10 100.00 77.10 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 90.62 50 23 4615 82 20 . . 90.62 91.28 
CAB-Compagnie Algerienne de Banques 100.00 56 05 56 05 100 00 . . . 100.00 100.00 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola 80.35 35.90 27 80 71 05 . . 80.35 86.25 
Citibank NA (Branch) 100.00 83.40 83.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing 77.20 20 23 15 08 42 58 . . . 77.20 50.30 Cr6dit du Maroc 97.77 27.68 26.68 80.37 97.77 81.95 
Credit Immobilier et Hotelier 100.00 30.78 30.78 86.60 100.00 86.60 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 10000 89.77 89.77 92.30 100.00 92,30 
General Leasing 87.85 16.33 13.98 56.40 87.85 62.45 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 100.00 54.87 54.87 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Societe dEquipement Domestique et Manager 59 30 . 16.55 9.80 57.25 59.30 96.55 
Soci6tC G6nCrale Marocaine de Banqucs 94 73 
. 27.20 26.03 79.10 94.73 83.36 
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FormtYear 
Tech. 
EM 
A1locaý 
FM Cost Elf TE CRS TE VRS Scale Elf 
Soci&6 Tunisi6nne de Banque 93.95 73.38 68.50 75,60 93,95 80.58 
Tunis International Bank 98 75 81.77 81.47 93.17 98.75 93.97 
Tunisie Factoring 98.73 88.10 86.97 67.10 98.73 68.00 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et Plndustrie SA UBCI 88.80 60.60 57.65 88.17 88.80 99.05 
Union Internationale de Banques 78.18 41 60 36.63 76.53 7818 97.63 
Wafabank 93.93 30.50 29.08 70.38 93.93 75.22 
Average 91.15 54.79 SL61 80.41 91.15 87.93 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-8: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the year 1994- Individual Bank Estimates 
Farm\Year 
Tech. 
F}t7 
Alloca 
EM Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale Eff Area 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank " " " " a " " 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algerie " ' 
Alubaf International Bank 100 87 87 100 100 100 - 
Amen Bank " " " " " " " 
Amen Lease ' " " " " 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisia " " 
' ' 
Arab Tunisian Bank ' ' " 
Arab Tunisian Lease 
Banque Algdrienne de Ddveloppement - B. A. D. 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement at de 100 28.7 28.7 91.3 100 91.3 ir3 
Commerce Ext6rieur 
Banque Centrale Populaire " ' ' ' 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 100 100 100 78.6 100 78.6 dra 
Banque doDeveloppementEconomique de Tunisia 74.3 71.4 53.1 73.9 74.3 99.5 its 
Banque de D6veloppement Local 93.2 64.7 60.3 77.5 93.2 83.1 drs 
Banque de l'Agriculture at du Developpemcnt Rural ' ' ' ' ' " ' 
Banque de ITIabitat 
Banque de Tunisia a ' a a a a a 
Banque do Tunisia at des Emirates d'Investissement - BTEI " " " " " " " 
Banque du Sud ' ' " " ' ' ' 
Banque Ex36rieure d'Alg6rie 41.1 37.6 15.4 41 41.1 100 
Banque Franoo-Tunisienne " " " " " " " 
Banque Internationale Aruba de Tunisia - BIAT " " " " " " " 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Ext6ricur - BMCE " " " " " " " 
Banque Marocainc pour to Commerce at 1'Industrie BMCI " " " " " " " 
Banque Nationale Agricola " " a a a a a 
Banque Nationale d'Algbrie 84.2 82 69.1 81.5 84.2 96.8 do 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Banque Nationale pour le D6veloppement Economique - a a a " a a " BNDE 
Banque Tunisi6nne de la Solidarite " " " " " " " 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweiti6nne de D6veloppement BTKD- gg 6 34.4 30.5 58.6 88.6 66 1 in Tunisian - Kuwaiti Development Bank . 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements " " " " " " " 
Bait Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 100 40.5 40.5 71.7 100 71.7 irs 
CAB-Compagnie Algerienne de Banquet " " " " a " " 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola " " " " " " a 
Citibank NA (Branch) " " " " " " " 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing " " " " " " " 
Credit du Maroc 92.4 54 49.9 65.3 92.4 70.6 drs 
Cr6dit Immobilier at Hotelier " " " " " " " 
Credit Populaire d'Algdrie 100 100 100 100 100 100 
General Leasing " " . . " . " 
North Africa International Bank - NAII3 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Societe' d'Equipement Domestique at Manager " " " " " " " 
Societe Generale Marocaine dc Banqucs 100 55.6 55.6 67.8 100 67,8 drs 
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Form\Year 
Tech. 
EM 
Alloea 
EM Cost Elf TE CRS TE VRS Scale Elf Area 
Soci6t6 Tunisi6nne de Banque " " " " " " " 
Tunis International Bank " " " " " " " 
Tunisie Factoring s a " " " a " 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et l'Industrie SA UBCI " " " " " " " 
Union Internationale de Banques " " " " " " + 
Wafabank 100 48.1 48.1 65.3 100 65.3 drs 
Average 92.11 69.00 64.89 79.53 92.11 86.93 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-9: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the year 1995- Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 
Tech. 
FM 
Alloca 
Fall Cost EI? TE CRS TE VRS Scale Eff Area 
AI Rayan Algerian Bank " ' " s " " " 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka dAlgerie 100.00 7.80 7.80 76.50 10000 76.50 us 
Alubaf International Bank 100.00 33.30 3330 64.80 100.00 64.80 irs 
Amen Bank 51.70 52.30 27.00 50.40 51.70 97.40 drs 
Amen Lease " " " " " " " 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria " ' 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisia " " " " " " " 
Arab Tunisian Bank 57.40 24.60 1410 56.60 57.40 98.60 drs 
Arab Tunisian Lease " " ' ' " " ' 
Banque Algerienne de D6veloppement - B. A. D. 10000 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement at da 100.00 6.20 6.20 100.00 100 00 10000 Commerce Extdrieur 
Banque Centrale Populaire " " " " " " 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 91.60 57.50 52.70 68.80 91.60 75.10 drs 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisia 58.30 31.20 18.20 56.90 58.30 97.60 irs 
Banque de Dbveloppement Local 36.10 51.90 18.70 32.70 36.10 90.60 drs 
Banque de l'Agrieulture at du Developpement Rural 100.00 100.00 100.00 84.50 100.00 8450 drs 
Banque del7iabitat 100.00 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque de Tunisia 57.30 18.90 1080 56.30 57.30 98.30 drs 
Banque de Tunisia at des Emirates dlnvestissement - BTEI " " " * + " 
Banque du Sud 62.00 32.30 20.00 58.60 62.00 94.60 drs 
Banque Ext6rieure dAlgbrie 100.00 100.00 100.00 10000 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Franco-Tunisiennc " " " " " " " 
Banque Internationale Arsbe de Tunisia - BIAT 70.90 80.90 57.40 56.20 70.90 79.30 drs 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extäieur - BMCE " " " " " " . 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce at ('Industrie BMCI 71.00 42.80 30.40 5440 71.00 7660 drs 
Banque Nationale Agricola 77.20 93.60 7230 59.10 77.20 76.50 drs 
Banque Nationale d'Alg6rie 44.30 88.60 39.20 30.90 44.30 69.90 drs 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique 100.00 52.20 5220 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Economique - , * " BNDE " 
Banque Tunisi6nne de la Solidarit6 " " " " " " " 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweitidnno de Dfveloppement BTKD- 
Tunisian - Kuwaiti Development Bank 
81.60 20.50 16.70 7460 81.60 91.40 its 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari dInvestisaements " " " " " " e 
Bait Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 100 00 45.50 45.50 82.60 100.00 82.60 irs 
CAB-Compagnie Algerienne de Banques " 0 " " " . " 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola a " " " e a " 
Citibank NA (Branch) " " . " . " . 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing " " . . . . . 
Cr6dit du Maroc 95.10 35.70 33.90 70.80 95.10 7440 drs 
Cr6dit Immobilier at Hotelier 100.00 2.40 240 100.00 100.00 10000 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
General Leasing " " " " " " " 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 100.00 60.70 60.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Societd d'Equipement Domestique at Manager " . . . " " " 
Societe Generale Marocaine de Banques 92.90 3560 33.10 65.00 92.90 69.90 drs 
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Form\Year 
Tech. 
EM 
All«a 
Efli Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale Eli Area 
Societb Tunisibnne de Banque " " " " + + 
Tunis International Bank 100.00 100.00 100.00 10000 100 00 100.00 
Tunisie Factoring " + " " " " " 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et l'Industrie SA UBCI 66.80 34.80 23.20 66.10 6680 98.90 drs 
Union Internationale de Banques " + " " + + " 
Wafabank 91.70 36.80 33.80 60.70 91.70 66.20 drs 
Average 82.96 53.31 45.16 73.33 8296 88.40 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-10: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the year 1996- Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 
Tech. 
Eilt 
Alloca 
Ern 
Coat Elf TE CRS TE VRS Scale Elf Area 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank " " " " " " " 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algerie 100.00 21.80 21.80 68.40 100.00 68.40 irs 
Alubaf International Bank 67.30 9.10 6.10 5960 67.30 88.60 irs 
Amen Bank 61.10 66.30 40.50 6060 61.10 99.10 drs 
Amen Lease " " " " " " " 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria " " " " " " " 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie " " " " " " " 
Arab Tunisian Bank 93.30 28.40 26.50 75.20 93.30 80.60 drs 
Arab Tunisian Lease 100.00 48.20 48.20 38.90 100.00 38.90 irs 
Banque Algdrienne de Developpement - B. A. D. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement et de 
Commerce Ext6rieur 
100.00 11.80 11.80 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Centrale Populaire " " " " " " " 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 100.00 55.90 55.90 74.30 100.00 74.30 des 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisie 66.70 15.10 10.10 65.70 66.70 9860 irs 
Banque de Ddveloppement Local 39.70 46.30 18.40 37.40 39.70 94.10 drs 
Banque de ! 'Agriculture et du Devcloppement Rural 100.00 100.00 100.00 68.00 100.00 68.00 drs 
Banque de I'Habitat 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque de Tunisie 71.90 10.80 7.80 66.30 71.90 92.30 drs 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates d'Investissement - BTEI 100.00 82.70 8270 8230 100.00 82.30 irs 
Banque du Sud 64.40 43.10 27.80 60.30 64.40 93.60 des 
Banque Exterieure d'Algbrie 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Franco-Tunisidnne " " " " " " . 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 78.50 56.10 44.00 63.50 78.50 81.00 drs 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur - BMCE 100.00 63.70 63.70 66.40 100.00 66.40 drs 
Banque Marocainc pour le Commerce et l'Industric BMCI 78 80 36.60 28 80 62.70 78.80 79.50 drs 
Banque Nationale Agricole 52.70 64.70 34.10 49.80 52.70 9440 drs 
Banque Nationale d'Alg6rie 100.00 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique 100.00 48.40 4840 10000 100.00 100.00 
Banque Nationale pour to Developpement Economique - , * BNDE " " a » 
Banque Tunisienne de la Solidarite " " S " . . . 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweiti6nne de D6veloppement BTKD. 
Tunisian -Kuwaiti Development Bank 
98 40 24.90 24.50 94.20 98 40 95.70 in 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements 100.00 100.00 100.00 55.80 100.00 55.80 irs 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 100.00 64.60 6460 100.00 100.00 100.00 
CAB-Compagnie Algerienne de Banques " " " . " . 
Cause Nationale de Credit Agricole " " . " . a 
Citibank NA (Branch) " " " " * a 
Compagnie Internationale do Leasing 75 80 39 60 30 00 23 10 7 8 . . . . 5. 0 30.50 us Credit du Maroc 100.00 31.10 31.10 73.70 100.00 73.70 drs 
Credit Immobilier at Hotelier 100.00 5.10 5.10 100.00 100.00 10000 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - General Leasing " 0 . * a a 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 100.00 44.50 4450 100.00 100.00 100,00 
Sooieb d'Equipement Domestique at Menager " " . . " a 4 
Soci6t6 Generale Marooaine de Banques 90.20 26.70 24.10 66.00 90.20 73.20 do 
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Form\Year 
Tech. 
FM 
Alloca 
E Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale Eff Area 
Sooi&6 Tunisidnne de Banque 100.00 100.00 100.00 73.80 100.00 73.80 drs 
Tunis International Bank 100.00 10000 10000 10000 100.00 100.00 - 
Tunisie Factoring " " " " " " " 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et ('Industrie SA UBCI 66.00 17.90 11 80 62.90 66.00 95.40 drs 
Union Internationale de Banques 66.80 32.40 21.70 62.70 66.80 93.90 drs 
Wafabank 98.70 32.80 32.40 68.60 98.70 69.50 drs 
Average 88.06 53.57 49.07 74.45 88.06 85.04 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-11: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the year 1997- Individual Bank Estimates 
Tech. Alloca Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale Eff Area Form\Year Eff EM 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algerie 
Alubaf International Bank 
Amen Bank 
Amen Lease 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisia 
Arab Tunisian Bank 
Arab Tunisian Lease 
Banque Algerienne de Dbveloppement - B. A. D. 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement at de 
Commerce Exterieur 
Banque Centrale Populaire 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisia 
Banque de Developpement Local 
Banque de l'Agriculture at du Developpement Rural 
Banque de IlIabitat 
Banque de Tunisia 
Banque do Tunisia at des Emirates d'Investissement - BTEI 
Banque du Sud 
Banque Exterieure d'Algdrie 
Banque Franoo-Tunisidnne 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisia - BIAT 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur - BMCE 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce at l'Industrie BMCI 
Banque Nationale Agricola 
Banque Nationale d'Algerie 
Banque Nationale do Developpement Touristique 
Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Economique - 
BNDE 
Banque Tunisienne de la Solidarite 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweiti6nnc de Ddveloppement BTKD- 
Tunisian - Kuwaiti Development Bank 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari dInvestissements 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 
CAI3-Compagnie Algerienpo de Banques 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola 
Citibank NA (Branch) 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing 
Credit du Maroc 
Credit Immobilier at Hotelier 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 
General Leasing 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 
Societb d'Equipement Domestique et Menager 
Societ6 Gbnerale Marocaine de Banques 
100.00 6.60 6 60 100.00 100.00 100.00 
100.00 17.70 17.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 
81.40 60.70 49.40 64.90 81.40 79.70 dry 
100.00 27.50 27.50 44.80 100.00 44.80 irs 
100.00 18.50 18.50 67.40 100.00 67.40 drs 
96.70 18.40 17.80 46.30 96.70 47.90 j 
100.00 10000 10000 100.00 10000 10000 
100.00 24.60 24.60 100.00 100.00 100.00 
_ 
100.00 79.80 79.80 75.90 100.00 75.90 drs 
87.30 45.90 40.10 82.40 87.30 94.40 drs 
71.60 86.80 6220 59.90 71.60 83.60 drs 
100.00 100.00 100.00 67.20 100.00 67.20 dr6 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
100.00 24.50 24.50 68.60 100.00 68.60 dri 
100.00 69.60 6960 100.00 100.00 100,00 
96.20 30.70 2960 87.90 96 20 91.40 dre 
100.00 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 10000 
99.40 75.00 7450 81.30 99.40 81.80 dr6 
100.00 93.50 93.50 64.10 100.00 64.10 dr6 
100.00 10000 100.00 99.60 100.00 99.60 dre 
100.00 56.40 56.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 
80.80 10.70 8.70 61.90 80.80 76.60 drs 
100.00 64.00 64.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
100.00 54.80 54 80 100.00 100.00 100.00 
100.00 3060 30.60 95.10 100.00 95 10 . y 
10000 15.60 15.60 46.40 10000 46 40 . im 
100.00 38.60 38.60 53.80 100.00 53.80 dra 
100.00 15.70 15.70 86.10 100.00 86.10 drs 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
100.00 17.80 17.80 100.00 100.00 100.00 
" 
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FormWear 
Tom'. 
EYfi 
`coca 
EM Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale EU Area 
Socikta TunisiEnne de Banque a 0 " " . 
Tunis International Bank 92.50 2450 2270 59.00 92.50 63.80 ds 
Tunisie Factoring 96.20 91.40 88.00 70.60 96.20 73.30 drs 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et l'Industrie SA UBCI 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
- 
Union Internationale de Banques a " " " a " . 
Wafabank 100.00 27.10 27.10 88.10 100.00 88.10 drs 
Average 97.12 53.74 5223 81.51 97.12 83.81 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-12: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the year 1998- Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 
Tech. 
EM 
Alloca 
Eilt 
Cost Elf TE CRS TE VRS Scale Etf Area 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank " " " " " " " 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algerio 100.00 6.00 6.00 100.00 100.00 10000 
Alubaf International Bank 87.30 6.60 5.70 85.00 87.30 97.30 irs 
Amen Bank 73.90 58.30 43.10 72.00 73.90 97.40 drs 
Amen Lease 90.30 19.70 17.70 23.90 90.30 26.50 irs 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria ' " 
" ' * " 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisia " ' " ' ' ' 
' 
Arab Tunisian Bank 75.20 60.40 45.40 73 80 75.20 98.10 drs 
Arab Tunisian Lease 100.00 24.10 24.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Algerienne de Developpement - B. A. D. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de D6veloppement at de 100.00 22.90 2290 100.00 100.00 100.00 - Commerce Exterieur 
Banque Centrale Populaire ' ' ' ' ' * " 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 100.00 22.20 22-20 7390 10000 73.90 des 
Banque deDeveloppementEconomique de Tunisia 67.80 64.90 44.00 67.60 67.80 99.60 irs 
Banque doDeveloppementLocal 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque de I'Agriculture at du Dcveloppcment Rural 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque de 111abitat 100.00 10000 100.00 100.00 100,00 100.00 
Banque de Tunisia 100.00 28.40 28.40 90.40 100.00 90.40 des 
Banque de Tunisia at des Emirates dinvestissement - BTEI 100.00 77.50 77.50 100.00 100 00 100.00 - 
Banque du Sud 88.50 23.50 20.80 87.80 88.50 99.10 drs 
Banque Exterieure d'Algerie 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Franco-Tunisienne 100.00 90.50 90.50 86.70 100.00 86.70 ins 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisia - BIAT 95.30 56.30 53.70 88.00 95.30 92.30 des 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Ext&ieur- BMCE 100.00 28.60 28.60 63.20 100.00 63.20 des 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce at l'Industric BMCI " " " " " " " 
Banque Nationale Agricola 100.00 100.00 100.00 97.60 100.00 97.60 drs 
Banque Nationale d'Algerie " " " " " " " 
Banque Nationale do Developpement Touristique 100.00 48.90 48.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Nationale pour le Dcveloppcmcnt Economiquc - 
BNDE 
79.70 7.90 630 7450 79.70 93.40 des 
Banque Tunisienne de la Solidarite 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweitienne de Developpement BTKD- 
Tunisian - Kuwaiti Development Bank 
91.60 21.10 19.30 91.20 91 60 99.50 ire 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements 100.00 84.00 84.00 85.00 100.00 8500 its 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 71.40 56.40 40.30 67.80 71.40 95.00 irs 
CAB-Compagnie Algerienne de Banques " " " " " " " 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola " " " a " a " 
Citibank NA (Branch) " " " " " " " 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing 65.00 19.10 12.40 19.60 65.00 30.10 irs 
Credit du Maroc 99.10 17.90 17.80 78.00 99.10 78.60 drs 
Credit Immobilier at Ilotelier " " " " " " - 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
General Leasing 100.00 13.80 13 80 33.50 100.00 33.50 irs 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 100.00 11.80 11.80 100.00 100.00 100.00 
SocietC dEquipement Domestique at Manager 60 70 16 30 9 90 58 00 . . . . 60.70 95.60 irs 
Societe Generalo Marocaine do Banques 88.70 16.20 14.40 71.40 88.70 80.60 des 
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Form\Year 
Tech. 
FM 
Alloca 
FM Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale Ett' Area 
Societ Tunisienne de Banque 91.40 55.30 50.50 81.50 91.40 89.20 drs 
Tunis International Bank 100.00 95.50 95.50 100.00 100.00 100 00 - 
Tunisie Factoring 0 " " 0 + " " 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et ]'Industrie SA UBCI 100.00 56.80 56.80 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Union Internationale de Banques 7420 17.30 12.80 72.00 74.20 97.00 drs 
Wafabank 90.70 19.80 17.90 64.80 90.70 71.50 drs 
Average 92.07 49.95 47.26 82.24 92.07 89.00 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-13: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the year 1999- Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 
Tech. 
EM 
Alloca 
EM 
Cost EIY TE CRS TE VRS Scale EtY Area 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank " " º " " º º 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algenie 100.00 35 20 35.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Alubaf International Bank 78.00 13.10 10.20 72.60 78.00 93.10 us 
Amen Bank 77.70 45.10 3500 76.30 77.70 98.20 drs 
Amen Lease 56.00 25.70 1440 23.20 5600 41.50 irs 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria 100.00 43.70 43.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie " " " " " " " 
Arab Tunisian Bank 79.00 59.70 47.20 76.30 79.00 96.60 drs 
Arab Tunisian Lease 100.00 21.10 21.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Algerienne de DEveloppemcnt - B. A. D. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement et de 
Ext6rieur Commerce 
100.00 21.70 21.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Centrale Populaire ' " º " " " " 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 100.00 30.80 30.80 9440 100.00 94.40 drs 
Banque de Developpement Eoonomique de Tunisie 69.40 51.50 35.80 67.30 69.40 96.90 irs 
Banque de Developpement Local 100.00 40.60 40.60 88.90 100.00 88.90 drs 
Banque de l'Agriculture et du Developpement Rural 100.00 100.00 100.00 71.30 100.00 71.30 drs 
Banque de l'Habitat 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque de Tunisie 100.00 33.40 33.40 98.20 100.00 98 20 drs 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirates dinvestissement - BTEI 100.00 96.40 96.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque du Sud 100.00 26.80 26.80 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Ext6rieure d'Algerie 100.00 100.00 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Franco-Tunisienne 100.00 66.70 66.70 86.10 100.00 86.10 irr 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie -BIAT 100.00 52.60 52.60 10000 100.00 100.00 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extiaieur - BMCE 100.00 16.20 16.20 87.70 100.00 87.70 drs 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce et l'Industrie BMCI 78.40 13.60 10.70 77.20 78.40 98.50 drs 
Banque Nationale Agricole 100.00 93.40 93.40 98.50 100.00 98.50 drs 
Banque Nationale d'Alg6rie 100.00 50.20 50.20 90.80 100.00 90.80 drs 
Banque Nationale de D6veloppement Touristique 100.00 44.50 4450 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Nationale pour le D6veloppement Economique - 
BNDE 50 80 6.80 3 50 46.90 50 80 92.40 do 
Banque Tanisi6nne de la Solidarith 10000 100.00 100.00 95.00 100.00 95.00 irs 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweiti6nne de D6veloppement BTKD- 
Tunisian - Kuwaiti Development Bank 
96.70 19.60 19.00 93.90 96.70 97.00 in 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements 100.00 65.40 65.40 90.50 100.00 90.50 irs 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 72.30 30.40 2200 71.10 72.30 98.40 irs 
CAB-Compagnie Algdrienne de Banques " " " " º . " 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agrioole " " " " º º " 
Citibank NA (Branch) " " º º º º º 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing 68 00 13 50 9 20 27 60 68 . . . . 00 40.60 irs 
Credit du Maroc 100.00 7.80 7.80 94.80 100.00 94.80 drs 
Credit Immobilier et Hotelier º º º º º º " 
Credit Populaire d'A1gCrie 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
General Leasing 62.90 20.80 13.10 22.50 62.90 35 80 irs 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 100.00 12.20 12.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Societ6 d'Equipement Domestique et Menager 57 90 16 80 9 70 56 50 . . . . 57.90 97.50 irs Societ6 Gbnerale Maroeaine de Banques 91.30 14 80 13.50 89.40 91.30 97.90 drs 
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Form\Year 
Tech. AD°ca 
Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale ET Area Efl1 EM 
Societe Tunisienne de Banque 100.00 43.90 43.90 81.50 100.00 81.50 drs 
Tunis International Bank 100.00 70.60 70.60 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Tunisie Factoring 100.00 73.30 73.30 47.00 100.00 47.00 irs 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et Plndustrie SA UBCI 100.00 69.00 69.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Union Internationale de Banques 71.70 16.70 1200 71.40 71.70 99.60 irs 
Wafabank 82.50 18.40 15 20 74 80 82.50 90.70 drs 
Average 90.53 46.09 43.86 83.06 90.53 90.68 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-14: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the year 2000- Individual Bank Estimates 
Form\Year 
Tech. 
FM 
Alloca 
EM Cost Elf TE CRS TE VRS Scale Eff Area 
Al Rayan Algerian Bank " " " " " " " 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d Algerie 89.50 21.40 19.10 89.30 8950 99.70 drs 
Alubaf International Bank 100.00 99.20 99.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Amen Bank 70.10 7860 55.10 69.60 70.10 99.20 irs 
Amen Lease 85.10 12.20 10.40 57.10 85.10 67.20 its 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria 10000 50.10 50.10 100.00 10000 10000 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisia " " " " " " " 
Arab Tunisian Bank 89.50 21.40 19.10 89.30 89.50 99.70 drs 
Arab Tunisian Lease 100.00 99.20 99.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Algerienne de D6veloppement - B. AD. 70.10 78.60 55.10 69.60 70.10 99.20 irs 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement at de $5 10 1120 10 40 57 10 85 10 67 20 ira 
Commerce Exterieur . . . . . 
Banque Centrale Populaire 100.00 50.10 50.10 100.00 100.00 100,00 - 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc ' " " " " " " 
Banque deDeveloppementEconomique de Tunisia 75.70 81.90 62.00 71.20 75.70 94.00 drs 
Banque de Dbveloppemant Local 88.70 5.50 490 62.00 88.70 70.00 irs 
Banque de l'Agriculturc at du Dcveloppement Rural 100.00 38.40 38.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque de PHabitat 76.00 19.80 15.00 67.10 7600 88.30 irs 
Banque de Tunisia 100.00 100.00 100.00 71.80 100.00 71.80 drs 
Banque de Tunisia at des Emirates dlnvestissement - BTEI 100.00 14.00 14.00 97.60 100.00 97.60 dra 
Banque du Sud " " " " " 0 " 
Banque Ead6rieure d'Alg6rie 100.00 69.90 69.90 85.30 100.00 85.30 drs 
Banque Franco"Tunisienne 100.00 100.00 100.00 90.30 100.00 90.30 drs 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisia - BIAT 10000 100.00 100.00 100,00 100.00 10000 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur - BMCE 87.70 40.40 35.40 87.60 87.70 100.00 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce at l Industrie BMCI 100.00 84.90 84.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Nationale Agricola 74.70 47.30 35.30 74.20 74.70 99.30 irs 
Banque Nationale d'Alg6rie 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Nationale de D6veloppement Touristique 100.00 6660 66.60 68.50 100.00 68 50 us 
Banque Nationale pour le D6veloppement Economique - 
BNDE 71.40 7260 51.80 71.00 71.40 99.50 drs 
Banque Tunisi6nne de la Solidaritk 100.00 13.30 13.30 86.30 100.00 86.30 drs 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweitidnno de Ddveloppement BTKD- 
Tunisian -Kuwaiti Development Bank 
73.90 46.60 34.50 73.80 73.90 99.80 drs 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissementa 97.50 78.20 76.20 88.10 97.50 90.30 drs 
BeitEttamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank 80.10 42.80 34.30 76.90 80.10 96.10 drs 
CAB-Compagnie Algerienne de Banques " " + " . . " 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola 53.10 45.70 24.30 49.40 53.10 93.10 drs 
Citibank NA (Branch) 100.00 43.60 43.60 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing 99 60 22 20 10 22 92 60 . . . . 99.60 93.00 its 
Credit du Maroc 91.90 81.50 74.80 70.00 91.90 76.30 irs 
Credit Immobilier at I Iotelier 76 10 37 50 28 50 73 70 7 . . . . 6.10 96.90 irs 
Credit Populairc d'Algcrie 100.00 96.30 96.30 100.00 100.00 100.00 
General Leasing 60.10 41.70 25.10 59.90 60.10 99.80 irs 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 10000 
Socibt6 d'Equipement Domestique et Menager 76.70 9 20 7 10 48 00 . . . 76.70 62.60 im Societe Generale Marocaine de Banques 89.20 13.80 12.30 88.60 89.20 99.30 drs 
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Fonn`Year 
Tech. Alloca Cost Elf TE CRS TE VRS Scale Eff Area 
Societe Tunisfenne de Banque " " " " " " " 
Tunis lnternationalBank 100.00 84.80 84.80 85.60 100.00 85.60 drs 
Tunisic Factoring 57.80 15.20 8.80 33.40 57.80 57.70 irs 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et l'Industrie SA UBCI 100.00 12.40 1240 100.00 100.00 100 00 - 
Union Internationale de Banques 65.40 21.00 13.70 62.60 65.40 95.80 irs 
Wafabank 94.20 14.40 13.60 88.70 94.20 94.10 drs 
Average 100.00 90.60 90.60 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Table A3-15: DEA Efficiency Estimates for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
Banks for the year 2001- Individual Bank Estimates 
Tech. Alloca Cost Elf TE CRS TE VRS Scale Elf Area Form\Year EM Em 
AI Rayan Algerian Bank 100.00 100.00 100.00 59.90 100.00 59.90 irs 
Albaraka of Algeria-Banque Al Baraka d'Algerie 89.60 17.70 15.90 89.50 89.60 99.90 - 
Alubaf International Bank 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Amon Bank 87.20 49.90 43.50 77.50 87.20 88.90 drs 
Amen Lease 100.00 12.20 1220 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Arab Banking Corporation - Algeria 100.00 18.70 18.70 100.00 10000 100.00 - 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisia 100.00 100.00 10000 10000 100.00 100.00 - 
Arab Tunisian Bank 88.90 50.30 44.70 84.60 88.90 95,20 drs 
Arab Tunisian Lease 79.90 8.10 6.50 77.70 79.90 97.20 irs 
Banque Algerienne de Developpement - B. A. D. 100.00 13.10 13.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Arabe Tuniso-Libyenne de Developpement at de 82,40 32.10 26.50 82.40 82.40 99.90 
Commerce Extdrieur 
Banque Centrale Populaire 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Banque Commerciale du Maroc 100.00 69.90 69.90 99.30 100.00 99.30 drs 
Banque de Developpement Economique de Tunisia " " " + " " " 
Banque de Dbveloppement Local 63.60 10.40 6.60 39.40 63.60 62.00 drs 
Banque de I'Agriculture at du Developpement Rural " " " " " " " 
Banque de ITIabitat 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque de Tunisia 100.00 56.10 56.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque de Tunisia at des Emirates d'Investissement - BTEI 87.00 11.50 10.00 74.50 87.00 85.60 irs 
Banque du Sud 73.90 35.00 25.90 71.80 73.90 97.10 drs 
Banque Ext6rieure d'Alg6rie 100.00 100.00 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Banque Franco-Tunisienne " " " " " " " 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisia - BIAT 100.00 59.00 59.00 92.70 100.00 92.70 drs 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extdrieur - BMCE 87.00 50.70 44.10 82.60 87.00 95.00 dro 
Banque Marooaine pour le Commerce at l'Industrie BMCI 72.30 50.00 36.10 61.50 72.30 85.10 drs 
Banque Nationale Agricola 100.00 100.00 100.00 87.10 100.00 87.10 drs 
Banque Nationale d'Alg6rie " " " " " " " 
Banque Nationale de Developpement Touristique ' " " " " " " 
Banque Nationale pour le D6veloppement Economique - + " a a + + " BNDE 
Banque Tunisienne de la Solidaritk " " " " " " + 
Banque Tuniso - Kuweiti6nno de Ddveloppement BTKD- 
Tunisian - Kuwaiti Development B ank 
94.30 38.00 35.80 86.30 94.30 91.50 irs 
Banque Tuniso - Qatari d'Investissements " " + " " " " 
Beit Ettamouil Saoudi Tounsi - B. E. S. T. Bank " " " " " " 
CAB-Compagnie Alg6rienne de Banques 100.00 57.30 57.30 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola 60.70 41.20 25.00 47.00 60.70 77.40 drs 
Citibank NA (Branch) 100.00 83.40 83.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Compagnie Internationale de Leasing 100.00 8.70 8.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Credit du Maroc 100.00 19.60 19.60 99.60 100.00 99.60 drs 
Credit lmmobilier at hotelier " " " a " a 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie + " " " " 0 " 
General Leasing 88.50 15.00 13.30 83.50 88.50 94.40 Is 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB " s " a a " " 
Societe d'Equipement Domestique et Manager " " + a + " a 
Societe Generale Marocaino de Banques 100.00 23.70 23.70 94.10 100.00 94.10 drs 
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Fanm\Year 
Tech. 
Eft'i 
Allaa 
EM Cost Eff TE CRS TE VRS Scale Elf Area 
Societe Tunisienne de Banque 84.40 94.30 79.60 65.60 84.40 77.80 drs 
Tunis International Bank 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 10000 - 
Tunisie Factoring 100.00 99.60 99.60 83.70 100.00 83.70 irs 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et ('Industrie SA UBCI 100.00 85.10 85.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 
Union Internationale de Banques 10000 10000 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Wafabank * ' " " " " " 
Average 88.87 92.77 55.85 53.33 87.23 92.77 93.43 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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